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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the role of the British merchant firm Jardine, Matheson & Co. (Jardine 
Matheson) in promoting and facilitating Chinese migration into and around the British Empire 
between 1833 and 1853. It argues that existing historiography on Chinese migration has 
focused too heavily on the late-nineteenth century and has paid insufficient attention to earlier 
experiments with Chinese labour. The case study of Jardine Matheson also emphasises the 
varied roles played by commercial organisations in the British Empire. Existing work has 
focused on the role of the firm’s partners either as opium traders or elite businessmen in 
colonial Hong Kong, with little analysis of their interest and involvement in Chinese 
migration. By examining Jardine Matheson’s archive of letters and accounts, official colonial 
correspondence, parliamentary papers, newspapers, books, journals and periodicals, the thesis 
will shed light on both the changing perceptions and uses of Chinese migrant labour in 
various imperial contexts from the 1830s to the 1850s. Chinese migration to different colonial 
destinations, including Singapore, Assam, New South Wales and Ceylon, will be examined 
comparatively.  
The colonial case studies examined in the thesis demonstrate how imperial experiments 
with Chinese labour in the mid nineteenth century were dependent on the resources and 
networks of Jardine Matheson on the China coast. The firm’s publishing network 
simultaneously circulated ideas about Chinese migrants that were reproduced across the 
British Empire. Additionally, Anglo-Chinese contact zones that developed over the 1830s and 
1840s were crucial to the formation of stereotypes about a specifically Chinese ethnic 
character and systems of onward migration to global destinations. This thesis demonstrates 
the importance of Jardine Matheson – as well as connected Western commercial organisations 
and individuals – in facilitating Chinese migration and creating demand for Chinese labour 
during a period of rapid change in the British Empire.   
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Introduction 
In 1834 the Prussian missionary Charles Gutzlaff – who worked as an interpreter aboard 
privately-owned China coast opium clippers – connected the issue of emigration from China 
with Western frustration over the isolationism of the Qing Empire: ‘with such an overflowing 
population, it would be wise policy in the government to allow emigration, and to open a 
trade with foreign nations, in order to furnish sufficient employment and sustenance for the 
increasing multitudes of people’.1 The legalisation of Chinese emigration was identified as 
part of a wider programme of ‘opening’ promoted by many contemporary Westerners in 
China.2 This thesis will situate Chinese migration and perceptions of Chinese labour in the 
British Empire in the broader context of Anglo-Chinese exchange and conflict in the 1830s 
and 1840s. Existing histories of Chinese migration in the British Empire focus on mass-
migration and the racialised exclusion of Chinese immigrants in the later nineteenth century. 
This focus neglects the formation of migration networks and stereotypes attached to migrants 
by those promoting Chinese migration in the earlier period. Stereotypes about Chinese 
workers, which were formed in the 1830s and 1840s by those facilitating emigration, were 
repeated in the anti-immigrant narratives prominent across the globe from the 1850s onwards.  
Historians such as Adam McKeown have taken 1842 as a starting point for 
discussions of Chinese migration, commenting that ‘Hong Kong and the treaty ports became 
portals through which local merchants could more easily search out and link up with 
economic opportunities and facilitate access to labourers from South China’.3 In this thesis, 
the British merchant firm Jardine, Matheson & Co. (hereafter Jardine Matheson) acts as a 
nexus between British interest in Chinese labour in the early 1830s and Chinese migration 
after the First Opium War (1839-1842). The firm maintained unparalleled access to China 
throughout this period, as one of few Western firms able to circumvent the Qing ban on 
emigration, and left behind a rich base of archival material. Jardine Matheson and connected 
commercial firms, organisations and individuals, are used to examine early population 
movements and perceptions of migrants. Using this firm as a point of analysis allows for a 
study of aspects of Chinese migration in the British Empire previously obscured by existing 
geographical and chronological approaches.4 We will see that the traditional historical 
                                                 
1 Charles Gutzlaff, A Journal of Three Voyages Along the Coast of China; in 1831, 1832 & 1833 (London: 
Frederick Westley and A. H. Davis, 1834), p. 140.  
2 The term ‘opening’ is borrowed from Gutzlaff’s own writing. See page 80 for more on this.  
3 Adam McKeown, ‘Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842-1949’, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 58, No. 2 
(1999), p. 313. 
4 For a discussion of recent studies attempting to transcend geographical or thematic limits see, Kelvin E. Y. 
Low, ‘Chinese Migration and Entangled Histories: Broadening the Contours of Migratory History’, Journal of 
Historical Sociology, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March, 2014), pp. 75-102.  
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narrative, which posits that British views of China and the Chinese had moved from broadly 
positive to broadly negative by the time of the First Opium War, is too simplistic. The 
acceptance of this narrative in Anglo-Chinese histories has been limiting as scholars have 
dwelt on economic and political confrontation. Conflict has been emphasised in place of 
collaboration, and different forms of Anglo-Chinese exchange, such as migration, have been 
under-researched.5  
The examination of Chinese migration into and within the British Empire between 
1833 and 1853 is based around three specific claims. First and foremost this thesis 
demonstrates how private merchant firms, such as Jardine Matheson, were vitally important in 
establishing new migration systems to British colonies. Not only did these firms tap into 
existing migration systems, Chinese emigration networks centred on the unregulated Chinese 
‘junk’ trade had been operating for centuries, but they also penetrated the China coast to 
extract skilled labour in the 1830s and unskilled labour in the 1840s. Anglo-Chinese contact 
zones, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, were also crucial in establishing networks of 
capital and expertise to facilitate onward migration.6 The development of British shipping 
networks on the China coast in the 1830s – outside of Chinese or British imperial oversight – 
created conditions that facilitated new forms of emigration, from new departure points and to 
new destinations. The mass migrations from Southern China to Australia and North America 
in the 1850s were contingent on firms like Jardine Matheson and the access to the China coast 
that they secured and maintained over the 1830s and 1840s.  
The second key theme of this thesis is that the idea of a distinctly Chinese ethnic 
character was constructed in Anglo-Chinese contact zones. In the 1830s and 1840s British 
observers formed and disseminated sterotypes about Chinese migrants in colonial contact 
zones – such as Singapore, Assam, Hong Kong and New South Wales. Despite their primary 
roles as missionaries, merchants, diplomats, colonial officials or military officers, many 
British and Western figures in Asia became recognised as ‘experts’ on China and the Chinese. 
These actors played a crucial role in defining and describing a specific Chinese character, and 
in collecting and creating ‘useful knowledge’.7 Jardine Matheson, and associated commercial 
organisations, were an important part of the information networks that disseminated such 
knowledge. Due to the existing literature’s focus on anti-immigration movements from the 
                                                 
5 The limits of this historical narrative are demonstrated in John M. Carroll, ‘The Canton System: Conflict and 
Accommodation in the Contact Zone’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, Vol. 50 (2010), 
pp. 51-66. 
6 There is fuller discussion of the importance of contact zones from page 12 of this introduction.  
7 Songchuan Chen, ‘An Information War Waged by Merchants and Missionaries at Canton: The Society for the 
Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China, 1834–1839’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 46, No. 6 (2012), pp. 1705-
1735; Maxine Berg, ‘Britain, Industry and Perceptions of China: Matthew Boulton, ‘useful knowledge’ and the 
Macartney Embassy to China’, Journal of Global History, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006), pp. 269-288. 
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1850s, the nature of these stereotypes of a Chinese character have been generalised as either 
positive or negative. Given the range of China experts with different experiences, access and 
interests, ideas about the Chinese were neither uniform nor simple. Yet if there was a common 
theme in colonial and imperial attitudes towards Chinese immigrants it was that they were 
‘useful’.8 At one end of colonial stratification Chinese labourers formed a cheap and effective 
labour force that met the economic needs of the British Empire, whilst at the other end 
Chinese merchants were valued collaborators in enabling colonial control. The emerging 
China experts of the 1830s, and the ways in which they used information networks, were 
essential in confirming certain tropes about Chinese migrants – tropes as varied as being 
duplicitous, organised, criminal, frugal and entrepreneurial – which would later be 
appropriated in anti-immigration rhetoric. 
 The third area this thesis engages with is the role of Jardine Matheson in facilitating 
economic and political change in the British Empire in Asia. The 1830s is widely 
acknowledged as a crucial period in the development of British imperialism in Asia.9 It was 
the starting point of a new era of Anglo-Chinese relations, with Britain initiating Western 
economic incursions that would shape China for the next century.10 The aspects of Anglo-
Chinese exchange that have received the greatest scholarly attention have been the diplomatic, 
military and trading conflicts.11 Existing histories focus on the Opium War, the deregulation 
of the China trade and foundation of British rule in Hong Kong.12 That the history of Chinese 
migration in the British Empire has been kept separate from these events, and from Anglo-
Chinese relations more generally, is surprising considering the effects that Chinese 
immigration had on the economic, social and legal structure of numerous British colonies and 
developing nation-states.13 In this period Jardine Matheson not only played an active role in 
change, as opium traders, policy influencers and free trade advocates, but also adapted to 
shifts in British and Chinese policy to maintain commercial access to the China coast during 
                                                 
8 In the same way that certain forms of knowledge were prioritised and described as ‘useful’, often in terms of 
economic utility, Chinese migrants were often procured in order to fulfil a specific economic role.  
9 Julia Lovell, The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China (London: Picador, 2011), p. 9.  
10 ‘Anglo-Chinese’ in this thesis refers to Britain and China, not specifically England. This requires clarification 
due to the varying roles of Scottish, Irish, Anglo-Prussian and, at times, American characters in the events 
detailed. The choice of ‘Anglo-Chinese’ reflects contemporary usage. For example, Robert Morrison’s Anglo-
Chinese College (1818) or the Anglo-Chinese War (1839), in which Anglo was synonymous with British. 
11 Priscilla Napier, Barbarian Eye: Lord Napier in China, 1834 The Prelude to Hong Kong (London: Brassey’s, 
1995); Glenn Melancon, Britain’s China Policy and the Opium Crisis: Balancing Drugs, Violence and National 
Honour, 1833-1840 (London: Ashgate, 2003); Alain Le Pinchon (ed.), China trade and empire: Jardine, 
Matheson & Co. and the origins of British rule in Hong Kong, 1827-1843 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006). 
12 Le Pinchon, China Trade and Empire; Lovell, The Opium War; John S. Gregory, The West and China Since 
1500 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
13 Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian migration and the globalization of borders (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008). 
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periods of upheaval across the 1830s and 1850s. In particular the way that Jardine Matheson 
operated in the vacuum created by the scaling back of the East India Company’s (hereafter 
EIC) commercial operations in 1833 reveals the continued importance of private actors in 
expanding the imperial periphery. Whilst the British state sought to better regulate and control 
colonial governance in Asia generally, the loss of the EIC monopoly created opportunities for 
unscrupulous, ambitious entrepreneurs. 
There were also changes taking place in the British Empire, which would create 
demand for Chinese migrant labour. The economies and labour pools of British colonies were 
in transition from 1833 onwards. Most clearly, the abolition of slavery and the movement 
away from convict transportation ostensibly signalled the ending of forced labour in British 
colonies.14 At the same time, previously un-remunerative colonies came under pressure to 
increase the production of resources for export.15 This desire for increased profitability whilst 
absorbing the costs of non-coercive labour, meant that the ‘useful’ Chinese character was in 
demand. The changing need for Chinese labour, and the methods through which labour was 
extracted from the China coast by Jardine Matheson, points us to the broader shifts that were 
occurring in the British Empire in Asia. Discussions about Chinese labour fed into debates in 
Britain, especially those on the EIC charter, which asked what empire was for and how it 
should be funded and managed? The story of Chinese migration in the British Empire in the 
1830s and 1840s is a story of economic and social change, both imperial and global in scope, 
which laid the groundwork for mass migration from the 1850s onwards.   
Specific experiments with Chinese migrant labour in the 1830s and 1840s have been 
neglected by scholars. Yet this thesis draws on several, connected historiographical streams: 
perceptions of migrants and immigration restriction movements; general studies of Chinese 
migrations and Chinese communities overseas; Anglo-Chinese contact zones; imperial 
information networks; and debates and ideas about race and ethnicity. The history of Asian 
migration into the British Empire and the West more generally is inseparable from a much 
broader historical theme: otherness. As a result, the paradigm of host versus migrant, or East 
versus West, has been dominant in much of the relevant research. Asian migration generally – 
often incorporating disparate ethnic groups, such as Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Malaysian and 
others – has also been regularly addressed, rather mistakenly, as a whole. Many histories have 
over-emphasised the role of the exclusionary response to Chinese migration in the second half 
of the nineteenth century in forming stereotypes or racial hierarchies. The focus on exclusion 
                                                 
14 Chinese indentured labour would subsequently be compared to slavery, this is discussed in chapter five.   
15 Zoe Laidlaw, ‘Investigating Empire: Humanitarians, Reform and the Commission of Eastern Inquiry’, The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 40, No. 5 (2012), pp. 749-768. 
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has meant that histories of Chinese migration have overlooked how migration networks were 
established and stereotypes were created in colonial contact zones in the 1830s and 1840s.  
 
The Firm: Jardine Matheson  
This thesis makes particular use of Jardine Matheson to connect different examples of 
Chinese migration into the British Empire. Jardine Matheson acts as an extra-national case 
study that links seemingly separate geographic, economic and conceptual contexts, as well as 
different forms of migration.16  Kelvin Low has recently argued for the need to ‘recalibrate 
the focus and broaden the contours of Chinese migratory history’.17 Low argues that 
migration histories must be trans-national and trans-thematic and be unafraid to engage with 
broader processes and patterns, such as colonialism, that shaped migration. Similarly Adam 
McKeown has argued that understanding and unpicking themes of ‘Chinese migration’ and 
‘ethnic Chinese’ requires historical enquiries that operate outside of perspectives shaped by 
nation states.18 Jardine Matheson allow us to connect migration systems that are too often 
kept separate. Both the firm’s prominence, as the vanguard of Western economic intrusion 
into China, and its large archival footprint makes it an effective source. This is particularly 
significant as Chinese emigration was official prohibited by the Qing state until 1860. The 
nefarious activities of Jardine Matheson not only circumvented this ban, but provide a base of 
sources for migrations that were essentially ‘illegal’.   
James Matheson and William Jardine advertised their new firm (Jardine Matheson) in 
Canton from 1 July 1832. Both men had been active in the China trade from the 1810s, 
bringing a variety of experiences and connections, and were the lead partners in Magniac & 
Co. from 1825.19 In the early 1830s the new firm began conducting exploratory voyages along 
the China coast to find new opium markets outside of the Canton system of trade regulation. 
Capital from opium smuggling operations was re-invested into the legal tea trade. Effectively 
the firm acted as a go-between for business clients who lacked the ‘knowledge and clout’ to 
conduct such operations themselves.20 The firm offered sixteen different ‘agency’ services 
that revolved around broking for buyers and sellers of goods to and from Asia.21 The services 
provided included sales, arranging insurance, chartering ships, obtaining freight and 
                                                 
16 Extra-national is used here in place of more common terms, such as transnational, multinational or 
international, as the role of the firm not only transcended national boundaries but, particularly in its China coast 
smuggling operations, operated beyond or outside of any form of established legal territoriality.    
17 Low, ‘Chinese Migration and Entangled Histories: Broadening the Contours of Migratory History’, p. 76. 
18 McKeown, “Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842-1949”, p. 310.  
19 For an overview of the firm’s beginnings see Maggie Keswick (ed.), The Thistle and the Jade: A Celebration 
of Jardine, Matheson & Co. (London: Octopus, 1982), pp. 12-22. 
20 Carol Matheson Connell, A Business in Risk: Jardine Matheson and the Hong Kong Trading Industry 
(London: Praeger, 2004), p. 6. 
21 Ibid.  
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transhipping goods. These services could be applied to any number of imported or exported 
products, such as tea or silk, but the firm’s most important customer was Parsee merchant 
Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy. Based in Bombay, Jejeebhoy supplied the firm with Indian-grown 
opium for sale on the China coast, which accounted for the bulk of their business growth in 
the 1830s.22 The firm made profit through the commission charged on sales made on behalf of 
sellers such as Jejeebhoy. Crucially, the firm’s opium voyages were not just used for selling 
opium and extracting capital; they were also channels through which biblical literature was 
circulated, tea cultivators were recruited, valuable plant samples were sourced, and various 
forms of ‘useful knowledge’ were acquired and disseminated.23 The firm itself can be studied 
as a contact zone through which Anglo-Chinese encounters and exchanges, as well as varied 
forms of emigration can be traced.24 The extra-national status of Jardine Matheson allows for 
perspectives formed in various contexts to be connected and compared. 
Jardine Matheson have been extensively studied and discussed in historical writing, 
but vast areas of the firm’s activities and significance remain under-examined or entirely 
ignored. The firm is primarily studied as an artefact of economic history or cast as a central 
player in the decline of Anglo-Chinese relations. Studies by Carol Matheson Connell and W. 
E. Cheong have focused on the firm’s early commercial activities, with Jardine Matheson 
serving as a historical business model.25 Robert Blake’s Jardine Matheson integrates a 
systematic economic history of the firm with its role in Anglo-Chinese relations more 
broadly.26 The firm is ubiquitous in histories of the Canton system, the removal of the EIC 
monopoly of the China trade, the Opium Wars and Hong Kong.27 The comprehensive archive 
of commercial, and personal, letters and records at Cambridge University has made Jardine 
Matheson an attractive topic of study. Yet no study has interrogated the archive for material 
on migration, instead the focus has been on the conventional narrative of the famous, or 
infamous, firm. For example, Alain Le Pinchon’s China Trade and Empire provides a 
selection of letters from the archive in order to trace the ‘main driving forces behind the 
firm’s creation and subsequent business of the period 1827-1843’.28 Similarly, Maggie 
                                                 
22 Le Pinchon, China trade and empire, p. 33. Jejeebhoy was also indicative of the different ways business 
relationships could emerge – he met William Jardine whilst a French prisoner of war in 1805.   
23 The extraction of ‘useful knowledge’, such as knowledge of tea cultivation, from China has been the subject of 
recent scholarly inquiry, see Berg, ‘Britain, Industry and Perceptions of China’, pp. 269-288 and Chen, ‘An 
Information War Waged by Merchants and Missionaries at Canton’, pp. 1705-1735.  
24 For a good example of using a merchant house to explore broader economic and social processes in this period 
see Anthony Webster, The Richest East India Merchant: The Life and Business of John Palmer of Calcutta, 
1767-1836 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2007). 
25 Connell, A Business in Risk; W. E. Cheong, Mandarins and Merchants: Jardine Matheson & Co., a China 
agency of the early nineteenth century (London: Curzon Press, 1979). 
26 Robert Blake, Jardine Matheson: Traders of the Far East (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1999). 
27 Cheong, Mandarins and Merchants; Blake, Jardine Matheson. 
28 Le Pinchon, China trade and empire, p. xviii. 
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Keswick’s The Thistle and Jade, more a celebration of the firm than an analytical history, is 
laden with images and items of material culture.29 The spectre of opium smuggling, 
inevitably, looms large in all of these texts.  
Throughout this literature the firm is either chastised as a drug-dealing agent 
provocateur or celebrated as an enterprising pioneer of free trade. This has been best 
summarised by Richard Grace’s recent biography of William Jardine and James Matheson 
Opium and Empire, which seeks to look beyond the firm’s infamous reputation. Grace 
describes how Jardine and Matheson have been,   
 
caricatured by writers who mention them briefly, depicting them as one-
dimensional villains whose opium commerce was ‘ruthless’ and whose imperial 
drive was ‘war-mongering’. Such cardboard figures fail to represent with any 
adequacy the complex, multifaceted personal and business histories of Jardine and 
Matheson.30 
 
It is this realisation – that this firm, which has left such a visible and searchable wealth of 
sources, has often been reduced to the role of an evil corporation or swashbuckling enterprise 
– that underpins the approach taken in this thesis. Jardine Matheson do not just offer an 
insight into the opium trade or the Opium War, but also into more nuanced forms of Anglo-
Chinese exchange. No existing history has addressed Jardine Matheson’s involvement in 
Chinese migration. Grace examines the lives of the firm’s founders through the framework of 
‘gentlemanly capitalism’. Yet his work still wrestles, at length, with the moral quandary of the 
opium trade.31 This thesis will engage with a firm that is simultaneously infamous as a symbol 
of economic imperialism, and yet in many ways neglected and ‘caricatured’ by historians of 
the British Empire in Asia. 
As a large, extra-national firm, Jardine Matheson also managed, and were part of, a 
large information network. Histories of British imperialism in the early 2000s have been 
particularly interested in how Empire provided points of connection, and created a network 
that facilitated the exchange of ideas and information beyond national boundaries.32 To avoid 
over-simplifying the network concept, by suggesting it was entirely inclusive, it is necessary 
to consider how different discourses were competing to be exchanged. This point is clearly 
illustrated in Alan Lester’s Imperial Networks, which focused on nineteenth-century British 
settlement on the South African Cape, and identified competing colonial discourses of 
                                                 
29 Keswick’s book was produced by Jardine Matheson in 1982.  
30 Richard J. Grace, Opium and Empire: The Lives and Careers of William Jardine and James Matheson 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014), p. viii. 
31 Ibid, pp. 341-348.  
32 John Gascoigne, ‘The Expanding Historiography of British Imperialism’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 49, No. 
2 (2006), p. 578. 
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governmentality, humanitarianism and settler capitalism.33 Though, at times, these discourses 
collaborated and overlapped they spent much of the time at odds with one another, and were 
transferred in different ways. Jardine Matheson had an extensive business network – which 
can be re-traced thanks to Jardine Matheson archive, which contains approximately 175,000 
letters – and were heavily involved in publishing in China and Britain. Little has been said of 
the information networks that were used to promote Chinese emigration. Consequently, 
Jardine Matheson’s archive provide a crucial insight into how ideas about Chinese migrant 
labour were disseminated in the 1830s and 1840s.    
 
Chinese Migration in the British Empire  
There are several critical issues with the historiography of Chinese and Asian migration into 
the British Empire and the West. First, it is clear that there are transnational themes in the 
history of Chinese migration and the subsequent responses to Chinese immigration, whether 
inter-colonial, imperial, continental, hemispheric or even global. Where these histories have 
taken a transnational approach the focus has been overwhelmingly on the host nations and 
little attention has been paid to migrant embarkation. As a result these histories have dwelt on 
exclusion and exploitation and neglected the stories of those who promoted Chinese 
emigration and immigration. They have looked to economic pull factors alone to explain 
emigration. Second, the assumed linear development of movement and resistance is crucial to 
shaping our current understanding of migration and exclusion. The traditional analysis of 
exclusionary politics being born from white working class reactions to labour competition in 
the late nineteenth century is too simplistic. Stereotypes were invoked, not necessarily 
created, by exclusion movements.34 Third, the tendency to over-simplify distinctions of race is 
common within these histories. The focus on host communities and notions of ‘yellow’ or 
‘Asiatic’ peril, has obscured much of the colonial knowledge production that emphasised 
difference within Asia. In this literature there has been an obsession with the mass migration 
of the late nineteenth century as an independent phenomenon that was unconnected to Anglo-
Chinese exchanges of the 1830s and 1840s.  
In the late 1970s many texts examined migration through the prism of otherness, by 
focusing on exclusion in the national contexts of white settler dominions: Canada, Australia, 
                                                 
33 Alan Lester, Imperial Networks: Creating Identities in Nineteenth Century South Africa and Britain (London: 
Routledge, 2001), p. 4. 
34 Older studies of exclusion movements have particularly neglected the earlier nineteenth century. For example, 
note the dates in the title of A. T. Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia: The Background to Exclusion 1896-
1923 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1964).  
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New Zealand and South Africa.35 Histories of white settler responses to Asian immigration 
focus mainly on the late nineteenth century, when the political demand for exclusion was 
most visible, enabling a comparative approach. Various texts in the 1970s focused on 
locations where there was a parallel development of white working class anti-immigration 
movements and exclusionary legislation in response to Asian migration.36 At the same time, 
Edward Said’s seminal Orientalism raised awareness of ingrained, ubiquitous Western 
attitudes to the East.37 This was an unequal relationship defined by otherness. However, China 
sat uneasily within Said’s dichotomy of occident and orient. More recent histories have 
emphasised how China stood apart from other Asian countries in European social and 
political thought.38 Whilst China’s otherness was visible in nineteenth-century Western 
literature, this was an otherness from both the West and the rest of Asia. As demonstrated by 
this thesis, the Chinese often occupied a space between notions of British civilization and 
native barbarism in colonial hierarchies.      
Early histories of Asian migration into the British Empire were histories of 
immigration-restriction. These histories were essentially political narratives, telling the story 
of transition from colony to nation. Specifically the development of ‘white men’s countries’.39 
The fact that many Chinese migrants were sojourners – often single men who migrated to 
work for a limited number of years before returning to China – meant they were cast in 
opposition to white settlers and their families. Thus exclusionary legislation in settler 
dominions was of particular importance as it played a role in defining who was, or was not, an 
accepted part of emerging national identities. Such a focus is problematic as it fails to 
recognise the wider significance of reactions to Asian migrants in the West.  
In recent scholarship, issues of race and migration have been addressed as global 
phenomena, which has tended to a focus on immigration and host nations rather than on the 
act of emigration itself. The approach of viewing the histories of Asian exclusion in the 
                                                 
35 Ken Adachi, The Enemy that Never Was: A History of the Japanese Canadians (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 1976); W.P. Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Towards Orientals in 
British Columbia (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1978); Ann Curthoys and Andrew Markus (eds.), 
Who Are Our Enemies? Racism and the Working Class in Australia (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1978). 
36 Charles Price, The Great White Walls Are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North America and Australasia, 
1836-1888 (Canberra, 1974); Andrew Markus, Fear and Hatred Purifying Australia and California 1850-1901 
(Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1979); Robert Huttenback, Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Coloured 
Immigrants in the British Self-Governing Colonies 1830-1910 (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1976). This is 
also a theme of more recent historical inquiry, see Jeremy Martens, ‘A transnational history of immigration 
restriction: Natal and New South Wales, 1896-97’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 
34, Issue 3 (September 2006), pp. 323 – 344.  
37 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1978). 
38 Hillemann, Asian Empire and British Knowledge, p. 10; David Martin Jones, The Image of China in Western 
Social and Political Thought (New York, 2001).  
39 The term ‘white men’s countries’ is most thoroughly developed and discussed in Marilyn Lake and Henry 
Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White men’s countries and the international challenge of racial 
equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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British Empire, United States and other European nations as interconnected is best 
demonstrated by Drawing the Global Colour Line. Lake and Reynolds engage with a rapid 
globalization of ideas about race that brought together white settlers from different locales 
‘into a sacred union at the mere whisper of Asiatic immigration’.40 Similarly, attention is paid 
to the multiplicity of prejudices, with Chinese immigration part of a shared narrative that 
encompasses the treatment of black Americans and the prejudice faced by Mahatma Gandhi 
in South Africa. These prejudices also changed over time. For example, the idea of ‘yellow 
peril’ could be applied to the economic threat of Chinese migrants or adapted to describe the 
spectre of Japanese imperialism.41 However, the separation of the globe into two categories, 
white and non-white, fails to capture the nuances of Empire citizenship and the problematic 
interactions this concept had with ideas about race and ethnicity. These histories have dwelt 
on exclusion and exploitation and neglected the stories of those who promoted emigration 
from China and immigration into the British Empire.  
Combining issues of migration, otherness and race, Adam McKeown’s Melancholy 
Order charts the development of a ‘civilized’ West, which was defined by attempts to prevent 
migration from the ‘uncivilized’ East.42 Indeed, McKeown emphasises how the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century saw border control become an integral component of 
developing notions of sovereignty in the West. McKeown’s analysis of Asian migration as the 
catalyst for a globalised system of border control, which is ubiquitous today, highlights the 
chronological and geographical limitations of the scholarly literature on exclusion. The 
creation of stereotypes and hierarchies is too often identified as a response to Asian migration, 
which is problematic when we consider that the formation of ethnic hierarchies significantly 
pre-dates migration and often took place in Asia itself.43 The traditional analysis of 
exclusionary politics being born from white working class reactions to labour competition in 
the late nineteenth century is too simplistic. As the examples in this thesis show, stereotypes 
were invoked, not necessarily created, by exclusion movements.  
It has also become increasingly common to examine the movement of Chinese 
migrants as a specific phenomenon, one which was distinct from broader patterns of Asian 
migration. Due to the vast scale of Chinese emigration over the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, Chinese migrants have figured heavily in broad surveys of migration 
history. Texts from the 1990s emphasised the importance of Chinese emigration, not just as 
                                                 
40 Ibid, p. 3. 
41 Ibid, p. 282.  
42 McKeown, Melancholy Order. 
43 As argued in Said’s Orientalism the casting of the ‘East’ as an ‘Other’ dates back to the first descriptions and 
imaginings of the East by European explorers.  
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an economic process, but in shaping different multi-ethnic cultures globally.44 There have 
been several texts that have sought to chart Chinese emigration on a global scale. Lynn Pan’s 
Encyclopaedia of the Chinese Overseas surveys Chinese communities internationally and – 
despite the limitations caused by complicated issues of identity and loose definitions of ‘the 
Chinese’ – gives a good overview of population movement generally.45 More recently, edited 
volumes have addressed Chinese migration through a wide lens.46 Of particular interest has 
been the connection that long-term Chinese settler communities have to their self-identified 
‘homeland’ and the connections between different groups of ‘Chinese Overseas’.47 The 
definition of Chinese migrants as distinct from Asian migrants in various global contexts has 
been a crucial part of the construction of a Chinese identity. The parameters of who ‘the 
Chinese’ were was often defined outside of China itself.   
A major failure of the histories of Chinese migration has been the lack of comparison 
between different forms of migration. The study of indentured Chinese labour in the West 
Indies and South America has been seen as separate from ‘free’ migration to Southeast Asia, 
the British Empire and beyond.48 Yet the similarities in migrant push factors, regions of origin 
and stereotypes applied to Chinese workers, would suggest that they cannot be seen as 
independent developments. This thesis demonstrates that these different systems of migration 
were often directly connected.49 Some studies have similarly made the connection between 
Chinese indenture and slavery because both systems provided cheap labourers with no 
economic agency.50 There has been some consideration of the overlaps between indentured 
and free Chinese migration. L. L. Walton points to indentured labour as part of a wider 
movement of Chinese migrants out of the Southeast Asian orbit in the 1840s. He also, 
identifies the unilateral migrant origins as being from Fukien (Fujian) and Kwantung 
(Guangdong) provinces, and suggests indentured labour was one of various forms of 
                                                 
44 Colin G. Pooley and Ian D. Whyte (eds.), Migrants, Emigrants and Immigrants: A Social History of Migration 
(London: Routledge, 1991); Jan Lucassen (ed.), Migration, migration history, history: old paradigms and new 
perspectives (Bern: Peter Lang, 1999).  
45 Lynn Pan (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of the Chinese Overseas (Richmond: Curzon, 1998).  
46 Donna Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerder (eds), Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic, and 
Pacific Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s (Leiden: Brill, 2011); Tan Chee-Beng 
(ed.), Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora (New York: Routledge, 2013).  
47 Pan, The Encyclopaedia of the Chinese Overseas.  
48 The term ‘free’ is used loosely to denote voluntary as opposed to coerced labour. Though migration financing 
such as the credit-ticket system was not fixed term, and therefore ‘free’, debt bondage was common factor that 
limited the economic agency of migrants in such arrangements.   
49 The earliest work on Chinese indentured labour identified the indentured labour system as directly descended 
from both credit-ticket migration from China to Singapore and the legacy of slavery, Persia Crawfurd Campbell, 
Chinese Coolie Emigration within the British Empire (London: P.S. King & Son, 1923), p. xvii. 
50 Arnold Joseph Meagher, ‘The Introduction of Chinese Laborers to Latin America: The ‘Coolie Trade’, 1847-
1874’ (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, 1975), pp. 21-34; Hugh Tinker, A New System of 
Slavery: the export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830-1920 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).  
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emigration from China.51 Furthermore, David Northrup points out that many nineteenth 
century labour movements in the Marxist tradition identified themselves ‘wage slaves’ and 
drew comparisons between their own conditions and those of indentured Chinese migrants.52 
Yet, although these texts use comparative methods they still only examine Chinese indentured 
migration in isolation. This thesis is unique in that it simultaneously examines contrasting 
experiments with Chinese labour. As such it highlights how the distinctions between free and 
un-free labour were not entirely clear.  
 
Contact Zones 
To understand the formation of broad ideas about Chinese migrants in the West, attention 
must be turned to Asia. Ulrike Hillemann’s Asian Empire and British Knowledge takes up this 
call, focusing on Anglo-Chinese contact zones between 1763 and 1840.53 Hillemann 
catalogues how zones of British control in Southeast Asia, were crucial in allowing 
missionaries, merchants and officials to form ideas about different ethnic groups. This idea of 
the ‘contact zone’ is taken from Mary Louise Pratt’s Imperial Eyes.54 Contact zones are 
understood to be places – often trading ports, cities or borders – in which the movement of 
people, commodities and ideas bring different cultures into ‘contact’ with each other.55 As 
each contact zone was unique it becomes clear that there was no single idea of Orientalism 
that equated all Asian countries, cultures or ethnicities. In Southeast Asia in particular 
Chinese emigration significantly predated European colonial control and Chinese migrants 
were not without power and agency.56 Relationships in the contact zone were two-way 
encounters. In these societies the seemingly contradictory themes of ‘Chinese-ness’ and 
cultural assimilation varied depending on political, social and economic conditions, with 
proximity to China itself a key factor. In the nineteenth century, ideas about Chinese migrants 
were not constructed in the West but were already being formed in multi-ethnic Asian contact 
zones, where Chinese migrants played various social and economic roles. This thesis 
examines such interactions in various contact zones.  
                                                 
51 L. L. Walton, Indentured Labour, Caribbean sugar: Chinese and Indian migrants in the British West Indies, 
1838-1918 (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1993), pp. 38-45. 
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The Straits Settlements of Penang (ceded to the British in 1786), Singapore (ceded in 
1824) and Malacca (ceded in 1824) were the first British colonies to rely on Chinese migrant 
labour for their economic development.57 In particular, the contact zone of Singapore 
confirmed the idea that Chinese labour was compatible with British colonialism and thus 
served as an example to colonial and metropolitan observers. Singapore, with its rapid 
economic growth over the 1820s, was identified as an example of Anglo-Chinese success. In 
one of the earliest histories of the colony, One Hundred Years of Singapore, the Chinese 
community is ubiquitous.58 The Chinese merchant elite, as collaborators with colonial 
authority, was seen as crucial to both the economic success and social cohesion of the colony. 
The work of Mark Frost and Carl Trocki has highlighted the role of the Chinese merchant 
community in mediating between European state authorities and the Chinese labour force, 
which constituted the largest group numerically.59 This population of Chinese labourers who 
worked on pepper, gambier and opium plantations, as well as in Singapore’s tin mines, was 
crucial to the colony’s economic success. Simultaneously the Anglo-Chinese mixture of the 
colony’s merchant elite contributed to the development of what Anthony Webster has called a 
‘regional economic identity’.60 As a result of this economic success Chinese migration to the 
Straits Settlements became an imperial template for migration to new colonial contexts. 
Additionally, it also gave Western observers access to existing migration networks and would 
later serve as a point of onward migration in the British Empire.61    
Juxtaposing the success of Singapore in the nineteenth century was colonial Hong 
Kong, which has long been a politically contested contact zone. In Chinese history, Hong 
Kong has acted as an uncomfortable reminder of the encroachment of Western imperialism on 
Chinese sovereignty and the lives lost in the Opium Wars. This narrative, which can be 
summarised by You Ding’s assertion that Hong Kong was ‘built and made prosperous on the 
blood, sweat and corpses of Chinese coolies’, has run contrary to traditional, uncritical themes 
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in Western scholarship.62 Throughout much of the twentieth century historiography Hong 
Kong was hailed as a success of liberal free trade and Anglo-Chinese business co-operation.63 
This celebratory tone is perhaps best typified by Solomon Bard’s description of Hong Kong 
as a ‘miracle of human endeavour and enterprise’.64 More recently these two narratives have 
been supplanted by more nuanced studies of the development of Hong Kong. A good example 
of the new histories of interaction is Christopher Munn’s Anglo-China which focuses on 
issues of ethnicity and the application of the law in nineteenth century colonial Hong Kong.65 
Similarly, studies of class in both Chinese and European communities by Wai Kwan Chan 
and Cindy Yik-yi Chu present the Chinese population, not as victims or collaborators, but as 
agents in creating a ‘Hong Konger’ identity.66 Hong Kong, like Singapore, was a migrant 
destination in which new ethnic identities were created. Crucially, Hong Kong was dominated 
economically and politically by Jardine Matheson. The firm worked closely with both 
colonial authorities and Chinese business partners. As Hong Kong developed as a contact 
zone in which ideas about the Chinese were created and shared, Jardine Matheson gained 
further influence over perceptions of Chinese migrants.  
From 1842 Hong Kong became an entry and departure point into a China that had a 
changeable relationship with processes of globalization across the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Histories of migration through Hong Kong have emphasised the significance of 
Chinese emigration in forming Hong Kong’s colonial and post-colonial identity. Studies have 
emphasised the role of ‘human capital’ in Hong Kong and its tendency to remain ‘open’ – 
whether to the movement of people, goods or capital.67 The work of Elizabeth Sinn in 
particular has highlighted the multi-faceted role Hong Kong played in facilitating onward 
migration to the United States in the 1850s.68 It is notable that histories of Chinese migration 
separate new processes of emigration from Hong Kong from existing migration systems 
which operated in the 1830s, an oversight this thesis will correct. Singapore and Hong Kong, 
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as departure points of onward migrations, should be connected to broader migration histories 
that focus on the destinations and reception of migrants.   
Locations like Singapore and Hong Kong were connected – through Anglo-Chinese 
political and commercial links – to Canton and the China coast. Texts that address long-term 
developments in Anglo-Chinese relations are necessarily situated on the China coast – often 
in Canton, Macao and treaty-port cities – and chart the transition from the pre-Opium War 
Canton system to the post-Opium War treaty port system.69 Recent histories have focused on 
the collaboration of these encounters as opposed to the traditional narrative of conflict. Paul 
Van Dyke has criticised the historical focus on the breakdown of diplomatic relations and has 
cited the longevity and growth of trade as evidence of the Canton system’s effectiveness.70 
Similarly John Carroll has pointed to the close relationships that Chinese compradors, Hong 
merchants and local imperial officials had with Western Merchants. All of these groups had a 
mutual interest in continued trade.71 Carroll suggests that the Opium Wars were not a result of 
a ‘culture clash’ or a ‘clash of civilizations’ over the issue of free trade, but were a very 
specific result of the illicit opium trade.72 It is important to remember that China itself, and its 
cities, was a contact zone that was sometimes subject to Western hegemony. In The Scramble 
for China Robert Bickers explores the ‘world the West had created in China’, in which the 
variety of interactions is encapsulated by the fact that the ‘West’ was represented ‘by mission 
missionaries, merchants and mercenaries, by Britons, Americans, Russians, Parsees and 
Malacca born Chinese, by comers from all corners’.73 As highlighted by Bickers, Western 
commercial enterprises, like Jardine Matheson, were a particularly important point of 
connection between different individuals, locations and processes.  
 
Conceptualising ‘the Chinese’ 
Discussions of Chinese migrant labour in the nineteenth century British Empire took place in 
a changing intellectual environment. Historians have identified the nineteenth century as a key 
period in terms of the development and institutionalisation of scientific racism.74 Ideas such as 
polygenesis and Social Darwinism changed how race and racial difference were understood 
                                                 
69 Robert Bickers, The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832-1914 (London: Allen 
Lane, 2011); Gregory, The West and China Since 1500; Harry G. Gelber, Opium, Soldiers and Evangelicals: 
Britain’s 1840-42 War with China, and its Aftermath (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).  
70 Paul Van Dyke, Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 2005), pp. 1-4. 
71 Carroll, ‘The Canton System’, pp. 54-61.  
72 Ibid, p. 61.  
73 Bickers, The Scramble for China, p. 11. 
74 Kay Anderson, Race and the Crisis of Humanism (New York: UCL Press, 2006); David Hollinsworth, Race 
and Racism in Australia (Katoomba: Social Science Press, 1998);  
 16 
 
and articulated, particularly in Britain and the United States.75 However, in the 
correspondence and publications of Jardine Matheson the language of civilization, rather than 
race, remained the dominant means for articulating differences between Britain and China or 
the British and the Chinese.76 The concept of civilization was particularly useful for implying 
British superiority and justifying the British legal authority over China and the Chinese.77 In 
certain colonial contexts the emphasis on civilization also allowed for the promotion of the 
interests of Chinese migrant populations ahead of indigenous communities. Concepts of 
civilizational status were not static or consistent, Chinese migrants were perceived differently 
in different colonial contexts, but the language of civilization is common throughout 
discussions of China and the Chinese in the 1830s and 1840s.   
This thesis also refers to the concept of ethnicity in both a modern and historical sense. 
As defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, the term ‘ethnicity’ refers to social groups that 
have ‘a common national or cultural tradition’.78 Similarly, sources from the 1830s and 1840s 
refer to ‘ethnology’, understood as the study of ‘peoples’ with shared, usually cultural, 
characteristics.79 The similarities and differences highlighted between the Chinese and other 
ethnic groups are particularly pertinent in English language writing in the 1830s. 
Contemporary observers clearly identified Chinese culture as a distinguishing feature, which 
set the Chinese apart from other ethnic groups in Asia.  However, this terminology is 
deployed in various ways and with various meanings. In particular, the acknowledgement of 
cultural difference within China and between Chinese migrants from different regions 
problematizes the concept of ‘the Chinese’. Distinctions could be drawn between the Chinese 
and neighbouring ethnic groups, as well as within the broad category of ‘the Chinese’. Whilst 
there was no uniform definition of Chinese culture it is clear from the sources examined that 
the Chinese were perceived as a specific ethnic group, often defined and differentiated by 
their culture, even after centuries of settlement in a particular location.  
Another important idea, invoked in texts published by Jardine Matheson and by 
British observers of Chinese migrants more generally, is that of character. Ethnic groups, such 
as the Chinese, were commonly attributed a set of unique characteristics or personality traits.  
The idea that there was a specifically Chinese character was most famously articulated in 
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Arthur Henderson Smith’s Chinese Characteristics, which was published over several 
editions in the 1890s. For Smith the Chinese character was defined by a ‘Contempt for 
Foreigners’ and ‘The Absence of Public Spirit’.80 This interest in an inherent Chinese 
character was a theme that ran through English-language literature on China from the late 
eighteenth century onwards.81 The conceptual development of a national character in Western 
thought was not solely applied to China or the Chinese. In Britain the language of a shared 
character was becoming increasingly common in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century. In his work on the growth of national character as a concept, Peter Mandler identifies 
the late eighteenth century as a key period of development in discussions of an English 
national character.82 While the English were identified as ‘related’ to the Germans or French 
in a racial sense, they were also viewed as having a distinct and unique character.83 This could 
equally be applied to British views on China. Though the Chinese might be broadly seen as 
Asian, they were also attributed specific characteristics believed to unique to their ethnic 
group.84 
The identification of a Chinese character, by British observers in particular, also 
informed the creation of a collective British self-identity. Peter Kitson has discussed how the 
creation of ideas about China by British observers in the 1830s were ‘inflected by their own 
increasingly national concerns’.85 Importantly for this thesis, a sizeable number of the 
observers were wealthy Scots, from similar backgrounds. James Matheson, William Jardine, 
and John Crawfurd, were all educated at Edinburgh University before going to India.86 
Matheson and Jardine also became Whig MPs on their return to Britain. The Scottish 
aristocrat James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie was educated in England and held a Highland 
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seat in Parliament as a Whig before embarking on his imperial career.87 These men were 
Scots, but they were also consciously British and agents of the British Empire. Colin Kidd’s 
work notes how Scottish identity in the enlightenment era was tied to a rejection of one form 
of Scottishness – often represented by cultural symbols like the Gaelic language – in favour of 
a unionist identity, which balanced autonomy and assimilation, and emphasised shared British 
history, religion and concepts of freedom.88 Richard Grace’s biography emphasises the 
influence of the post-Jacobite conceptualisation of ‘North Britain’, as well as the Scottish 
enlightenment more generally, on both William Jardine and James Matheson’s early lives and 
education.89 In particular he describes Adam Smith’s writings as ‘economic gospel’ to both 
men.90 At the same time as these intellectual developments Scots were prominent in the 
expansion of British imperial control. The ‘improvement’ of Scotland and the Scottish, and 
the ‘improvement’ of the British Empire’s subjects were connected.91 Many of those 
observing China and the Chinese in this thesis had a background in an intellectual climate that 
emphasised the civilizing virtues of ‘British’ values and identified the British Empire in Asia 
in the nineteenth century as a mechanism for ‘improvement’.92  
Histories of Anglo-Chinese relations have traditionally focused on the positive or 
negative attributes attached to these concepts of character. The most commonly, uncritically 
repeated argument has been that British, or Western, perspectives on China deteriorated from 
a largely positive view of Chinese culture, civilization and technology in the eighteenth 
century to a negative view of Chinese despotism, vice and heathenism in the nineteenth 
century.93 Texts such as China and the West, Sinophiles and Sinophobes and China through 
Western Eyes have emphasised the ‘pendulum swing’ between positive and negative views of 
the Chinese character.94 Peter Kitson’s acceptance of this orthodoxy is demonstrative of how 
the positive to negative narrative is handled in much scholarship: ‘My thesis accepts the 
conventional view that the representation of the Qing Empire in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries suffered a staggering reversal of fortune from admiration to 
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degradation’.95 However, this positive to negative narrative is overly simplistic. Kitson’s 
acceptance raises further questions. ‘Representation’ by whom? How do we define and 
understand the ‘Qing Empire’?  Even as scholars like Ulrike Hillemann recognise that ‘the 
West’, ‘China’ and ‘the Chinese’ could refer to various groups, individuals or institutions, 
they still operate within the positive to negative paradigm. More nuanced approaches can be 
found in the PhD level work of Ting Man Tsao and Hao Gao, who both emphasise the 
contradictions of definitions of Chinese character and the diverse motives and narratives of 
different Western observers.96 Similarly, Laurence Williams has emphasised how cross-
cultural forms of civility were promoted by British writers, merchants and diplomats in 
response to political and economic turmoil.97 In the same way that recent histories have 
emphasised the importance of ‘useful’ knowledge in Anglo-Chinese exchange, it is more 
appropriate to describe how the imagined Chinese character was seen as useful, particularly in 
the context of colonial rule, rather than positive or negative.98     
As the example of Jardine Matheson leads to a focus on constructions of Chinese 
character by British observers, there is a conscious omission of the Chinese perspective. That 
is not to say that Chinese migrants were entirely passive in these constructions. For example, 
in chapter one the writing of the Chinese merchant Seah Eu Chin is examined, which sought 
to explain the social and economic hierarchies of the Chinese community in Singapore to an 
anglophone colonial audience. However, in many of the accounts discussed, Chinese migrants 
or Chinese subjects were largely passive. Their voices were not accidently excluded from the 
historical record, they were explicitly ignored by British authorities or colonial observers. 
This thesis is focused on the perceptions of, and demands for, migrant labour, as it aims to 
place Chinese migration in the 1830s and 1840s within a wider framework of empire 
building.    
The ethnic differences within the generalisations about Asian, or even Chinese, 
migrants need to be drawn out and analysed in order to build a fuller picture of the 
complexities of competing perceptions of Chinese labour and the Chinese character. What 
constituted the ‘genuine’ Chinese character was often contested and confused. As Henrietta 
Harrison points out, this is hardly surprising if we consider how large and diverse the 
population that came under the umbrella of ‘Chinese’ was in terms of language, religion, 
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cultural practices and ethnic identity.99 A homogenous China, given the size of the population, 
would be miraculous.100 The complexities of both China and who constituted the Chinese cast 
doubt on the idea that there could be a simple positive to negative model of Western 
perception. Re-evaluating this is particularly necessary considering its recurrence in the 
historiography of China’s interaction with the West.  
 
Sources and Approaches 
It is primarily through an examination of Jardine Matheson, and connected contemporary 
actors and organisations, that this thesis explores the networks that facilitated Chinese 
migration in the British Empire in the 1830s and 1840s. It has been increasingly common to 
use individual life stories to reveal the hidden and complex themes of empire that are 
obscured by a lack of sources. Such personal approaches, as found in Colonial Lives across 
the British Empire and Subaltern Lives, illustrate how the overlaps and connections between 
individual can be used to reflect the intertwined strands of imperial history.101 As Anderson 
writes, ‘life history is a useful tool for attracting and holding interest in large, complex 
historical processes.’102 As individuals formed key nodes within networks of empire they 
have also been successfully used to connect imperial locales – such as Birmingham, Australia 
and Jamaica in Catherine Hall’s Civilising Subjects – and can act as case studies that are not 
limited to a fixed time or place, but can physically move and transcend limitations.103 Indeed, 
the British merchants facilitating Chinese emigration were sojourning migrants themselves, 
who connected various locations in China and Asia with the metropole.  
Using Jardine Matheson as an extra-national case study allows us to connect migration 
systems that are too often kept separate. The firm also provides a link to broader changes in 
Anglo-Chinese relations in this period, something particularly pertinent considering the scale 
and significance of the Opium War. Anthony Webster’s work on the merchant John Palmer is 
a good example of how a merchant firm or individual merchants can be used to examine 
broader changes to economic relationships and commercial communities.104 The study of 
famous, powerful organisations like Jardine Matheson has become increasingly unfashionable 
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in histories of empire and migration, which aim to trace actors omitted from the historical 
record. This thesis does not seek to recapture migrant voices that have been lost from 
conventional narratives, but to interrogate the vast records on systems of migration and 
perceptions of migrants that have been neglected by historians of Chinese migration. The 
firm’s archive offers a rich and unique insight into its previously undiscussed involvement in 
migration.    
The approach employed in this thesis is heavily influenced by the source material 
available. The clandestine nature of Chinese emigration in this period makes the use of 
comparable, quantified statistical migration records impossible. Emigration was prohibited by 
the Qing Empire until 1860 and was, in theory if not in practice, punishable by death. Chinese 
and Western facilitators of emigration often recruited migrants from locations other than 
Canton, outside of Chinese or British oversight. Additionally, in both credit-ticket (where the 
cost of passage was repaid by workers) and indentured (where contracts were signed prior to 
embarkation) migration schemes the level of consent was debateable.105 Even after 1855, 
when the Passenger Act connected migrant numbers to ship tonnage, documentation on 
passenger numbers was routinely forged.106 It was not until the rise of exclusion and mass 
migrations of the late nineteenth century that colonial censuses expanded in scope and 
regularity to allow for the longitudinal tracing of migrant movements. The migration schemes 
examined in this study were often experimental and limited in scope. Though the number of 
migrants involved in these projects was small compared to later migrations the 
documentation, debate and discussion these experiments generated is invaluable to our 
understanding of the construction of the Chinese migrant in the British consciousness. As is 
demonstrated in this thesis, Jardine Matheson’s involvement directly connects the 
experiments of the 1830s to the larger migrations from the 1850s onwards.  
 In order to analyse these migration experiments, and the individuals involved, a 
variety of sources are examined. These can be divided into four broad groups: official, 
commercial, private and public. The main official documents that have been used are 
Parliamentary Papers and Colonial Office Records, which deal with imperial and colonial 
policy. The Parliamentary Papers comprise select committee and special reports or published 
correspondence on a range of issues around migration and Anglo-Chinese relations. The 
Colonial Office Records centre around the work of the Colonial Land and Emigration Officers 
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and individual colonies, such as Singapore, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), New South Wales and Hong 
Kong.107 Such official sources are often treated with caution by historians of migration. 
Specifically, because as instruments of state power they often reinforced negative stereotypes 
towards migrants, they provide no insight into the migrant experience and because they omit 
unrecorded population movement. However, in the context of this thesis, these sources are of 
interest precisely because they demonstrate attempts by colonial and imperial authorities to 
understand, control and manage migration. Most crucially, the information sources that 
official institutions turned to in these documents indicates the importance of private actors 
emerging as China experts and conduits of knowledge about the imagined Chinese character.         
The commercial sources refer to the business letters of the Jardine Matheson archive 
and the firm’s account books. These also include the records of related firms and 
organisations, such as Davidson & Co. of Singapore or Tait & Co. of Amoy. As well as 
illuminating the firm’s business operations, these letters also include personal discussions and 
information. At times overlapping with commercial sources, the private sources category 
covers the personal letters of relevant individuals, many of which are included in the Jardine 
Matheson archives, and journals or diaries not intended for publication or concerning 
commercial transactions.108 The category of personal correspondence also includes the private 
papers of James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie accessed at the National Archive in Scotland. 
The information gleaned from individual letters can be limited (particularly when only one 
direction of correspondence is available). Yet it is the volume of private sources available that 
offers a unique insight into the thoughts of members of the firm and their correspondents. 
Specifically, the opinions expressed on the Chinese and Chinese migration in these sources 
were not intended for publication and are often less guarded.         
The public documents comprise a large amount of the sources analysed and include 
newspapers, journals, periodicals, reports and books intended for a mass contemporary 
audience. Many of these have been accessed digitally but archives in London and Hong Kong 
have been mined for printed material which disseminated news and knowledge on China. 
These sources are not examined alone as records of events. Instead their main utility is as an 
insight into the public narratives than specific organisations and actors were hoping to 
disseminate. That Jardine Matheson published their own newspaper and were enthusiastic 
patrons of China coast publishing demonstrates the significance of these documents intended 
for a wider audience. Through these various sources the story of the migration experiments of 
the 1830s and 1840s, and their broader significance, can be told. 
                                                 
107 The Colonial Land and Emigration Officers reported annually from 1840.  
108 Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge University Library 
(http://janus.lib.cam.ac.uk/db/node.xsp?id=EAD/GBR/0012/MS%20JM), accessed 27 September 2015. 
 23 
 
Case Studies 
1833 is the starting point of this study as it was a seminal year in Anglo-Chinese relations 
with the removal of the EIC’s monopoly of the China trade.109 Chapter one will examine this 
by looking at the both the pre-1833 development of Anglo-Chinese relations and the 
significance of the EIC Charter Act of 1833. It will also discuss the importance of Singapore 
as a contact zone. Credit-ticket migration to Southeast Asia had been taking place for 
centuries, but in Singapore became crucially important to British observers in forming ideas 
about Chinese migrants and Chinese migration more generally. Chapter two will detail the 
construction of an imagined Chinese character and the complexities of constructing ethnic 
identities in the contact zone. How ideas about the Chinese ethnic character were circulated 
through print, commercial and personal networks, is a primary focus. These chapters will 
introduce some key actors and themes, which will be developed throughout the thesis. They 
will address at the opening of the China trade, the growth of publishing on China in the early 
1830s and imperial conceptions of labour and ethnicity as well as Chinese migration before 
1833.  
The following chapters examine different Chinese migration schemes over the 1830s, 
1840s and early 1850s. It is notable that many of these migration schemes have been left un-
examined because they were never successfully established or they were retrospectively 
considered failures. However, these schemes had a wider narrative significance in shaping 
perceptions of Chinese labour in the British Empire. Chapter three will build on chapters one 
and two by examining some examples of Chinese labour migration outside of the existing 
patterns of migration to Singapore. First, it will examine Jardine Matheson’s involvement in 
procuring Chinese migrants for the Assam tea growing project on behalf of the Indian 
Government. The use of the firm’s opium distribution network to extract Chinese tea 
cultivators from the Chinese interior will be detailed. It will also comparatively examine 
Gordon Forbes Davidson's Chinese migration scheme into New South Wales. In establishing 
such a scheme, Davidson was attempting to replicate migrant systems he had observed in 
colonial Singapore. Both of these examples demonstrate how Chinese migrant labour was 
utilised to fulfil specific colonial needs, which were not just caused by new projects of 
production but also by negative perceptions of indigenous peoples.    
Chapter four will look at a different colonial context by focusing on Chinese migration 
to Ceylon under the Governorship of James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie, a personal 
acquaintance of James Matheson, between 1837 and 1841. This chapter will introduce some 
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of the wider points about changes to economic and employment systems in the British 
Empire. In contrast to the personal connection between Ceylon and Canton, the establishment 
of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commission shows the growing interest in 
systematically regulating migration on an imperial scale. Building upon this, chapter five 
provides the final case study with an examination of Chinese emigration from the China coast 
in the 1840s. Jardine Matheson’s role in establishing new systems of indentured emigration 
from Amoy is the key focus. Additionally the role of Hong Kong is discussed in this ‘new’ 
era of Chinese emigration and continuities from the previous period are emphasised. 1853 
marks the end of this study as it saw the beginning of colonial attempts to regulate and control 
migration from China. Specifically, an inquiry into the Chinese passenger trade was 
established by Hong Kong Governor John Bowring in December 1852 and state managed 
recruitment of labour for the West Indies began through James T. White in January 1853. The 
1850s also marked a new era of Anglo-Chinese relations with the onset of the Taiping 
Rebellion (1850-1864) and Second Opium War (1856-1860).  
 In studying these examples this thesis traces early representations of and experiments 
with Chinese labour in the British Empire from the 1830s to the early 1850s. It centres on 
Jardine Matheson’s commercial network and its role in facilitating Chinese emigration and 
contributing to the formation of an imagined Chinese ethnic character. In examining the 
firm’s role in developing migration processes the thesis will also engage with broader changes 
in Anglo-Chinese relations and the British Empire.  
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Chapter One: Singapore, China Experts and the 1833 Charter Act 
 
Introduction 
Histories of Anglo-Chinese relations refer to the William Napier’s expedition of 1834 as the 
‘prelude’ to the First Opium War and Treaty of Nanking.1 The necessity for Napier’s ill-fated 
diplomatic mission arose from the removal of the EIC’s monopoly of the China trade in 1833, 
and his death in 1834 has been identified as a turning point in Anglo-Chinese relations. In 
order to contextualise the impact of these changes in terms of migration, this chapter will 
chart the increasing significance of Britain’s colonies in Southeast Asia as Anglo-Chinese 
‘contact zones’ in the 1820s and early 1830s.2 The 1833 Charter Act was a key moment in 
Anglo-Chinese commercial exchange. Changes to the regulation of Anglo-Chinese trade in 
the early 1830s created an environment that was conducive to subsequent experiments, which 
sought to resolve colonial labour shortages through Chinese migration. Moreover, debates 
around free trade were grounded in concepts of ethnic hierarchy, which were a result of both 
commercial encounters and colonial experience in contact zones. The removal of the EIC 
monopoly in 1833 provided a new, poorly-regulated framework for British trade on the China 
coast, which facilitated the expansion and dominance of firms like Jardine Matheson. This 
transition made available the necessary capital, access and knowledge for new emigration 
systems to be established on the China coast. Here we shall see that the early 1830s was a 
vital period for the establishment of both physical and conceptual frameworks for Chinese 
migration in the British Empire.  
A crucial point of analysis in this study is the role of Singapore as a contact zone, 
where ideas about the Chinese character were developed by colonial observers. Most 
significantly, Southeast Asia was the site of pre-existing systems of Chinese migration in the 
form of the seasonal junk trade, which carried labourers from southern China on credit-ticket 
contracts.3 Jardine Matheson’s perception of Chinese migrant labour, and its possible use, was 
shaped by the example of Singapore. Singapore provided contemporary observers with an 
example of a significant Chinese population living and working under British governance. It 
was in Singapore that the colonial administrator John Crawfurd attained his status as a ‘China 
expert’.4 Crawfurd formed ideas about Chinese labour, the Chinese character and concepts of 
ethnic hierarchy whilst serving as British Resident of Singapore in the 1820s. Elite Chinese 
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merchants, who acted in compliance and partnership with colonial authority, were singled out 
and celebrated as ideal colonists. As a crucial point of contact, Singapore both validated the 
credentials of Western experts and provided an example how Chinese migrants fulfilled 
various economic roles. The writing of Chinese businessman Seah Eu Chin reveals the agency 
of Chinese elites in mediating colonial understandings of Chinese society within Singapore. 
Residence in Singapore was also a major influence on the British merchant Gordon Forbes 
Davidson, who went on to establish a Chinese migration scheme to Australia in 1837. It was 
in Singapore that Davidson saw first-hand the utility of Chinese labour in a British colony and 
was familiarised with pre-existing systems of Chinese emigration. Singapore was a template. 
It provided both an example of pre-existing systems of Chinese migration as well as a large 
Chinese population, which could be ‘exported’ to other colonies.  
The second, connected issue that this chapter addresses is the emergence and 
importance of the ‘China expert’ and discussions of ‘Chinese character’ in the debates over 
the 1833 Charter Act. Existing histories of Chinese migration into the British Empire largely 
focus on the late nineteenth century, and this emphasis has meant that these early free trade 
debates, which were ostensibly about Anglo-Chinese commercial relations, have been 
overlooked. These debates are critical to understanding the intersection between concepts of 
free trade, civilization and perceptions of the Chinese. This chapter’s analysis of the free trade 
debates will focus on how John Crawfurd’s experience in Singapore, where he worked with 
Chinese merchants and community leaders, informed his role as a lobbyist and expert when 
he returned to Britain. Additionally, Crawfurd’s career bestowed his ethnographic 
observations with a degree of legitimacy in colonial and metropolitan circles. It is no 
coincidence that Jardine Matheson was rebranded in 1832, ready to exploit the new, poorly-
regulated framework for British trade on the China coast after the EIC charter renewal of 
1833. Discussions of Chinese ethnicity in debates over the Charter Act were essential in 
affirming long standing stereotypes. That these stereotypes were integral to the new 
framework of Anglo-Chinese relations, an environment in which Jardine Matheson thrived, 
demonstrates the way that British imperial commercial interests and concepts of ethnicity 
were interconnected.    
The role of figures like John Crawfurd and Gordon Forbes Davidson both before and 
after 1833 highlights emerging commercial, personal and information networks that filled the 
power vacuum left by the absence of the EIC in Anglo-Chinese exchange. It is also important 
to emphasise the impact of wider imperial changes on the demand for labour and the 
centrality of debates on emigration. For example, the abolition of slavery in the British 
Empire in 1833 and the more gradual shift away from convict transportation to Australia both 
 27 
 
created labour shortages and new conversations about the very nature of labour. Specifically, 
the ‘desirability’ of certain forms of labour and labourers – and ideas about ethnicity, class 
and coercion – were at the centre of discussions about colonization. Within this context the 
changes that occurred in the early 1830s, and the events of 1833 in particular, created both a 
fertile ground for the development of a discourse about a specific Chinese character and 
enabled the practical conditions required to facilitate labour migration from China into the 
British Empire.  
 
Credit-ticket Migration to Singapore and the Straits Settlements in the 1830s 
In the early nineteenth century, China, with its vast ‘surplus’ population, was identified by 
some imperial planners as a solution to imperial labour shortages.5 In 1810 a House of 
Commons Select Committee was appointed ‘to consider the practicability and expediency of 
supplying our West India colonies with free labourers from the East’. This committee 
examined the possibility of replacing the recently prohibited African slave trade (1807) with a 
system of Chinese immigration. In this report the Chinese were praised for having ‘uniformly 
conducted themselves with the greatest propriety and order’ and being ‘distinguished by their 
orderly and industrious habits’, though such a scheme was dismissed as impracticable.6 
Similarly, in colonial settings where there were labour shortages, such as the Australian 
colonies, colonial employers saw Chinese migrants as a possible solution from the turn of the 
nineteenth century.7 These demands were driven by vast, Empire-wide changes. Colonies 
became more important as centres of production for the supply of raw materials to the rapidly 
industrialising British economy. Yet, the first encounter between British colonial authority 
and sizeable Chinese immigrant populations took place in the Straits Settlements of Penang 
(ceded to the British in 1786), Singapore (ceded in 1824) and Malacca (ceded in 1824).8 The 
British colonial experience in the Straits Settlements over the 1820s and 1830s demonstrated 
the economic utility of Chinese migration. It was a consequence of migration to the Straits 
Settlements that schemes which were deemed impracticable at the start of the nineteenth 
century were established and operational by the 1850s.   
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2008), p. 99. 
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 Contact zones such as Singapore were crucial for providing knowledge of the 
practicalities of Chinese immigration and as locations in which ethnic hierarchies were 
constructed.9 Whilst Southeast Asia had been home to Chinese expatriate communities for 
centuries, the increasing population movement between 1740 and 1840, which was partly 
driven by the infusion of European capital into the region, has been described by scholars as 
the ‘Chinese century’.10 Singapore was of particular significance in the 1830s because of its 
rapid development in the 1820s. The colonial administrator Stamford Raffles founded a 
trading post at Singapore in 1819 (Singapore was officially ceded to the British in 1824) and 
the population of the colony increased rapidly. Experience of Singapore had a significant 
impact on colonial observers who were later involved in establishing schemes for Chinese 
migration and diffusing ideas about a Chinese ethnic character. Life in Singapore shaped John 
Crawfurd’s perceptions of Chinese migrants. John Crawfurd was a significant figure, serving 
as British Resident of Singapore from 1823 to 1826. His role in negotiating the 1824 treaty 
with the Temenggong on the status of Singapore means that he is often cited, alongside 
Raffles, as the ‘father’ of the colony.11 After travelling to Calcutta to work for the EIC’s 
Bengal Medical Service in 1803 Crawfurd had a long career in Asia, as an administrator and 
diplomat, before returning to Britain to be active in the EIC Charter debates in the 1830s. As a 
consequence of the colonial experience in Singapore the Chinese were characterised as the 
‘highest ranking Asians on the scale of civilization’.12 Ideas about ethnicity and economic 
utility were mutually constituted in colonial Singapore, which provided a fertile ideological 
rationale for later colonial experiments with Chinese labour. 
In Singapore British colonial authorities and merchant elites exploited pre-existing 
systems of Chinese migration across the Malay Peninsula and Southeast Asia. Whilst 
contemporary Western critics chastised the insularity of the Qing Empire, there had long been 
semi-clandestine Chinese migration networks.13 Significant population movement from China 
to the Philippines, Java, Siam, Borneo and Malaya had been recorded from the 1600s 
onwards.14 These migrations were not just driven by economic pull factors but also the 
growth of Amoy (Xiamen) as a thriving port city on China’s south coast.15 This long history 
has led to the designation of Southeast Asia as the ‘Nanyang’, described by Craig Lockyard as 
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14 Trocki, Opium and Empire, p. 30. 
15 Kuhn, Chinese Among Others, p. 35. 
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a ‘Chinese Mediterranean’.16 The port-towns that would be designated the Straits Settlements 
by the British were already connected, through commerce and population movement, to 
China. Nordin Hussin’s study of Penang and Melaka shows the growth of the Chinese 
populations across Southeast Asia in the eighteenth century, prior to British colonial control. 
As an example, the Chinese immigrant community in Melaka grew from three per cent of the 
total population in 1675 to twenty-two per cent by 1750.17 These pre-existing Chinese 
communities were visible to Europeans in Southeast Asia. For example, John Crawfurd 
suggested that of the total population of the Siamese Empire (which he estimated to be 2.8 
million) more than 440,000 were Chinese, and that they made up ‘one half of the population 
of Bangkok’.18 Chinese migrants were important economic and social power brokers across 
Southeast Asia, often in areas outside of European colonial control.   
Singapore provided an example of a large Chinese population, living under British 
rule, which could be ‘exported’ to other parts of the Empire via onward migration.19 Over the 
1820s Singapore became a vital trade point connected to India, Canton and various ports in 
Southeast Asia.20 Singapore’s commercial success, proximity to China and shortage of labour 
quickly attracted migrant populations from Europe, China and areas within Southeast Asia. 
By the 1830s the island attracted between 5,000 and 8,000 Chinese labourers annually, mainly 
for work in tin mines and on rubber plantations. Additionally this population movement both 
attracted and created a class of wealthy Chinese merchants, who by 1867 made up two-thirds 
of the colony’s merchant community.21 Different classes of Chinese – whether labourers, 
artisans or merchants – were simultaneously connected and played different roles in colonial 
society. Anthony Webster has uncovered how the Chinese, along with the native Malay 
population, were regularly subject to racism and ridicule in the English language press.22 By 
contrast, Webster has also revealed how the prominence of the Chinese in the Straits 
Settlements created a distinct Southeast Asian identity – amongst the colonial elite – that 
contributed to growing ‘regional, political and commercial consciousness (that) emerged in 
the 1830s and 1840s’.23 British narratives of hierarchy in Singapore led to an ethnic 
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stratification in which the Chinese were placed above other Asian ethnic groups, due to their 
economic contribution, but below Europeans, due to their perceived cultural and social 
inferiority.24 
Many Chinese migrants to Singapore, and the Malay Peninsula in general, were credit-
ticket migrants: manual labourers who signed contracts to get their ‘tickets’ from China to 
Singapore paid. Numerous scholars have detailed how this system long pre-dated British 
colonial control.25 The credit-ticket system largely worked to the benefit of employers seeking 
cheap labour. Workers signed contracts for a set period of time with a broker in China before 
they were taken to their destination (in this case Singapore) where the Chinese brokers would 
sell the contract to a Chinese or European employer. The sale of the contract acted as payment 
to the broker for passage and the labourers repaid their new employers for the purchase of the 
contract from their wages.26 Alternatively some credit-ticket passengers were brought to 
Southeast Asia on the account of specific vessels, where on arrival the passengers would be 
detained until an employer secured their services by paying their expenses and a margin of 
profit to the ship.27 This ‘junk trade’ was conducted entirely by Chinese brokers and operated 
in some form across most of Southeast Asia.28 These trading vessels often carried labourers as 
supplementary cargo, meaning that the movement of people followed existing trade routes. 
Trocki’s periods of Chinese migration mark the early nineteenth century as an important 
shifting point, with the growth of the existing Chinese trade being stimulated by increased 
European capital investment.29 The rapid economic development of Singapore vastly 
increased the demand for credit-ticket labourers, which, prior to the cession of Hong Kong in 
1842, was reliant on pre-existing Chinese trading networks.  
Many Chinese men (it was almost universally a system for male labourers) entered 
credit-ticket contracts willingly, but there were abuses within the system – including coercion, 
contract manipulation, false promises of pay and conditions, and even forcible abduction.30 
Debt was often used by both employers and brokers in order to extend contracts beyond their 
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original terms.31 Workers from China would enter into contracts in coastal towns, often to 
repay debts incurred through opium addiction, gambling or financial mismanagement.32 In the 
early period the credit-ticket system was entirely unregulated by the colonial state and little 
information about population movement was recorded. Estimates from 1876 suggest that two-
thirds of arriving Chinese labourers were credit-ticket as opposed to ‘free’.33 As new systems 
of migration to distant European colonies developed in the mid-nineteenth century, Singapore 
became a favoured destination of emigrants from southern China. A particular attraction of 
Southeast Asia for potential migrants was the ease of return migration. Many of the brokers 
involved in the Southeast Asian credit-ticket system were return migrants themselves.34 For 
those planning to sojourn for purely economic reasons, the high level of return migration, as 
compared with later destinations such as the West Indies, was particularly reassuring and 
made colonies like Singapore favoured migrant destinations. 
For the early period it is difficult to estimate the exact size of the Chinese population 
in Singapore, and the extent to which this population laboured under credit-ticket contracts. In 
particular the sojourning nature of the credit-ticket system meant the population was largely 
transient. As early as 1827 the colonial state was attempting to quantify the population’s 
demographic composition. The Singapore census information shown in Table 1.1 was 
published in the Singapore Chronicle and Canton Register in 1828: 
 
Table 1.1. Singapore Census, 1827 
Source: Canton Register, 31 May 1828. 
 
                                                 
31 Eli Murakami, ‘Two Bonded Labour Emigration Patterns in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Southern China: The 
Coolie Trade and Emigration to Southeast Asia’, in Gwyn Campbell and Alessandro Stanziani, Bonded Labour 
and Debt in the Indian Ocean World (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2013), pp. 153-165.  
32 Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native, p. 84. 
33 Chang, ‘Chinese Coolie Trade in the Straits Settlements in the Late Nineteenth Century’, p. 3. The term ‘free’ 
here refers to labourers who were not bound by contract or debt upon arrival, yet it is used cautiously as the 
degree to which a choice of employer or employment was available was often questionable.  
34 Murakami, ‘Two Bonded Labour Emigration Patterns in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Southern China’, p. 162. 
 Males Females 
Europeans 85 23 
Native Christians 119 74 
Malays 2,850 2,486 
Armenians 17 8 
Chinese 5,847 363 
Coromandel Coast  1,072 23 
Bengal 237 57 
Arabs 17 0 
Bugese 877 375 
Javanese 247 108 
Total 11,368 3,517 
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Historians have been reluctant to cite Singapore’s census results prior to the 1870s due to the 
irregularity of their timing and methodology. However the 1827 figures do, at the very least, 
give an indication of how the population of the colony was perceived and understood by 
colonial administrators. Notably the total population of 14,885 was significantly higher than 
the estimated 150 inhabitants in 1819, when Stamford Raffles first established a trading post 
on the island.35 The Chinese already constituted forty-two per cent of the total population by 
1827. Strikingly, the Chinese population was deemed to be larger than the Malay population 
by this point, and dwarfed the European merchant population. Most interestingly, the different 
ethnic groups are listed in the census in the form of a hierarchy. For example, ‘Europeans’ 
and ‘Native Christians’ are presented at the top of the census, despite their relative statistical 
insignificance. 
The gender imbalance within the Chinese population was also well above average. 
The Chinese population of Singapore was only six per cent female, compared to the figure of 
thirty-one per cent female for the colony as a whole. The same trend of majority male Chinese 
migration continued later in the century and can be attributed to three main factors: the 
illegality of emigration until 1860; the exclusively male mining and plantation work available; 
and the temporary, sojourning nature of contract migration. Generally speaking, amongst 
credit-ticket migrant labourers, male ‘breadwinners’ from southern China left dependent 
wives and families in China and remitted surplus earnings.36 The small amount of female 
emigration reflects the fact that the majority of Chinese migrants were single men working in 
mines and on plantations for temporary periods. By the late 1820s Singapore had a sizeable 
Chinese population but it continued to grow even further in the 1830s. The growth of 
productive export industries in Singapore led to a consistently increasing annual influx of 
Chinese workers. 
In 1837 the Canton Press reported the total number of annual Chinese arrivals at 
2,069, noting that ‘from ports in the province Fuk-heen, or Hokien, there are numerous 
emigrants.’37 Though ‘Hokkien’ is more appropriately described as a language dialect related 
to certain ethnic groups as opposed to a geographical space, it is mainly spoken in Fujian 
Province and indicates the regional focus of migrant origins.38 The bulk of migrants came 
from southern China. Fukien (Fujian) and Kwantung (Guandong) provinces were the 
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principle centres of emigration.39 These geographical differences would prove crucial in the 
construction of the Western narrative of southern Han Chinese escaping the despotic northern 
Chinese to live under Western dominion.40 Emigration from these regions continued to grow 
to such an extent that by 1840 there were over 5,000 new arrivals each year, with nearly one 
third of Chinese migrants working in gambier cultivation.41  
The credit-ticket labourers and miners were a prominent occupational majority, but as 
Singapore grew so did the importance of the wealthy Chinese merchant community (the 
Towkays) and Chinese artisans in various skilled industries.42 Colonial Singapore was, as 
evidenced by the census data, a multi-ethnic society, but John Crawfurd specifically praised 
the ‘two most industrious, intelligent, and wealthy classes, the Europeans and the Chinese’.43 
After his experiences in India, Burma, Siam and Java, Crawfurd published accounts of his 
travels.44 His experience of different social contexts across Southeast Asia fed into his praise 
of Chinese merchants in Singapore. For Crawfurd, the Chinese merchant elite were vitally 
important to economic development across Southeast Asia.  
There were important regional and class differences within the Chinese community in 
Singapore. A unique insight into these distinctions was offered by Seah Eu Chin (also styled 
Siah U’Chin). Seah was born and educated in Guangdong province and first arrived in 
Singapore in 1823 as a clerk on a trading junk.45 After acquiring the necessary capital whilst 
working on trading vessels, he was able to invest in property in the 1830s and married into the 
elite of the Straits Chinese by marrying the daughter of the Chinese Kapitan of Perak.46 
Investment in pepper and gambier plantations secured Seah’s fortune. He became the colony’s 
first Chinese ‘man of letters’, writing in English, and maintained connections with prominent 
European merchants.47 Seah was an example of a wealthy Chinese businessman who 
collaborated with British colonial authority. He joined the Singapore Chamber of Commerce 
in 1840 and employed credit-ticket Chinese labourers on his plantations.48 Though Seah 
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became part of the Chinese elite in Singapore, the overview he gave of the Chinese population 
was more nuanced than the observations of his British contemporaries.   
Seah Eu Chin’s account of Singapore’s Chinese in the 1840s identified six different 
classes (mainly based on dialect groupings) amongst the then 40,000 strong community: 
Chinese from Hokien; Malacca born Chinese; Chinese from Tio Chiu; Chinese from Canton; 
the Khe Chinese; and Chinese from Hai-nam.49 From these different groups, which Seah 
called ‘tribes’, came a vast range of professions for Chinese migrants:  
 
The different trades and professions of the Chinese in Singapore, are School-
masters, Writers, Cashiers, Shop-keepers, Apothecaries, Coffin-makers, Grocers, 
Gold-smiths, Silver-smiths, Tin-smiths, Blacksmiths, Dyers, Tailors, Barbers, 
Shoemakers, Basket-makers, Fishermen, Sawyers, Boat-builders, Cabinet-makers, 
Architects, Masons, Manufacturers of lime and bricks. Sailors, Ferrymen, Sago 
manufacturers, Distillers of Spirits, Cultivators of plantations of Gambier, Sugar, 
Siri, Pepper, and Nutmegs, Play actors, Sellers of cake and fruit, Carriers of 
burdens, Fortune tellers, idle vagabonds who have no work and of whom there are 
not a few, beggars, and, nightly, there are those villains the thieves.50 
 
Within the Chinese community these different ethnic ‘tribes’ were believed to be predisposed 
to specific professions. As an example the Hokkien dialect group was overrepresented in 
trading and finance in both Malacca and Singapore.51 Seah’s references to ‘idle vagabonds’ 
and ‘those villains the thieves’, demonstrates a class hierarchy within the Chinese community. 
Certain strata of colonial society were identified as undesirable by their wealthy 
contemporaries. Over time, the increasing group of Straits-born Chinese came to dominate 
Singapore socially and economically as they were able to draw upon multiple connections and 
networks.52 The Chinese community and narratives about the Chinese as an ethnic component 
of Singaporean society were complex and diverse. Importantly, Chinese migration to 
Singapore influenced British perceptions of the Chinese, and consequently China, more 
generally.  
 
The Chinese in Singapore: Uncivilized or Industrious Colonists? 
The various classes of Chinese migrants were perceived differently by both the colonial state 
and Western residents. Whilst certain Chinese migrants were criticised and others were 
celebrated, the community at large was recognised as essential to the colony’s economic 
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development. Under the Governorship of Robert Fullerton, comparative census information 
was analysed with the aim of ‘ridding the settlement of vagabond Chinese’.53 In the same 
analysis Fullerton discussed the possibility of allowing Chinese migrants free land rent, in 
order to ‘afford encouragement to the settlement of industrious labourers in the cultivation of 
the land’.54 Chinese migrants in Singapore were seen as both essential and problematic. 
Stereotypes about Chinese workers were intimately connected to notions of labour and class.  
The main work for manual labourers emigrating from China was to be found in tin 
mines or in pepper, opium or gambier production. Increasing numbers of Chinese manual 
labourers supplemented the growing influence of ethnic clans known as Kongsis – ethnic 
associations, which acted in lieu of domestic familial networks.55 The Kongsi associations 
allowed for disenfranchised Chinese workers to act collectively and pool capital and 
resources.56 The social and economic structures of these Chinese communities were important 
for the creation of the industrious stereotype that was applied to the Chinese in contrast to the 
colonial view of the ‘lazy native’.57 The supposed industriousness of the labouring Chinese in 
colonial Singapore was driven by economic necessity – namely debt. The nature of the credit-
ticket system allowed for manipulation of workers, as payments for passage, food, shelter, 
clothing and debts (incurred due to opium addiction, gambling or financial mismanagement) 
could be deducted from wages and allow contracts to be extended until debts were repaid. 
This led to employment well beyond the initial contract’s original terms.58  
A major cause of migrant debt was opium addiction. Opium was used to control the 
workforce, with supply established through the Kongsis. Expenditure on opium in excess of 
income meant contract extensions were necessary in order to repay the initial debts incurred 
as part of the credit-ticket system.59 Trocki’s view of this relationship between addiction and 
the labour supply is substantiated by the account of Seah Eu Chin who, as an owner of 
gambier and pepper plantations, was well aware of addiction amongst his employees.60 He 
explained in an article for the Journal of the Indian Archipelago why workers would regularly 
extend their contracts in Singapore: 
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Those who originally intended to return to their native country after 3 years, and 
yet after the lapse of more than 10 years have not been able to fulfil their wish; 
but what is the reason of it? It is because they become addicted to the prevailing 
vice of Opium smoking.61 
 
Where colonial observers attributed the long contracts of Chinese labourers to an innate 
industriousness of the Chinese character, Towkays such as Seah were aware of the financial 
necessity for extended employment. Opium addiction was extremely profitable for multiple 
groups. Opium revenue farming provided a lucrative income for the Kongsis.62 The ethnic 
associations connected the different Chinese classes: ‘there existed a bourgeoisie and a 
working class, which were linked together by systems of commodity production and 
consumption’.63 As the different Chinese classes were symbiotic, the ‘industrious’ Chinese 
could not be neatly separated from the ‘vagabond’ Chinese as hoped by Fullerton. Not only 
did opium addiction provide the Towkays with a cheap labour force, it also provided a profit 
for British merchants and colonial revenues. Opium exports from Singapore increased from 
1,285 chests in 1835 to 7,550 by 1841.64 Whilst opium addiction was seen as a problem, and 
one that was used to criticise Chinese ‘vagabonds’, it was also a profitable export for the 
colonial state.  
Many of the criticisms of Chinese labourers in Singapore were linked to addiction. As 
Chinese-owned opium farms provided the colonial government with revenue and respected 
European and Chinese merchants profited from the system, addiction and its negative effects 
were attributed to the lack of self-control of the consumers: ‘the victim had come to stand for 
the crime’.65 Again, in spite of his personal economic interest in the use of debt from 
addiction to entrap workers, Seah Eu Chin reflected on the negative social consequences of 
addiction:  
 
They become addicted to the prevailing vice of Opium smoking. After a 
continued residence here they learn the habit, which afterwards becomes fixed. 
Many of the Chinese labourers after having earned a little money, waste it upon 
opium or expend it in gambling … when these opium smokers are reduced to 
straits from want of money they resort to schemes of plunder and robbery.66 
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In addition to opium smoking, gambling was seen as a distinctly Chinese vice. John Crawfurd 
described the Chinese of Singapore as ‘the most debauched of gamesters’ and in criticising 
the possible relaxing of gambling restrictions the Singapore Chronicle warned that ‘every 
Chinaman’s shop would become a receptacle of villainous sharpers.’67 As a result the colonial 
state was concerned with introducing restrictive laws that brought ‘a beneficial public moral 
effect’.68 Despite their important economic role the Chinese labouring classes were perceived 
to be fundamentally immoral and a troublesome social presence. The gender imbalance of the 
Chinese population was also believed to exacerbate immorality. By the 1830s the preference 
of many British observers was for the immigration of families. The Chronicle hoped that ‘the 
tide of emigration should return in our favour, with married emigrants.’69 The idea that innate 
Chinese immorality could be subdued through abstinence and marriage held a particular irony 
as it was the expense of opium consumption and the system of familial remittance that made 
the Chinese plantation workers such a cost-effective workforce in the first place.  
 The majority Chinese population was also perceived as fundamentally untrustworthy 
by colonial authorities. The European community of Singapore was outnumbered by most 
Asian ethnic groups in the colony, but it was an organised Chinese labour force that presented 
the clearest political threat. As Anthony Webster has suggested, the Chinese were perceived 
as an intimidating presence, especially during outbreaks of violence in the 1840s.70 The 
associations formed by the Chinese were a particular source of concern. The social institution 
of the Kongsis often came into conflict with the free market ideology of European merchants 
and colonial authorities.71 In particular, the Kongsis organisations aroused European 
suspicions because of a fear of the Chinese criminal organisation: the triad society. The main 
source of English language information on the triad society was an article by the missionary 
William Milne written in 1826. Milne conceded that many of his assertions were speculative 
as the society was secret and it was virtually impossible to distinguish between members and 
non-members.72 This mystique added to the threat of the society, which was notable for 
organised criminal activity. According to Milne, the society’s activities involved ‘theft, 
robbery, overthrow of government, and aiming for political power’.73 The triad society was 
supposedly present in colonial Singapore. Milne suggested that ‘the idle, gambling, opium-
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smoking Chinese (particularly of the lower classes), frequently belong to this fraternity’.74 
The clandestine nature of such societies prevented the collation of membership information. 
However, by the 1880s the colonial authorities estimated that the largest secret societies – the 
Ghee Hin, Ghee Hok and Hai Sin – had a membership of over 33,000.75 The accusation of 
secret society membership was a useful tool to collectively denote the Chinese as deceitful 
and threatening. The triad society became a catch-all slur for Chinese organisations and 
associations that were not recognised as legitimate by the colonial state. 
 In a reflection of the multi-ethnic hierarchies of colonial Singapore, Chinese 
immigrants were also presented as a threat to the Malay population. Sandra Manickam has 
written about the use of ‘race as a strategy of colonial rule’ in Singapore and particularly the 
emphasis on comparisons between Malay and Chinese colonists as a justification of British 
governance.76 Sir John Bowring, Governor of Hong Kong during the Second Opium War, saw 
the movement of Chinese migrants into Southeast Asia as an ultimately destructive force: 
 
Immigration of the black-haired races is changing the whole character of society, 
the Indian Archipelago being the field where the battle of the nationalities is 
constantly fought, and where the expulsion of the less civilised by the more 
civilised may be studied.77 
 
Notably, though Bowring recognised the economic utility of Chinese migrants in Southeast 
Asia, he saw the Chinese population as a replacement for indigenous peoples. The use of the 
term ‘battle’ in this context is especially revealing. Evidently the civilizational disparity 
between Chinese and other Asian colonists made the ascendency of Straits Chinese inevitable.   
 Similarly, it was the view of John Crawfurd that the British acted as stewards of the 
Malay population, which would be swamped by the powerful Chinese majority in the absence 
of colonial rule. Such views were grounded in Crawfurd’s long experience of observing 
Chinese migration in Southeast Asia. Crawfurd warned that the wily Chinese, if left to their 
own devices, would deceive ‘the simple natives’.78 Crawfurd illustrated his warning with a 
tale of woe from his time in Java: 
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A Javanese boatman … was accosted by a Chinese from the bank requesting a 
passage … when the victim of this piece of roguery awoke, he found himself 
lying stark naked in a forest fifteen miles distant from the place where he had 
taken in the Chinese – robbed of his canoe, and all his property.79  
 
Whilst the Chinese migrant population was essential to Singapore’s prosperity, such 
cautionary tales perpetuated stereotypes about the Chinese as innately treacherous and 
untrustworthy. Moreover these concerns legitimised the control of a small governing class of 
Europeans over a Chinese majority population, which would ultimately mistreat other ethnic 
groups if allowed the opportunity.  
Despite colonial criticism and a fear of the Chinese population, the perceived Chinese 
propensity for hard work and entrepreneurship led Stamford Raffles to praise ‘the splendid 
foundation they form for the business prosperity of Singapore’.80 John Crawfurd, in spite of 
his criticisms of Chinese duplicity, recognised the economic benefits of Chinese migrant 
labour across Southeast Asia. Crawfurd’s account of Java was also littered with praise for the 
Chinese contribution to the local economy. He asserted that ‘the natives are indebted to the 
ingenuity of the Chinese, who are always the workmen’ and that silk production in the region 
‘under the direction of the indefatigable and enterprising Chinese can hardly fail’.81 In Siam 
Crawfurd observed that the Chinese took up skilled occupations and formed an artisan class. 
He noted the ‘superiority of the Chinese in industry, intelligence and enterprise’.82 This 
‘superiority’ was replicated across Southeast Asia. In Singapore it was believed that the 
presence of Chinese labourers was such a factor in the colony’s economic success that he 
attempted to quantify their impact. According to Crawfurd’s calculations in 1830, ‘the 
Chinese amount to 8,595. About five-sixths of the whole number are unmarried men, in the 
prime of life: so that, in fact, the Chinese population, in point of effective labour, may be 
estimated as equivalent to an ordinary population of above 37,000’.83 As a result of this 
increased output, Chinese migrants were paid more than other workers. As ‘the average value 
of the labour, skill, and intelligence of a Chinese to be in the proportion of three to one to 
those of a native of the continent of India’, it followed that ‘the wages of other classes of 
inhabitants are much lower than the Chinese’.84 Crucially, the perceived superiority of 
Chinese labourers over indigenous or other alternative sources mitigated the perceived 
deficiencies of their moral conduct.  
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The Chinese merchant community in Singapore was particularly eulogised by Western 
observers, from colonial administrators to Western merchants and transient visitors. In 
contrast to the threat posed by the large Chinese labouring population, and their mysterious 
secret societies, Chinese merchants were crucial to British authority as a ‘go-between’ with 
the wider Chinese community.85 For example, as a member of the Chinese elite Seah Eu Chin 
fulfilled important social roles in Singapore. He helped to fund the Tan Tock Seng Hospital, 
mediated the Hokkien-Teochiu riots of 1854 and became a Justice of the Peace in 1872.86 
Wealthy Chinese merchants and businessmen acted as community leaders through different 
social roles. The ‘Kapitan’ system of community leadership had been abandoned by the 
British in 1831, due to its overt centralisation of political power, and was replaced by 
economic leadership through the funding of temples and hospitals.87 Over time the Straits 
Chinese became dominant. An early example of this was Tan Tock Seng, a Hokkien merchant 
born in Malacca and founder of the hospital named in his honour, who was the first non-
European appointed a Justice of the Peace in 1846.88 Of course, Straits Chinese also enjoyed 
the advantage of British subjecthood. As described by Mark Frost, the Straits Chinese formed 
a ‘settled, gentry-official class, co-opted by the colonial state as intermediaries’.89 Even as 
European involvement in trade between the Straits Settlements and China increased the trade 
remained reliant on the knowledge, skills and connections of Chinese intermediaries.90  
It was the commercial success of the Chinese merchant elite that specifically 
distinguished them in the minds of colonial observers. As emphasised by Syed Alatas, notions 
of ethnicity, class and economic productivity were intertwined in colonial Singapore.91 The 
embrace of Western economic relationships and the value placed on individual property rights 
marked the Chinese merchant elite, to British observers, as particularly civilized. For 
example, the Chinese merchant community played a vital role in lobbying and raising money 
to fund the British Navy’s suppression of piracy in Southeast Asia: 
 
For the information of the Authorities, we can state that several of the most 
influential Chinese Merchants in the settlement contemplate sending a petition to 
the higher authorities on the subject of Piracy, in which they will set forth the 
heavy losses which they and other native merchants have sustained within the last 
year only.92 
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The Chinese merchant elite were aligned with the wider merchant community and British 
colonial authorities. British praise of Chinese merchant elites was connected to this alignment 
of economic interests. Colonial observers of Chinese merchants noted how ‘the indolent air of 
the Asiatic was thrown aside’, with the implication that by assimilating with British 
commercial practices Chinese merchants were perceived as having overcome the natural 
disadvantages of their ethnic heritage.93 The Singapore Chronicle reprinted, and concurred, 
with John Dean’s suggestion that the Chinese ‘are keen, enterprising traders, extremely expert 
in their dealings ... I do not think they are exceeded by the natives of any country as a 
commercial people’.94 Over time these multi-ethnic commercial alliances would be manifest 
in the make-up of the Chambers of Commerce and, as noted by Webster, the formation of ‘a 
discrete economic and political identity’.95 For all the criticisms of Chinese migrant labourers, 
colonial observers recognised that the success of British colonial rule in Singapore was 
contingent on the active role of a large, economically diverse, Chinese population.  
In colonial discourse Singapore’s success was overtly attributed to the combination of 
Chinese industriousness and British governance. Straits-born Chinese were particularly 
successful as they were connected to several communities simultaneously, and as Webster has 
suggested, Chinese merchants had to ‘switch identity’ in order to prosper in the multi-ethnic 
Singaporean business environment.96 Indeed the Chinese elite certainly appear to have utilised 
the connections made possible through both British subjecthood and their existing ties to 
southern China, combining European capital investment and the cheap labour procured by the 
credit-ticket system. John Crawfurd, though he praised Chinese enterprise, emphasised the 
importance of liberal British governance in Singapore’s development. He attributed economic 
prosperity to ‘British leadership combined with the energy of Chinese settlers’.97 The Anglo-
Chinese ‘combination’ was deemed particularly effective in managing the production of 
plantation crops. Crawfurd specifically praised the ‘free enterprise of Europeans, and the skill 
and economy of the Chinese cultivator’ in developing Singapore’s pepper industry.98 The idea 
that British rule enabled the potential of the Chinese, as merchants and labourers, was an 
important part of qualifying the praise for the Chinese community whilst maintaining British 
supremacy. Such ethnic hierarchies were created and used as a justification of colonial rule.  
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Gordon Forbes Davidson and Singapore as an Imperial Template 
Could the combination of British governance and Chinese economic activity in Singapore, 
which was considered such a success by British contemporaries, have been as effective in a 
different colonial context? The British merchant Gordon Forbes Davidson clearly thought it 
could have been. Davidson saw Singapore as a model that could be replicated elsewhere. 
Importantly, after spending more than a decade in colonial Southeast Asia, Davidson actually 
attempted to establish a system of Chinese migration to New South Wales, which was 
explicitly based on the example of Singapore.   
Unlike John Crawfurd, little is known about Gordon Forbes Davidson and he is rarely 
mentioned in historical literature. Tony Ohlsson has made brief reference to Davidson’s New 
South Wales Chinese migration scheme, and Sibing He has mentioned Davidson as an 
associate of the American firm Russell & Co., but this is where the historiographical coverage 
ends.99 Davidson was not connected to the power structures of the EIC. He mainly dealt with 
private traders like Jardine Matheson through his Singapore firm Clark, Davidson & Co.100 
The frequency with which his letters appear in the Jardine Matheson archive reveals a close 
commercial relationship with the firm, particularly in the early 1830s, and strong connection 
with James Matheson himself as letters frequently passed between the two. Davidson traded 
mainly spices (specifically cinnamon) but also opium, silk and rice through Jardine 
Matheson.101 The main source of information about Davidson’s time in Asia is his 1846 book 
Trade and Travel in the Far East, but an extensive search also yields letters in various 
archives, information on ancestry websites linked to his later life in Australia, and multiple 
articles relating to him in newspapers from Singapore, Australia and Britain.102 From this trail 
it can be deduced he lived in Hull when in Britain, with a variety of business interests, 
including a steam mail company, a telegraph company, a cotton mill company and later a 
Chinese labour migration scheme to Australia.103 Using these sources, we can build a 
chronology of Davidson’s movements. He lived in Java (1823 to 1826), Singapore (1826 to 
1835), Sydney (1836 to 1839), Macao (1839 to 1842) and Hong Kong (1842 to 1844). 
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Davidson operated outside of official imperial structures and was the symbolic of the new 
breed of private trader operating within the China trade after 1833.104  
Gordon Forbes Davidson’s ideas about colonization were informed by his experience 
in Asia. In his writing in Trade and Travel in the Far East he continuously, in line with 
contemporary colonial ideas of ethnic hierarchy, linked ideas about labour and economic 
utility to ethnicity.105 Davidson regularly equated industriousness and mercantilism with 
notions of civilization.106 These ideas about the relationship between labour and ethnicity 
were formulated during his time in Java and Singapore in the 1820s and fitted within the 
colonial notions of ‘native’ laziness. Contemporary European observers within Southeast Asia 
identified clear ethnic divisions between Chinese and Malay residents, founded on their 
proficiency as a labour-force. Davidson’s view of ethnicity, as connected to economic 
activity, was shaped by this context. It was Davidson’s experience in multiple colonies in 
Southeast Asia that shaped his view of Chinese labourers and informed his later attempts to 
establish a scheme of Chinese migration to New South Wales.107  
In his book, Davidson’s narrative began with his experiences from his arrival in Java 
in 1823. Whilst Davidson described Java as a ‘lovely and magnificent island’, he was struck 
by what he perceived as the laziness of the indigenous population.108 Residing in Batavia 
from 1823 to 1826, Davidson’s account of his time there was littered with such comments as 
‘the inhabitants of Java are … rather lazy withal’ and ‘the lazy Javanese labourer’.109 The 
label of lazy fitted well within existing contemporary attitudes to the indigenous inhabitants 
of Southeast Asia. In The Myth of the Lazy Native Alatas discusses how the idea of natives 
being lazy was developed by European observers in the early nineteenth century across 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia.110 These ideas evolved from a reluctance of 
indigenous peoples to form a labour force in plantation systems of high intensity production. 
For example, the inhabitants of Java, who were expected to act as a colonial labour force, 
were unlikely to enter into contract work on tobacco, rubber or coffee plantations as they were 
already agricultural small-holders in a pre-existing subsistence economy.111 To British 
capitalists like Davidson, native resistance to labour on European-owned plantations was 
construed as laziness. In fact, Davidson went as far to assert that forced labour in the Java was 
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justifiable: ‘I object in toto to slavery in any form; but I confess I do not think the slaves of 
Java would be benefitted, were their liberty given them tomorrow.’112 For Davidson, an 
unwillingness to labour was directly linked to inferiority and even justified slavery. By 
contrast a willingness to labour could been seen to reflect positive stereotypes, or a higher 
position in Western concepts of civilizational hierarchy.  
From 1826, Davidson lived in Singapore, where he observed the interactions between 
British colonial authorities, Chinese labourers, Chinese merchant elites and Malay 
inhabitants. Chinese labourers impressed Davidson with their work ethic: ‘a tight curb on a 
China-man will make him do a great deal of work; at the same time, he has spirit enough to 
resist real ill treatment’.113 Importantly this extract reflects the intermediate role of the 
Chinese labourers. Davidson saw the Chinese as both compliant and resistant to exploitation. 
In contrast to other Asian ethnic groups, the Chinese were able to avoid becoming slaves. In 
contrast, Davidson was unimpressed by the indigenous population: ‘the original Malay 
inhabitants of this Island are now the most insignificant, both as to numbers and as to general 
utility’.114 Similarly, mixed-race Eurasian migrants to Singapore from Malacca were also 
dismissed by Davidson as ‘a bad breed certainly, and the men I speak of seem to possess all 
the devilry of both races ... their employments ... are not quite so creditable to their 
characters.’115 Davidson’s continual use of words like ‘employment’, ‘utility’ and ‘work’ 
when constructing ethnic stratifications shows how his time in Singapore caused him to 
identify ethnicity and labour as mutually constitutive. This was consistent with a British 
imperial world view that emphasised ‘hard work’ as a mark of civilization and godliness.116 
Davidson’s observations of Singaporean society engaged with contemporary colonial 
discourse. For example, John Crawfurd wrote of the ‘Indian islanders’ that they were ‘of slow 
comprehension and narrow judgement’ and added that ‘all their intellectual faculties are in 
general feeble.’117 Like his contemporaries, Davidson saw the presence of the British Empire 
in Southeast Asia as a simultaneously profitable and necessary, especially given the 
ineffectiveness of the indigenous population.  
When Davidson visited Australia in the early 1830s he applied ideas about labour and 
ethnicity that he had developed in Java and Singapore. Of Aboriginal Australians Davidson 
                                                 
112 Davidson, Trade and Travel in the Far East, p. 36. 
113 Ibid, p. 47. 
114 Ibid, p. 48. 
115 Ibid, p. 96. 
116 Specifically linked to the idea of a ‘Protestant work ethic’, see Peter Harrison, ‘“Fill the earth and subdue it”: 
Biblical Warrants for Colonization in Seventeenth Century England’, Journal of Religious History, Vol. 29, No. 
1 (2005), pp. 3-24. 
117 Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago, Vol. I, p. 37; Crawfurd’s accounts have been an essential part of 
tracing and charting the early history of colonial Singapore.  
 45 
 
remarked that ‘they are, without exception, the most complete savages I have ever come 
across. They resist almost every attempt to induce them to labour’.118 Here again, the 
resistance to capitalist forms of production and contract-based labour relationships was 
directly equated with inferiority. Davidson’s views of Aboriginal Australians were in line 
with the dominant frontier narrative. Aboriginal resistance to colonization and employment 
was interpreted as resistance to or ignorance of civilization and progress. Existing systems of 
subsistence agriculture, which had been developed over centuries, meant that Australian 
Aborigines were reluctant to labour for capital.119 For observers like Davidson this resistance 
to labour was an indication of Aboriginal mental and moral inferiority.120 It was apparent to 
Davidson that the answer to Australia’s labour shortage was to be found in China. Chapter 
three examines Davidson’s scheme for Chinese migration to New South Wales, which was 
funded through his association with Jardine Matheson. Davidson’s experiences across Asia 
had simultaneously convinced him of the benefits of Chinese labour, and of the inability of 
certain indigenous peoples to fulfil labour shortages due to their ‘savagery’.   
 Davidson’s time in Singapore had provided him with a template for supplying colonial 
labour that he believed could be replicated elsewhere. He saw the low cost, civilizational 
standing, tendency for hard work and large population as appealing aspects of the Chinese 
labour pool. By contrast, the decline of indigenous populations was both inevitable and, 
bearing in mind Davidson’s economic interests, desirable. Additionally, the removal of the 
EIC charter, which allowed an increased and unregulated exchange of capital, information 
and people between the British Empire in Asia and China created a fertile ground for Chinese 
labour migration experiments in the 1830s and 1840s. This was exacerbated by Empire-wide 
factors that increased the demand for cheap, yet voluntary, labour.121   
 Despite the official prohibition of emigration from China, Singapore proved that 
emigration from China was taking place. The Canton Register noted with interest that: 
 
Emigration although strictly forbidden by the law of China, is still practiced to a 
very considerable extent; and we observe in the Singapore Chronicle that the 
arrival lately of four junks, brought upwards of 1600 passengers, the greater 
proportion of whom we conclude to remain on the Island.122 
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The rapid development of Singapore, based on the integration of existing migration systems 
and European capital, demonstrated that Chinese migrant labour was a viable solution to 
colonial labour shortages. By the mid-1830s Crawfurd observed that the ‘[Chinese] 
government, in favour at least of male inhabitants, had relaxed the rigour of its prohibitory 
law against natives leaving the country.’123 As described by Hillemann, contact zones like 
Singapore were essential in the formulation of perceptions of China and the Chinese.124 
Importantly, in developing colonies like Singapore, the use of Chinese migrants as 
replacement labour served as a process of ‘internal colonialism’ that was used to pacify 
resistant or autonomous indigenous subjects.125 The opportunity provided by the vast pool of 
cheap and reliable labour in China was not lost on British merchants, colonialists and imperial 
planners. The development of Singapore in the 1820s showed that an Anglo-Chinese society 
could be successful. In this context success was defined in terms of generating profit for 
British and Chinese merchant elites, whilst remaining politically stable. This was a notion of 
success in which the financial, political and social status of Chinese labourers themselves was 
largely irrelevant. By the 1830s various British actors attempted to repeat this success and 
experiment with Chinese labour under British rule in different colonies.   
 
The China Expert and the ‘Opening’ of the China Trade 
Whilst Singapore flourished economically, the EIC Charter Act of 1833 was the final nail in 
the EIC’s commercial coffin.126 The Act removed the EIC monopoly of the China trade, 
which effectively de-regulated the ‘country traders’ and created the space for a new 
commercial networks on the China coast.127 Anglo-Chinese trade was profitable for both the 
British state and the EIC. The tea trade accounted for sixteen percent of Britain’s total 
customs revenue by the 1830s and was worth £4 million per annum to the EIC.128 
Additionally, the sale of Indian opium in China, which had reversed the trade deficit of the 
China trade by creating a new import market, gave the EIC a profit of £2.7 million in 1832.129 
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Yet these profits were contingent on the ‘Canton System’ of trade regulation that had been in 
operation since 1757.130 Not only was British trade regulated but British attempts to establish 
European-style diplomatic relations with China before 1833 had ended in failure. Debate over 
how Anglo-Chinese trade and diplomacy should be reformed was contingent on the evidence 
of select China experts. Not only did the changes of 1833 open up space for private 
commercial expansion, but they were also the product of debates that became infused with 
ideas about the Chinese character.131   
The importance of individuals recognised as ‘China experts’ in the changes of 1833 
cannot be overstated. The pivotal role of John Crawfurd in the debates over the EIC 
monopoly underlines the implications of the Anglo-Chinese experience in Singapore. The use 
of Crawfurd’s individual story provides an entry point into complicated strands of imperial 
history, which have been the focus of entire texts in their own right. Here, Crawfurd offers an 
insight into vast debates about monopoly and free trade in Britain and Asia. Individuals 
formed key nodes within networks of empire, often moving from place to place. Specific 
actors have been successfully used to connect imperial locales and can act as case studies that 
are not limited to a fixed time or place, but can physically move like the organisations or 
processes to which they were connected.132 Crawfurd’s long career in Asia validated his 
expertise. After being posted to Penang by the EIC in 1808 he served the Company during the 
British occupation of Java from 1811 to 1816, before returning to India. Crawfurd’s 
experience of Penang and Java ultimately qualified him for his role in Singapore, but also 
meant he was selected for diplomatic missions on behalf of the Governor-General of India to 
Burma and Siam. By the time of Crawfurd’s return to Britain his wealth of experience meant 
that he was in demand by lobbying groups, such as the provincial East India Associations.133  
Crawfurd – much like his predecessor in Singapore, Stamford Raffles – became a 
student of the nations and cultures he experienced. His impressive list of multi-volume 
publications reinforced his credentials as an expert on Asian cultures and societies, which 
would be utilised in the debates over the EIC monopoly.134 Specifically Crawfurd’s first-hand 
experience in the contact zone of Singapore gave him a status of expertise that could be 
                                                 
130 Le Pinchon, China trade and empire, p. 10; Lovell, The Opium War, p. 2. The regulations included various 
restrictions on the movements and personal lives of European merchants, but most importantly the restriction of 
trade to the state-sanctioned Hong merchants at Canton, which was believed to limit the profit of import trade.  
131 The notion of a specifically Chinese character is the main focus of chapter two.  
132 Hall, Civilising Subjects. 
133 See Yukihisa Kumagai, Breaking into the Monopoly: Provincial Merchants and Manufacturers’ Campaigns 
or Access to the Asian Market, 1790-1833 (Boston: Brill, 2013) for more on Crawfurd’s connection to the East 
India Associations in their campaign against monopoly.   
134 The following works were also purchased by the EIC and used for educational purposes: John Crawfurd, 
History of the Indian Archipelago, Vols. I-III (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable, 1820); John Crawfurd, Grammar 
and Dictionary of the Malay Language (London: Smith, Elder, 1852). 
 48 
 
deployed against his metropolitan rivals.135 In the first instance, his contributions to 
parliamentary select committees over a prolonged period legitimised his opinions, which were 
based on direct personal experience in Asia. After giving evidence to the House of Lords 
Select Committee into the EIC in 1830, Crawfurd sat on the 1840 Select Committee on the 
trade with China. The witness had become a committee member. A variety of non-
governmental groups made use of and helped to build his status and reputation as an expert in 
Britain. For instance, in 1828 Crawfurd became a lobbyist on behalf of the merchants of 
Calcutta and Singapore; his View of the Present state and Future Prospects of the Free Trade 
and Colonisation of India was published by the Central Committee on the East India and 
Chinese Trade in 1829; and 600 copies of his Notes on the Settlement or Colonization of 
British Subjects in India were ordered by the Glasgow East India Association.136 He went on 
to write his most significant pro-free trade tract, Chinese Monopoly Examined, in 1830. On 
his return to Britain, Crawfurd became part of a network of merchants, lobbyists and regional 
East India and China Associations that aimed to remove the EIC monopoly of the China trade.  
 Crawfurd’s career overlapped with the ‘information revolution’ that Zoë Laidlaw and 
Christopher Bayly have highlighted as a key feature of both imperial and colonial governance 
in the 1830s and 1840s.137 Whilst metropolitan figures such as Robert Montgomery Martin 
collated colonial statistics to interpret and disseminate knowledge about the Empire, such 
information was supplemented by the direct colonial experience of those who had imperial 
careers.138 In this environment the role of the expert and their specialised knowledge was 
recognised by both lobbyists and policy makers. Histories of Crawfurd’s role in Britain have 
detailed his collaboration with provincial merchants and his later role as the first president of 
the Straits Settlement Association in 1868.139 He was widely recognised by his 
contemporaries as an authority on the ‘Indian Archipelago’, and the fields of ethnography, 
commerce and colonial politics in particular.140 Crawfurd’s importance in Britain was 
influenced by the success of Singapore, where his role in the colony’s early history was 
significant. In the 1921 multi-volume history One Hundred Years of Singapore, as in this 
chapter, Crawfurd’s importance was demonstrated as a primary source on issues in colonial 
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Singapore, ranging from law and crime to education and land reform.141 Crawfurd’s writing 
provided the historical record of much of colonial Singapore’s early administration. The 1833 
Charter Act connected Crawfurd’s colonial and metropolitan lives. Crawfurd’s experiences in 
Asia meant that his ideas about ethnicity influenced his advocacy of free trade and 
simultaneously provided legitimacy for his criticism of the EIC. In addition, the changes of 
1833 facilitated the growth of firms like Jardine Matheson and allowed them to create new, 
unregulated commercial networks. The environment created by the Charter Act was 
ultimately conducive to new systems of emigration from the China coast in the 1830s.  
 
John Crawfurd: Free Trade Ethnographer? 
The 1833 Charter Act was ostensibly about trade, but the debates that circulated around it 
were imbued with ideas about ethnicity, character and civilizational hierarchy. John 
Crawfurd’s role particularly highlights the cross-over between notions of free trade and 
emerging hierarchies, which emphasised notions of Chinese civilizational superiority over 
other ethnic groups in Asia. Tomotaka Kawamura’s work demonstrates how the two main 
groups that benefitted from the decline of the EIC, Anglo-Indian agency houses and British 
provincial industrialists, were both connected to Crawfurd.142 Due to these connections 
Crawfurd argued vehemently against the EIC monopoly of the China trade. The extent to 
which Crawfurd’s criticisms of the EIC’s management of the trade drew on his experiences in 
Asia and his ethnographic observations, underlined the importance of debates about the China 
trade in shaping perceptions of the Chinese as an ethnic group in this period.  
From his work with the Glasgow East India Association from 1828, to his role as the 
first president of the Straits Settlement Association in 1868, Crawfurd’s return to Britain was 
dedicated to advocating reforms that would benefit the Anglo-Indian agency houses. 
Specifically, these were reforms for the liberalisation of trade with China.143 His record in 
Singapore suggests that he was already a convert to free trade liberalism, but as an additional 
incentive, Robert Bickers has noted that Crawfurd was on a ‘handsome Bombay retainer’ for 
his advocacy.144 It is worth noting that notions of free trade, particularly in Asia, were 
essential to the ideological underpinnings of the Empire. Commercial freedom was one of the 
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markers of civilizational superiority that legitimised imperial expansion.145 In ‘orientalist’ 
fashion, the representation of the British Empire as an empire of freedom set it in contrast to 
Asian despotism and tyranny. The liberal embrace of empire saw issues such as 
humanitarianism and commercial freedom connected under the auspices of colonial 
improvement and the broader narrative of a ‘civilizing mission’.146 Crawfurd’s earlier role as 
a colonial administrator and his later role as a free trade advocate were both compatible and 
connected.     
The arguments Crawfurd deployed in his critique of the EIC monopoly sat within the 
standard rhetorical narratives of contemporary free trade advocates. The influence, or even 
dominance, of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations in early nineteenth century notions of 
political economy and, crucially, debates over the economic management of empire has been 
well acknowledged in the historiography.147 Crawfurd and his allies – influenced by Smith – 
argued that the monopoly, whilst previously necessary, had run its natural course and reached 
its maximum profitability.148 So dominant was this strain of economic thought that Phillip 
Lawson suggests the decision to end the monopoly was tacitly agreed as early as 1825, and 
was merely confirmed by the committees and debates of the early 1830s.149 Crawfurd’s EIC 
background was common amongst free traders campaigners, and he received support from 
prominent figures such as Joseph Hume and James Silk Buckingham, both of whom had their 
own histories, and grievances, with the EIC.150 In Chinese Monopoly Examined Crawfurd 
criticised the EIC for limiting the Chinese tea trade as the only access point for Chinese teas 
into the British market.151 Direct and quantifiable financial gain formed the basis of 
Crawfurd’s case as he asserted that the ‘advantages of a free intercourse with China’ would be 
an additional ‘one million sterling per annum’ in profit from the China trade.152 However, 
Crawfurd’s case was not purely economic. What distinguished Crawfurd from contemporary 
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critics of the EIC was the significance of his experiences in Asia, and his emphasis on 
ethnography as well as economic theory.  
During the free trade debates, Crawfurd used his experience in Asia to present himself 
as an expert. In his tenure as Resident of Singapore, Crawfurd was notable for legislative 
measures that stimulated commercial growth.153 He legalised gambling, reduced duties on 
various products, kept Singapore a free port and enforced strict punishments for piracy.154 It 
was Crawfurd’s experience and success in Singapore that qualified him to give evidence to 
the 1830 Select Committee. When providing evidence Crawfurd highlighted his expertise. For 
example, he emphasised his knowledge of cotton cultivation across ‘the Island of Java, and to 
considerable parts of Cochin China, and some parts of Siam and Ava; I refer also to some of 
the provinces of Bengal’.155 Similarly, in Crawfurd’s writing on the monopoly debate he 
continually referred to his own expertise in contrast to his metropolitan adversaries’ lack of 
knowledge. It is important to note that not only did others recognise Crawfurd as an expert 
but he cultivated a self-image of supreme wisdom on issues relating to the British Empire in 
Southeast Asia. A lack of experience or knowledge was used to undermine opponents. 
Crawfurd aggressively argued that a pro-monopoly article in Quarterly Review made ‘vulgar 
pretensions to knowledge’, had ‘neither the capacity nor the inclination to supply’ information 
about Chinese commerce and must have been using a map ‘constructed before the age of 
Marco Polo’.156 Crawfurd was fully aware of the value of his experience and his residence in 
Asia. To legitimise his arguments against the EIC monopoly he invoked experiences that his 
critics did not share.  
Crawfurd’s commercial policy in Singapore had been heavily influenced by his ideas 
about resident ethnic groups. The impact this had on his anti-monopoly writing signalled a 
significant departure from any economic arguments that he shared with Hume and 
Buckingham.157 As a colonial administrator Crawfurd felt strongly that the imposition of 
British, or Western, concepts, on indigenous populations was vital to their civilizational 
development. In his History of the Indian Archipelago he wrote that ‘the nations of the East, 
in point of civilization, continue unchanged – they seem rapidly to advance to a certain state 
of improvement, and then to continue in all ages as the same unchangeable semi-
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barbarians’.158 An example of the interplay between liberal colonial economic policy and 
different ethnic groups was Crawfurd’s decision not to extend the colonial licensing system to 
gambling as it was an amusement which ‘the most industrious of them (the Chinese) are 
accustomed to resort to’.159 Crawfurd’s commercial policies in Singapore had been influenced 
as much by his assumptions about different ethnic groups, and their needs, as by economic 
ideology. 
The importance of notions of civilization, development, skill and hierarchy in 
Crawfurd’s free trade writing is most evident in his View of the Present state and Future 
Prospects of the Free Trade and Colonisation of India, published in 1829. In this text 
Crawfurd drew a comparison between the ‘superior skill of the Chinese’ and the 
‘unskillfulness of the Indians’.160 Crawfurd’s writing was infused with specific criticisms of 
‘the Indians’ as a ‘timid, often effeminate, and, as a nation, a feeble race of semi-barbarians’ 
who were ‘inferior to Europeans and to Chinese in real skill and intelligence’.161 The repeated 
reference to Indian barbarism was set in contrast to British and Chinese civilization, reflecting 
similar hierarchies to those seen in Singapore. Crucially the critique of the EIC was not a 
critique of British imperialism in India, which, in Crawfurd’s view, was entirely necessary. 
Crawfurd’s experience in Southeast Asia clearly informed his equation of Chinese and 
Europeans as superior ethnic groups. Lamenting the Qing Empire’s controls on emigration 
Crawfurd appeared to compare the effect of British imperialism with Chinese immigration as 
a bearer of progress. He remarked that ‘to it [Chinese migration] we owe more than half the 
prosperity of all the countries in which it has occurred; such is the efficacy of a little infusion 
of civilization into semi-barbarous communities’.162 That a text ostensibly about the reform of 
the EIC contained so many allusions to the civilizational superiority of Chinese migrants over 
host communities was indicative of the pervasive influence of Crawfurd’s time in Southeast 
Asia. This conceptual dichotomy, between civilized Chinese migrants and uncivilized Indian 
locals, would be particularly pertinent in Jardine Matheson’s recruitment of Chinese tea 
cultivators for Assam in the late 1830s.   
Praise of Chinese civilization was intimately tied to the role played by Chinese 
communities in commercial networks. For Crawfurd an aptitude for trade was a sign of ethnic 
superiority. In his History of the Indian Archipelago Crawfurd identified Chinese 
                                                 
158 John Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago, Vol. II (Edinburgh: Archibald, Constable & Co., 1820), p. 
39. 
159 Braddell et al., One Hundred Years of Singapore, p. 56. 
160 John Crawfurd, View of the Present state and Future Prospects of the Free Trade and Colonisation of India 
(London: James Ridgway, 1829), p. 19. 
161 Ibid, p. 68. 
162 Ibid, p. 70.  
 53 
 
mercantilism as something comparable to earlier stages of European commercial 
development: ‘the Chinese, indeed, carry the principle of the mercantile system to an extreme, 
which would have excited the admiration or envy of the European politicians of the early part 
of the last century’.163 Crawfurd routinely used terms such as ‘industry’ and ‘ingenuity’ in his 
praise of Chinese settlers who, along with Europeans, he classed as ‘improvers’.164 Of course, 
not only could an aptitude for trade be used to form civilizational hierarchies, but the idea that 
the Chinese were pre-disposed to trade also assuaged fears that the removal of the EIC 
monopoly would jeopardize Anglo-Chinese trade. Importantly, Crawfurd was not asserting 
Chinese equality with the British, but their superiority over other Asian ethnicities, as 
suggested in his select committee evidence: ‘Chinese skill and capital resemble very much 
European skill and capital; I take European skill and capital however, to be as much superior 
to Chinese skill and capital, as Chinese skill and capital are superior to Hindoo skill and 
capital’.165 For Crawfurd, ethnic hierarchies reflected and dictated commercial realities. 
Concepts of ethnic hierarchy Crawfurd had developed in Singapore and Southeast Asia 
heavily informed his understanding of trade and commerce and were present throughout his 
anti-monopoly writing. This had the added effect of further disseminating stereotypes and 
perceptions of a Chinese character, which was superior to comparable Indian ethnic traits and 
suited to British colonial rule.166     
Crawfurd was part of a growing group of imperial careerists who were identified as 
China experts by metropolitan bodies, such as parliamentary select committees, and promoted 
as experts by lobbying organisations. As outlined by P. J. Marshall, British India provided an 
opportunity for figures ‘to win reputations for themselves as transmitters of knowledge to a 
curious and expectant Europe’.167 The EIC charter renewal acted as a particular stimulus to 
metropolitan interest in the experience of imperial careerists like Crawfurd. It was the 
philosophy of liberal thinkers, like John Stuart Mill, that Indian policy should be constructed 
from the advice of experts in India, rather than emerging from metropolitan political 
processes.168 Within this framework of Indian governance, Crawfurd’s experience amongst 
the Chinese migrants in Singapore was seen as particularly significant during debates over the 
future management of the China trade.     
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Other select committee witnesses also drew on experience of Chinese migration in 
Asia. Sir Ralph Rice, who had spent seven years as a court recorder on Prince of Wales 
Island, similarly emphasised the contrast between the indigenous population and Chinese 
immigrants.169 In giving evidence to the 1830 Select Committee, Rice identified a comparable 
hierarchy in which the Malay population was the most ‘uncivilized’ and prone to violent 
criminality, whilst the Chinese population had a tendency to steal but were simultaneously 
‘admirable merchants, most excellent in every respect’.170 Various witnesses made reference 
to the perceived character traits of the Chinese, such as American merchant Joshua Bates who 
referred to Chinese commercial success in Singapore or Judge William Malcolm Fleming 
who bemoaned Chinese opium addiction.171 Hollingworth Magniac, who had been head of 
Magniac & Co. until 1827 (the firm that was renamed Jardine Matheson in 1832), also gave 
evidence. Primarily this was focused on his firm’s trading activities, but in addition he also 
discussed the cheap cost of labour in China, which was believed to be an obstacle to the 
competitive pricing of British exports. Excluding Crawfurd and Magniac, sixteen of the 
remaining fifty witnesses called by the select committee featured in the correspondences or 
accounts of Jardine Matheson.172 This was the mobilisation of opposition to EIC monopoly 
engineered by private interest groups in Asia and Britain, as outlined by Kumagai.173   
As Anglo-Chinese trade had grown and become more profitable so too had the 
number of imperial actors invested in the trade. Simultaneously, the expansion of direct 
British imperial control of Southeast Asia had provided a number of experts, such as 
Crawfurd, who could cite years of experience of working with, and governing, Chinese 
populations. Crawfurd’s experiences in Southeast Asia not only allowed him to assert himself 
as more qualified than his metropolitan, monopolist opponents, but informed and connected 
his ideas about free trade and the Chinese as an ethnic group. Crucially, Crawfurd’s 
experience of Chinese migration in Southeast Asia was deemed relevant to the legislative 
management of trade between Britain and China. British imperial and economic growth in 
Southeast Asia meant that Chinese migration and Anglo-Chinese trade could be understood as 
connected issues. Observation of Chinese migration to Singapore, and the meanings attached 
to migrants, informed perceptions of the Qing Empire and Britain’s China policy.  
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The 1833 Charter and the Rise of Jardine Matheson  
The removal of the EIC monopoly opened up new diplomatic and commercial opportunities 
for private merchants and agents of the British state on the China coast. Histories of Anglo-
Chinese relations have dwelt on the political ramifications of the 1833 Charter Act.174 British 
attempts to establish European-style diplomatic relations with China before 1833 – 
specifically the Macartney embassy of 1792 and the Amherst ambassadorship in 1813 – had 
ended in failure, leaving mediation through the Hong merchants of Canton the only 
diplomatic contact between the British and Chinese governments.175 Under the stewardship of 
the EIC the perceived insult of the Chinese failing to accord the British their ‘deserved’ 
diplomatic status was absorbed in the interests of profit, and recent, revisionist, studies have 
emphasised the collaboration and compromise inherent in the Canton system prior to the 
1830s.176 Yet the removal of EIC monopoly would lead to attempts to establish a ‘proper’ 
diplomatic relationship, resulting in the appointment of William Napier as Superintendent of 
the China trade in 1834.177 The contrasting Anglo-Chinese perspectives on diplomacy 
indicated a reciprocal cultural ignorance that would contribute to a precarious diplomatic 
situation exacerbated by the removal of the EIC after 1833.178 
The free trade movement essentially called for two separate changes to the China 
trade. First, on the British side, free trade advocates wanted the removal of the EIC monopoly 
of the China trade.179 This move allowed for the deregulation of the private merchants at 
Canton, which in turn allowed for the deregulation of British imports and exports from and to 
China. Second, on the Chinese side, free trade advocates wanted a liberalisation of Chinese 
trade controls and European-style diplomatic relations to be established. The 1833 Charter 
Act had initiated the first of these changes and had provisioned for re-negotiation through the 
creation of the role of superintendent, but an overall strategy for engendering a liberal reform 
of Chinese policy was unclear. The assumption of Western merchants, that Chinese trade 
liberalisation would be an inevitable consequence of progress, proved unfounded. The fact 
that China imported few British goods, and that the Qing state resisted the entry of British 
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subjects and British cultural practices remained completely unchanged.180 In the immediate 
aftermath of the Charter Act, attention would be turned to reforming the Canton system. 
Crucially, these new diplomatic efforts and commercial challenges by private merchants to 
the existing system were ultimately connected.  
The 1833 bill on the China trade confirmed the free traders’ victory over the company 
and its monopoly: ‘the exclusive right of trading with the Dominions of the Emperor of China 
… will cease from and after the Twelfth Day of April One Thousand Eight Hundred and 
Thirty-Four’.181 The bill allowed merchants to invest private capital in the China trade without 
the permission of the EIC, as had been required previously. The role of Superintendent of the 
China trade was created to protect and regulate the commercial activities of the ‘subjects’ who 
were now free to trade in China.182 The Chief Superintendent would fulfil multiple roles by 
acting as Britain’s diplomatic representative to China as well as having ‘powers and 
authorities over and in respect of the Trade and Commerce of His Majesty’s Subjects within 
any part of the said Dominions’.183 At the stroke of a pen the British Crown bestowed upon 
the Superintendents a level of judicial authority that had not been agreed with the Qing 
government: 
 
To create a Court of justice with Criminal and Admiralty Jurisdiction for the trial 
of Offences committed by His Majesty’s Subjects within the Dominions of the 
Emperor of China... and on the High Seas within one hundred miles of the Coast 
of China, and to appoint one of the Superintendents in the said Act mentioned to 
be the Officer to hold such Court.184 
 
The move to free trade, and the resulting necessity for British legal authority to replace the 
EIC, had created a situation in which the British state had assumed legal extraterritoriality for 
British merchants. This extraterritoriality would later be legally recognised in the Treaty of 
Nanking in 1842, but the assumption that British law extended around the globe with the 
spread of British subjects, which was vital component of imperialism, was extremely 
problematic in the context of the Canton system.185  
 The ‘Napier Fizzle’ was a famous disaster. William Napier – who knew nothing of 
China, little of diplomacy and even less about trade – lacked experience and was appointed 
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due to his connection to the King.186 Napier failed to aggressively enter the city of Canton and 
negotiate directly with the Chinese authorities, which would have circumvented the Canton 
system and the Hong merchants. He died of a fever in Macao in October 1834.187 There has 
been historiographical debate around whether or not the embarrassment of the Napier 
expedition placed Britain on a course for conflict with China from as early as 1834, and to 
what extent Napier was acting autonomously or implementing Colonial Office policy.188 
Some historians have gone so far as to suggest that Napier was faced with an ‘impossible 
mission’.189 The problems faced by Napier had been foreshadowed in the free trade debates 
and the role of Superintendent was an integral part of the deregulation of the private 
merchants. Charles Grant, president of the EIC Board of Control, noted that ‘the jealousy of 
the Chinese might be even more sensitive under the new system than under the old’ and that it 
was crucial that the Crown appoint an authority with ‘adequate powers of supervision over all 
British subjects resorting to China’.190 Such measures were, according to Grant, necessary 
when dealing with ‘a people so peculiar as the Chinese’.191 Grant recognised in 1833 that the 
coming impasse between Chinese officials and the private merchants at Canton would result 
in British trade with China becoming ‘a smuggled one’.192 As a result, private firms that could 
establish illicit trade networks were able to capitalise on the freedom from regulation granted 
by the end of the EIC monopoly.    
 The removal of the EIC monopoly had significant ramifications for the newly 
rebranded Jardine Matheson. First, the removal of the oversight of the EIC allowed the firm to 
flagrantly flout Chinese trade restrictions and explore the China coast for new markets 
without the threat of licence removal from the EIC. This facilitated the rapid growth of the 
firm’s illicit opium distribution network over the 1830s. Second, the introduction of new 
power structures, such as the office of Superintendent, allowed the firm to make new 
connections. For example, the Register repeatedly publicly defended William Napier and 
upon his death James Matheson returned to Britain with his widow in order to petition 
Palmerston for aggressive action against the Chinese authorities. Third, the withdrawal of the 
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EIC allowed for the creation of entirely new private structures and organisations, free from 
state control, which could co-ordinate to apply political pressure.193 
With the scaling back of EIC oversight in the early 1830s Jardine Matheson began 
conducting exploratory voyages along the China coast to find new opium markets outside of 
the Canton system of trade regulation. Capital from opium smuggling operations was re-
invested by the firm into the legal tea trade. As discussed in the introduction, the removal of 
EIC control allowed the firm to position itself as a go-between for new, private clients who 
lacked the ‘knowledge and clout’ to conduct such operations themselves.194 As discussed by 
Carol Matheson Connell, the firm offered sixteen different ‘agency’ services that revolved 
around broking for buyers and sellers of goods to and from China.195 Now acting 
autonomously, the firm was free to represent any client and ship any product without 
interference, or even the threat of interference, from British authorities. The firm’s opium 
voyages were not just used for selling opium and extracting capital; they were also channels 
for the movement of people, goods and information.196 Such voyages contravened multiple 
Qing laws.     
The legislation of 1833 fundamentally changed very little diplomatically, but it had 
unleashed ‘Her Majesty’s Subjects’ into a variety of new, un-regulated economic and political 
relationships with China. The most aggressive of these subjects were William Jardine and 
James Matheson, whose firm was able to circumvent Qing restrictions on trade and 
population movement. Crucially, the changes made to the China trade were influenced by 
evidence from the contact zone of Singapore. The views China experts such as John Crawfurd 
were underpinned by assumptions of ethnic hierarchy and developing notions of a Chinese 
character, informed by experience of Chinese migrant communities. Consequently, colonial 
sites of Anglo-Chinese exchange, such as Singapore, had implications for Anglo-Chinese 
relations on an imperial scale and created a demand for Chinese migrant labour. A demand 
that could be met by Jardine Matheson.   
 
Conclusion 
The impact of the colonial experience in Singapore – as seen by the examples of Gordon 
Forbes Davidson, Seah Eu Chin and John Crawfurd – demonstrates how pre-existing systems 
                                                 
193 The importance of the new chambers of commerce that were established across the Empire in Asia after 1834 
will be discussed in chapter two. 
194 Connell, A Business in Risk, p. 6. 
195 Ibid.  
196 The extraction of ‘useful knowledge’, such as knowledge of tea cultivation, from China has been the subject 
of recent scholarly inquiry, see Berg, ‘Britain, Industry and Perceptions of China’, pp. 269-288 and Chen, ‘An 
Information War Waged by Merchants and Missionaries at Canton’, pp. 1705-1735. See chapter three for a full 
discussion of the opium voyages of Charles Gutzlaff.  
 59 
 
of Chinese migration were understood and interpreted in the context of changes to Anglo-
Chinese trade in 1833. They also demonstrate the importance of personal expertise on China 
in the dissemination of knowledge and the continuing presence of ethnic stratifications in 
discussions of China and the Chinese. In Crawfurd’s contribution to the free trade debates he 
emphasised his expertise and experience in Asia when critiquing his opponents and 
admonishing their pretensions to knowledge. Crawfurd’s ideas about free trade and the role of 
the EIC were connected to the ideas about the Chinese character that he had formed whilst a 
colonial administrator in Singapore. Similarly, in Davidson’s writing the perceptions of 
different Asian ethnicities were founded on his experiences in Asia over a lengthy trading 
career. The expertise these figures were attributed by metropolitan power structures ensured 
the replication of the notions of ethnic hierarchy that were being formed in the contact zone of 
Singapore.  
 It is important to note that though the focus of this chapter has been the commercial 
changes of 1833, the implications of the changing Anglo-Chinese relationships were by no 
means limited to commerce. The ‘opening’ of China in 1842 has also been highlighted as a 
key turning point in the development of Christian missions to China. Brian Stanley’s work 
has emphasised the shared aims of ‘Commerce and Christianity’ in establishing access to 
China.197 The missionary and Canton Register editor Rev. Robert Morrison shared many of 
the frustrations of his mercantile associates with the ‘despotic’ Chinese government.198 The 
1830s brought a new missionary phase that was more aggressive then Morrison’s assimilatory 
mission, with American missionaries, such as Elijah Bridgman, and the Prussian Charles 
Gutzlaff challenging the Chinese authorities more overtly.199 The deregulation of private 
British merchants from 1833 allowed the establishment of new trading networks that could be 
used to facilitate transfer of information and literature, as well as allowing for new systems of 
emigration. The changes of 1833 altered China’s relationship with Britain in numerous, multi-
faceted ways, which is why it makes an effective starting point for the examination of British 
attitudes to Chinese migrant labour.  
 In subsequent chapters many of the issues surrounding 1833 will re-emerge. 
Commercial networks, publishing, expertise and labour migration will be continually 
examined as subject to intertwined processes of change. In particular the idea of a distinctly 
Chinese character evolved over the 1830s and 1840s. The changes occurring in the early 
1830s, detailed in this chapter, created a fertile ground for the development of an ethnic 
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discourse surrounding Chinese labour and the practical conditions to facilitate new systems of 
migration. Singapore demonstrated how Chinese labour migration took place and confirmed 
that such migration was desirable. The new framework of Anglo-Chinese relations served to 
energise the development of British colonial control in Asia and provide a space for 
experimentation with migration. For British observers in Asia the effectiveness of Chinese 
labour was undoubted and was to be tested in new, diverse, colonial contexts. Crucially, 
assumptions about issues like trade and migration were underpinned by the notion of a 
Chinese ethnic character.  
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Chapter Two: The Creation of the Chinese Character: the 
Publication Boom of the 1830s
 
Introduction 
‘The Civilized World Versus China’ was how the Canton Register described growing 
animosity between the Western merchant community and the Canton authorities in 1835.1 The 
editorial of this newspaper, which was owned by Jardine Matheson, seems to reflect the 
widely accepted decline of Western perceptions of China.2 The dominant historical narrative 
has been that a positive view of China, and by extension the Chinese, in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries had transformed to a negative and critical attitude by the early 
nineteenth century.3 In particular the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries have been 
identified as the height of Western fascination with Chinese institutions, society and culture. 
The praises of influential thinkers such as Gottfried Leibniz and Voltaire, as well as the fetish 
for Chinese architecture (William Chambers’ Pagoda at Kew Gardens, built in 1762, being an 
example) and Chinese consumer products, have been cited as evidence of European reverence 
towards the civilized Celestial Empire.4  In the late eighteenth century a combination of 
commercial and diplomatic frustration led to a transformation of how China was perceived in 
Britain and Europe more broadly. The failure of the Macartney Embassy (1792-94) has been 
described as a key moment at which British reverence began to morph into disdain.5 The 
formation and circulation of a Western perception of an archetypal Chinese ethnic character 
over the 1830s, which is charted in this chapter, provides a new perspective and complicates 
this narrative. As we saw in Singapore, Chinese migrants were perceived as economically 
valuable, rather than simply positively or negatively, by British colonial observers.  
 Histories of Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1830s concentrate on diplomatic and 
military hostilities, and have therefore emphasised negative attitudes towards the Chinese. 
This, in turn, has largely hidden from view other forms of exchange, such as the collaboration 
that took place in contact zones.6 This chapter will chart the spread and prominence of the 
idea of what was coming to be known as a distinctly ‘Chinese character’ through the 1830s 
and early 1840s. The particular focus will be on the role of Jardine Matheson in the 
dissemination of information and knowledge that contributed to perceptions of the Chinese as 
                                                 
1 Canton Register, 27 January 1835. 
2 It has been a tendency of recent scholarship to affirm rather than challenge this narrative. See the introduction 
for an overview of histories of western perceptions of China.  
3 Hillemann, Asian Empire and British Knowledge, p. 7; Hillemann identifies this shift in British perceptions of 
China as occurring between 1763 and 1840; Gregory, The West and China Since 1500, pp. 1-3. 
4 Gregory, The West and China Since 1500, pp. 45-48; Roberts, China through Western Eyes, p. 1. 
5 For an overview of the Embassy’s significance see Williams, ‘Anglo-Chinese Caresses’. 
6 Carroll, ‘The Canton System’, p. 51.  
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an ethnic group. This marks a shift from examining the individual agents in the contact zone 
of Singapore – such as Gordon Forbes Davidson, Seah Eu Chin and John Crawfurd – to a 
focus on the importance of the merchant house as a multi-national organisation that facilitated 
information exchange. Additionally the firm was part of wider commercial, political and 
social groups. Importantly they were often able to exert and exercise greater agency than 
individual actors due to their increased connections and resources. In doing this, the firm 
controlled systems of expert knowledge and helped formulate images of a simultaneously 
industrious and duplicitous Chinese character that would prosper under British authority and 
instruction.  
 Jardine Matheson’s role in the creation of ethnic stereotypes moved well beyond the 
firm’s conventional economic and diplomatic roles in Anglo-Chinese relations, but 
importantly coalesced with the firm’s economic aims and interests. This chapter explores how 
British perceptions of a useful Chinese character and Chinese despotism could co-exist once 
the Chinese population was separated and distinguished from the Qing Empire.7 The rhetoric 
of a Chinese people living under a Manchu yoke was popularised in the 1830s as Western 
firms – particularly Jardine Matheson – justified their violation of Chinese laws and 
advocated military action against the Chinese authorities to protect business networks and 
open up new markets. This distinction between the Chinese people and the Qing dynasty was 
also useful in advocating labour migration to the British Empire as a form of liberation. 
Consequently, ideas about a Chinese ethnic character were riven with contradictions. China 
experts were able to articulate stereotypes about Chinese colonists who were industrious and 
obedient under European instruction, but innately deceitful and sinful when granted political 
power.8 Jardine Matheson provide a good example of the importance of the influence of 
economic relationships on perceptions of the Chinese character.  
First, the historical development of notions of a Chinese character is explored. This 
will involve the examination the common tropes attributed to China and the Chinese, which 
had developed over centuries of contact.9 These ideas were mobilised in the changing context 
of the 1830s and especially before and during the First Opium War. Though the military and 
diplomatic events of the First Opium War will not be covered in depth, the impact of ideas 
about the Chinese character popularized during the war are considered. Second, the 
contribution that Jardine Matheson made in establishing the idea of a Chinese character is 
investigated. In particular, the firm’s role in publishing on China and the Chinese is assessed 
                                                 
7 This process has been identified in texts such as Gregory, The West and China Since 1500, pp. 72-126 and 
Gabaccia and Hoerder, Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims, p. 198. 
8 Specifically opium and gambling addiction were commonly identified as innately Asian traits. 
9 See Kitson, Forging Romantic China, for more on eighteenth century ‘Chinoiserie’ and ‘Sinology’.  
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through an analysis of the Canton Register and a network of book and periodical publications, 
which were funded by and published through the firm and its connections. In conjunction 
with the firm’s own publications, the connections the firm had with China experts, British 
officials and other commercial organisations will also be discussed. This approach will give 
us a richer understanding of the varied roles that commercial organisations played in empire. 
Private firms engaged in projects of knowledge collection and maintained information 
networks comparable to those utilised by the EIC as a strategy of colonial governance.10 Both 
the creation of an archetypal Chinese character, and Jardine Matheson’s role within that 
process, provided a rationale for the use of Chinese migrant labour in the British Empire.  
 
Making Sense of China  
In 1836 James Matheson wrote that the Chinese were ‘to be spoken of much in the same spirit 
as one would speculate concerning the suppositious tenants of the moon’.11 This sense of 
mystery could be applied to centuries of Western efforts to define, explain and understand 
China and the Chinese. Aside from a cursory acknowledgement of Marco Polo’s ‘discovery’ 
of China, it is common in histories of Sino-Western relations to identify the sixteenth century 
as a starting point of significant interaction and exchange.12 In particular the inroads made by 
Portugal, with the acquisition of a permanent base on the China coast at Macao in 1557, 
opened up opportunities for missionary endeavour. The activities of Jesuit missionaries 
involved both the attempted conversion of the Chinese populace to Christianity and the 
transmission of knowledge of China to a Western audience. Early publishing on China was 
consequently dominated by biblical scholarship. In the century or so after the establishment of 
the Catholic mission in China in 1583 European missionaries are estimated to have composed 
and published 450 works in Chinese, 330 of which were religious texts.13 This early 
missionary impact was minimal in terms of Chinese conversion, but it was significant in 
igniting a Western fascination with understanding and extracting knowledge from China. By 
the 1760s Christianity had been outlawed in China – the Qianglong Emperor was wary of the 
alternative moral authority offered by the Pope – and Chinese interactions with the West were 
                                                 
10 Norbert Peabody, ‘Knowledge Formation in Colonial India’, in Douglas M. Peers and Nandini Gooptu (eds.), 
India and the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 75-97.  
11 James Matheson, The Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China (London: Smith, Elder 
and Co., 1836), p. 3. 
12 Gregory, The West and China Since 1500, p. 5; For an overview of British knowledge of China over this 
period see Rosalind Ballaster, Fabulous Orients: Fictions of the East in England, 1662-1785 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
13 Peter Burke and R. Po-Chia Hsia, Cultural Translation in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 39. 
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regulated through the Canton system.14 Aside from relations with Russia, all official 
economic and political exchange between China and the West was channelled and mediated 
through the thirteen Hong Merchants, who were chosen by and ultimately answerable to the 
Qing authorities.15 The system also limited Western residence in China to Canton and 
Macao.16 As a result Canton, much like Singapore, became a contact zone in the late 
eighteenth century and would remain a key site of exchange throughout the 1830s.  
 Much recent scholarship has been concerned with British ‘perceptions’, ‘views’ and 
‘representations’ of China and the Chinese from the late eighteenth century onwards.17 In 
particular the work of Hao Gao on Britain’s diplomatic overtures has emphasised how these 
events led to a greater interest in Sinology and the conceptualisation of ‘the Chinese’.18 Yet 
histories of Anglo-Chinese relations have rested on the oversimplifications and assumptions 
of the decline theory. An examination of the publications of Jardine Matheson demonstrates 
that distinctions – whether of class, ethnicity, language or regional origin – were essential to 
the conceptual formation of a Chinese character. The industrious Chinese populace and 
despotic Qing Empire were separated, allowing for the framing of British aggression as 
ultimately benevolent and morally imperative. Though many of the characteristics attributed 
to the Chinese were contradictory – for example, some authors simultaneously praised 
honesty in business transactions whilst critiquing innate deceitfulness – the central point of 
emphasis was that perceptions of the Chinese character not only validated British military and 
economic aggression, they also provided a case for the use of Chinese migrants as colonial 
labourers. 
In Britain the language of an archetypal national character was becoming increasingly 
common in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Similar concepts of ethnic 
exceptionalism were applied to China, as the Chinese were often grouped with ‘Asiatic’ races 
but also attributed specific ethnic characteristics. The writings of John Crawfurd, discussed in 
the previous chapter, show that attempts to essentialize the Chinese as an ethnic group 
predated the 1830s.19 However, the 1830s was of particular significance due to a significant 
increase in publishing on China. Print literature was essential to the definition of racial, ethnic 
                                                 
14 Gregory, The West and China Since 1500, p. 34. 
15 For an overview of the Co-hong system see Van Dyke, Life and Enterprise on the China Coast. 
16 Westerners could reside permanently in Macao and could only stay in Canton temporarily during trading 
season. Western women were not allowed to stay at Canton at all as Qing officials sought to discourage 
permanent foreign residence.  
17 Jeng-Guo Chen, ‘The British View of Chinese Civilization and Emergence of Class Consciousness’, The 
Eighteenth Century, 45 (2004), pp. 193-205; Berg, ‘Britain, Industry and Perceptions of China’, pp. 269-288; 
Tsao, Representing China to the British Public in the Age of Free Trade. 
18 Gao, ‘Prelude to the Opium War?’, pp. 491-509; Gao, ‘The Amherst Embassy and British Discoveries in 
China’, pp. 568-587. 
19 See chapter one for Crawfurd’s background.  
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or national groups beyond ‘local’ geographical spaces.20 Within these publications the fact 
that ethnic groups were evaluated by their level of culture or civilization was an important 
condition for the formulation of a Chinese ethnic character and its potential value to the 
British Empire. Specifically, the civilizational, and connected commercial, potential of 
Chinese migrants was emphasised by those arguing for the colonial use of Chinese labour.21 
Moreover, the role of British self-identity, cast as the most civilized nation, in perceptions of 
China highlights the importance of British imperialism as a context for the formation of the 
Chinese character.    
As the British Empire’s territorial possessions in Asia increased in the late eighteenth 
century it came into contact with a variety of ethnic groups in a variety of contexts. Defining 
and categorising these different Asian groups was a particular obsession of British 
ethnographers in the early nineteenth century. The specialist journals of the period carried 
articles on the history and nature of Asian ethnicities – such as the Oriental Herald 
(established in the 1820s), the Chinese Repository (established in the 1830s) and the Journal 
of the Royal Asiatic Society (with its first volume in 1834). Figures who sought to define the 
Chinese character were carriers and disseminators of knowledge about a range of Asian ethnic 
groups. For example, John Crawfurd’s History of the Indian Archipelago included sections on 
the ‘Language and Literature of the Malays’, ‘Language and Literature of the Celebes’ and 
the ‘Ancient History of Java’.22 Texts such as Crawfurd’s Journal of an Embassy from the 
Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China and the missionary 
Charles Gutzlaff’s Journal of a Residence in Siam defined, in the Western imagination, Asian 
kingdoms and ethnic groups into similar categories as European Empires and nations.23 
Alongside these ethnographic texts the imperial information revolution saw various 
metropolitan actors taking an interest in Britain’s Asian colonies.24 The definition of a 
Chinese character was part of a wider British interest in the categorisation various Asian 
ethnicities.  
                                                 
20 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1983), pp. 1-7.  
21 This will be seen explicitly in examples discussed in chapter three.   
22 Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago, Vols. I-III. 
23 Crawfurd, Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin 
China; Charles Gutzlaff, Journal of a Residence in Siam: and of a Voyage Along the Coast of China to 
Mantchou Tartary (Canton: Chinese Repository, 1832). 
24 Bayly, Empire and Information, p. 8. As mentioned previously, the works of Robert Montgomery Martin 
sought to categorize and provide a statistical analysis of Britain’s imperial possessions; Robert Montgomery 
Martin, A History of British Possessions in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans (London: Whittaker & Co., 1837); 
Robert Montgomery Martin, Statistics of the Colonies of the British Empire: From the Official Records of the 
Colonial Office (London: W.H. Allen and Co., 1839). For a full account of Martin’s work see Frank H. H. King, 
Survey Our Empire! Robert Montgomery Martin (1801-1868): A Bio-Bibliography (Hong Kong: University of 
Hong Kong, 1979). 
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Perceptions of Chinese character were also formed in a wider context of declining 
Anglo-Chinese diplomatic and commercial relations. The frustration of the Macartney 
Embassy is a good example of how wider diplomatic events shaped British attempts to 
understand China. The most famous texts to emerge directly from the Embassy were Aeneas 
Anderson’s A Narrative of the British Embassy to China (1795) and Sir George Staunton’s An 
Authentic account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain (1797). Staunton – whose 
son Thomas was an interpreter for the Embassy and would later advocate military action 
against China as an MP – showed a particular interest in understanding the Chinese 
character.25 His account of the Embassy includes various attempts to describe unique Chinese 
characteristics, such as extracts on the ‘character of civil and military officers’, ‘thoughts of a 
person long resident in China, as to the character of the people and government in that 
country’, ‘trait in character of Chinese’, and the ‘character of Chinese men’.26 Scholars have 
emphasised how Macartney and other members of the mission observed a China in decline. 
Macartney referred to China as ‘an old, crazy, first rate man-of-war’.27 Such observations 
have been identified as the starting point of a re-evaluation of China’s position in the world.28 
The Embassy also confirmed the superiority of British technology and, consequently, British 
civilization.29 The failure of the Macartney Embassy was followed by similar diplomatic 
failures by Lord Amherst (1816) and William Napier (1834), which again provided more 
accounts of a tyrannical Qing Empire in decline.30 As Anglo-Chinese trade grew, and the 
British state became increasingly concerned by the lack of diplomatic progress, questions 
about who the Chinese were and what delineated their character became increasingly 
interesting to metropolitan and imperial audiences.  
Histories of Western perceptions of China have repeatedly pointed to a growth in 
publishing on China in the 1830s. Figure 2.1 shows the growth of titles as demonstrated by 
John Lust’s Western Books on China Published up to 1850, which is a descriptive catalogue 
of the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). Though the SOAS 
collection makes no claim to be comprehensive, the collection of 654 texts – predominantly in 
                                                 
25 Julia Lovell, The Great Wall: China Against the World (London: Atlantic Books, 2006), pp. 4-9. 
26 Sir George Staunton, An authentic account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain (London: G. Nicol, 
1797), pp. x-xvii. Similar efforts to use diplomatic missions to evaluate the civilizational status and nature of a 
‘closed’ nation can be seen in US exchange with Japan in the 1850s, see Jeffrey A. Keith, ‘Civilization, Race, 
and the Japan Expedition’s Cultural Diplomacy, 1853-1854’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 35, No. 2 (April 2011), p. 
193.   
27 Helen H. Robbins, Our first ambassador to China : an account of the life of George, Earl of Macartney, with 
extracts from his letters, and the narrative of his experiences in China, as told by himself, 1737-1806, from 
hitherto unpublished correspondence and documents (London: John Murray, 1908), p. 386.  
28 Chen, ‘The British View of Chinese Civilization and Emergence of Class Consciousness’, pp. 193-205. 
29 Berg, ‘Britain, Industry and Perceptions of China’, p. 270.  
30 Gao, ‘The Amherst Embassy and British Discoveries in China’; Gao, ‘Prelude to the Opium War?’, Melancon, 
‘Peaceful Intentions’.   
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English, French, Spanish or German – illustrates general, long-term trends in Western 
publishing on China. The volume of book publications on China increased decade by decade 
in the early nineteenth century. Figure 2.1 shows the general upward trend in publications that 
peaked in the 1830s and 1840s – with the 1770s and 1780s also particularly high due to the 
prolific publication record of French Jesuit missionaries Pierre-Martial Cibot, Antoine Gaubil 
and J. J. P. Amiot: 
 
Figure 2.1. Western books on China published up to 1850.  
 
The 1830s was clearly a peak decade for Western publishing on China. The slight decline in 
publications in the 1840s indicates that this was not part of a perpetual increase but that the 
peak of interest in the 1830s was specific. As Robert Bickers has commented, ‘publication 
numbers on China have shown a close relationship to the newsworthiness of the country as it 
affected foreign interests’.31 Peaks in publication figures were also influenced by the means of 
the publishers. As seen in this chapter, foreign merchant firms consciously attempted to guide 
public discourse on China.32  
Among the increased number of nineteenth century texts there was also a greater 
spread of topics – this contrasts with the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when missionary 
                                                 
31 Robert Bickers, ‘British Travel Writing from China in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of the Economic and 
Social History of the Orient, 54 (2011), p. 781; Review of Elizabeth H. Chang (ed.), British Travel Writing From 
China, 1798-1901. 5 vols. (Routledge, 2009).  
32 A similar desire to articulate the narrative and interests of a specific merchant community was expressed in 
Shanghai. Specifically, see the work of Robert Bickers.  
Source: John Lust, Western books on China published up to 1850 (Library of the School of Oriental and 
African   Studies, University of London).  
 
 68 
 
works focusing on theological matters, such as Ricci’s De Christiana Expeditione Apud Sinas 
(1615) or Gaubil’s Memoire Sur Les Juifs Establish en Chine (1780-1783), had dominated.33 
That is not to say that nineteenth-century missionaries were not concerned with Chinese 
religion, but that a greater diversity of topics, such as Chinese society, Chinese politics and 
international relations, became the focus of nineteenth-century Sinology. As suggested by 
Ting Tsao, the removal of the EIC monopoly allowed for a more political and visceral public 
debate of the ‘China question’. The commercial and political space left by the removal of the 
EIC was exploited by Jardine Matheson. The consequent, un-regulated exploration of the 
China coast allowed for the development of different genres such as the exploratory narrative, 
the political pamphlet and the military account.34 These new genres fitted within broader 
literary developments. As Mary Louise Pratt has outlined, the development of new forms of 
travel and exploration writing were connected to ‘European economic and political 
expansion’.35 As greater numbers of foreigners gained access to China, for diverse primary 
purposes, different forms of travel writing became increasingly common.  
Early nineteenth century missionary texts on China are notably diverse. Charles 
Gutzlaff who features heavily throughout this thesis, due to his close working relationship 
with Jardine Matheson, is a good example of a missionary who disseminated knowledge 
about China to a wider audience.36 Similarly to Gutzlaff, the missionary Robert Morrison 
(who worked as a translator for the EIC and edited the Jardine Matheson-owned newspaper 
the Canton Register) also wrote widely. In doing so he went well beyond the brief of his 
missionary role. An accomplished linguist, Morrison became best known for his Grammar of 
the Chinese Language, which was published by the EIC, and as a pioneer of Chinese 
language teaching in Britain.37 Morrison’s interest in learning the Chinese language came 
from a broader philosophy of immersive mission promoted by the London Missionary Society 
(hereafter LMS). It was commonly accepted that in order to improve the chances of 
conversion, Western missionaries required as much knowledge about China and the Chinese 
as possible.38  
                                                 
33 Burke and Po-Chia Hsia, Cultural Translation in Early Modern Europe, p. 39. 
34 Tsao, Representing China to the British Public in the Age of Free Trade, p. iv.  
35 Pratt, Imperial Eyes, p. 3. 
36 Details of Gutzlaff’s publications will be discussed in this chapter and his role with Jardine Matheson will be 
detailed in chapter three.   
37 R. K. Douglas, ‘Morrison, Robert (1782–1834)’, rev. Robert Bickers, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2007 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19330, accessed 27 September 2015]. 
38 Edwin J. Van Kley, ‘Europe’s “Discovery” of China and the Writing of World History’, American Historical 
Review, 76 (1971), pp. 358-85; This was standard practise for the LMS, see Christopher Allen Daily, ‘From 
Gosport to Canton: A new approach to Robert Morrison and the beginnings of protestant missions in China’ 
(Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, SOAS, 2009) for more on the methods used by LMS missionaries.   
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Missionaries disseminated the information and knowledge they collected and as a 
result played a vital role in discussions of the Chinese character. For example, William 
Milne’s ‘Account of a Secret Association in China, Entitled the Triad Society’ articulated 
many of the tropes commonly deployed to denigrate Chinese labourers in Singapore as 
subversive gambling and opium addicts.39 Often critiques of the Chinese in missionary 
literature were set alongside critiques of contemporary merchants. The LMS missionary 
Walter Henry Medhurst admonished the ‘sinful condition’ of the Chinese in the same chapter 
that he ‘appealed’ to the ‘opium merchant’.40 One of the most important missionary authors 
was Elijah Bridgman, the first American missionary to China, who edited the regular title the 
Chinese Repository and collaborated with missionary colleagues from varied backgrounds.41 
Missionaries – though often semi-autonomous and morally conflicted, as they balanced access 
to unsaved souls against the evils of opium addiction – were at the forefront of defining the 
attributes of the Chinese character over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
Whilst missionaries were critical in shaping perceptions of the Chinese, growing 
political and commercial interest in China in the 1830s meant that the Chinese character was 
increasingly open to definition by different Western actors. British territorial expansion in 
Asia opened up avenues for colonial officials to be established as experts, as seen by the 
example of John Crawfurd in Singapore.42 Crawfurd’s experience in Asia and his connections 
to both metropolitan and colonial power brokers meant that his opinions on the Chinese – 
whether given through publications, personal letters or evidence to parliamentary select 
committees – were influential.43 Experts from contact zones in Asia were increasingly 
appropriated by metropolitan authors. Robert Montgomery Martin’s British Relations with the 
Chinese Empire (1832) was a prime example, as Martin dedicated an entire chapter to John 
Crawfurd’s ‘opinions of the Chinese’, which reflected the perceived significance of 
Crawfurd’s first-hand experience in Asia.44 Crawfurd and Martin were not impartial 
observers, but heavily committed to the expansion of British imperial control and trade across 
Asia. Authors like Crawfurd were more directly connected to imperial power structures and 
                                                 
39 Milne, ‘Account of a Secret Association in China, Entitled the Triad Society’, p. 241. For the importance of 
these stereotypes and their connection to opium consumption see Lovell, The Opium War. 
40 Walter Henry Medhurst, China: its State and Prospects (Boston: Crocker & Brewster, 1838), p. 67.  
41 Bickers, The Scramble for China, p. 36; Jessie Gregory Lutz, Opening China: Karl F. A. Gutzlaff and Sino-
Western Relations, 1827-1852 (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans, 2008), p. 151.  
42 Crawfurd’s background was discussed at length in chapter one; Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago, 
Vols. I-III; Hugh Murray and John Crawfurd et al., An Historical and Descriptive Account of China, Vol. I 
(Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1836). 
43 Kumagai, Breaking into the Monopoly, pp. 93-113; Webster, The Twilight of the East India Company. 
44 Robert Montgomery Martin, British Relations with the Chinese Empire in 1832 (London: Parbury, Allen & 
Co., 1832).  
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systems of colonial rule than their missionary contemporaries.45 Wider debates about national 
character, the increased economic significance of Anglo-Chinese relations and the growing 
number of China experts in Asian contact zones all contributed to developing notions of 
Chinese character over the 1830s.   
 Authors with different background and interests understood China through different 
analytical frameworks. However, the 1830s and 1840s also saw a degree of standardization 
with an increase in the number of texts that utilised the specific vocabulary of ‘character’. In 
this period the Chinese Repository repeatedly ran sections on the ‘Chinese national character’ 
and the indexes contained similar terminology, including references to the ‘Chinese, their 
national character’ and ‘the character of Chinamen’.46 One of the first texts with a titular 
reference to character was the British missionary and diplomat George Tradescant Lay’s The 
Chinese as They Are: Their Moral, Social and Literary Character, which was published at the 
height of the Opium War in 1841.47 That Lay sought to engage with numerous aspects of 
‘character’ reflects the various uses and adaptations of ethnic character as a concept. For 
Charles Gutzlaff character was suffixed with ‘religion’, whilst for the later Governor of Hong 
Kong John Francis Davis character was defined by ‘manners’.48 Character meant different 
things to different observers, yet it was a useful shorthand to generalise personality traits and 
attach them to specific ethnic groups.    
The language of character was so pervasive that in 1831 outgoing EIC Select 
Committee President Charles Marjoribanks wrote a Brief Account of the English Character, 
which was translated into Chinese by Robert Morrison and was distributed on voyages along 
the China coast by Charles Gutzlaff and Hugh Hamilton Lindsay.49 The distribution of the 
tract on these voyages indicates the role of newly empowered private interests in aggressively 
challenging both Chinese and British authorities. William Jardine endorsed Gutzlaff’s 
involvement in exploration aboard the Lord Amherst.50 Additionally, Lindsay distributed 
Marjoribanks’ pamphlet in contravention of the instructions of his successor, John Davis.51 
The tract highlighted English desire for trade, which was evidenced by the distance that ships 
travelled to China; emphasised that there was no desire for conquest, given that Britain 
                                                 
45 See chapter one for an overview of Crawfurd’s writing on the Chinese in Asia and his background.  
46 Chinese Repository, Vol. I (1833); Chinese Repository, Vol. X (1841); Chinese Repository, Vol. XI (1842). 
47 George Tradescant Lay, The Chinese as They Are: Their Moral, Social and Literary Character (London: 
William Ball & Co., 1841). 
48 Charles Gutzlaff, A Sketch of Chinese History, Ancient and Modern, Vol.I (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 
1834), pp. 43-54; John Francis Davis, The Chinese: a general description of the empire of China and its 
inhabitants (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1836), p. 240.  
49 Robert Bickers, ‘The Challenger: Hugh Hamilton Lindsay and the rise of British Asia, 1832-1865’, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th series, 22 (2012), pp. 147-150 
50 Bickers, The Scramble for China, p. 27. 
51 For more on the conduct of Lindsay during this voyage see Bickers, ‘The Challenger’.  
 71 
 
already had a large empire; and cited assistance to shipwrecked Chinese sailors and Chinese 
merchants as evidence of English kindness.52 In detailing the English character Marjoribanks 
also praised the commercial character of the Chinese: ‘the people of China are highly 
intelligent, industrious, and prosperous’.53 By the 1830s the need to understand and 
essentialize the Chinese character was acknowledged by various Western observers, and 
especially by British imperial actors and stakeholders. Moreover, the notion of character was 
not merely a useful interpretative concept, but it was used actively in Anglo-Chinese 
interactions as a tool to try and engender changes in policy in both Britain and China. 
 
The 1830s and the Chinese Character 
The construction of an archetypal Chinese character became increasingly common in English 
language publishing over the 1830s, but what characteristics were believed to be Chinese? As 
Ulrike Hillemann has commented, there was never ‘one single idea of China’ that was 
universally accepted, but some common themes did emerge in English language publishing 
over the 1830s.54 This section explores some of the traits that were believed to make up the 
Chinese character and their significance. Many of the sources examined were publications 
funded and published under the auspices of Jardine Matheson (such as the newspaper the 
Canton Register, which acted as the public mouthpiece of the firm) as the firm developed a 
sizeable publication network.55 Yet even within this network many of the character traits 
discussed in contemporary publications were seemingly contradictory. Jardine Matheson’s 
publications described the Chinese as both hard working labourers and lazy opium addicts; or 
commercially astute and trustworthy, yet fundamentally deceitful. Despite these 
inconsistencies, the characteristics ascribed to the Chinese had significant consequences. 
Ideas about character were important in creating a distinction between the Chinese people and 
the Qing Empire. This divide was used to promote both the economic intrusion of Britain’s 
informal empire into China and to advocate the use of Chinese migrant labour in the British 
Empire.  
Chapter one demonstrated how the relative industriousness of the Chinese, in 
comparison to other Asian ethnic groups, was lauded by British colonial observers. For those 
interested in sourcing cheap and effective migrant labour the fact that Chinese migrants 
embraced a contractual employer-employee relationship, unlike many indigenous ethnic 
                                                 
52 Ting Man Tsao, ‘Representing "Great England" to Qing China in the Age of Free Trade Imperialism: The 
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groups, was an overwhelmingly positive trait. Eulogies of Chinese labour were commonplace 
in English language publications. For example, articles in the Canton Register praised 
Chinese ingenuity in ‘agricultural labour’ and ‘irrigation’ in order to feed such a large 
population.56 Chinese ethnic traits were identified as useful to British modes of production in 
Asian colonies. The Chinese Repository (published by the American missionary Elijah 
Bridgman) detailed how China’s ‘increasing numbers taught them the necessity of labour’ but 
simultaneously lamented that ‘in olden times they were far more sincere, honest, and less 
corrupted than at present’.57 Much praise of the Chinese was tempered in that it suggested 
they were less savage than other ethnic groups, rather than virtuous in their own right: 
‘piracies were committed on the coast of China more frequently than even in the waters of the 
Indian Archipelago. But the desperadoes of this country are not as bloodthirsty as the Malays, 
and therefore fewer people were killed and less ravages committed’.58 Moreover, the common 
trope of an innate predilection to addiction – which, according to Jardine Matheson, was the 
cause of the opium crisis – was extended to include gambling as an ethnic trait: ‘all classes of 
persons, coolies, servants, shopmen, gentlemen of town and country, officers civil and 
military, old men and boys, engage in gambling’.59 In the 1830s many of these negative 
stereotypes became connected to an idea of an archetypal Chinese character. Crucially, the 
vices of the Chinese were redeemable because of their embrace of Western-style economic 
and labour relationships.  
Jardine Matheson provide a good example of the importance of the influence of 
economic relationships on perceptions of the Chinese character. The firm simultaneously 
maintained a friendly relationship with Hong merchants and Chinese employees, known as 
compradors, whilst holding Qing officials in contempt. This distinction was regularly 
articulated in the Canton Register, which often critiqued Chinese officials and defended 
Chinese merchants.60 However, members of the firm did not make such distinctions clear 
when addressing a British audience. Matheson began his 1836 book The Present Position and 
Prospects of the British Trade with China by describing ‘the Chinese – a people characterised 
by a marvellous degree of imbecility, avarice, conceit, and obstinacy’.61 Throughout the book, 
which emphasised the perceived oppression of Western merchants by Chinese officials, 
Matheson made repeated reference to the Chinese character. For example, he explained that 
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the poor policy of the EIC was based on ‘an utter ignorance of the real character of the 
Chinese’ which was ‘mercenary and rapacious’.62 Matheson also attributed Chinese imperial 
policy to the ‘far-sighted cunning and inflexible pertinacity of the Chinese character’.63 
Resistance to the opium trade, and reluctance to liberalise trade with the West in general, 
motivated Matheson’s critique. He chastised the ‘policy of this extraordinary people, to 
shroud themselves’ and complained at how the Chinese ‘consider all other inhabitants of the 
earth ... as barbarians’.64 In writing for a metropolitan audience Matheson made little effort to 
differentiate between the Chinese people and the Qing Empire as his China coast newspaper 
did.  
The distinction between the government and population was crucial on the China 
coast. A positive review of James Matheson’s book from the rival Canton newspaper the 
Canton Press explained that the difficulties faced by the merchants were the fault of the 
government and not the population: ‘the Chinese Empire has, ever since the first European 
adventurers made their appearance on the coasts of China, restricted the intercourse between 
them and its own subjects’.65 The merchants at Canton continually emphasised the desire of 
China’s ‘subjects’ to trade. Of particular use to Western authors were the northern, Manchu 
origins of the ruling Qing dynasty, which allowed the imperial elite to be portrayed as a 
foreign ruling power with the true (Han) Chinese living under their ‘yoke’.66 The use of the 
term ‘yoke’ invoked a developing mythology of Britain’s own historical development. The 
growth of democracy in the nineteenth century British Empire was framed as a reclamation of 
Anglo-Saxon freedoms from Norman tyranny.67 Articles on Chinese history appeared 
frequently in journals like the Chinese Repository and provided a historical context for the 
perceived despotism of the Qing Empire: ‘it is now about one hundred and eighty years since 
the Tartars obtained the government of the whole Chinese dominions ... they imposed certain 
regulations which were viewed by the conquered either as highly disgraceful or oppressive’.68 
Western awareness of the diversity of ethnicity, language and culture in nineteenth century 
China was most commonly expressed in critiques of the Qing. A virtuous Chinese population 
victimised by cruel foreign rulers legitimised the Western merchant’s contravention of 
Chinese laws and formed part of the justification of the Opium War as a war of liberation.  
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The salvation of the Chinese population from the despotism of the Qing Empire was 
deemed particularly important because the Chinese people were already civilized. A letter to 
the editor of the Canton Register articulated this: ‘now if you disapprove of the state of mean 
submission and ignorance in which the Chinese are placed … you have no alternative … but 
to reclaim them from the alarming degree of civilization in which they already stand’.69 The 
idea that China’s historical civilization was in jeopardy was a common theme of Western 
writing.70 For Walter Henry Medhurst, China exhibited ‘many traces of civilization’ but at the 
present time ‘possesses as much civilization as Turkey now, or England a few centuries 
ago’.71 For missionaries, like Medhurst, China’s once great civilization was now in decline. 
Qing China, in spite of the civilizational potential of its population, was moving backwards. 
The ‘reclamation’ of Chinese civilization could be interpreted as the opening of China to 
Western trade or religion; as a justification for war; or to promote emigration into the British 
Empire. These different openings demonstrated the various routes to civilizational salvation.   
The conclusion of many British observers was that if the Chinese were more civilized 
than other Asian ethnic groups, but inhibited by a despotic government and some innate 
character flaws, they would be able to prosper under British rule. Chinese despotism should 
not just be removed, it should also make way for British civilization.72 The Canton Register 
invoked the most British of symbols, John Bull, to criticise the authoritarian Qing Empire in 
an article titled ‘Happiness of the Chinese’. The Register asked ‘what would John Bull think 
of being sentenced to be pilloried for two or three months; beaten with a hundred cudgel 
blows, and transported three years, for killing an ox in order to eat it?’73 In an article titled 
‘Barbarism - Civilisation’ the Register invoked the global progress of the Anglo-world as 
evidence that the Chinese must convert to British notions of governance and international 
relations:74  
 
By what right are the aborigines of North America and New Holland driven from 
their indisputable homes by the governments of the United States and Great 
Britain? By no other than that barbarism must vanish before civilisation, 
ignorance succumb to knowledge: such appears to be a law of nature, or rather, 
the will of God!75  
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The comparison of the Chinese with the ‘the aborigines of North America and New Holland’ 
shows the importance of notions of civilization as a justification for British, and more broadly 
Western, imperialism. These notions underwrote Jardine Matheson’s challenge of Qing 
authority. Such a comparison simultaneously emphasised the perceived contrast in terms of 
civilization between the Chinese and indigenous colonial populations. The specific problem in 
the case of China was the Qing dynasty’s despotic rule: ‘the intrigue and deceit of the 
Chinese, and the rude courage of the Tartar, seem to unite in what may be considered the 
present national character of China’.76 The prevailing argument of the 1830s was that to 
liberate the southern Han Chinese from their current rulers and place them under British rule 
would be mutually beneficial. Perspectives on China and the Chinese were informed and 
constructed in the context of the British Empire. These concepts of Chinese character as 
compatible with British authority were not just being discussed in newspapers and travel 
literature but were already tested in the contact zone of Singapore in the 1820s and 1830s. 
Concepts of a homogenous Chinese national character, or even a binary divide 
between Chinese people and state, were complicated by variations of language, ethnicity, 
class and geography. For the Western mercantile community, the Chinese merchant elites and 
Chinese compradors were particularly important groups in facilitating the China trade. They 
therefore attracted special praise in contrast to the Chinese populace as a whole. This praise 
was motivated partly by economic necessity, but also class distinctions and a mutual 
understanding of commercial respectability. Hugh Hamilton Lindsay – the aggressive free 
trade advocate, EIC official, pamphleteer, and later MP – wrote of the Chinese merchant 
elite’s ‘high character’ and suggested that ‘it would be difficult to find, in any community of 
merchants, men more alive to the feelings of humanity’.77 The close business relationship 
between merchants and ‘respectable’ Chinese was perhaps no better demonstrated than by the 
role of the Chinese buys for Western firms, later known as compradors.78 Chinese compradors 
were employed by Western merchant houses to conduct sales and purchases from Chinese 
merchants. The responsibility of compradors implied a high level of trust as Western 
merchants often lacked the necessary linguistic abilities to properly monitor transactions or 
negotiate with Chinese business partners.79 Jardine Matheson were particularly reliant on 
Chinese staff as they employed a house steward (or lead comprador), a provisions comprador, 
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a cash comprador and an operational comprador, who as a group acted as a ‘Chinese firm 
within a foreign firm’.80 A good example of the closeness of these business relationships was 
the Western defence of comprador turned Hong merchant Aming in 1836. Having been tried 
and prosecuted for his involvement in smuggling, the Western merchant community 
petitioned Chinese officials for his release, publicised his plight, and many prominent 
merchants visited him during his incarceration.81 The close mutual interests of Western 
merchants and their Chinese employees and business partners meant that these groups were 
often insulated from criticisms and negative tropes attached to the Chinese character or Qing 
officials.   
Of course the defence of Aming also provided Western merchants with an opportunity 
to advocate their own economic interests. In critiques of the Qing Empire, a general sense of 
Chinese institutional corruption was paramount.82 The Canton Register ran numerous stories 
presenting Anglo-Chinese conflicts as tensions between civilization and barbarism. One of the 
most commonly invoked differentiators was the distinction between British and Chinese legal 
systems, an unsurprising choice given that Jardine Matheson were violating Chinese laws but 
not British ones.83 Amongst the merchants’ complaints were the absence of a jury system, the 
lack of respect for private property and, as can be seen in this extract from the Register, the 
use of torture by the authorities: ‘the unfortunate and tortured Aming was brought out of the 
city under a guard, wearing a heavy wooden collar … his confession of his guilt has been 
wrung from him by torture: an Englishman, therefore, considers him innocent.’84 The case of 
Aming demonstrates the close personal relationships between the European and Chinese 
merchant communities, but it also served as a useful example of Qing injustice.   
More important than class difference or economic co-operation, particularly with 
regards to emigration, was the importance of Chinese regional and linguistic variations – 
though such distinctions were not always identified by contemporary Western observers. 
Whilst recognised as a China expert, Charles Gutzlaff described China as the ‘largest and 
most homogenous nation’ in the world.85 Yet many of Gutzlaff’s contemporaries, and 
subsequent historians, have emphasised the significance of regional variations. As Fairbank 
and Gregory have highlighted, China’s regions can be historically compared to European 
nation-states in terms of geographical size, population, linguistic divergence and cultural 
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identity, if not political autonomy.86 The idea of China as a nation of nations is certainly 
tangible if we accept the primacy of language as a marker of national identity. As was 
demonstrated by the writing of Seah Eu Chin, the Chinese community of Singapore was a 
good example of this divergence as the Chinese in the colony were separated into six ‘tribes’ 
based on dialect groupings.87 It is also important to stress that the identification of Chinese 
regional distinctions often took place in contact zones that were external to China.  
Existing literature has underplayed the extent to which migration was essential to 
Western knowledge of regional difference. Chinese emigrants would form ethnic associations 
based on points of geographical origin in their adopted homelands.88 Migrants of a shared 
dialect group would often relocate to the same destinations due to local and familial networks. 
Linguistically or regionally connected migrants would form a qiaoxiang, or ‘emigrant 
community’, which reflected the social structures of mainland China.89 As the vast majority of 
emigrants were from southern China it was common for Western colonial observers to 
emphasise regional distinctions with the north.90 One of the main regions of emigration, 
Fukien (Fujian province), was particularly singled out for praise by Western authors, in 
contrast to northern China. For example, Robert Mudie wrote of Fukien, ‘the inhabitants of 
this province are remarkably industrious’.91 Socio-economic practices, such as footbinding, 
were particularly useful as identifiers of regional difference and allowed for Western 
promotion of the perceived ethnic traits of southern over northern Chinese.92 The 
acknowledgement of Chinese regional difference, based around concepts like 
‘industriousness’, served the broader narrative of a Chinese population that could be separated 
conceptually from the Qing Empire. Ironically, the fact that China was an Empire – with 
Taiwan, Mongolia and Tibet to ‘China proper’ over the 1600s – opened the Qing to criticism 
from agents of British imperialism.93 The north-south distinction heavily fed into the idea that 
the Han Chinese of the southern regions required liberation from their despotic rulers.  
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The Chinese Character and the Opium War 
There is a vast body of English and Chinese-language literature on the significance, events 
and narratives of the First Opium War.94 As the focus of this thesis is on Chinese migration 
over a period that includes the war, it is essential to consider the impact of the War on the idea 
of the Chinese character and its implications for Chinese migration in the British Empire. 
Moreover, Jardine Matheson had a key role in the events that led to the war and in supporting 
British intervention in defence of their economic interests. Through the post-war era and up to 
the 1970s historians had generally accepted the Victorian discourse of the Opium War as a 
‘clash of civilizations’ – in the British mind between liberal Britain and authoritarian China; 
in the Chinese mind between imperialist Britain and a vulnerable, weak and declining Chinese 
state.95 More recently, as a number of key works have added nuance to our understanding of 
Chinese opium culture, the broader historical narrative of the war has become more 
complex.96 A key factor in this development has been increased access to Chinese archives.97 
This section will draw on two key points raised from recent literature on the Opium War. 
First, Lovell suggests that the idea of a clash of civilizations is too simplistic and does not 
account for the variety of motivations and responses to war on both sides.98 The diversity of 
the authors discussed in this chapter – whether missionaries, merchants, military or colonial 
officials – means that there was no single perspective or interpretation of the war. For 
example, whilst merchants were primarily motivated by economic interests, more abstract 
notions, such as honour, were also significant.99 Second, an important point for migration 
history raised by several of Christopher Munn’s publications, is that the outcome of the 
Opium War (particularly the Treaty of Nanking and the cession of Hong Kong) meant the 
                                                 
94 For a good overview of events or the background context see Lovell, The Opium War or Gregory, The West 
and China Since 1500.  
95 For the clash of Civilizations literature see: Hsin-pao Chan, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War, 1840-1842: Barbarians in the 
Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the nineteenth Century and the War by Which They Forced Her Gates Ajar 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975); Gerald Graham, The China Station: War and 
Diplomacy, 1830-1860 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); Tan Chung, China and the Brave New World: A study 
of the Origins of the Opium War (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1978); J. Beeching, The Chinese Opium 
Wars (New York: Harcourt, 1975). 
96 Specifically see the work of Frank Dikotter, Lars Laaman, Zhou Xun and Yangwen Zheng. M. Booth, Opium: 
A History (St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1996); Chris Feige and Jeffrey A. Miron, ‘The Opium Wars, Opium 
Legalization and Opium Consumption in China’, Applied Economics Letters, 15 (2008) pp. 911-913. 
97 Specifically Lovell, The Opium War, has drawn on the work of Mao Haijian; Polachek, The Inner Opium War; 
A. Waley, The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995); Zhu Xiehan, 
Yapian zhanzheng shihua [A Narrative of the Opium War] (Beijing: Social Research Press, 2000). 
98 Lovell, The Opium War, pp. 333-336. 
99 This point on differing motivations has been discussed in Melancon, Britain’s China Policy and the Opium 
Crisis, p. 1; Melancon’s work emphasises the importance of honour and contests the more economically 
determined view of British Opium War policy put forward by David Owen, British Opium Policy in China and 
India (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 
 79 
 
British faced the challenge of colony building on the China coast itself.100 This colony would, 
in turn, attract vast numbers of migrants from mainland China and act as a point of onward 
migration. Hong Kong would also become a new Anglo-Chinese contact zone. As colonial 
discourse in early Hong Kong was grounded in the context of the war, Opium War-era 
discussions of Chinese character had a significant impact on perceptions of Chinese migrants 
in the 1840s. Importantly, the way that the ‘opening’ or ‘modernization’ of China was 
presented as a necessary act of liberation, justified both the aggression of the Opium War and 
the increased circumvention of the Qing prohibition of emigration.     
The First Opium War generated a great deal of debate and analysis of China in Britain. 
The Canton Register figured heavily as a source of information during the war years.101 
Between 1839 and 1843 a total of 261 Canton Register articles were quoted at length or 
reprinted in British newspapers, compared with lower figures over the 1830s as a whole.102 
Over the same period 165 articles were quoted or reprinted in Australian titles.103 These 
articles were generally concerned with updates on the progress of the war, for which ‘Latest 
News from China’ or ‘Military News’ were popular titles.104 These stories were focused on 
the success or failure of military operations as opposed to the wider rhetoric of the war or 
debates about the Chinese character. References to ‘Jardine Matheson’ over the same period 
were largely concerned with trade news and shipping information, showing the resilience of 
the firm’s clandestine networks during the suspension of trade.105 The opium trade itself was a 
hotly contested subject, with critics in the religious and industrial communities suggesting 
that the drug was immoral or preventing Chinese capital from being used to purchase British 
manufactures.106 These attacks were mitigated by the fact that by the end of the war even 
Alexander Matheson – then acting as head of Jardine Matheson in Hong Kong – did not 
support opium legalization as he feared taxation and increased competition from smaller 
firms.107 Metropolitan commentators often combined criticism of the opium trade with 
criticism of Qing officials. In an article titled ‘The Opium Trade and its Defenders’ the Leeds 
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Mercury concluded that though the trade was ultimately undesirable, ‘our conduct  should be 
regulated not by considerations of right and wrong, but by our own estimate, whether true or 
false, of the honesty and fair dealing of the other party’.108 In essence, the Chinese authorities 
were presented as so corrupt that the actions of British merchants were negligible by 
comparison.  
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1839 there was a growing sense that an 
aggressive opening of China would benefit a range of connected British interests. Considering 
James Matheson’s economic interests in such an opening it is unsurprising that his 1836 
Present Position and Prospects repeatedly made the case for a more aggressive diplomatic 
policy towards China and ultimately military intervention. As well as critiquing the 
‘submissive’ policy of the EIC, Matheson described William Napier’s death in 1834 as ‘Yet 
Unavenged!’ and asked ‘are the Chinese so formidable in a warlike point of view?’109 
Alongside Matheson’s aggressive rhetoric, religious motivations coalesced with economic 
interests in advocating for a China that was more open to outside influence.110 Gutzlaff’s aptly 
named 1838 work China Opened began by bemoaning that ‘whilst civilization has advanced 
with rapid strides … it was not able to overstep the barrier which an anti-national Chinese 
policy created around the Celestial Empire’.111 Despite Gutzlaff’s opposition to opium 
consumption, his missionary practice in China was reliant on the opium trading system of 
Jardine Matheson and he relished the prospect of a more open relationship with China, which 
ultimately depended on British aggression.112 Shared self-interest effectively unified different 
actors and institutions, with different motives and priorities, in broad support of Britain’s 
China policy. The various ways in which China could be opened – to British commerce, to 
Christianity, to emigration – were all contingent on the success of Palmerston’s attack on 
China in bringing significant change.  
The belief that the Chinese were predisposed to submit to despotism was a key 
component of the construction of the Chinese character. This was further cemented by 
accounts of the war.  At the beginning of his Narrative of the Late Proceedings and Events in 
China John Slade asked ‘what is the ruling passion of the Chinese nation? A love of peace 
and submission to rulers?’113 An example that was commonly deployed to highlight Chinese 
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despotism was the treatment of women, specifically footbinding. Discussions of the treatment 
of women was a common theme in British imperial discourse more broadly as liberal thinkers 
utilised developing notions of humanitarianism to denigrate subject cultures.114 Captain 
Arthur Cunynghame’s account of Service in China and Robert Mudie’s China and its 
Resources both highlighted footbinding as an example of Chinese despotism and 
barbarism.115 Mudie was particularly critical of the gender-power relationship incarnate in the 
footbinding process and how it made Chinese women ‘helpless dependents upon the other 
sex’.116 Mudie did qualify his concern for the rights of Chinese women by explaining that 
contemporary European women ‘often exercise too much authority’.117 In broad constructs of 
otherness, for example in twenty-first century debates about Islam and the West, 
denunciations of culture are often couched in terms of gender.118   
The critique of Chinese gender roles also served as a critique of Chinese masculinity. 
In contrast to comparable notions of the ‘effeminate Bengali’, footbinding implied a 
viciousness and cruelty.119 Whilst Indian men were characterised as effeminate and Chinese 
men were characterised as cruel, British men were neither. Such concepts served to justify 
British colonial rule as the associated traits of British masculinity were suited to benevolent 
leadership. An example of the intersection between gender politics and imperial rule is the 
Indian funeral practice of Sati which, partly thanks to metropolitan pressure, was abolished in 
Bengal in 1829.120 Similar humanitarian pressure groups emerged in opposition to footbinding 
in China in the late nineteenth century.121 Footbinding – which was a particularly effective 
emotional device, due to its shock value to Western observers – supplemented the wider 
articulation of macro-despotism of the Chinese nation with an example of micro-despotism 
from the Chinese domestic sphere. 
The opium question was dominated by the assumption that addiction was an 
inherently Chinese trait. Commentators from both ends of the spectrum – that is, both critics 
and defenders of the opium trade – agreed that Chinese consumers would abuse opium 
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regardless of European supply.122 Hugh Hamilton Lindsay’s The Rupture with China and its 
Causes included an ardent defence of the trade by pointing to what he saw as the hypocrisy of 
opponents who ‘do not, and dare not, interfere with the gin drinkers at home’, and argued that 
‘opium was smoked in China long before it was introduced by Europeans’.123 George 
Tradescant Lay, like many missionaries, objected to the opium trade and consumption on 
moral grounds. Lay suggested that, as a result of the trade, ‘thieves of a most dexterous kind, 
and rogues of every description, are plentiful in China’.124 Lay’s thoughts on the Chinese 
demonstrate the complexities of defining the Chinese character during the war. Despite 
berating the ‘thieves’ and ‘rogues’, Lay also praised Chinese entrepreneurship: ‘a Chinaman 
is a man of business, and therefore understands the value of truth.’125 Again, Lay’s discussion 
of the Chinese character highlights implied distinctions of class and region. The overriding 
theme of Opium War literature was that whilst the Chinese character did possess positive or 
useful traits it ultimately required liberation from its current circumstances, which encouraged 
despotism, cruelty, avarice and deceit. 
As liberation was the prescribed route to salvation for the positive aspects of the 
Chinese character it followed that Chinese emigration was largely seen as positive in Opium 
War discourse. Mudie, as one of the most vociferous critics of the Chinese authorities, praised 
existing migration to the ‘Oriental archipelago’ where the Chinese were a ‘steady and 
industrious people’.126 British victory in the war was seen by many as an exciting prospect in 
opening opportunities for Chinese migration in the British Empire, especially with the 
controversial establishment of Hong Kong as a British colony.127 A newspaper editorial in the 
Essex Standard exemplified this hope: 
 
The Chinese Government has hitherto prevented as much as possible the 
emigration of the people ... The delusion is over, the veil is removed, and a current 
of feeling has set in which will be too strong to be restrained among so money-
loving a people as the Chinese. The despotism which has hitherto directed the 
destinies of China has received a fatal blow.128 
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The ‘opening’ of China was a cause for optimism for all those interested in utilising Chinese 
migrant labour. The need for liberation lent a moral imperative to both the military action of 
the Opium War and the forcible opening of China to increased emigration.  
Perceptions of the Chinese character were dictated by concepts of utility and the needs 
and expectations of British imperialism. As such a binary of positive and negative is of little 
use when examining the construction of an archetypal Chinese character. Walter Henry 
Medhurst connected the Chinese character to colonial labour shortages when he suggested 
that the Chinese should migrate to ‘New Holland’ where ‘millions of acres await their 
assiduous and energetic cultivation’.129 Not only did an awareness of imperial needs feed into 
discussions of China and the Chinese, but those looking to solve imperial labour shortages 
also looked to China. In a similar way to Medhurst’s connection of China with Australia, key 
figures in Australian colonization, such as John Dunmore Lang, Robert Gouger and Edward 
Gibbon Wakefield, had similarly identified China as a possible solution to Australia’s labour 
shortages (Lang would later emerge as one of the first European Australians to defend the 
civil rights of Chinese immigrants).130 The developing perceptions of a Chinese character over 
the 1830s and through the Opium War, whether concerned with issues like opium 
consumption or footbinding, ultimately informed and intensified the demand for Chinese 
labour in British colonies.       
 
The Mechanics of Dissemination: Newspapers, Print Culture and China 
As new concepts of a shared Chinese character developed over the 1830s, new networks for 
the dissemination of these concepts also emerged. Various mechanisms were used to share 
knowledge about China and the Chinese. Crucially, firms like Jardine Matheson became key 
facilitators of information exchange. The China coast newspaper, the Canton Register, was an 
important part of the firm’s commercial information network, and its content became 
increasingly broad in scope. Additionally the firm was connected to various China experts and 
was involved directly in the publication of numerous texts written on the China coast. Beyond 
publishing, the firm had connections with different metropolitan associations, politicians and 
networks, which it could manipulate to set the agenda for discussion of China and the 
Chinese. Perceptions of the Chinese character on the China coast and in Asian contact zones 
were not peripheral but were widely disseminated across the British Empire. Simon Potter’s 
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work on ‘press systems’, where newspaper content was of secondary importance to the 
methods by which information was circulated, illustrates the importance of methods of 
dissemination.131 The emphasis here is placed on systems of knowledge and mechanisms for 
transferring information to, and influencing debate in, the metropole. The collection and 
dissemination of information about China was not a process distinct from the Jardine 
Matheson’s commercial operations. Information networks developed over the 1830s were 
ancillary to the firm’s success.  
The Canton Register was the brainchild of American merchant William W. Wood, 
who started the publication using a hand-press borrowed from Alexander Matheson (James 
Matheson’s nephew).132 The production of the newspaper was personally overseen by James 
Matheson during his time in China, and at the time of the first publication (8 November 1827) 
both of the Mathesons were partners in the firm Magniac & Co. The missionary and linguist 
Robert Morrison was also involved in creating content for the Register from an early period, 
providing both translations and original articles. The editorship switched frequently: from 
Wood to Morrison in 1828; Morrison to Arthur Sanders Keating – an Irish merchant who later 
challenged William Wood to a duel as a result of his personal attacks – in 1830; and Keating 
to the English Merchant John Slade in 1833.133 Throughout these changes Matheson was a 
continual presence as proprietor and exerted clear editorial influence.134 The paper’s Price 
Current, which listed import and export prices, has been identified as vital to its success 
amongst the merchant community at Canton.135 However, as this letter (sent from Alexander 
to James Matheson the day after the first issue) demonstrates it was intended to do more than 
appeal to the local community or carry apolitical commercial copy: 
 
Our newspaper is likely to take much better than we expected … Mr Jardine 
has kindly subscribed for 6 copies, and is to forward 50 to his Bombay friends. 
He also proposes to curtail the price current, and to omit stores entirely. Dr 
Morrison is quite disappointed that there is little room for original matter but 
will, I hope, now be satisfied, as we mean, if you approve, to limit the price 
current in future to two pages … There is no doubt now of the paper 
succeeding.136  
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The ‘original matter’ proposed by Morrison took the form of ethnographic articles and essays 
on Chinese culture, society and politics. He was clearly supported by Matheson’s suggestion 
that the Price Current be restricted in size. Correspondence between key figures in the firm 
reveals both an optimism for the paper’s future success and a desire to widen the scope of the 
‘original matter’ to encompass more general commentary on China as well as necessary 
trading information. 
 The newspaper was started as a ‘recorder of facts’ and not a ‘vehicle for controversy’, 
according to James Matheson.137 It was this aversion to controversy that led Matheson to 
remove the American editor Wood in February 1828 and replace him with Robert Morrison. 
Wood’s public criticism of the EIC monopoly was condemned by Matheson who kept the 
Register’s editorial position on the monopoly debate neutral until 1834, when the paper 
became openly anti-regulation and pro-free trade. The need to avoid controversy, despite its 
potential benefits in terms of an increased audience, was clearly demonstrated in another letter 
from Alexander to James Matheson: ‘I mean to disavow any connection with the paper … 
The offensive paragraph will, I have not the smallest doubt, give notoriety to the paper, and 
gain it many subscribers in India’.138 In spite of the acrimony with Wood, the paper’s future 
was viewed with optimism. Such hopes were explicitly linked to the specialist knowledge of 
China it could offer its audience: ‘the field for a newspaper is certainly extensive, and if the 
Register is properly conducted it may be made the most popular journal in the East’.139 A gap 
in the provision of news and information about China had been identified. By making use of 
his connections to contemporary China experts Matheson used the Register to reach an 
audience beyond the Western Canton community. Matheson’s success was reflected by the 
fact that in 1850 Shanghai merchants published the North China Herald so that they could 
similarly advocate their interests.140 Given the controversial and illicit activities of the firm 
the paper also served a more basic political purpose as it was used to advocate the firm’s 
economic interests over the 1830s.141  
The different editors used distinct editorial styles: after Wood’s advocacy of free trade 
Morrison focused more editorial space to ethnographic information about China; Keating 
turned attention to the social events of the European community and utilised advertising as a 
form of revenue; and Slade, in the post-monopoly era, was much more factional and critical of 
Jardine Matheson’s rivals. All of the editors devoted space to trade issues, Chinese news and 
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reprints from English-language Singaporean, Indian, European and American papers. The 
paper evolved as an independent journalistic enterprise to such an extent that by Slade’s 
editorship James Matheson himself would write letters to the editor to complain.142 The 
development of the Register fitted with colonial examples of the early nineteenth century, 
such as India or Australia, where a ‘free press’ was celebrated as a symbol of British 
civilization.143 This establishment of Western-style journalism reflected the burgeoning 
British community developing in the period before the military conflict with China. However, 
the newspaper’s primary function was as a public relations device. With increasing 
professionalization the Register gained legitimacy, particularly in Britain, as a source of 
information about China.  
 The newspaper was affected by practical and pragmatic as well as ideological changes. 
The Register’s structure and usage exhibited its evolution from a hand-pressed minor 
publication to a more standardised and professional commercial newspaper. The changes to 
issue covers between 1828, 1834 and 1841 demonstrate the evolution of the Register and the 
way in which it evolved from a disgruntled merchant’s pamphlet to a serious journalistic 
enterprise.144 There are some noticeable differences between the issues: the use of a smaller 
type; a new larger header and insertion of a sub-header quote; the movement of notices and 
adverts to the front page; the increased presence of shipping adverts; and the increased use of 
clear article headers. Many of the changes to the newspaper were gradual and reflected 
broader changes that affected the foreign merchant community at Canton. From June 1829 the 
Register was used regularly by the Chinese and British authorities to publicise official edicts 
and notices. From March 1830 the adverts and notices had moved from the back page to the 
front, from June 1830 the Price Current was sold separately to the Register. From January 
1834 the larger-type header, with quote, was introduced and the paper became a weekly 
publication. By 1841, the sub-header was replaced by subscription information for the 
Register. The number of advertisements increased gradually, with a maximum of five per 
issue in 1830 increasing to nine per issue in 1832. By 1834 the structure had become more 
uniform and sections appeared in fixed patterns: advertisements and notices first, then news 
articles, then commercial remarks, then shipping news and occasionally supplementary pages. 
The firm and its editors consciously attempted to professionalize the Register. From the 1828 
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issue, the design of which reflected it as a single-man, experimental publication, it evolved to 
a title that resembled and was at home alongside established colonial presses by the 1840s.  
The Register successfully grew in circulation and prestige under the stewardship of 
James Matheson in the 1830s. The newspaper, and by extension its publishers, had indeed 
become ‘famous’ as evidenced by the quote proudly displayed under the header. Charles 
Grant – the president of the EIC Board of Control in 1833, who would be restyled Baron 
Glenelg in 1835 – remarked that ‘the free traders appear to cherish high notions of their 
claims and privileges. Under their auspices a free press is already maintained at Canton; and 
should their commerce continue to increase their importance will rise’.145 Such recognition of 
the Register and the firm from an esteemed metropolitan statesman was a significant publicity 
coup. The newspaper also fulfilled a practical role as it was used by Matheson in personal 
correspondence to communicate information. In a letter to James Scott, Matheson wrote, ‘I 
have no time to advert to public affairs but, for your complete information on the subject is a 
series of Canton Register since the first of August’.146 By 1834 the Register had grown to 
fulfil its proprietor’s hopes as a successful source of information about China for a growing 
audience. The debate around the 1833 Charter Act, and the resulting deregulation of the China 
trade, had opened up a new, larger, more informed audience for the Register. 
The analysis of Chinese culture, society and politics was an important element of the 
newspaper’s editorial content from an early stage. The first issue of the Register suggested 
that the ‘want of a printed register of the commercial and other information of China, has long 
been felt’, and promised that ‘accounts relative to the trade, customs, and peculiarities of the 
Chinese, will occupy a portion of our pages’.147 Considering the controversy caused by 
Wood’s criticism of the EIC, the focus on China and the Chinese kept the paper out of 
political trouble: ‘a Register of facts and occurrences is all we can pretend to. By these we 
hope to shew what China is, in the nineteenth century’.148 Most striking was the Register’s 
coverage of a range of topics, the scope of which was well beyond that of a trade publication. 
The Register was intended to disseminate various forms of knowledge to Europe, around the 
Empire and the wider Anglosphere.149 This ‘transculturation’, or removal of knowledge from 
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China, reflected the growing asymmetry of power on the China coast.150 As in colonial India, 
the mantra that ‘knowledge is power’ was increasingly applicable to Jardine Matheson as 
agents of informal empire.151  
 The Register’s editorial angle towards China was conditioned by a need to de-
legitimise the Qing Empire in order to justify the opium trade.152 Much of the Register’s 
content was concerned with the implications of Chinese law for the foreign community and 
the prejudice that Western merchants faced. In an 1828 article these issues were compounded 
by the linguistic debate over Chinese words for foreign residents and whether they were 
offensive: ‘everyone knows that in ordinary speech they use to each other … the most 
contemptuous language: such as foreign devil; red bristled devil; black devil; a devil; flower 
flagged devil … (to refer to) not only the poor ignorant people, but the Gentleman 
merchants’.153 The idea that the Chinese did not treat foreign, and most importantly British, 
merchants with adequate respect was a common accusation – the inference being that Chinese 
restriction of trade was connected to an anti-British prejudice. This introduction to a Chinese 
imperial edict on the employment of Chinese linguists was typical of the Register’s 
hyperbolic tone: ‘we have to add a fourth proclamation, the terms of which are so offensive as 
to be too gross for literal translation in a Christian Journal’.154 The dismissive attitude of 
Chinese officials to the wants and desires of the firm was especially hard to accept given the 
contemporary attitudes of civilizational superiority and hierarchy: ‘the superiority of 
Europeans in some of the mechanical arts, and physical sciences, does not elevate them as 
rational beings in the estimation of the Chinese’.155  
In contrast an empathetic view of the Chinese populace was articulated in the editorial 
copy of the 1830s. As much of the Chinese news printed in the Register from the Peking 
Gazette (the official bulletin of the Qing state) was concerned with stories of murder, 
uprisings and violence, the Register addressed the need to reset the balance in an article titled 
‘A Moral Story’ which began, ‘we are induced to give place to the following production of a 
juvenile pen, which is a pleasing relief to the darker view of the Chinese character with which 
our pages have hitherto perhaps too much abounded’.156 Such praise of the Chinese people 
was a feature of the Register’s editorial that has been overlooked by a historical focus on 
Anglo-Chinese conflict. Ulrike Hillemann has described how the Register was used ‘to justify 
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their [Jardine Matheson’s] breaking of Chinese law by depicting the Chinese as an immoral 
and cruel people’.157 However, as acknowledged by the above editorial, criticisms of the Qing 
officials and discussion of the ‘darker’ proclivities of the Chinese people were consciously 
balanced with positive stories. Articles on ‘public morals’, the ‘industrious habits’ of the 
Chinese people, and the ‘happiness of the Chinese’, featured alongside criticisms of Chinese 
barbarism and the isolationist policies of the Qing.158 
 The Register’s first major competitor, the American owned Chinese Courier and 
Canton Gazette, was aggressively critical of both Chinese and British trade regulations.159 
William Wood, who Matheson had removed as editor of the Register in 1828, set up the 
Courier in 1831.160 The paper was funded by American firm Russell & Co. and was primarily 
used to criticise the EIC monopoly, which was why the paper ceased publication in 1833 with 
passing of the Charter Act.161 In its short print run the Courier was critical of the Register, 
describing its purpose as being ‘for the dissemination of those opinions which it is the policy 
of our contemporary to avoid’.162 For Wood there was a clear hypocrisy in the Register’s 
silence on the EIC and attacks on Qing trade restrictions.  
The Courier criticised all limits to trade, whether British or Chinese, and in the case of 
the China linked restrictions to trade to notions of Chinese character. It was claimed by Wood 
that ‘no one who has any personal experience of the Chinese will deny their very powerful 
prejudices’.163 These ‘prejudices’ thusly explained the Qing Empire’s trade restrictions. 
Similarly, in articles titled ‘Chinese Hospitality and the ‘Chinese poor’, criticisms of the 
Chinese character were commonplace.164 The Register, with respect to both the EIC and the 
Chinese, was noticeably more guarded in its criticism. This changed significantly after 1833 
with the closure of the Courier, the removal of the EIC monopoly and the introduction of 
John Slade as editor. Additionally, the growing economic and political clout of Jardine 
Matheson was reflected in the Register’s increasingly aggressive criticism of Chinese officials 
and the temerity of British foreign policy over the 1830s.  
 Both Canton newspapers enthusiastically advocated Chinese emigration. In particular, 
emigration was described as a necessary solution to China’s impending Malthusian crisis. An 
1832 Courier article on the ‘Chinese Poor’ criticised the ‘low price of wages and the overplus 
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of working people, famine and inundation too often contribute to overwhelm the inhabitants 
of whole districts of  the country’.165 Similarly, in 1834 the Register published an editorial 
concerned with the surplus population of China. This article criticised the Qing Empire 
‘which caused them [the Chinese people] to abhor foreigners and to crowd under the 
protection of their native leaders’.166 This criticism fitted with the firm’s broad critique of the 
tyranny of the Chinese Emperor, but was also connected to the issue of emigration. The 
Register’s owners and editors hoped that ‘excess finds an outlet in emigration, we fondly 
hope the threatening evil may be averted from this empire’.167 The firm’s desire for China to 
open its borders advocated such an opening in both directions. In the pre-Opium War context 
of the 1830s a warning was offered for the cost of Chinese isolationism: ‘if they do not 
advance with the world they will sooner or later fall a sacrifice to their stubbornness’.168 
Invoking Western notions of political economy, such as the theories of Malthus, allowed 
restrictions on emigration to be seamlessly critiqued as part of a broader ideological attack on 
the isolationism of the Qing Empire.  
The promotion of Chinese emigration also drew on knowledge of existing Chinese 
expatriate communities. Citing the Singapore Chronicle, which was a common source, the 
Register referred positively to Chinese emigration as early as 1828:169  
 
Although strictly forbidden by the law of China, is still practised to a very 
considerable extent; and we observe in the Singapore Chronicle that the arrival 
lately of four junks, brought upwards of 1600 passengers … over-population, 
which we imagine to be the case in many parts of China, this voluntary 
retirement must be very beneficial … a large majority of these people are of 
the class of mechanics, carpenters, blacksmiths, and various other handicrafts, 
they have been found of the highest use.170 
 
Again the despotism of the Chinese government was highlighted, but the migration of 
Chinese workers to replace Malay labour was viewed as positively on the China coast as it 
was in Singapore. The Courier concurred with the Register. In a multiple issue report on 
‘Chinese Emigrants’ from 1832 the Courier identified Chinese overpopulation as 
necessitating emigration and suggested – in line with the Opium War narrative of liberation – 
that migration benefitted the Chinese people: ‘where these emigrants are permitted to enjoy 
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their rights of property and personal liberty, no fault it to be found with them, they are 
obedient, frugal, temperate, and industrious’.171 This view of emigration further reflects the 
separation of the Qing Empire from the Chinese people, and underlines connection of this 
separation to the view of an industrious and economically productive Chinese character. As 
conflict with Chinese authorities intensified during the Opium War, the British Empire 
loomed increasingly large as a space in which the ‘rights’ and ‘liberty’ of the ‘industrious’ 
Chinese could be properly protected.   
The evolution of the Canton Register between 1827 and 1833 reflected the growth of 
China coast publishing generally. 1833 signalled change for the Register in two ways. First, 
John Slade was installed as editor. Slade was much more independent and controversial than 
his predecessors. Second, the removal of the EIC monopoly had eliminated the first rival 
publication the Chinese Courier. Both the independence of Slade and removal of the EIC 
created opportunity for more adversarial journalism. For example, in 1834 an advert was 
taken out by James Innes in order to ‘refute slanders’ made against him in the Register.172 The 
installation of William Napier as the Superintendent of the China Trade provided most of the 
copy for the 1834 issues, which centred on Napier’s appointment and subsequent diplomatic 
expedition. By 1834, the Register had risen to prominence as a respected English language 
source of information about China.  
Though the Courier ceased publication in 1833, another newspaper rival emerged in 
1835: the Canton Press.173 The Press was funded by Jardine Matheson’s main rivals – the 
British merchant house of Dent & Co.174 The fact that the Courier, Register and the Press 
were so closely tied to the large merchant houses operating in Canton meant that editorial on 
China was heavily reflective of the interests of the foreign trading community. Indeed, Lucy 
Brown’s work on Victorian news suggests that early titles were not necessarily seen as 
conduits for news but were more concerned with participation in public debate.175 In the case 
of the Register and the Press, commercial competition between the firms was reflected in 
acrimonious and divisive editorial content. Similarly, Simon Potter has outlined how early 
colonial newspapers were markedly more concerned with the owner’s political interests than 
later, revenue driven titles.176 These titles aimed to bring European and world news to the 
attention of the China coast’s international merchant community, but given that the Canton 
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trading community was so small (with only thirteen foreign factories, employing a handful of 
‘foreigners’), the intended audience for these newspapers lay elsewhere.177 
Given Matheson’s hopes that the Register would become ‘the most popular journal in 
the east’ the newspaper’s imperial impact was the main measure of its success. With British 
merchants in the Straits Settlements, India, Britain, and across the Empire financially invested 
in the China trade the interest in China coast titles was widespread.178 That the tiny foreign 
population of Canton supported two English language titles simultaneously for all but two 
years of the ‘first period’ of China coast publishing suggests a considerable overseas 
audience.179 The importance of the China trade to commercial interests in the metropole was 
undeniable, with the customs revenue of China produce being sixteen percent of Britain’s 
total in 1830. Subsequently British newspapers reprinted articles from the China newspapers 
as they did from Indian titles or respected journals like the Repository.180 Figures 2.2 and 2.3, 
which are based on an analysis of digital newspaper databases, show the number of articles 
reprinted annually from the Canton Register and Canton Press by British and Singaporean 
newspapers:181 
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     Figure 2.2. China coast articles in British Newspapers, 1830-1839  
     
 
     Figure 2.3. China coast articles in Singaporean Newspapers, 1831-1839 
 
 
The fluctuation within Figures 2.2 and 2.3 can be attributed to several factors. The China 
trade was relatively stable, and consequently less newsworthy in Britain, between 1835 and 
1839. Furthermore, articles that were second reprints in provincial titles, largely from Indian 
Source: British Newspaper Archive (http://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/). 
Source: National Library of Singapore Newspaper Archive (http://newspapers.nl.sg/).  
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or London newspapers, cannot be detected.182 Whilst these are crucial qualifiers about what 
the data can demonstrate, the graphs are important as they show an impressive reprinting and 
consumption of China coast copy in both a colonial and metropolitan context. For two titles, 
one of which was only published for half the period, to amass 171 reprints in Singapore and 
363 reprints in Britain over the 1830s is significant and reflects a reach beyond the China 
coast. This type of reprinting was not unique to the China coast. Similar trends are also visible 
in Beals’ work on the reprinting of Australian titles in the Scottish press.183 By comparison 
articles from the Sydney Gazette, a premier carrier of colonial news from New South Wales, 
were reprinted 600 times in Scottish newspapers between 1803 and 1842. Alan Lester and 
Christopher Holdridge have identified these ‘inter-colonial’ dialogues as vital to the 
transmission of narratives for specific interest groups.184 The reprinting of the Canton 
Register, which served as a vehicle for the promotion of Jardine Matheson’s business 
interests, can be compared to the reprinting of South African newspaper titles as a means of 
disseminating and articulating the South African settler narrative in Britain and the Empire.  
 The Press and Register were rival publications – Dent & Co. made particular use of 
the Press to criticise James Matheson personally – yet they agreed on the broad angle of 
Britain’s China policy and in their views of China and the Chinese.185 The Press was 
vehemently pro-free trade from its establishment in 1835, much like the Register was after the 
fall of the EIC monopoly in 1834, and similarly advocated progress towards trade 
liberalisation and the Westernisation of Chinese society.186 These rival titles disagreed on 
some issues, such as what form British regulation of the trade should take, but shared a 
common view of Qing despotism and backwardness, which was reflective of the broader 
mercantile frustration with the Chinese authorities. As both firms’ economic interests became 
increasingly threatened by Chinese regulations in the 1830s their criticism of Chinese 
despotism became more vociferous. The rhetoric of liberation, which was integral to the 
construction of a Chinese ethnic character and useful to advocates of Chinese emigration, was 
consequently emphasised.  
 
 
                                                 
182 The graphs also do not account for hard copies of newspapers sent to either country.  
183 M. H. Beals, ‘The Role of the Sydney Gazette in the creation of Australia in the Scottish Public Sphere’, in 
John Hinks and Catherine Feeley (eds.), Historical Networks in the Book Trade (London: Pickering and Chatto, 
2015), p.2.  
184 Alan Lester, ‘British Settler Discourse and the Circuits of Empire’, History Workshop Journal, No. 54 (2002), 
pp. 24-48; Christopher Holdridge, ‘Circulating the African Journal: The Colonial Press and Trans-Imperial 
Britishnessin the Mid Nineteenth Century Cape’, South African Historical Journal, No. 62 (2010), pp. 487-513. 
185 King, A Research Guide to China-Coast Newspapers, p. 19. 
186 Ibid, p. 46. 
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Jardine Matheson and the Control of Information 
In addition to the Canton Register, Jardine Matheson was also integrated into broader 
information networks. The firm was central to multiple publications that popularised 
stereotypes about the Chinese as an ethnic group and set out to define an archetypal Chinese 
character. As has already been discussed in this chapter, the missionaries Robert Morrison and 
Charles Gutzlaff, who were some of the most prolific China experts of the 1830s, were 
intimately connected to Jardine Matheson as employees. Morrison edited the Register after 
the departure of William Wood, and Gutzlaff was employed as a linguist on the firm’s opium 
vessels.187 Many of Jardine Matheson’s business connections also published newspapers, 
journals or periodicals that carried information on China. Figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 show the 
links between the firm and China publishing in the 1830s: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
187 R. G. Tiedemann, ‘Gützlaff, Karl Friedrich August (1803–1851)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/54362, accessed 27 September 2015]; 
R.K. Douglas, ‘Morrison, Robert (1782–1834)’. 
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Through these networks Jardine Matheson were connected to some of the most prominent 
Western authorities on China.188 The term ‘network’ is deployed here, as opposed to ‘system’, 
to reflect that the connection that the firm had with these individuals were often multi-faceted 
and bi-lateral. The firm had a different power relationship with an independent trader like 
Gordon Forbes Davidson than it had with a wealthy business partner like Jamsetjee 
Jejeebhoy, yet its economic interests were defended in both Trade and Travel in the Far East 
and in the Bombay Courier. It must be stressed that the networks presented are not exhaustive 
or definitive. They neglect the numerous articles by heads of the firm, such as William Jardine 
and Alexander Matheson who both had publishing credentials. They also neglect the personal 
relationships and aligned interests they had with China publishing rivals, such as Lancelot 
Dent. Furthermore, it was common for prominent China coast authors to be connected. For 
example, the American missionary Elijah Bridgman collaborated regularly with Gutzlaff as 
editor of the Chinese Repository. Though many of these authors wrote widely and 
independently of the firm, these networks demonstrate the volume of titles that were either 
directly controlled by the firm or were published by individuals or organisations with aligned 
interests. Figures connected to the firm through these networks were largely critical of the 
Qing Empire and advocated, like Charles Gutzlaff, the ‘opening’ of China. 
In some cases the firm had direct control over the activities of China experts and 
facilitated or funded their research and writing. A letter from Gutzlaff to James Matheson in 
1834, demonstrated the role Matheson played in the book publishing process. Gutzlaff, 
working on an opium clipper on the China coast for the firm, gave Matheson specific 
instructions to publish his General Description of China through the firm’s London agent 
Thomas Weeding at the earliest possible time.189 The firm also had an important involvement 
in Chinese language publishing. William Jardine paid for the publication of Gutzlaff’s Dong-
Xi as part payment for his interpreting work on the firm’s opium vessels.190 Gutzlaff also 
distributed this Chinese language magazine – which brought news of Western science, 
geography, government, and history for a Chinese audience – during his voyages along the 
China coast. Perhaps most significantly, given Jardine Matheson’s economic interests, 
Gutzlaff published texts titled Outlines of Political Economy and Treatise on Commerce in 
                                                 
188 In figures 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 individuals have only been connected to publications they owned, edited or 
authored – contributions to other titles, such as John Robert Morrison’s contributions to the Chinese Repository 
or Canton Register are not included. The listed occupations relate to their relationship with Jardine Matheson 
specifically, for example Gutzlaff could alternatively be described as a missionary, an author or a British official, 
but his employment with Jardine Matheson was primarily as a translator. 
189 Charles Gutzlaff (Lintin) to William Jardine (Canton), 2 July 1834, in Le Pinchon, China trade and empire, 
p.218. Thomas Weeding had acted as agent for William Jardine’s private trade as early as 1802.  
190 Chen, ‘An Information War Waged by Merchants and Missionaries at Canton’, p. 1711.  
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Chinese in 1840, both of which advocated free and open markets.191 Similarly, during Robert 
Morrison’s editorship of the Canton Register he saw the dissemination of information into 
China as important as the acquisition of knowledge: ‘were instructive papers and books, 
printed in Chinese, they would no doubt gradually find their way to every part of the Empire 
... and convey new ideas, calculated to benefit every country of Eastern Asia’.192 Such English 
to Chinese publications formed part of what Songchuan Chen, in his work on the Society for 
the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (which was active in Chinese language knowledge 
dissemination from 1834 onwards in China), has called an ‘information war’.193 Jardine 
Matheson were heavily involved in this ‘war’ over following decades. For example, Scottish 
missionary James Legge’s translations of the Chinese Classics, which were published through 
the 1860s, were also subsidised by the firm.194 The firm’s involvement in publishing on China 
in the 1830s was widespread, combining direct ownership of the Register and specific firm-
funded publications, as well as more surreptitious associations. Jardine Matheson were not 
only connected to several contemporary China experts, but their assistance enabled certain 
China experts. As a result of these associations, the firm’s interests were heavily reflected in 
contemporary discourse on China.  
Defence of the firm’s economic interests in the 1830s provided the rationale, 
particularly for James Matheson, for such an involvement in publishing. After the removal of 
the EIC monopoly the firm advocated a European-style diplomatic relationship with the 
Chinese government, a relaxing of Chinese trading regulations and, ostensibly, the 
liberalisation of the despotism that oppressed the Chinese populace.195 Jardine Matheson, as 
opium merchants, were regularly targeted by Chinese government edicts prohibiting their 
trade, and this fed into a sense of victimhood at the hands of Chinese authorities. In a Register 
article titled ‘Seizure of a European’, the editorial concluded that ‘we trust by the conviction 
on the part of the Chinese government that British subjects are no longer to be insulted and 
treated like children with impunity’.196 Similarly, on his return to Britain, Matheson lamented 
how foreigners had to deal with 'ignominious surveillance and restrictions'.197  As the Chinese 
officials aimed to curtail the opium trade – which was Jardine Matheson’s main income – it 
was in the firm’s economic interests to present Chinese trade restrictions alongside broader 
critiques of the Qing tyranny. Attempts to control the opium trade were equated with 
                                                 
191 Paul B. Trescott, Jingji Xue: the History of the Introduction of Western Economic Ideas into China, 1850-
1950 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2007), p. 23.  
192 Canton Register, 16 August 1828. 
193 Chen, ‘An Information War Waged by Merchants and Missionaries at Canton’, p. 1706.  
194 Lutz, Opening China, p. 79.  
195 Keswick, The Thistle and the Jade, p. 21. 
196Canton Register, 27 May 1834. 
197 Matheson, The Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China, p. 3. 
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resistance to Christianity, freedom of movement, the rights of women and the expansion of 
legal trade. This was particularly important for the firm as it meant that the blame for poor 
British export sales could be attributed to the regressive Chinese authorities. Opium 
merchants faced increasing opposition from British industrialists, who saw the opium trade as 
absorbing Chinese purchasing power and capital to the detriment of British manufacturing 
exports.198 It was in the firm’s economic interest to portray the Qing Emperor’s legal edicts as 
despotic and against the natural laws of humanity. The firm’s connection to the publishing 
network of China experts was not coincidental. Jardine Matheson both offered unparalleled 
access to China and had a vested interest in supplementing the criticism of the Qing Empire 
that became a significant narrative of writing on China in the 1830s and 1840s.     
 
Jardine Matheson’s Political and Commercial Connections 
In addition to Jardine Matheson’s publishing connections, their commercial and political links 
ensured that their narrative of Western and Chinese victimhood at the hands of the despotic 
Qing Empire was also visible in British political discourse in the 1830s. Due to their 
perceived expertise on China and the China trade, the opinion of members of the firm was 
sought in the metropole. William Jardine and Alexander Matheson, as well as other notable 
Canton merchants, were called to give evidence to the 1840 Select Committee on the Trade 
with China, which had been appointed in a direct response to Commissioner Lin Zexu’s 
seizure of British-owned opium.199 Through the 1830s the firm had been represented in 
London by their London sister firm Magniac, Smith & Co., as well as the veteran Whig MP 
John Abel Smith.200 An even more direct connection to parliament came from the positions 
taken by prominent members of the firm after their time on the China coast. After returning to 
Britain, William Jardine was elected as Whig MP for Ashburton in 1841.201 Upon Jardine’s 
death in 1843, James Matheson ran for, and won, Jardine’s seat and subsequently sat on the 
1847 Select Committee on Commercial Relations with China.202 Throughout the 1830s and 
1840s the firm was well connected with the political elite in London, and no relationship 
                                                 
198 LeFevour, Western Enterprise in Late Ch’ing China, p. 5. 
199 Parliamentary Papers, Report from the Select Committee on the Trade with China, 1840 (359). This Select 
Committee was specifically a response to the ‘Petition of Merchants interested in the Trade with China’, who 
were able to leverage their grievance against ‘Her Majesty’, and therefore bring the British state into the dispute, 
as the opium had been surrendered to the Superintendent Charles Elliot.  
200 Jacob M. Price, ‘Smith, John Abel (1802–1871)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford 
University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/25854, accessed 27 
September 2015]. 
201 Keswick, The Thistle and the Jade, p. 24. 
202 Parliamentary Papers, Report from the Select Committee on Commercial Relations with China; together with 
the minutes of evidence, appendix, and index, 1847 (654). 
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exemplified this more than the connection they established with the statesman Viscount 
Palmerston.  
As Foreign Secretary for most of the 1830s, Palmerston was instrumental in 
determining British policy towards China. The first meeting between the firm’s partners and 
Palmerston, engineered by John Abel Smith, took place in 1835 when James Matheson 
returned to Britain with the widowed Lady Napier.203 In light of the diplomatic failure and 
death of the first Superintendent William Napier in 1834, Matheson urged an aggressive 
stance towards the Qing Empire. At this meeting Matheson was unsuccessful in convincing 
Palmerston to take military action in defence of the interests of British subjects at Canton.204 
William Jardine, who was travelling to London as British opium was seized by Commissioner 
Lin in March 1839, had a private meeting with Palmerston to advise on the best course of a 
British attack.205 Histories of the firm have suggested that Jardine ‘persuaded’ or ‘instructed’ 
Palmerston to attack China.206 Conversely, texts looking more generally at Anglo-Chinese 
relations have suggested Jardine’s role has been overstated and that Palmerston had developed 
a plan of attack weeks before the meeting.207 As acknowledged by Palmerston himself, the 
advice of Jardine was crucial to Palmerston’s military planning. Jardine advised Palmerston 
on the necessary size of naval force and the strategic advantages of seizing Hong Kong – 
information which would later be acknowledged as essential by Palmerston.208 Jardine would 
also prove useful to Palmerston in his evidence to the Select Committee on Trade with China, 
on which Palmerston sat.209 The firm, as demonstrated by the Palmerston meeting, was seen 
as a vital point of information on China by both British legislators and senior statesmen.   
 Beyond the firm’s direct political links Jardine Matheson were also integral to new 
commercial networks and organisations developing in the 1830s, which were designed to 
articulate the interests of China trade merchants as a collective. Over the 1830s Chambers of 
Commerce were set up by merchants across Asia: in Canton (25 August 1834), Bombay (22 
September 1836), Madras (29 September 1836), Singapore (8 February 1837) and Ceylon (25 
March 1839).210 Given the prominence of Jardine Matheson in Canton’s foreign merchant 
                                                 
203 Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence Relating to China, 1840 (223). 
204 Napier, Barbarian Eye, p. 214. 
205 Keswick, The Thistle and the Jade, p. 24. 
206 Ibid, p. 24; Connell, A Business in Risk, p.32. 
207 Melancon, Britain’s China Policy and the Opium Crisis, p. 103; Frederic Wakeman Jr., ‘The Canton trade 
and the Opium War’, in Dennis Twitchett and John Fairbank (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, Vol.10: 
Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911, Part 1 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 194. 
208 Le Pinchon, China Trade and Empire, p. 43; Endacott, A Biographical Sketch-Book of Early Hong Kong, p. 
158. This intelligence inadvertently made Jardine an unofficial founder of colonial Hong Kong, though 
Palmerston would later describe the colony as a ‘barren rock’.  
209 Parliamentary Papers, Report from the Select Committee on the Trade with China. 
210 Anthony Webster, 'The strategies and limits of gentlemanly capitalism: the London East India agency houses, 
provincial commercial interests, and the evolution of British economic policy in South and South East Asia 
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community it is of little surprise that the firm was instrumental in the formation and 
coordination of these organisations. James Matheson was elected as the first president of the 
Canton Chamber of Commerce in 1834, a role to be taken on by several heads of the firm 
over subsequent decades.211 The purpose of the Chamber evolved over time as it was formed 
initially as a ‘medium of communication between the British merchants and their 
superintendent’ but was reformed in 1836 as a General Chamber of Commerce ‘to protect the 
general interests of the foreign trade with China’.212 Merchant houses also looked to exert 
political pressure at the centre of policy formation in London, which the Chamber of 
Commerce attempted through correspondence and collaboration with metropolitan East India 
and China Associations.213   
 In connection with increased mercantile collaboration, the 1830s also saw new 
developments in the various East India and China Associations across Britain. Such 
Associations had long existed – importantly lobbying against the EIC monopoly at the 
renewal of the Company’s charter in 1813 – but the start of the 1830s, and the upcoming 
Charter Act, saw increased activity from these groups.214 Yukihisa Kumagai’s work on the 
anti-monopoly campaign has highlighted how John Crawfurd, with his experience in Asia and 
political and commercial connections, was influential in both the policies supported and 
lobbying methods used by these Associations.215 But the China trade merchants were not 
solely reliant on returned representatives such as Crawfurd. Prominent China merchants could 
also contact these groups directly. In 1834, following the death of William Napier, James 
Matheson wrote to the Glasgow East India Association advocating a show of British strength 
against the Chinese.216 The London East India and China Association, formed in 1836, served 
as an example of the firm’s connections to these lobbying groups.217 The London Association, 
which was established for the ‘protection of the general interests of the trade with the East 
                                                                                                                                                        
1800-50', Economic History Review, Vol. 59, No. 4 (2006), p. 757; Ian Nish, ‘British Mercantile Cooperation in 
the India-China Trade From the End of the East India Company’s Trading Monopoly’, Journal of Southeast 
Asian History, Vol. 3, No. 2 (September 1962), p. 75. 
211 Ibid, p. 79. 
212 Chinese Repository, Vol. VI (1838), p. 44. 
213 Nish, ‘British Mercantile Cooperation in the India-China Trade’, p. 80. 
214 Webster, 'The strategies and limits of gentlemanly capitalism’, p. 749; Kumagai, The Lobbying Activities of 
Provincial Mercantile and Manufacturing Interests. 
215 Kumagai, Breaking into the Monopoly, pp. 93-113; See chapter one for more on Crawfurd.  
216 James Matheson (Canton) to Glasgow East India Association, 11 December 1834, in Minutes of the Glasgow 
East India Association, Incoming Correspondence (1835-6), MS 891001/7 (Glasgow City Archives).  
217 Nish, ‘British Mercantile Cooperation in the India-China Trade from the End of the East India Company’s 
Trading Monopoly’, p.84.  
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Indies and China’. Many of the members of the first provisional committee also featured in 
the correspondence and accounts of the firm (Table 2.1):218 
 
Table 2.1. Committee members of the LEICA featured in Jardine Matheson Archive.  
Source: Jardine Matheson Archive (Cambridge University Library).   
 
Beyond the eleven committee members who were connected personally or commercially with 
the firm, Thomas Weeding and William Lyall were of particular importance. Weeding had 
been a business partner of William Jardine since 1817 and Lyall was connected to James 
Matheson as a member of Lyall, Matheson & Co.219 Furthermore, the London Association, 
like the firm, also relied on John Abel Smith as a connection to Palmerston and imperial 
policy making.220 The close connections the firm had with the London Association reflect 
how the interests of the two were largely aligned. As Webster has discussed, such associations 
pressured the British state to obtain open access to the China market as relations deteriorated 
over the 1830s.221 
 Importantly, such connections also existed between the firm and the provincial 
pressure groups. Table 2.2 shows the committee members of the Glasgow and Liverpool East 
India Associations (1829) who feature in the Jardine Matheson correspondence and accounts:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
218 London East India and China Association (London: Dinmore, 1836); Correspondence and accounts from 
Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge University Library 
(http://janus.lib.cam.ac.uk/db/node.xsp?id=EAD/GBR/0012/MS%20JM), accessed 27 September 2015. 
219 Le Pinchon, China Trade and Empire.   
220 Nish, ‘British Mercantile Cooperation in the India-China Trade from the End of the East India Company’s 
Trading Monopoly’, p. 85.  
221 Webster, 'The strategies and limits of gentlemanly capitalism’, p. 756.  
Featured in Correspondence 
and Accounts 
Featured in 
Correspondence 
Not Featured  
Archibald Hastie Sir George Larpent John Horsley Palmer  
William Scott Samuel Gregson Robert Small 
William Lyall James Malcolmson Charles D. Bruce 
James Walkinshaw John Cryder William Edmund Ferrers 
Thomas Weeding William Crawford J. H. Gledstanes 
 John Scott John Fraser 
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Table 2.2. Committee members of GEIA and LEIA in Jardine Matheson Archive 
Glasgow East India Association Liverpool East India Association 
Kirkman Finlay Thomas Barclay 
James A. Anderson Robert Benson 
William P. Paton William Earle 
John Wright John Garnett 
Alexander Graham George Grant 
John Fleming A. Melly 
William Graham William Potter 
John May William Ward 
James Oswald John Yates 
Source: Jardine Matheson Archive (Cambridge University Library).222 
 
Jardine Matheson were directly connected to members of each of these provincial trade 
organisations. These political and commercial connections underline the variety avenues that 
the firm could manipulate to exert a metropolitan influence.  
 For the British merchant firm on the China coast the newspaper was just one part of 
the ‘information war’. There were various methods for contributing to imperial discourse, 
which ranged from direct publication; to the funding of publications; to building relationships 
with China experts; liaising with politicians; and through advocacy in Chambers of 
Commerce and East India and China Associations. Many of these connections were 
contingent on personal networks. As Tamson Pietsch’s work on the British academic world 
has shown, personal friendships and acquaintances between specialist imperial actors 
facilitated trans-imperial and trans-national information networks.223 Members of the firm 
were also tied to close familial networks with prominent Scottish landowners, who not only 
supplemented the firm with educated young recruits but were also able to exert metropolitan 
political influence.224 By definition, the fact that Jardine Matheson were connected to 
multiple, intertwined networks meant that they had impact and input into discussions of the 
Chinese character. The firm both supported the work of China experts and the senior partners 
of the firm came to be recognised and identified as experts themselves. 
 
 
 
                                                 
222 Of 18 (Glasgow East India Association) and 43 (Liverpool East India Association) total committee members 
in 1829.   
223 Tamson Pietsch, Empire of Scholars: Universities, networks and the British academic world, 1850-1939 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), p. 6.  
224 See Hamilton, Scotland, the Caribbean and the Atlantic world, for more on the importance of specifically 
Scottish networks in the British Empire.   
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Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that Jardine Matheson were vitally important in terms of 
generating and disseminating ideas about the Chinese character in the 1830s, both on the 
China coast and in Britain. These ideas and perceptions fed into a wider promotion of Chinese 
migrant labour. This is not to say that the traits ascribed to the Chinese were uniformly 
accepted – as the multiplicity of ideas and their inherent contradictions illustrate – but that the 
general concept that Chinese people would thrive if freed from despotism lent itself to the 
promotion of Chinese emigration into the British Empire. It was in the interests of 
missionaries and merchants alike to present the Qing Empire as a despotic entity from which 
liberation – either spiritual or economic – was necessary. The consequence of this rhetoric of 
liberation was the inevitable emigration of such a ‘money-loving a people as the Chinese’ to 
British colonies.225 
 What was particularly significant about these ideas is how, through Jardine Matheson, 
they came to be popularised in English language publishing on China and influenced Britain’s 
China policy. As we saw in chapter one, the importance of ‘expert’ status on Chinese issues 
acted as vehicle for particular ideas about the Chinese as an ethnic group. It would be an 
exaggeration to state that Jardine Matheson were committed to articulating ideas about 
Chinese migrants specifically. However, the firm’s anti-Qing narrative did confirm certain 
perceptions of Chinese character, which in turn were invoked by those who promoted Chinese 
migration as a solution to labour shortages in the British Empire. Even when emigration was 
not explicitly invoked, it was still assumed to be part of the broader opening that needed to 
take place. For example, the innate, entrepreneurial tendencies of the Chinese people were 
inhibited by both trading restrictions on foreign merchants and controls on migration. 
Similarly, China’s large population was used to both criticise the Qing as ineffective and to 
advocate emigration as a pre-emptive solution to the predicted humanitarian crisis. Whilst 
Jardine Matheson primarily invested in the dissemination of information to further their own 
economic interests, discourse on the necessity and desirability of Chinese emigration and 
Chinese labour was affected by discussions of China over the 1830s.      
What were the practical ramifications of these ideas about the Chinese character? The 
next chapter will outline the movements of Chinese emigrants to new imperial destinations in 
the 1830s. Not only did Jardine Matheson speak the rhetoric of Chinese liberation from 
despotic Qing governance, they also facilitated the movement of Chinese labourers and 
artisans from southern China to British colonial possessions. The firm were opening China 
even before they enlisted the military assistance of the British state. Over the 1830s their 
                                                 
225 Essex Standard, 2 December 1842. 
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opium distribution network offered unparalleled access to areas of southern China that had 
previously been controlled by the Chinese junk trade. Jardine Matheson were instrumental in 
creating new migration systems to new destinations. The demand for migrant labour was 
driven by the economic needs of individual colonies and the existence of Chinese migration 
systems that already existed across Southeast Asia. Moreover, such schemes were 
emboldened by the belief that Chinese migrants possessed an innate ethnic character that was 
predisposed to thrive under British governance.  
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Chapter Three: Assam and Sydney: Experiments with Chinese 
Labour, 1833-1839 
Introduction 
Perceptions of a Chinese character, one that was suited to provide a colonial labour force 
under British governance, had been constructed in the pre-existing contact zones of Canton 
and Singapore. But what were the applications of the Chinese migrant labour beyond the 
limits of contact zones on the China coast or in Southeast Asia? Whilst many historians have 
grappled with the commercial and political aspects of Anglo-Chinese relations in the 1830s, 
far less has been written on migration as form of exchange in this period. In particular, in spite 
of the wealth of historical literature written on the firm, no study has examined in detail the 
role that Jardine Matheson played as a facilitator of Chinese migration in the British Empire.1 
This chapter will focus on Chinese migrations into the British Empire during the period of 
increased Anglo-Chinese diplomatic tension in the 1830s.  
Examining new experiments with Chinese labour migration reveals the continuing 
construction of the Chinese character as a useful tool for colonial production. Chinese 
migrants were identified as particularly desirable in different colonies that required skilled 
and unskilled, cheap and free labour. The focus here is on the role that Jardine Matheson 
played in expanding Chinese migration beyond existing systems in Southeast Asia to new 
destinations. Chapter two revealed how the firm drew on systems of expert knowledge and 
helped to formulate images of a simultaneously virtuous and duplicitous Chinese population 
force that, under British instruction, could act as a colonial labour force in lieu of European 
settlers. This chapter will trace attempts to replicate the Anglo-Chinese success story of 
Southeast Asia through experiments with Chinese migration into India and Australia.  
 Whilst Assam and New South Wales were very different contexts, they were both 
extensions of existing systems of Chinese migration. Histories of the mass-migration era, 
from the 1850s onwards, have been identified as distinct from Chinese migration into British 
colonies in Southeast Asia.2 Migration to locations outside of British colonial control, like 
Java and Siam, and under British control, like Singapore or Penang, has been treated as 
unique and fundamentally separate process from migrations into ‘white men’s countries’.3 
This chapter will treat Chinese migration into the wider British Empire as an evolutionary 
process. Migration to Assam and New South Wales expanded and built upon existing 
                                                 
1 Elizabeth Sinn has discussed the role of the firm in trading goods that were consumed by expatriate Chinese 
communities. This is examined in chapter five.  
2 For a thorough overview of the historiography of Chinese migration in Southeast Asia see Lockard, 'Chinese 
Migration and Settlement in Southeast Asia Before 1850’, pp. 765-781. 
3 Barrett, The Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia. 
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movements of Chinese labour. Given that new systems of migration either relied directly on 
existing systems for supply or attempted to replicate existing systems, Chinese migration to 
new imperial destinations cannot be studied in isolation. Jardine Matheson, a transnational 
merchant firm, connects such disparate locations as the China coast, Singapore, Assam and 
New South Wales – all previously examined separately. The commonality between Chinese 
immigration to these locations, which has been obscured by their divergent geo-political 
contexts, has been neglected.  
Both case studies examine the movement of Chinese migrants outside established 
Southeast Asian parameters. The first case study is an analysis of tea planting experiments in 
Assam, Northeast India, in the 1830s. In particular, the role of Jardine Matheson in procuring 
labour is examined. The importance of the firm’s existing opium distribution networks as a 
system of recruitment will be demonstrated. Second, Gordon Forbes Davidson’s migration 
scheme to New South Wales in the late 1830s is examined. Whilst Davidson’s scheme failed, 
the discussion and debate it stimulated provides an insight into perceptions of Chinese 
migrants and the impact of Davidson’s formative experiences. This will demonstrate the 
connection between intra-Asian migration and migration into the white settler dominions of 
the British Empire. Without the existence of historic migration systems to Singapore it is 
unlikely that these subsequent colonial experiments with Chinese labour would have taken 
place. Davidson’s failure also emphasises the importance of Jardine Matheson’s commercial 
connections in successfully procuring labour for Assam. Examining these experiments will 
underline the desirability of a Chinese ethnic character and the expansion of Chinese 
migration to new areas of the British Empire to meet changing labour demands. Colonial 
authorities identified both indigenous Assamese and Australian populations as candidates for 
replacement by industrious Chinese migrants. However, Chinese migrant communities also 
began to be critiqued and stratified in new colonial contexts. Not only did this lead to a 
confirmation of certain ideas about the Chinese ethnic character, it also influenced the 
formation of new ethnic hierarchies as Chinese migrants were compared with different 
indigenous communities. Ultimately these case studies demonstrate how ideas about Chinese 
labour and ethnicity developed in different colonial settings in the 1830s. Jardine Matheson’s 
networks and expertise were essential to these experiments with Chinese labour.   
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Jardine Matheson and the Assam Experiment 
The 1830s were marked by British fears about the future supply of tea from China.4 
Politicians and tea merchants worried that an over-reliance on a single producer that lay 
outside direct colonial authority would leave Britain’s tea supply, and therefore Britain’s 
economy and the EIC’s profitability, at risk.5 Consequently, the discovery of wild tea plants 
in the Northeast Indian region of Assam provided scope for British-owned tea production and 
an opportunity to move away from commercial reliance on China. The drawback, as has been 
pointed out by Jayeta Sharma, was that China and tea were ‘synonymous’ and metropolitan 
consumers would be suspicious of Indian tea.6 This section will deal with one of the solutions 
that was offered to this conundrum: the recruitment of Chinese tea cultivators to work on tea 
plantations in Assam.7 Sharma’s work Empire’s Garden, as well as Antrobus’ much earlier 
narrative history, have been the main scholarly texts to document this experiment with 
Chinese labour in India.8 These texts offer a detailed insight into the transformation of Assam 
under British rule, but the focus on the development of the Assam region itself has shed little 
light on how Chinese labourers were recruited. Scrutiny of the process by which these 
specialist cultivators were procured will provide a deeper understanding of developing 
commercial networks and racial hierarchies in the British Empire in Asia in the 1830s. The 
resources of Jardine Matheson were crucial to the recruitment and transport of Chinese tea 
cultivators for the Assam experiment.  
In histories of Anglo-Chinese relations and the Opium Wars Jardine Matheson have 
been commonly depicted in the guise of drug dealer, war monger or free trade advocate.9 The 
firm’s position as a facilitator of emigration has been overlooked. In particular, studies that 
have examined the firm’s multiple roles in the transfer of goods, capital and information have 
omitted the movement of Chinese labour through the firm’s shipping arrangements. The 
essential role that Jardine Matheson’s opium distribution network played in the recruitment of 
skilled labour indicates the transformation of the mechanisms of Anglo-Chinese commercial 
relations that had taken place with the rise of the country traders. This points to the wider 
significance of the EIC Charter renewal of 1833 and the consequent proliferation of 
                                                 
4 British concern over maintaining access to Chinese markets in the 1830s has been discussed in depth in Carroll, 
‘The Canton System’; Gao, ‘Prelude to the Opium War?’; Melancon, ‘Peaceful Intentions’. 
5 Nicholas Dirks, The Scandal of Empire: India and the Creation of Imperial Britain (London: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), p. 143. 
6 Jayeeta Sharma, ‘Lazy Natives, Coolie Labour, and the Assam Tea Industry’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 43, 
No. 6 (November, 2009), p. 1289. 
7 This was only one possible solution, other sources of labour from different regions of India were later used.  
8 Jayeeta Sharma, Empire’s Garden: Assam and the Making of India (London: Duke University Press, 2011); H. 
A. Antrobus, The History of the Assam Company, 1839-1953 (Edinburgh: T. and A. Constable Ltd., 1957). 
9 A good overview of the range of Jardine Matheson’s commercial activities is Connell’s A Business in Risk. 
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unregulated private British commercial expansion on the China coast.10 The ‘opening’ of 
China to new private firms was broadly supported by the British state, though it was not 
uncontested by imperial and metropolitan contemporaries.11 The historical significance of the 
Opium War has led to the oversimplification of the role of firms like Jardine Matheson in the 
expansion of British imperial and commercial interests in Asia. The recruitment of tea 
cultivators for Assam demonstrates the different aspects of Jardine Matheson’s operations on 
the China coast, which have been neglected in existing scholarly work.12  
Jardine Matheson were heavily involved in two stages of recruitment for the Assam 
plantations. First, the opium voyages that Charles Gutzlaff and George Gordon undertook 
along the China coast in 1834 were used to extract tea cultivators and seeds. This was 
followed by the recruitment of tea cultivators by James Matheson personally in 1839 and the 
subsequent recruitment under the Assam Company. The recruitment of Chinese tea cultivators 
in the 1830s highlights the importance of Jardine Matheson’s commercial network and 
expertise in the development of new resource pools, which would be significant in ensuring 
the future profitability of the Indian government.13 The firm’s primary concern was extracting 
Chinese capital for its own benefit through the opium trade, but its operations also allowed for 
the extraction of skilled labour, plant resources and specialist knowledge from areas of China 
that lay beyond the reach of Britain’s official imperial structures. The Assam tea plantations 
also acted as a new contact zone in which racial hierarchies were constructed and tested. As 
has been discussed by Jayeeta Sharma, the ‘civilized’ Chinese tea cultivators juxtaposed the 
‘savage’ Assamese natives in the colonial mind-set.14 This was no means a simple binary as 
the attitudes towards Chinese cultivators were informed by a sense of mistrust and a fear of 
deception. These narratives of ethnic hierarchy were not unconnected from the recruitment of 
labour but were contingent on the supply of ‘genuine’ Chinese tea cultivators from Jardine 
Matheson. The recruitment of Chinese tea cultivators from the China coast in the 1830s fed 
into both the economic development of British imperialism in Asia and the ideologies of 
racial hierarchy that were used to justify colonial control.  
As early as 1788 Joseph Banks, President of the Royal Society, wrote to the EIC 
regarding the introduction of tea cultivation to India. Banks also gave Lord Macartney a list of 
                                                 
10 See Yukihisa Kumagai, Breaking into the Monopoly for an overview of the campaigns to remove the EIC 
monopoly of the China trade.  
11 Ibid; This is particularly evident in the failed Napier expedition of 1834.  
12 Though many texts have discussed the firm in depth none have addressed Jardine Matheson’s role in 
facilitating Chinese emigration, see Connell, A Business in Risk; Cheong, Mandarins and Merchants; Blake, 
Jardine Matheson; Keswick, The Thistle and the Jade.. 
13 Following the 1833 Charter Act the EIC was no longer a commercial organisation, yet it retained its position 
as a governmental institution.  
14 Sharma, Empire’s Garden. 
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Chinese plant seeds to collect on his ill-fated embassy and was instrumental in establishing 
British interest in botanical knowledge transfer from China.15 Attempts to begin the 
experimental cultivation of tea in Assam did not begin until the Tea Committee was 
established by the EIC in January 1834 under the direction of William Bentinck, Governor-
General of India.16 The ‘discovery’ of the tea plant’s wild growth in Assam was made by the 
Scottish explorer Robert Bruce in 1823, but samples of the plant were not remitted to the 
Indian authorities until 1831 by his brother Charles Bruce, who was an East India Company 
gun-boat commander in the region.17 The discovery was not widely reported in Britain until 
the mid-1830s, after further samples had been forwarded by Charles Bruce’s military 
superiors. Reports in Britain completely overlooked the role of Bruce brothers: ‘Tea plant 
discovered in Assam by Captain Jenkins and Lieutenant Charlton, who had forwarded 
samples’.18 The time it took for Robert Bruce’s 1823 discovery to be confirmed and the 
contemporary confusion over the specific details highlights the remoteness of the Assam 
region, from which information, people and resources were slow to travel. The distance from 
Calcutta to the main station at Nazira was roughly 1000 kilometres and it took roughly two 
months to make the journey in one direction. The discovery of the wild tea plant was reported 
on the China coast in the Canton Register in 1835, though James Matheson was aware of the 
discovery from 1834 when he was first contacted by the Tea Committee.19 From Banks’ 
initial interest in Indian tea-growth in the 1780s it had taken fifty years for a large-scale 
plantation project to be undertaken, due to both the discovery of the wild plant and the 
precarious nature of Anglo-Chinese trading relations following the removal of the EIC 
monopoly in 1833.  
 The Tea Committee relied on the expertise of several key individuals. From 1834, 
Charles Bruce, in addition to his military responsibilities, took charge of the experimental 
plantations in Assam due to his knowledge of the region’s geography and local tribal groups. 
By 1836 he would have to take up the role full time at a salary of 400 rupees.20 George J. 
Gordon was initially appointed secretary of the Tea Committee, which would oversee the 
operation from Calcutta. Gordon had been a long-time employee of the bankrupt Indian 
merchant firm Mackintosh & Co., leading Bentinck to comment that he knew ‘no one better 
                                                 
15 Kitson, Forging Romantic China, pp. 126-139.  
16 Antrobus, The History of the Assam Company, p. 5; Anonymous, Assam: a sketch of its history, soil, and 
productions (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1839), p. 24. 
17 Of course, the idea of ‘discovery’ is a Western misnomer, local tribes had long made use of the tea plant; S. K. 
Sharma and Usha Sharma (eds.), North-East India: Volume 5 Assam – Economy, Society and Culture (New 
Delhi: Mittal, 2005), p. 40. Markman Ellis, Richard Coulton and Matthew Mauger (eds.), Empire of Tea: The 
Asian Leaf that Conquered the World (London: Reaktion Books, 2015), p. 210. 
18 Reading Mercury, 4 May 1835. 
19 Canton Register, 6 October 1835.  
20 Captain F. Jenkins to N. Wallich (5 May 1836), Parliamentary Papers, Tea Cultivation, p. 70. 
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qualified’.21 James Matheson had worked for his uncle, who was a managing partner in 
Mackintosh & Co., in 1815.22 This connection was maintained in Matheson’s later career as 
the firm feature heavily in the Jardine Matheson archive’s accounts, invoices, business and 
private letters over the 1820s.23 Staff members and partners also transferred between 
Mackintosh & Co. and Jardine Matheson’s Calcutta partners Lyall, Matheson & Co., who 
maintained close personal and commercial links with the Canton community. Through his 
experience with Mackintosh & Co. Gordon was already intimately familiar with Jardine 
Matheson. When Gordon was despatched to source tea seeds and tea cultivators from the 
China coast in 1834 he was replaced by Dr Nathaniel Wallich as Secretary. Wallich was the 
director of the EIC’s botanic garden at Calcutta and was highly regarded for his knowledge of 
different tea seeds and plants. Chinese tea plants had been grown in the Calcutta Botanic 
Garden since its formation by Robert Kyd in 1786.24 Bentinck wrote to the Tea Committee in 
January 1834 that ‘the best evidence obtainable perhaps, not only in India, but elsewhere, is 
that of Dr. Wallich’.25 The premium placed on knowledge and expertise, whether local, 
commercial or scientific, was evident in the establishment of the Tea Committee and the 
experimental plantation. As noted by Nicholas Dirks, ‘colonial knowledge both enabled 
colonial conquest and was produced by it’.26    
As employees of the EIC the Tea Committee members were well aware of the 
commercial benefits that would come to Indian, British and private revenues once Britain 
secured an imperial tea supply. The state of commercial relations with China had been a 
primary concern of the 1833 EIC Charter Act, which removed the Company’s monopoly and 
oversight over the British private merchants at Canton.27 The first line of the Tea Committee’s 
‘proposition’ neatly surmised their view that ‘the commercial relations of this country with 
China have lately assumed a character of uncertainty’.28 The tea trade’s profitability meant its 
continuation was a priority for both Indian and British authorities – by the 1830s it brought £4 
million per annum to the EIC and provided seven percent of Britain’s public revenue in excise 
                                                 
21 W. C. Bentinck, Calcutta, (24 January 1834), Parliamentary Papers, Tea Cultivation, p. 6. Mackintosh & Co. 
failed in 1833, after the failure Palmer & Co through indigo speculation; Le Pinchon, China Trade and Empire, 
p. 176.   
22 Le Pinchon, China Trade and Empire, p. 24. 
23 Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge University Library 
(http://janus.lib.cam.ac.uk/db/node.xsp?id=EAD/GBR/0012/MS%20JM), accessed 27 September 2015 
24 Kitson, Forging Romantic China, p. 136 
25 Minute by the Governor General (24 January 1834), Parliamentary Papers, Tea Cultivation, p. 5. 
26 Peers and Gooptu, India and the British Empire, p. 5. 
27 Parliamentary Papers, A bill to Regulate the Trade to China and India. 
28 Proposition to the Honourable Directors of the East India Company to Cultivate Tea upon the Nepaul Hills, 
and such other parts of the Territories of the East India Company as may be suitable to its growth. By Mr. 
Walker, Parliamentary Papers, Tea Cultivation, p. 6. 
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duties.29 The main problem with the tea trade was that its profitability was contingent on the 
illegal importation of opium to China by private merchant firms such as Jardine Matheson. 
This illicit trade was, simultaneously, the catalyst for the decline in Anglo-Chinese relations, 
which, in turn, threatened the continuation of the tea supply as Chinese authorities threatened 
to suspend trade as a response to British opium smuggling. An Indian supply of tea would 
circumvent China, meaning any diplomatic breakdown over opium smuggling would not 
threaten the lucrative tea trade.  
In addition to the economic benefits of Indian tea production, the language used by 
Tea Committee members demonstrated an attitude of civilizational superiority that was 
ubiquitous in British imperial planning.30 The Secretary, Wallich made the case that it was 
imperative to not be ‘dependent on the will and caprice of a despotic nation for the supply of 
one of the greatest comforts and luxuries of civilized life’.31 Here Wallich implied not only 
that the cultivation and consumption of tea was a mark of civilization, but that the Chinese 
authorities, as overly despotic, were especially untrustworthy. For Wallich, the future of 
Britain’s tea supply could not be left to the Qing Empire or Assamese tribes, but required the 
guidance and management of the civilized British.   
The scheme for British-owned tea production in Assam faced a major hurdle: for all of 
the Tea Committee’s expertise they lacked experience and knowledge of large-scale tea 
cultivation. The Chinese monopoly of mass tea production was based on a monopoly of 
knowledge, which, in the words of Antrobus, was ‘guarded jealously’.32 Bringing Chinese tea 
cultivators to Assam to transfer such knowledge would be critical in order to bypass the 
restrictions of the isolationist Qing Empire. Much of Charles Bruce’s writing on the 
operations in Assam was concerned with learning processes from Chinese cultivators and de-
monopolising this specialist knowledge. His Account of the Manufacture of the Black Tea 
included lengthy dialogue and centred on practical questions such as ‘Does the Tea plant 
grow mostly on the mountains of China or in the valleys?’, ‘Does the Tea plant grow amongst 
the snow?’ and ‘How do you plant the Tea seeds?’33 Without Chinese expertise Bruce was 
unable to replicate the production of tea as undertaken in China, which was crucial to the tea’s 
commercial success in Britain. The British public was used to consuming Chinese tea and the 
                                                 
29 Lawson, The East India Company, p. 157. 
30 See Pitts, A Turn to Empire, on the centrality of civilizational superiority as the guiding philosophy of imperial 
expansion.  
31 Observations on the Cultivation of the Tea plant, for Commercial purposes, in the mountainous parts of 
Hindostan; drawn up at the desire of the Right honourable C. Grant, President of the Board of Control for Indian 
Affairs, by N. Wallich, Parliamentary Papers, Tea Cultivation, p. 15. 
32 Antrobus, The History of the Assam Company, p. 30. 
33 C. A. Bruce, An Account of the Manufacture of the Black Tea, As now practised at Suddeya in Upper Assam  
(Calcutta: Bengal Military Orphan Press, 1838), pp. 6-7. 
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Tea Committee believed that Chinese involvement would provide the final product with a 
level of authenticity.34 From the outset it was clear that Chinese tea cultivators could be 
replaced once the British public grew accustomed to the Assam brand and the cultivator’s 
knowledge had been transferred to British managers and Indian artisans. Samuel Ball’s 
writing, based on observation of India and China from 1804 to 1826, suggested that ‘tea can 
be produced in India at no greater cost than China.’35 Ball compared the living expenses of 
Indian and Chinese labourers and concluded that ‘so far as the wants of the two people, and 
wages of labour are concerned, India possesses no small advantage over China for the 
successful cultivation of tea.’36 Once Bruce was able to successfully manage a large-scale tea 
plantation, with enough workers skilled in the art of Chinese-style tea cultivation, the future 
of the tea production in Assam would be Indian labourers under British instruction. 
Ultimately the need for Chinese tea cultivators in Assam was driven by the short term needs 
of the Tea Committee and of Bruce, on the ground, in Assam.   
The desire for Chinese labour was also under-written by colonial concepts of ethnic 
hierarchy. For John Crawfurd, the very existence of a Chinese tea industry and absence of an 
Indian tea industry was indicative of Chinese superiority. Writing in 1829, Crawfurd 
determined that the Chinese ‘character’ was ‘peculiarly adapted to the tedious manipulation 
indispensable to the preparation of tea’.37 By contrast Crawfurd lamented that ‘not one pound 
of tea has ever been grown in our Indian possessions’ in spite of the similar climatic 
conditions and the wild growth of the tea plant.38 This failure was ascribed to the 
‘unskillfulness of the Indians in almost everything approaching to manufacturing’ in contrast 
to the ‘superior skill of the Chinese’.39 The cultivation of tea not only required specialist 
knowledge, but it implied skill and consequently a degree of civilization. The lack of a pre-
existing Indian tea industry was interpreted by colonial observers as an indictment of Indian 
civilization more generally. Importantly Crawfurd’s opinion was that of a well-respected and 
experienced expert, whose opinion had currency in both India and Britain.      
Whilst Crawfurd criticised ‘Indians’ generally, the population of Assam were 
specifically criticised by British observers. Jayeeta Sharma’s work has discussed how certain 
Assamese tribes were perceived, by colonial authorities, to be lazy and opium addicted.40 
Opium, like tea, grew naturally in the region and addiction in Assam was seen to be such a 
                                                 
34 Sharma, ‘Lazy Natives, Coolie Labour, and the Assam Tea Industry’, p. 1291. 
35 Samuel Ball, An Account of the Cultivation and Manufacture of Tea in China (London: Longman, 1848), p. 
335. 
36 Ibid, p. 342. 
37 Crawfurd, View of the Present state and Future Prospects of the Free Trade and Colonisation of India, p. 18. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid, p. 19. 
40 Sharma, Empire’s Garden, p. 5. 
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problem that private opium cultivation was banned and the Indian Government was given a 
monopoly of opium production in 1861.41 Charles Bruce lamented how opium ‘has 
degenerated the Assamese from a fine race of people to the most abject, servile, crafty and 
demoralized race in India’.42 Of course, there was an element of irony here as the Chinese, 
who were touted as replacement labour, were routinely stereotyped as opium addicts. As 
described by Trocki, ‘one of the most enduring European images of the Chinese was that of 
the opium wreck’, yet in discussions of Assamese addiction, this comparison was 
overlooked.43 Not only was Assamese savagery emphasised by those on the ground, such as 
Bruce, but it was directly contrasted with Chinese civilization in contemporary scientific 
discourse. Dr John Mccosh of the Bengal Medical Service wrote accounts of the region’s 
typography that were reprinted in both British and colonial newspapers and journals. Writing 
in the Singapore Chronicle he emphasised how Assam was 'thinly populated by strangling 
hordes of slowly procreating barbarians, and allowed to lie profitless in a primeval jungle', but 
not completely cut off from enterprising ‘Chinese merchants, [who] by a short land journey 
across these mountains convey [sic] their merchandise on mules’.44 The mountainous border 
between Assam in Northeast India and Yunnan in Southwest China was constructed as a line 
between savagery and civilization. This division fits within the broad tradition of state 
formation in Southeast Asia discussed by James C. Scott. The Assamese ‘hill tribes’ were 
viewed as a ‘barbarian periphery’ that would either have to be changed or removed in order 
for the British to achieve their aim of commercial tea production.45 In the 1830s context the 
Chinese were not only necessary as tea cultivators with specific expertise, but were expected 
to provide an industrious, skilled and compliant labour force in contrast to supposed native 
laziness and resistance.46  
 It was decided by the Tea Committee that the initial experiment in tea production 
would require a limited number of Chinese experts ‘employed to instruct the natives’ under 
the direction of Charles Bruce in Assam.47 Governor-General Bentinck had travelled to 
Malacca and Singapore in 1829 to ‘observe the Chinese character’ and had been impressed.48 
                                                 
41 Sharma, ‘Lazy Natives, Coolie Labour, and the Assam Tea Industry’, p. 1297. The peculiar irony being that 
Chinese opium addiction had maintained the economic viability of the tea trade. 
42 George Thompson, Report of a Public Meeting and Lecture at Darlington … on China and the Opium 
Question (Durham: J. H. Veitch, 1840), p. 13. 
43 Trocki, Opium and Empire, p. 1. 
44 Singapore Chronicle, 6 August 1836; Asiatic Journal, Vol. 26 (London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1838). 
45 Scott, The Art of not Being Governed, pp. 1-40. 
46 Hillemann, Asian Empire and British Knowledge, p. 128. 
47 W. H. Macnaughten, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, to the Tea Committee (18 April 1836), 
Parliamentary Papers, Tea Cultivation, p. 63. 
48 Douglas M. Peers, ‘Bentinck, Lord William Henry Cavendish- (1774–1839)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Oct 2009 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2161, 
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Again, this elevation of ‘character’ underlines the concepts of hierarchy that factored into the 
Tea Committee’s decision making. Bentinck later outlined his plan that an agent should be 
appointed to obtain Chinese tea cultivators and samples of Chinese tea plants.49 As a result of 
Bentick’s instructions, Tea Committee Secretary George J. Gordon proceeded to the China 
coast in June 1834 to procure Chinese tea seeds and tea cultivators.50 With Gordon on an 
exploratory mission, Bruce preparing a tea plantation in Assam, and Wallich overseeing the 
whole operation from Calcutta, the Assam tea experiment began.51  
 
George Gordon and Charles Gutzlaff on the China Coast 
Despite the experiment being overseen by the EIC, the early stages of Chinese recruitment 
were entirely reliant upon the expertise and resources of Jardine Matheson. Charles Gutzlaff – 
the Prussian missionary, linguist and ethnographer, who had been employed by William 
Jardine as an interpreter since 1829 – was appointed as George Gordon’s guide.52 Gordon 
headed, via the Water Witch, to Canton in 1834 with instructions to find out information 
about Chinese tea manufacturing as well as to acquire seeds, plants and tea makers.53 Gordon 
was sent to Canton with ‘a recommendation from this Government to the British authorities at 
Canton … to procure for Mr Gordon any facilities or protection that may be found necessary’, 
and to fund his endeavours an account for ‘20,000 to 25,000 dollars placed at his command’.54 
That quality, rather than quantity, was required was also emphasised in Gordon’s instructions: 
‘it will be Mr Gordon’s principal duty to bring round a select, rather than numerous, body of 
planters; men qualified to conduct every operation connected with the production of good 
tea’.55 It was suggested to Gutzlaff that the project need not exceed fifty recruits.56 The 
emphasis on Chinese seeds and plants reflected Wallich’s belief, which turned out to be 
unfounded, that they key to success was the use of the best quality Chinese seeds.57 This was 
contrary to the priorities of Bruce in Assam. He required the recruitment of trained cultivators 
urgently as he had a limited knowledge of how to proceed.58 With mixed priorities and 
instructions Gordon was especially reliant on the expertise of Gutzlaff on the China coast.  
                                                 
49 Assam, p. 23. 
50 Ibid, p. 24.  
51 Ibid, pp. 24-26. 
52 Tiedemann, ‘Gützlaff, Karl Friedrich August (1803–1851)’; Charles Gutzlaff has been used in this thesis as 
opposed to his other titles: Karl Gützlaff, Philosinesis, Gaihan. 
53 Antrobus, The History of the Assam Company, p. 30. 
54 The Tea Committee to C. Macsween, Esq., Secretary to Government, Revenue Department (15 March 1834), 
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55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Harold H. Mann, The Early History of the Tea Industry in North-East India (Reprinted from the Bengal 
Economic Journal, 1918), p. 12. 
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 Upon arrival in Canton, Gordon travelled aboard the firm’s ship Fairy to join Gutzlaff 
and the opium trading vessel the Colonel Young.59 The Fairy, which was the first ship built to 
the order of Jardine Matheson, was a ‘package vessel’ that ran between Canton, Lintin and 
vessels along the coast carrying intelligence, opium and capital.60 Gordon and Gutzlaff used 
the firm’s evolving system of opium distribution to recruit the Chinese tea cultivators and 
source the seed samples that Gordon required. Gordon explained in a letter to the Tea 
Committee how on his voyage along the coast aboard the Fairy he would, with Gutzlaff’s 
assistance, ‘make such arrangements for people, plants and seed, as, after personal 
examination of the quality of the tea produced’.61 William Jardine, whilst doing his utmost to 
assist Gordon’s mission, expressed some concern that Gordon and Gutzlaff’s venturing inland 
to recruit cultivators and source plants might impact upon the firm’s opium operations. In a 
letter to Captain Rees in 1835 he suggested that extensive exploration ‘may bring down the 
displeasure of the government Authorities on the Dealers and Boat’.62 Jardine Matheson’s 
existing system of opium distribution on the China coast was essential in enabling Gordon to 
fulfil his instructions from the Tea Committee. The Indian authorities were outsourcing 
recruitment because of the firm’s recognised expertise in accessing areas of the China coast 
ostensibly closed to the West due to the Canton system but also, crucially, the ending of its 
commercial activities on the China coast in the 1833 Charter Act meant that the EIC lacked 
the means to recruit itself.63  
 These voyages not only allowed for the selling of opium and the extraction of labour, 
they also facilitated Charles Gutzlaff’s prolific publishing record. As seen in chapter two, 
Gutzlaff became a pioneer of English language publishing on China with a range of titles 
describing different aspects of Chinese society and culture. He even claimed to be a 
naturalized Chinese subject following his adoption into the clan family of Kwo in Siam.64 The 
necessities of conversion meant Gutzlaff quickly became proficient in Chinese. This led to his 
hiring by Jardine Matheson as an interpreter and physician on the firm’s opium clippers, in 
exchange for which the opium fleets would offer the opportunity to preach the gospel to 
potential Chinese converts beyond the confines of Canton and Macao. Jardine Matheson also 
                                                 
59 Mr. Gordon to Dr. Wallich (Macao), 24 July 1834, Parliamentary Papers, Tea Cultivation, p. 30. 
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funded Gutzlaff’s publishing in both Chinese and English. In exchange for his work on the 
opium clippers the firm funded his Chinese language title Dong-Xi yangkao meiyue 
tongjizhuan (East-West monthly magazine).65 Letters between Gutzlaff and James Matheson 
also demonstrate the arrangements made by Matheson to publish his English language books 
on his behalf.66 Despite his personal opposition to opium smoking, access to the firm’s 
smuggling network was invaluable for Gutzlaff’s work in terms of both disseminating and 
collecting ‘useful’ knowledge.67 Importantly, these different aims of the opium voyages were 
complementary and related. As described by Gutzlaff, the ‘opening’ of China by the West 
incorporated the diffusion of ideas about free trade and Christian theology into China as well 
the extraction of information and resources from China.68 Emigration was not excluded from 
this as Gutzlaff also wrote about existing systems of Chinese migration in Southeast Asia as 
evidence of entrepreneurial Chinese subjects circumventing the Qing Empire’s despotic 
isolationism.69 The recruitment of Chinese tea cultivators and the acquisition of guarded 
knowledge was part of a broader process of opening, which would ultimately, from the 
perspective of missionaries like Gutzlaff, lead to the spread of Christianity in China. 
Gutzlaff’s knowledge of the China coast, the Chinese language and existing forms of 
emigration made him the ideal expert to assist Gordon.  
 Gutzlaff and Gordon were particularly successful at obtaining tea seeds and plants 
from inland China. Prior to his voyages with Gordon (1834-35), Gutzlaff had been collecting 
information about tea production. Gutzlaff’s expertise had been previously utilised on an 
exploratory voyage along the China coast for the EIC with the aggressive former EIC 
supercargo Hugh Hamilton Lindsay aboard the Lord Amherst.70 Gutzlaff and Lindsay’s 
reconnaissance on the commercial potential of China’s northern ports had been endorsed by 
William Jardine, who recognised the ‘useful information’ that could be collected on such a 
voyage.71 In his journals of such voyages Gutzlaff gave detailed accounts of tea growth in 
‘Formosa’, ‘Fuh-chow’ and ‘Ke-tow’.72 Even before the Tea Committee’s establishment 
knowledge of tea cultivation had been of interest. Gutzlaff’s account of an exploratory voyage 
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in 1832 included conversations with ‘the people from the tea plantations’ which left him 
‘pleased with the propriety and correctness of their answers’.73  
To acquire plants, seeds and cultivators Gutzlaff and Gordon made their way to the 
tea-producing hills of Fujian.74 In May 1835 they led a small party up the Min River to access 
tea hills northwest of Fuzhou, where they were fired upon by Chinese soldiers.75 The Tea 
Committee were aware of such risks when they had referred to difficulty of procuring 
information regarding China and tea production.76 In extracting skilled labourers and 
information from outside of the limits of the Canton system Gutzlaff and Gordon were 
breaking multiple Chinese laws. ‘Foreigners’ were not allowed to visit the Chinese interior 
and required a permit to travel between Macao and Canton.77 Similarly, the preaching and 
practising of Christianity and the consumption of opium were also banned.78 For the Chinese 
who collaborated with Gordon and Gutzlaff on their mission the risks were even greater. 
Assisting foreigners in this manner, and theoretically emigration itself, carried the penalty of 
death. Gordon’s later writing on Anglo-Chinese relations revealed an awareness of these risks 
as he referred to Robert Morrison’s translation of the ‘Penal Laws of China’.79 Gordon noted 
how ‘if any (Chinese subjects) are at all suspected of giving information, legal advice, or 
similar aid, to a foreigner, the local government immediately raises the cry of traitor!’80 The 
‘judicial murder’ of Briton Thomas Scott in 1773 was frequently referred to by Gordon as 
evidence of the danger that the despotic Qing Empire posed to enterprising Westerners.81 
Gordon was conscious that he was largely dependent on the abilities of Gutzlaff, without 
whom it would ‘be quite in vain to attempt a journey of such length into the interior’.82 
Despite Gordon’s official role as a representative of the Tea Committee he found himself 
dependent on the effectiveness of Jardine Matheson’s illicit operation.   
 Gordon wrote freely about the tea samples he gathered during his expedition with 
Gutzlaff, but the details of the recruitment and shipping of tea cultivators not recorded, 
presumably to provide anonymity. Gordon opted to recruit tea cultivators from the Bohea 
Hills (Wuyi Shan), a district notable for black tea production some 300 kilometres inland, 
after visiting several different tea districts. Gordon’s notes on the subject reveal a hierarchy of 
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Chinese tea cultivators as he explained that ‘the inferiority of Ankoy tea arises from unskilful 
culture and preparation of the leaf … I made, therefore, no offer to the peasantry at Twa-Be, 
to accompany me to Bengal as planters’.83 Gordon recruited the Bohea planters through a 
‘native agent’, who remained un-named, and expected the arrival of his recruits at Canton in 
January 1835.84 In later letters there were references to ‘two emissaries’ hired by Gordon for 
the task of ‘engaging competent superintendents’ from the Bohea Hills once he had returned 
to Calcutta, whilst his ‘private friends residing at Canton and Macao’ finalised the 
arrangements.85 The native agents and tea cultivator’s identities were omitted deliberately 
given Gordon’s knowledge of the risks they faced under Chinese law. This awareness is 
reflected by the fact that the Tea Committee offered salaries ranging between 300 and 600 
rupees per month ‘according to the degree of danger they would be exposed to in entering on 
a contract with foreigners’.86 Considering Bruce’s salary as head of the operation was 400 
rupees per month these payments reflected the perceived value of skilled cultivators to the 
success of the Assam operation. By March 1835 it had been realised that the tea plant in 
Assam was viable and Gordon was recalled from the China coast.87 Though an exact number 
is not given, Bruce’s reference to Chinese assistance within 1835 suggests the arrival of 
Gordon’s Bohea recruits. Gordon’s time on the China coast with Gutzlaff had been successful 
in furnishing him with tea plants and recruits, as well as knowledge of Chinese tea production 
for the benefit of the project.88  
This first round of recruitment for the Assam project (1834-1835) was not only 
challenging in execution but also insufficient. Many of the issues were caused by the Tea 
Committee’s stipulation that the project was experimental and required as few cultivators as 
possible, who would undertake multiple job roles. First, linguistic difference was an issue. 
The recruitment of cultivators from China had not accounted for translators for different 
regional dialects. As a result it was hard to locate translators with the necessary skills without 
incurring extra cost.89 As the Tea Committee noted in 1836, ‘the dialect spoken in that part of 
the province of Fahkeen bordering on Kyangse, of which those people are natives, differs 
very materially from that spoken on the coast of the same province’.90 The EIC was poorly 
resourced for such eventualities. An employee of the licence department of the police, Laon 
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Chung, was hired for the task despite being ‘inferior in point of intelligence’ to the first choice 
Dr Lumqua, a Chinese doctor in Calcutta whose proposed salary was deemed too expensive. 
Second, the cultivators hired by Gordon from the Bohea hills were black tea cultivators and 
not ‘practically acquainted with the peculiar process by which the green tea-leaf is prepared 
for the foreign market’.91 In August 1836 Bruce had discovered the wild growth of a species 
of green tea.92 A personal examination of the Assam plantations by Dr Wallich in 1836 led to 
the recommendation of ‘an additional number of [Chinese] planters’ and plans were made for 
further recruitment.93 However, no further recruitment from China took place until 1839 as 
Bruce proceed to cultivate and manufacture tea with the aid of the Chinese cultivators who 
had already arrived in Assam.  
 
James Matheson and the Recruitment of Chinese Tea Cultivators in 1839 
Gordon’s recruitment missions in the mid-1830s meant that the Assam tea experiment was 
successful in producing a marketable Indian tea. The first batch of Assam tea arrived in 
London in November 1838, where it was inspected by metropolitan experts and adjudged to 
be of satisfactory quality. It was first auctioned (at an inflated price due to the high level of 
public interest) in January 1839.94 The landing of the tea in Britain and the developing 
animosities with China meant that Assam tea and the Assam region was a popular topic of 
discussion in the British press in early 1839. In January various metropolitan and provincial 
titles remarked on the ‘curiosity among commercial men to the first sale of the specimens’.95 
Additionally, on 15 February, the House of Commons ordered a ‘Copy of papers received 
from India relating to the measures adopted for introducing the Cultivation of the Tea Plant 
within the British Possessions in India’ from the EIC.96 The resulting Parliamentary Paper, 
which mainly comprised the correspondence to and from the Tea Committee, was published 
two weeks later by East India House, having been approved by Robert Gordon, the 
Commissioner of the Board of Control. Most significantly the Assam Company was formed at 
a meeting of London merchants on the 14 February 1839 with an available capital of £500,000 
in 10,000 shares of £50 each and with outspoken merchant and aristocrat G. G. Larpent as its 
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Chairman.97 The privatisation of the Assam tea plantations had been planned from the outset, 
though the Assam Company did not take direct control of the tea plantations until early in 
1840.98   
Despite the success of the Assam tea in Britain, on the ground Charles Bruce had been 
unhappy with the Chinese cultivators. Many of Gordon’s secondary recruits had arrived in 
Assam dishevelled with no money – as they thought their expenses would be covered 
separately from their wages – and had to be compensated. Furthermore some of those 
recruited by Gordon from Singapore had lied about their tea-making credentials and were 
described by Bruce as ‘headstrong and passionate’.99 Unfortunately for Bruce, high demand 
and interest meant that more tea was required urgently. Consequently there was also an urgent 
demand for more Chinese cultivators. George Gordon had tendered his resignation to the Tea 
Committee in May 1836 due to ‘considerations, partly public and partly private’.100 The 
public reason given was that his task was largely completed and it was believed that Wallich 
could fulfil his role, which he did following his return to Calcutta from Assam late in 1836. 
The extra labour Bruce required following the success of the Assam tea in early 1839 led to 
direct communication between the Tea Committee and Jardine Matheson regarding the supply 
of additional Chinese cultivators. 
 For the 1839 recruitment Wallich approached Jardine Matheson in a lengthy, six-page 
letter to the firm: 
 
The committee having already benefitted in several cases by your valuable and 
courteous assistance in procuring, at the insistence of their late secretary Mr G. J. 
Gordon, manufacturing men from China, they entertain a confident hope, that you 
will likewise grant cordial cooperation on the present occasion, especially as it is 
one of great national interest and importance.101  
 
Wallich’s reference to the experiment as being of ‘great national interest and importance’ 
belies the shared aims of the Tea Committee and the firm. Wallich’s concerns about the Qing 
Empire’s control of the supply of tea coalesced with Jardine Matheson’s representation of the 
Chinese authorities as despotic in order to justify their opium trading activities. Similarly 
James Matheson’s meetings with Palmerston, then foreign secretary, in 1835, and his 1836 
                                                 
97 Antrobus, The History of the Assam Company p.37; In this meeting of the Assam Company it was discussed 
that the East India Company had agreed to ‘speedily make available’ information on Assam, which presumably 
led to the publication of the Parliamentary Papers; Minute book of the Assam Company, 12 February 1839 – 17 
December 1845, in MS 9924/1, London Metropolitan Archives (London).   
98 Antrobus, The History of the Assam Company, p. 269.  
99 Ibid, p. 271. 
100 Gordon to the Tea Committee (16 May 1836), in Parliamentary Papers, Tea Cultivation, p. 63. 
101 Nathaniel Wallich (Calcutta) to Jardine, Matheson & Co. (Canton), 15 February 1839, in MS JM/C10, Jardine 
Matheson Archive (Cambridge University).   
 124 
 
book The Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China, were attempts by 
the firm to convince metropolitan policy makers that the subversion of the authority of the 
Qing Empire was of national ‘interest and importance’.102  
Wallich left the fine details of recruitment to the firm’s ‘good judgement and 
execution’ but gave a budget to cover ‘the expenses of 60 Chinese artisans’.103 Some of the 
job roles that needed to be filled were listed. Specifically, ‘12 Tea-cultivators’, ‘8 Box Makers 
and Lackerers’, ‘8 paper manufacturers’ and an interpreter of ‘respectability and influence’ 
were required urgently.104 Wallich stipulated that Matheson make the contracts explicit, 
explaining that expenses would not be paid in addition to the advance wages (this oversight in 
the previous contracts had cost the Tea Committee who had to cover expenses).105 Given the 
‘national importance’ of the recruitment mission James Matheson took personal responsibility 
for arranging the contracts.  
 Jardine Matheson kept copies of contracts with 12 Chinese tea cultivators, all of which 
named James Matheson personally.106 All of the contracts were dated 15 August 1839 and 
were identical in structure.107 It is also worth noting that the terms ‘tea manufacturer’ and ‘tea 
cultivator’ were used interchangeably, even within the same contract. Low-a-Sam, Ko-Lu-
Leng, Low-Su-Fok, Low-Yum-Chin, Tang-Shim Kwai, Tang-Hoau-Se, Ling-Cam-Seng, Ting 
Ateem, Low A. Jin, Low Mok Yes and Ting Jin Leng were hired as ‘Tea Cultivators’, and A. 
Sing was hired as a ‘Tea Packer’.108 The surviving contracts reflect some of the concerns of 
the Assam project’s managers, as this extract from a contract signed by ‘Low-a-Sam’ 
demonstrates: 
 
Low-a-Sam, Tea Manufacturer who thoroughly understands the business of 
manufacturing tea hereby engages himself to Mr. James Matheson that he will 
retain to Assam for the space of five years to exercise his craft, after the expiration 
of which he will be permitted to return. His monthly wages are to be fifteen (15) 
dollars including his board. Mr Matheson will pay every month to Lim-Fok the 
relation of Low-a-Sam three (3) dollars and he himself will receive the remaining 
Twelve (12) dollars. He will reserve in advance three months wages forty five 
(45) dollars as bargain money.109   
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Not only was the three month advance of wages explained, as desired by Wallich, but the 
contract emphasised that the need for the employee to ‘understand’ tea manufacture. This 
emphasis came from a fundamental mistrust of the Chinese cultivators, both among the Tea 
Committee members and Jardine Matheson. Whilst Bruce complained in Assam that some 
recruits were believed to have exaggerated their knowledge of tea cultivation so that they 
would receive the lucrative wages offered. Indeed, James Matheson had previously written 
that the Chinese were characterised by 'imbecility, avarice, conceit, and obstinacy'.110 Given 
these attitudes the accuracy of the contracts was paramount. The contract was a short 
document, written in both English and Chinese, and contained details such as fines for Low-a-
Sam’s failure to see through the contract and explicitly confirming that he would be free to 
return to China at the completion of the five years of service. Ensuring that Chinese 
cultivators understood, or at least could not claim to have misunderstood, the terms of the 
contract was important to the Tea Committee. The EIC had struggled to acquire adequate 
translators to assist Bruce on the tea plantations in Assam. By contrast the needs of Jardine 
Matheson meant they employed a vast staff of interpreters and compradors who operated their 
clandestine opium distribution network.111 The Tea Committee was reliant on the resources 
and expertise of the firm in order to provide accurate translation.     
Following the recruitment of the twelve tea cultivators in August 1839 Matheson 
explained to Wallich the difficulties caused by the start of the First Opium War. Matheson 
wrote that ‘in these troublesome times … the attention of the Chinese Govt. has lately been 
drawn to the subject, and they have issued many severe proclamations against those who may 
aid or abet the emigration of their subjects’.112 In the last round of Chinese recruitment to be 
conducted by the firm for the Assam experiment, Matheson was able to recruit fourteen tea 
cultivators as well as eight lackerers and box makers, meeting the requirements that had been 
outlined by Wallich.113 Unfortunately for the Tea Committee, the beginnings of Opium War 
destabilised the firm’s access to the areas of the China coast from which they had recruited tea 
cultivators.  
Language was still a problem in Assam, where Wallich wished to find one Chinese 
representative to act as a headman and interpreter. Matheson explained to Wallich that 
‘Canton men do not use the same spoken language nor do they have the requisite authority 
over their countrymen of a different province’.114 Note here Matheson’s awareness of 
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linguistic difference. Though Matheson’s writing was largely unconcerned with Chinese 
culture and history, his experience on the China coast and his knowledge of Chinese society 
was evidence in his correspondence with the Calcutta-based Tea Committee members. 
Matheson’s allusion to authority also reflects concerns on the ground in Assam that the under-
resourced Bruce required intermediaries. The fact that Matheson was able to recruit in the 
context of rapidly worsening Anglo-Chinese relations (caused in no small part by his own 
firm’s activities) was testament to the firm’s networks that transcended both Chinese and 
British imperial control. 
From the very conception of the Assam experiment the EIC had planned to transfer 
the tea plantations to private ownership.115 Following the success of the first Assam teas the 
Assam Company was incorporated in 1839, with the new Company in control of production 
in Assam by the first tea season of 1840.116 The Assam Company, with its high levels of 
available capital hired Dr Lumqua, who had been too expensive for the Tea Committee, to 
manage the Chinese workers in Assam and arrange further Chinese recruitment.117 On the 
advice of Lumqua a Chinese agent (referred to as Eekan or E-kan) was appointed to hire 
Chinese labourers from Penang and Singapore.118 The agent was able to recruit 216 labourers 
from Penang and 245 from Singapore but, in these easily accessible contact zones outside of 
China, he was ‘not successful in finding any experienced artisans’.119 Instead these recruits 
were intended to become apprentices under tea makers already in Assam who would develop 
into skilled tea artisans. Additionally, Lumqua procured a messenger to travel across Burma 
and attempt to establish a supply of skilled Chinese labour from the Chinese province of 
Yunnan.120 In spite of the large numbers of labourers acquired from Penang and Singapore, 
Lumqua’s attempt to source skilled labour from Yunnan demonstrates the premium placed on 
skilled artisans from China itself. A colonial hierarchy that placed Chinese migrants from 
China above Chinese migrants from the Straits Settlements was emerging, and was informed 
by the premium placed on specialist skill and useful knowledge.                   
The Chinese recruitment undertaken by Assam Company’s was vastly more 
problematic than the recruitment of Jardine Matheson. In February 1840 nine Chinese 
labourers, out of a group of 105 intended for Assam, were arrested and put on trial for assault 
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at Bogra. Bruce warned that too many Chinese workers were arriving as he was still in the 
government’s military service and could not devote the time to manage the plantation.121 
Eekan’s shipment of Chinese labourers from Singapore arrived the next month. After fifty-
seven labourers from this shipment were arrested over an affray in which a local villager was 
killed at Pabna, the remainder of the ‘gang’ refused to move to Assam without a ‘further 
advance of pay, and supplies of opium and provisions’.122 After three months the group was 
completely abandoned, though the Assam Company regretted ‘that so many lawless 
characters should be let loose upon society’.123 The failure was specifically attributed to poor 
selection by Eekan and the poor ‘character’ of the Chinese from Penang and Singapore. 
Additionally, those who did reach the stations in Assam fell victim to fever – a common 
occurrence in the Assamese jungle. Similarly, Lumqua’s alternative mission to Yunnan was 
thwarted by ‘the cowardice and roguery of the Chinese’ who had been hired to undertake the 
journey but disappeared without a trace shortly after departing.124 The failure of these 
schemes, both to source unskilled labour from Singapore and skilled artisans from Yunnan, 
cost the Assam Company vast amounts of money.125 Such recruitment projects were also 
doomed by the death of Lumqua in August 1840 who, according to the 1841 Report of the 
Local Directors, had been ‘appoint a kind of Captain, with Magisterial powers, among his 
countrymen’.126 As a result the Assam Company began to seek alternative forms of labour.       
From early in the Assam Company’s ownership and management of the Assam 
plantations emphasis was placed on the diffusion of the specialist knowledge of the Chinese 
artisans. For example, the first annual report of the Assam Company remarked how one 
particular establishment had produced tea, despite consisting of ‘only two Chinese black tea 
makers, with twelve native assistants’.127 There was a growing realisation on the ground in 
Assam that the Chinese were becoming superfluous to tea production and their numbers 
gradually decreased. J. P. Parker, Superintendent of the East Division, discussed how when 
seven Chinese tea makers were ‘discharged’ after refusing to relocation to a different division, 
leaving only two, the establishment was able to continue tea cultivation without them.128 A 
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contributing factor to the move away from Chinese recruitment was the employment of 
indigenous labour. In 1841 Charles Bruce noted how the ‘wild people’ of the ‘Naga tribes’ 
were first induced to help in the labour of clearing the jungle.129 The heavy financial cost of 
the failed Singapore and Yunnan recruitments especially turned the Company’s attention to a 
local labour supply. The 1841 Assam Company Report noted that the ‘Assamese are 
beginning to work, and for the important art of Tea manufacture, they seem peculiarly 
adapted, and likely to supply eventually all the labour that will be required’.130  
Since the mid-1830s knowledge of tea production had been acquired from Chinese tea 
cultivators by British managers and Indian artisans. As a result the difficult recruitment of 
Chinese specialists became increasingly unnecessary. A letter from a Mr Masters 
accompanying a tea invoice in late 1841 stated that ‘the whole of it has been made without the 
aid of the Chinamen, and that only one person on the establishment had ever seen a Chinaman 
engaged in the manufacture’.131 By 1842 there was no longer a necessity for the recruitment 
of skilled Chinese artisans as their expertise was no longer required and Chinese labourers 
had been replaced by cheaper, locally-sourced labour. Ultimately, the Assam Company lacked 
the networks or resources to effectively manage large numbers of Chinese labourers, many of 
whom had been hired for job roles that they could not fulfil. Luckily for the Assam Company, 
thanks to the diffusion of specialist knowledge in the 1830s, such recruitments were no longer 
required. By the 1860s there were no Chinese tea cultivators or labourers left in Assam.132 
Instead the importation of labour from elsewhere in India was used to fill colonial needs over 
the rest of the nineteenth century. These migrations led to new debates around issues of 
labour, with the Indian Tea Association formed in 1881 to advocate for European plantation 
owners against workers’ rights and ‘labour militancy’.133  
 Much of the discussion around the use of Chinese and Assamese labour on the tea 
plantations fed into and contributed to notions of hierarchy. Despite the catastrophe of the 
Assam Company era recruitment, the perception of the Chinese as an especially industrious 
ethnic group was left relatively unharmed. The failure of Chinese labour at Assam was most 
commonly attributed to poor recruitment, particularly after Jardine Matheson’s involvement 
had ceased. Notably, the later recruitment had not been from the tea producing regions of 
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Southern China, but from the Straits Settlements of Singapore and Penang. The Assam 
Company complained that those recruited at Singapore by Eekan had been ‘selected without 
discretion’ and that they were ‘turbulent, obstinate, and rapacious’.134 Similarly, the 
newspaper editor and author Robert Mudie criticised the Assam Company recruits for a ‘want 
of mental dignity’.135 As Jayeeta Sharma has pointed out, when discussing botanist William 
Griffith, discussions of Chinese emigrants in Assam were increasingly imbued with ideas 
about purity and hierarchy.136 Griffith was sceptical of Chinese who had spent too long 
outside of China: ‘I found that among all the so-called Chinese, who are to be met with at 
Mogoung, Bamo, and Ava, as well as among those who form the large annual caravans that 
trade with Burma, there is not a single genuine Chinaman.’137 The use of ‘genuine’ here 
implies an ethnic hierarchy emerging within the construct of ‘the Chinese’. In particular it 
acted as an appraisal of the China coast recruitment undertaken by Jardine Matheson, which 
the Assam Company tried to replicate overland from Yunnan, rather than the subsequent 
recruitment from Southeast Asia. The failure of the Assam Company’s recruitment highlights 
the importance of Jardine Matheson’s opium distribution networks for extracting skilled 
labour from China. That the Assam Company abandoned the recruitment of Chinese labour 
within a year of taking control demonstrates both the successful diffusion of specialist 
knowledge and the limited resource networks of the new organisation.  
The role of Jardine Matheson in procuring Chinese tea cultivators for the Assam 
experiment illustrates the growth of private commercial and information networks on the 
China coast in the 1830s. That James Matheson became personally involved indicated the 
multiple roles that partners and employees of the firm undertook. For example, Charles 
Gutzlaff – though acting primarily as a missionary, an interpreter and an author – utilised his 
skills and expertise to procure tea cultivators. Additionally, the opium voyages along the coast 
indicated the multiple ways in which the firm was ‘opening’ China in the 1830s.138 Not only 
was opium being sold and religious literature being disseminated but labour, physical 
resources and knowledge were being extracted. Somewhat ironically the very firm that was at 
the forefront of jeopardizing Anglo-Chinese relations, and therefore Britain’s tea supply, also 
played a crucial role in establishing the rival Indian tea plantations. Jardine Matheson’s role in 
the tea experiment not only shows a side to the firm’s activities that has been under-explored, 
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namely their role in Chinese emigration, but also the emerging autonomy of private British 
merchant firms on the China coast whose interests and actions would shape Anglo-Chinese 
relations over the following decades. 
The recruitment and use of Chinese tea cultivators in Assam also complicated 
developing ethnic hierarchies. Contrasts were formed between the Assamese and the British; 
the Chinese and the British; the Chinese and the Assamese; and, increasingly, between 
specific Assamese tribal or Chinese regional groups. It is of note that after increased 
experience of recruiting and employing Chinese labour perceived hierarchies of different 
Chinese groups emerged. The discussion over what was a ‘genuine’ Chinese tea cultivator 
raised questions about who was or was not Chinese. As with the Assamese, the appraisal of 
different groups was contingent on their economic utility. Chinese migrants to Singapore had 
previously been celebrated as industrious drivers of economic activity, yet in the context of 
tea cultivators for Assam the Straits Chinese were unsuitable. In some ways the failure of 
Assam Company recruitment confirmed Singapore’s colonial authorities’ suspicion of the 
Chinese labour force. Importantly, stereotypes, whether they focused on Assamese ‘savagery’ 
or Chinese ‘treachery’, were conducive to the broader economic aims of the EIC and British 
merchant firms on the China coast. Such hierarchies were not static, but shifted over time and 
across different geographical spaces. As a developing colonial space, Assam was an early 
testing ground for ideas about Chinese labour. Criticisms of Chinese labourers in Assam were 
mitigated by questions about the authenticity of Chinese communities outside of China. 
Whilst the Straits Chinese recruited by the Assam Company were criticised, ‘genuine’ 
Chinese tea cultivators were still held in high esteem.    
 
Gordon Forbes Davidson in New South Wales 
As the EIC sought skilled Chinese artisans to undertake tea cultivation in Assam the merchant 
Gordon Forbes Davidson hatched a plan for the assisted migration of Chinese labourers to 
New South Wales. Davidson was struck by the scarcity of cheap, available labour in the 
Australian colonies after his arrival in 1836. As a result he attempted to establish a Chinese 
migration scheme to New South Wales in the late 1830s. There were significant similarities 
and differences between the New South Wales and Assam projects. As in Assam, the New 
South Wales scheme sought to extend Chinese migration systems beyond existing boundaries 
of Southeast Asia. Similarly, Davidson specifically drew inspiration from the Anglo-Chinese 
success story of Singapore. As discussed in chapter one, Davidson’s ideas about ethnicity and 
labour were immediately shaped by his experiences in Southeast Asia, which had convinced 
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him of the clear imbalance between the ‘lazy’ natives and the ‘industrious’ Chinese.139 There 
were also key differences. In New South Wales Chinese labourers were required for general 
employment, rather than for a specific skill set or knowledge base, such as tea cultivation. An 
important difference in terms of ethnic hierarchy was that the movement of Chinese labourers 
to New South Wales would bring them into direct economic competition with European 
settlers. Given the prominence of themes around ethnicity and labour in Australian 
historiography, it is notable that Gordon Forbes Davidson’s scheme has been almost 
completely neglected by historians with only a brief mention of the advertisements in an 
article by Tony Ohlsson.  
From the start of Britain’s colonial project in New South Wales there was an awareness 
that a viable source of imported labour would be required in order to facilitate the colony’s 
economic development. Long before Davidson’s scheme, in 1804, the possibility of Chinese 
migration to Australia was discussed in official communication between Governor King and 
the Colonial Secretary, Lord Hobart: 
 
It would be attended with the most desirable consequences in introducing Chinese 
into these settlements, which from your knowledge your Lordship has had of the 
industrious character of that people, and how much the Dutch settlements in India 
have profited by their residence among them, I presume might be attended with 
great advantage to this country.140 
 
Not only was labour required, but the ‘industrious character’ of the Chinese made them 
particularly desirable labourers. King’s scheme was never put into practice, and the severity 
of the shortage had intensified by the 1830s. Few British territories caused more demands and 
challenges in labour supply than the growing Australian colonies in the 1830s.  
Movements away from transportation, and consequently away from convict labour, 
threatened Australia’s pastoral economy. The 1837 select committee on transportation, 
presided over by the radical MP William Molesworth, recommended that the convict 
transportation system be abolished.141 The system was believed to be both ineffective in 
reforming convicts and a contributing factor to the social ills of the colony. Along with this 
metropolitan condemnation of convict transportation, colonial opinion was similarly 
galvanised in opposition to the system.142 By 1840 convict transportation to New South Wales 
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had been ended, though a reduced system continued to Western Australia until the 1860s.143 
In addition to the ending of convict transportation, the increased demand for cheap manual 
labourers in 1830s Australia was caused by the rapid growth of land ownership in the colony 
as freed convicts took up smallholdings on the edge of existing settlements.144 As the labour 
force of the colony gradually became employers they exacerbated New South Wales’ existing 
shortages by creating excess demand for labour.145 An indication of the necessity to prevent 
the proliferation of land ownership was the replacement of government land grants with land 
sales in 1831. In spite of the establishment of a ‘bounty system’, which was funded using 
revenue from land sales, to induce ‘free’ migrants from Britain as an alternative source of 
imported labour was required.146     
A particular frustration for colonial employers was the reluctance of Aboriginal 
Australians to undertake agricultural labour under the management of British settlers. 
Colonial perceptions of Aboriginal Australians in the 1830s were extremely critical. These 
perceptions were often a more extreme version of the ‘lazy native’ narrative prominent in 
Southeast Asia. Watkin Tench, a British marine officer and author who was amongst the first 
British settlers to arrive in Australia in 1788, wrote of the indigenous population that ‘they 
certainly rank very low, even in the scale of savages’.147 Here Tench was not only asserting 
British or European superiority, but also forming a comparative ethnic hierarchy within which 
the Aboriginal Australians were placed at the very bottom. The demarcation of Aboriginal 
Australians as ‘savages’ was also connected to British ideas about industry and appropriate 
forms of labour. The concept of terra nullius, which dictated that Aboriginal Australian 
peoples did not own land and that Australia was uninhabited because it was not cultivated, 
was central to the British assumption of territorial control.148 Production in excess of need, a 
key component of capitalist agricultural practice, was seen by the British as innately 
connected to civilization. British colonial control in Australia, as in South Africa, caused a 
production-led redefinition of local economies.149  
The redefinition of land ownership also had biblical origins, with the instruction that 
man should ‘subdue’ the earth feeding into the suggestion of Richard Windeyer, the 
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prominent barrister and politician, that ‘land belongs to he who first cultivates it’.150 The non-
production based economic and social structures of Aboriginal Australian tribes stood in 
complete contrast to European ideas about ownership and labour. The land appeared to 
settlers to be un-cultivated and was therefore un-occupied. As Angela Woollacott has 
emphasised, the brutal frontier violence perpetrated by settlers against Aboriginal Australians 
was ‘interwoven with the topics of land and labour’.151 Additionally, when Aboriginal 
Australians did take up employment they were prone to exploitation and violence at the hands 
of settler ‘land owners’. Given existing alternative structures it was unsurprising that 
Aboriginal Australians were reluctant to form a labour force under British control.152 As 
highlighted by Kay Anderson, the vastly contrasting social and economic structures meant 
that for many British settlers Aboriginal Australians existed at the very limits of humanity.153 
For many colonial observers, the growing Australian colonies best demonstrated the extremes 
of civilization hierarchy. The British Empire was seen as a symbol of progress and the 
Aboriginal population was a representation of savagery and barbarism. This contrast was 
regularly underlined by episodes of frontier violence, in which the allocation of land and 
labour were the stakes.  
 Early in 1836 Gordon Forbes Davidson moved to New South Wales and his account 
of his first three years’ residence demonstrated an acceptance of many of the contemporary 
prejudices and concerns in the colony.154 On arrival Davidson was impressed: ‘landing in 
Sydney, the traveller from India is ready to exclaim, surely this is not a town some seventeen 
thousand miles from England! Everything reminds him of home’.155 Glad to be in an ‘English’ 
town, Davidson was struck by the shortage of suitable workers as he remarked that, ‘labour is 
so much cheaper in Britain than it is in Australia’ and was unimpressed by British and Irish 
migrants who ‘generally are very difficult to satisfy in the matter of rations’.156 The solution to 
this shortage was not to be had through further convict transportation. As Davidson’s initial 
excitement subsided, he concurred with contemporaries that convicts were undesirable as they 
made a negative contribution to the colony’s moral character. In a tirade against drunkenness 
Davidson asked, ‘what better conduct, however, can be expected from men, nine-tenths of 
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whom either are or have been convicts?’157 Davidson’s criticism of the role of convicts, or 
freed convicts, reflected the contemporary shift in attitudes against convict transportation, and 
consequently, ‘unfree’ labour.  
 Davidson was also dismissive of the prospects of an Aboriginal workforce. 
Davidson warned that the payment of indigenous labourers ‘must not be given them, 
however, till their work is done: give it beforehand, and not a hand's turn will they do, but 
decamp at once to enjoy their dinner’.158 Much of Davidson’s writing on New South Wales 
was concerned with descriptions of Aboriginal Australian culture and customs. Particularly 
struck by the nakedness of Aboriginal Australians, Davidson suggested that if a European 
‘Samaritan’ did distribute clothes they would ‘in all probability, appear naked at his door 
tomorrow, having given away their clothes to some convict, in exchange for a pound of flour 
or an ounce of tobacco’.159 As in Singapore, Davidson immediately accepted and reiterated the 
colonial trope of the ‘lazy native’. For Davidson, New South Wales was similar to Singapore 
in that imported, non-European labour was required. Consequently, Davidson would draw on 
his experience of Southeast Asia when proposing a solution to the labour crisis.   
 Davidson’s experiences were set in a wider context of concern over the shortage of 
labour in Australia. Metropolitan imperial planners were concerned with providing Australian 
colonies with a supply of ‘free’ labour. Notably, those ‘colonial reformers’ interested in 
colonization in Australia would later form the basis of metropolitan migration bureaucracy on 
an imperial scale.160 In 1830 Edward Gibbon Wakefield, an advocate of ‘free’ migration to 
Australia, established the National Colonization Society.161 Notable early members included 
Robert Gouger (a future colonial secretary in South Australia), Sir William Molesworth 
(whose 1838 select committee denounced convict labour), Robert Torrens (who was made a 
Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioner in 1840) and the influential liberal-thinker John 
Stuart Mill.162 Thomas Frederick Elliot, one of the original three Colonial Land and 
Emigration Commissioners, worked with the London Emigration Committee from 1831 and 
was Agent-General for Emigration from 1837. Elliot’s management of emigration, originally 
focused on Australia, became increasingly broad.163 The growing involvement of the Colonial 
Office in migration led to the creation of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commission by 
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the Colonial Secretary Lord Russell in January 1840.164 Notably, the entire framework of the 
metropolitan management of imperial emigration and colonization evolved from shortages of 
labour in the Australian colonies. Within a wider metropolitan interest in systems of imperial 
migration and colonial development, the Australian colonies were paramount.165 
The advocacy of the ‘colonial reformers’ demonstrates that Davidson was not alone in 
recommending imported Asian labour. A rival solution of the 1830s was the recommended 
the importation of Indian coolies. In 1836 John Mackay arrived from Bengal with Bengali 
servants and sent a memorandum on ‘Indian Coolies’ to Governor Bourke. A year later J. R. 
Mayo sent a similar memorandum regarding the success of Indian labour in Mauritius.166 The 
supply of labour in Australia, and possible Asian solutions, was a concern of both colonial 
and imperial governments. Reports, with evidence given from colonists who required 
labourers, were compiled by ‘Governors of the Australian Colonies’ and dispatched to the 
Secretary of State or the Colonies.167 Thomas Walker, who was a Sydney merchant and cattle 
owner, revealed that individual proprietors had already made arrangements for the recruitment 
of Indian and Chinese labour:  
 
So urgent is the demand for labour, that many settlers have been obliged, in 
opposition to their own inclination, to send India for Chinese and Coolies, to be 
hired and introduced at their individual expense. It comes within my own 
knowledge, that 1,203 such labourers have actually been sent for by 111 settlers, 
each of whom has paid an advance at the rate of £5 for each labourer, and entered 
into an engagement to pay the balance of the expense of their introduction on 
arrival of the parties here.168 
 
Given the details discussed here, it would appear that Walker was referring, in part, to 
Davidson’s Chinese migration scheme. Crucially, from Walker’s perspective, ‘Chinese and 
coolies’ were grouped together for the purposes of filling colonial labour shortages. 
As early as 1829 texts written by leading colonization advocates, Robert Gouger and 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield, recommended Chinese labour as a solution to the Australian 
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problem.169 The main argument was that free migrants, not slaves or convicts, should be 
procured for the Australian colonies by the imperial government in London.170 However 
Gouger also looked to China as a possible solution. He noted that: ‘the Chinese, especially, 
who, with a population of 300,000,000, feel the pressure of people upon territory more than 
any other nation whatsoever, - who are greatly disposed to emigrate, - and are, by far, the 
most industrious and skilful of Asiatics’.171 Wakefield expanded upon this, suggesting that it 
was ‘surprising that the Chinese haven’t already moved to Australia. And it is not still more 
surprising that these British settlers, who would gladly purchase slaves at one hundred pounds 
per head should not have procured labourers from Canton?’172 As emphasised by Woollacott, 
though thinkers such as Wakefield advocated specific types of labour migration – namely 
promoting the emigration of British working class families – Indian, Chinese and Pacific 
Islander migrant labour was preferred to coerced or Aboriginal labour.173 As in Singapore, the 
use of Chinese labour in Australia was intimately tied to notions of ethnic hierarchy and 
desirability.   
 A colonial trailblazer in the employment of Chinese migrants was the Scottish 
clergyman and politician John Dunmore Lang. After arriving in Sydney in 1823, Lang is 
reported to have employed two Chinese migrants (named Queng and Tchiou) in 1827.174 
Lang, like Wakefield, was an outspoken advocate of assisted migration from Britain to 
Australia. After a visit to England in 1830 Lang used a Colonial Office loan to assist 140 
Scottish tradesmen and their families to emigrate.175 Yet his advocacy of Chinese immigration 
into Australia demonstrated the different purposes attributed to different types of migrants. In 
1837 Lang mooted the possibility of Australian tea cultivation, which would require a 
‘numerous’ Chinese population.176 Evidently, Lang was aware of the on-going Assam 
experiment. He also demonstrated knowledge of existing systems of Chinese migration and 
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was confident that the success of Chinese migration in Southeast Asia could be repeated in 
New South Wales: 
 
The Chinese … are an emigrating nation; and as they are easily induced, by the 
prospect of bettering their fortunes to emigrate to Singapore, Batavia, and 
Calcutta, there is no reason to doubt that a similar prospect would induce them to 
emigrate to New South Wales.177 
 
When there was opposition to large scale Chinese migration to Australia in the 1850s and 
1860s, Lang took the lead in seeking the repeal of anti-immigration legislation.178 There was 
demand for Chinese labour in New South Wales. In 1837 Davidson attempted to provide a 
supply for employers like Lang and establish a regular system of Chinese migration to 
Australia.  
 
Gordon Forbes Davidson’s Chinese Migration Scheme 
Importantly Davidson was connected to Jardine Matheson as opposed to any official or 
governmental structures. Loans from the firm funded his activities. Of the many letters 
between Davidson and the firm the first came in 1828, and it reveals Davidson’s involvement 
in the opium trade. William Jardine was personally involved in selling ‘Turkey opium’ on 
Davidson’s behalf.179 The correspondence between the two over the 1830s shows the firm 
acting as a broker between Davidson and Chinese opium purchasers. In an 1832 letter 
Davidson wrote ‘your invoice and bill of landing of the chests of Patna opium shipped by me 
on the Water Witch to your kind care, be good enough to dispose of this small cost at your 
earliest convenience’, again this highlights the versatility of Jardine Matheson’s shipping 
operations, as the Water Witch was the same ship used by Gordon to reach the coast to recruit 
tea cultivators for Assam.180 Davidson also exchanged market information and news with the 
firm, something which was a common feature of merchant letters and communications. The 
end of an 1832 letter to the firm read, ‘we have a report that the government in Java are 
thinking seriously of stopping the exportation of rice for some months ... everything quiet in 
England and affairs on the continent.’181 Not only was Davidson commercially connected to 
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Jardine Matheson but the content of his letters reveals his role as part of the firm’s 
information network.  
 Davidson readily accepted contemporary narratives of ‘native’ laziness in both 
Southeast Asia and Australia. His view of Chinese labour drew heavily on his own 
experiences and observations in Singapore, and fitted with ideas of Chinese industriousness 
and enterprise. Davidson’s praise of the Chinese character coalesced with the anti-Qing 
narrative propagated by firms like Jardine Matheson and he was supportive of the ‘opening’ 
of China enabled by the Opium War. Writing shortly after the seizure of Hong Kong, 
Davidson remarked that ‘now that we have a footing in China, I would draw the attention of 
the inhabitants of New South Wales to Hong Kong for an unlimited supply of cheap 
labour’.182 In Davidson’s promotion of Chinese labour he equated it with European labour and 
was keen to emphasise his own expertise from his time in Singapore: ‘for field-work, the 
China-man is fully equal to the European labourer. I speak advisedly, having tried them 
together, side by side, for months at a time’.183 Yet, Davidson was well aware that the main 
rival source of labour being proposed for New South Wales was from India. Again, Davidson 
made use of his first-hand experience that gave him authority on issues of labour and 
ethnicity: 
 
Many gentlemen have turned their attention to Bengal for a supply of labour. The 
men procurable from that country, are not equal in physical strength to the 
Chinamen, nor are they to be had for lower pay. I had six Bengal Coolies in my 
employ in the Bush, and have no hesitation in saying, that three China-men would 
have done their work.184 
 
In his promotion of Chinese labour as a viable solution to labour shortages in Australia, 
Davidson continually emphasised his experience in Singapore. Like Bentinck in Assam, 
Davidson had witnessed the contribution of Chinese colonists in Singapore – occupying an 
economic, political and social space between European elites and ‘lazy natives’ – and wished 
to replicate such an effective system of production Australia.  
 Davidson promoted his migration scheme in June and July 1837. After approaching 
investors through the ‘Sydney Banks’, Davidson published nine copies of an advertorial titled 
‘Chinese Mechanics and Labourers’ in the Colonist, Sydney Gazette, Sydney Herald and 
Hobart Town Courier.185 These articles were followed up by further notices from 31 July 
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1837 reminding subscribers to pay their deposits. The scheme Davidson laid out in this article 
was a direct extension of the credit-ticket migration system to Singapore: 
 
My plan is to write to Singapore, in the early part of August, for four or five 
hundred Chinese,   to be hired from the annual supply by the Junks from various 
ports in China, which arrive there in December and January in large numbers, 
and may be hired for this or any other country with very little trouble … From a 
calculation I have made. I feel convinced I can land the men in Sydney at £10 a 
head, say £11, and add £1 for commission to my Singapore agent, for this the men 
would serve twelve months after their arrival in the Colony, getting fed of course, 
and they would serve a second year for £1 per month and rations; after the second 
year they would expect wages something nearly equal to what free Europeans get 
here.186 
 
The initial advance required by subscribers was £5, with the additional £6 payable on the 
arrival of the Chinese labourers. The subscriber’s payments would be recouped, as they were 
in Singapore, from the wages of the Chinese employees. His advert for subscribers reveals 
Davidson’s lofty expectations of his scheme’s initial scope and its continued success: ‘I 
would not begin with fewer than four hundred men, as it would require that number to fill 
a ship, and make it worthwhile. As many more as I can get subscribers for and I have no 
objections to contract for an annual supply’.187 The single shipment of 400 labourers was 
significantly larger than the shipments of fifty or sixty specialist workers the EIC required 
from Jardine Matheson. This was not only due to the skillset of the Assam labourers, but also 
the fact that Davidson’s scheme involved numerous capital investors and therefore spread 
potential risk. Davidson’s advertisement was accompanied by a list of subscribers and the 
number of Chinese workers required by each – Davidson himself had subscribed and paid for 
five labourers.188 The list amounted to 335 labourers, a sizeable portion of Davidson’s 
planned total of 400, after just two months of advertising.   
 In advertising the scheme, Davidson played heavily on his own expertise from 
Singapore and his first-hand experience of Chinese labour. In particular Davidson emphasised 
the versatility of Chinese labourers: 
 
From my long experience amongst Chinese, I have no hesitation in recommending 
strongly to the settlers of New South Wales, the importation of them into this 
country; as Carpenters, Cabinet-makers, Wheelwrights, Millers, 
Blacksmiths, Bricklayers and Brick-makers, Gardeners, Cooks, growers of Maize, 
Sugar, and Tobacco, and general labourers, I can with perfect safety recommend 
them.189 
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Unlike the precise needs of tea cultivation in Assam, Davidson’s wide ranging list of Chinese 
professions is more reminiscent of the various Chinese occupational classes found in 
Singapore, as described by Seah Eu Chin. Davidson’s knowledge of the Singapore labour 
market was key as he confidently stated that the colonists of New South Wales would be able 
to attract workers: ‘If they get £l5 a year and rations, it will be double what they earn in and 
about Singapore, and, in my opinion, will be sufficient to keep up a constant supply of 
Chinese labour in this market’.190 Davidson was explicit in his desire to establish a seasonal 
migration scheme that replicated and competed with Singapore.  
A crucial component of the appeal of Chinese migration in 1830s Australia was that 
China was a source of free, or voluntary, labour. Groups that had been victims of coercive 
employment, in the form of convict and slave labour, were perceived as responsible for their 
own bondage.191 In a cyclical fashion not only were specific ethnic or social groups subjected 
to bondage because they were inferior, but their perceived tolerance of their lack of liberty 
was further indication of their inferiority. Notions of free labour were innately connected to 
notions of civilizational hierarchy. In Davidson’s view the Chinese, more so than Aboriginal 
Australian labourers, would be able to resist poor treatment at the hands of the Australian ex-
convict squatter class.192 On the subject of ‘ill-treatment’ from employers Davidson cautioned 
that ‘a Chinaman will not put up with it, and will spread such reports about it as will tend to 
prevent future supplies reaching this part of the world’.193 This resistance to ‘ill-treatment’ 
from Chinese labourers made them the perfect group to replace coercive forms of labour. 
Labour relations in settler Australia highlight a contrast between the ‘detailed employment of 
Indian and Chinese labourers on the one hand, and the infantilized employment of Aboriginal 
workers on the other’.194 In lieu of white settlers the Chinese would provide a stable, effective 
and cheap workforce, whilst fulfilling the political imperative for free labour. Davidson’s 
optimism and belief in the suitability of Chinese labour for an Australian context was 
bolstered by the success of the scheme in attracting subscribers. In terms of planning and 
preparation, the project had started with promise.   
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Resistance to Chinese Labour in Australia and Davidson’s Failure 
The shortage of labour was a widespread concern in 1830s Australia, but Australian colonists 
were not united in support of Davidson’s proposed scheme. The mid-nineteenth century 
would see the development of white, working-class unionism against Asian migrant labour.195 
As Tony Ohlsson has suggested, the opposition towards Chinese and Indian labour schemes 
from British settlers in the 1830s can be seen as the genesis of the ‘White Australia’ policy 
created through exclusionary legislation in the late nineteenth century.196 The views of the 
Secretary to the Emigration Commission, T. F. Elliot, underline the main points made by 
opponents to Davidson’s scheme: 
 
There must be a vast superiority in our well-assorted parties of European 
Families, including a carefully secured equality of females, as compared with any 
importations that could be made of Chinese, who only come to go away, or of 
Indian coolies, who are accompanied by a scanty proportion of Women, and who 
also stipulate to be returned to their own country.197 
 
The argument that Asian labour was unreliable, particularly that of the sojourning Chinese, 
and was morally undesirable, due to the gender imbalance, would be repeatedly made in 
opposition to non-white immigration in nineteenth century Australia.198 That the planned 
migration to Australia was by private, not state, arrangement and consequently was almost 
entirely undertaken by single men allowed Chinese migrants, without families to support, to 
undercut the wages of white Australian settlers. The perceived causes of wage disparity were 
not limited to family, but included racial tropes, such as the suggestion that Chinese workers 
could subsist solely on rice, unlike white workers who required meat, and therefore required 
less money.199 The undercutting of wages would be a major factor in white Australian 
resistance to Asian migration throughout the nineteenth century, whether based on economic 
reality or racialised fantasy.200 
The New South Wales press was also critical of Davidson’s plan.201 The Sydney 
Monitor hoped for the failure of Davidson’s scheme and warned that, ‘to introduce Chinese 
men by the thousand without women, (they being a gross and sensual people, and addicted to 
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a nameless vice) would be to pollute this land with crimes, which, with all its vices, New 
South Wales is at present free from’.202 This suggestion of Chinese criminality, and 
specifically the threat of sexual violence, notably complemented contemporary criticisms of 
convict or ex-convict labour. This article was littered with sensational, hyperbolic racism, 
with Davidson’s proposed immigrants described as ‘a most outrageous evil’ and ‘seed of 
moral pestilence’.203 The article repeatedly presented Chinese men, who would be without 
accompanying wives or families, as sexually threatening. As in Singapore, it was precisely 
because migrant labourers were overwhelmingly single men, that they were able to provide 
cheap labour.204 In colonial imagery the white settler family was emerging as an idealised 
social unit, in contrast to the threatening single male Chinese sojourner.205 The Sydney 
Monitor’s stance reflected the editor Edward Smith Hall’s avowed aim to represent the 
interests of the ‘poor and labouring classes’ through the editorial line of his paper.206 Hall 
realised the potential resentment towards competing, cheaper sources of manual labour. In 
spite of Davidson’s success in attracting subscribers, the opposition to his scheme revealed 
the social and economic fissures forming in colonial Australia, which would later become 
much more overt and politically charged in opposition to Chinese migration to the gold fields 
from the 1850s. The political disharmony amongst Australian colonists around issues of 
labour and migration placed additional pressure upon imperial planners to find an adequate 
solution.   
 Ultimately, and to the benefit of Davidson’s detractors, the scheme failed to bring any 
Chinese labourers to New South Wales. A letter published in both Australian and Singaporean 
newspapers in May 1839 explained that the advanced money would be returned and the 
project would be abandoned ‘temporarily’. In this letter Davidson explained that, 
 
Shipping having been so scarce this season, and freight to England so high, has 
rendered it quite impossible for me to procure a vessel to go to your port with 
Chinese, and there being still not the latest prospect of my being able to get a 
vessel, I beg to return, as desired, the first, second, and third of the Treasury Bills 
for £1,500 sterling.207 
 
Despite this setback Davidson did suggest that the project could be successful in the future. 
He provided details of future prices and contracts ‘in case it should be wished to import 
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Chinese from this place next year’.208 The next year saw the outbreak of Anglo-Chinese 
hostilities in the First Opium War. As a result, Davidson’s scheme was never put into 
practice. As seen in Matheson’s correspondence with Wallich over the recruitment of tea 
cultivators, the conflict brought complications for existing migration systems. That Davidson 
failed completely where Matheson was able to recruit migrants can be explained by 
Matheson’s exclusive commercial networks and access to the China coast. Davidson lacked 
the resources of Jardine Matheson, with their opium network allowing them to bypass the 
restrictions of the Chinese authorities, and any significant connections with the Chinese 
middlemen brokers who were essential for facilitating migration from China to Singapore.209     
Davidson’s failure can also be attributed to financial mismanagement. In contrast to 
the riches of Jardine Matheson, Davidson’s commercial activities, both through his firm and 
private account, were much more limited. Davidson appears to have been largely unsuccessful 
in his investments during his time in Asia as he declared bankruptcy on his return to 
Britain.210 Furthermore, a letter from Alexander Matheson in 1843 signalled the end of 
Jardine Matheson’s business dealings with Davidson. Citing a loan Davidson took from the 
firm to purchase a house, which he instead invested in opium, Matheson explained, ‘I have 
made up my mind to have no further transactions with you ... Our firm has suffered so much 
from granting credit and procuring advances, that we are quite sick of the system. I have 
determined never again to incur similar risks.’211 By the 1840s Davidson was no longer part 
of the firm’s commercial or information networks.   
Davidson’s project had failed, and the beginning of the Opium War and his return to 
Britain prevented any repeat attempts. However, Davidson’s attempt to establish such a 
scheme does show how his experience of Chinese migration in Singapore informed his 
attempts to procure Chinese labourers for Australia. Davidson was drawing on both the 
stereotypes and ideas about Chinese labourers that were circulated in print media, as well as 
his personal experience of Anglo-Chinese society in Singapore. As a result, Singapore 
fulfilled two functions. It was important both as a representative model of Chinese migration 
and as a site of onward migration from which Davidson could recruit migrants. Furthermore 
the long list of subscribers Davidson attracted, and the criticism his scheme faced, show a 
conflict in Australian society between the need for cheap labour, the economic interests of the 
white working class and the desire for racial homogeneity in the colony. Davidson’s scheme 
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was the first attempt to introduce a significant number of Chinese labourers into a colony with 
a sizeable white-settler population. Its failure shows the limitation of the idealised narrative of 
Chinese migrant labour. Whilst Chinese labour was desired by employers and colonial 
authorities in both Singapore and New South Wales, in Australian colonies there was a 
growing class of settlers who were opposed to cheap, non-white labour. Even so, this well 
publicised attempt to set up a system of Chinese migration to Australia from Singapore does 
demonstrate the desire for Chinese migrant labour amongst many colonists and the 
intersection between concepts of ethnic hierarchy, land ownership and labour in colonial 
Australia.  
 
Conclusion 
Both of the case studies examined in this chapter show attempts to utilise Chinese migrant 
labour in new colonial contexts in the 1830s. Though efforts in both Assam and New South 
Wales failed in replicating the success of Anglo-Chinese society at Singapore they drew 
heavily on concepts formulated in the contact zone and circulated through imperial publishing 
systems. Ideas about the Chinese character – highlighted in chapter two and dominated by 
Jardine Matheson and their connections – were vital concepts that lay behind these migrations 
within the British Empire. Of particular importance was the idea that the Chinese people lived 
under a despotic regime, which perpetuated their current state of barbarism. Thus the Chinese 
had the potential to become civilized were they liberated from the authority of the Qing 
Empire. The example of early colonial Singapore further underlined the potential of Chinese 
labour and citizenship under British, rather than Chinese, governance.  
 Ultimately both of these experiments with Chinese labour failed on a practical level. 
The sense of failure also affected perceptions of Chinese labour. The movement away from 
the use of Chinese cultivators in Assam was part of the Tea Committee’s plan from the outset. 
It can also be attributed to the growing use of the local Assamese labour force and the 
problems faced by the Assam Company shipments from the Straits Settlements. The Assam 
experiment drew on information about the Chinese character, as well as being influenced by 
observations of Singapore and the China coast. It also highlighted difference within the 
Chinese community with the experiment’s need for skilled workers, and consequently led to 
the identification of types of ‘genuine’ Chinese. It is a particular imperial irony that the 
‘genuineness’ of Chinese migrants should be determined by British agents in India who were 
entirely reliant on the knowledge and expertise of skilled Chinese tea cultivators. The 
distinctions raised in Assam between different types of Chinese labourer, prevented a broader 
critique of Chinese migrants.  
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Davidson’s New South Wales scheme aimed to transplant the success of Chinese 
labour in Singapore into a different colonial context. Both the Assam and New South Wales 
examples point to the importance of experts and information networks – topics discussed in 
chapter two. The failure of Davidson’s scheme, whether caused by a lack of shipping or a lack 
of capital, did not harm the standing of Chinese migrant labour in the eyes of employers or 
colonial authorities. However it did raise awareness of the opposition of white Australian 
settlers to cheap Chinese labour. This was an entirely new, yet significant, political dynamic 
in discussions of Chinese migration in the British Empire. These forces would not be fully 
mobilised until the gold rush era of the 1850s. In the meantime, Davidson’s scheme had 
alerted Australian land-owners to the vast, untapped supply of labour that China offered.       
These experiments with Chinese migration took place during a deterioration of Anglo-
Chinese relations over the 1830s. Following the removal of the EIC monopoly in 1833 and 
the failure, and death, of William Napier in 1834 the relationship became ever more 
fractious.212 Over the 1830s the opium trade grew in value and volume, and Chinese 
government edicts against the opium trade grew in regularity. That Jardine Matheson were at 
the forefront of growing diplomatic tensions in the 1830s but were simultaneously involved in 
the procurement of Chinese labour, particularly for Assam, shows the multifarious Anglo-
Chinese exchanges taking place. At the same time there was a growing labour crisis across the 
British Empire. Over the 1830s the abolition of various forms of coercive labour created new 
debates about what types of labour and colonization were desirable. As new demands for 
Chinese labour emerged, perceptions of the Chinese character were tested and negotiated in 
different contexts. This process was made possible by Jardine Matheson’s access to China. 
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Chapter Four: Ceylon: Chinese Migration and Governor James 
Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie, 1837-1843 
 
Introduction 
By the late 1830s China had acquired a reputation amongst imperial planners and colonial 
authorities in Asia as a potential source of cheap and industrious labour. At the same time the 
issue of labour in the British Empire was subject to intense debate. The phasing out of 
coercive forms of employment – slave labour, convict labour and the suspension of Indian 
indentured labour – left questions about how labour shortages could be filled. This had a 
significant impact on British colonies in the Indian Ocean, which were moving towards mass 
plantation production to ensure their solvency and compete economically with West Indian 
possessions.1 This transformation required cheap, reliable and free labour, which was in short 
supply. Within this context of an imperial shift to free labour and systematic colonization, this 
chapter investigates the use of Chinese migrants as a solution to economic problems in the 
developing plantation economy of Ceylon.2 The assessment of Ceylon will demonstrate the 
preference for Chinese immigrants as agents of economic improvement. Moreover, as in the 
1830s, the role of Jardine Matheson’s commercial infrastructure was essential to the 
possibility of procuring Chinese labourers from China. The close relationship between James 
Matheson and Ceylon Governor James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie serves to illustrate the 
importance of personal as well as commercial, official and publishing networks in facilitating 
Chinese migration. Crucially, this chapter reveals how the ideas about Chinese migrants that 
developed over the 1830s had an impact on colonial planning in Ceylon between 1837 and 
1843. It also examines how these ideas were informed by wider imperial debates and issues.   
 Interest in the introduction of Chinese emigrants to Ceylon has been neglected in the 
colony’s history. This is in stark contrast to other comparable Indian Ocean colonies, such as 
Mauritius. During the nineteenth century, labourers migrated to Mauritius from Southern 
India, Madagascar, Eastern Africa, China and the Straits Settlements. Many of these 
immigrants to Mauritius settled permanently to create a visibly multi-ethnic colonial and post-
colonial society.3 In contrast, labour migration to Ceylon was dominated by emigrants from 
Southern India, a pattern which has formed the basis of research into the labour policy of 
                                                 
1 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 102; Laidlaw, ‘Investigating Empire’, pp. 749-768. 
2 Throughout this chapter the British colonial term Ceylon will be used, as opposed to Sri Lanka, to reflect 
contemporary usage and maintain consistency with primary documents.  
3 Marina Carter and James Ng, Forging the Rainbow: Labour Immigrants in British Mauritius (Mauritius: Alfran 
& Co., 1997).  
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colonial authorities.4 The historiography of society in colonial Ceylon has focused on the 
different ethnic groups on the island and the perceived issues they caused for the colonial 
state. In particular Sujit Sivasundaram’s Islanded discusses at length the role of British policy 
in exacerbating ethnic division between the Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority.5 Indeed, 
colonial interest in classifying and categorising the ethnic groups that made up the colony’s 
population was at a peak in the 1830s, and is therefore of particular relevance here.  
This chapter focuses on the attempts to introduce Chinese colonists to Ceylon in a 
period notable for increased metropolitan and economic pressure on Indian Ocean plantation 
colonies. The career and motivation of Governor James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie is a 
central concern. In particular, the labour shortages on the island and the desire of Stewart-
Mackenzie to enact various forms of colonial improvement are discussed. His attempts to 
acquire labourers through James Matheson provides a unique personal connection between 
the China coast and the colonial context of Ceylon, which was heavily affected by imperial 
changes. That Stewart-Mackenzie turned to Matheson illustrates the continual involvement of 
the firm in extracting labour from the China coast during the Opium War. The repeated efforts 
to introduce Chinese labourers into Ceylon in the late 1830s and early 1840s reflected the 
impact that the British concepts of Chinese character and access to the China coast had on 
labour migration. Finally, the role of the Colonial Land and Emigration Commission 
(hereafter CLEC) – formed in January 1840 – in overseeing migration policy generally and 
filling colonial labour needs are discussed. The Empire-wide interest in labour and migration 
led to efforts to replicate existing systems of migration to new colonial destinations, such as 
Mauritius and the West Indies. As demand for cheap, voluntary labour increased across the 
British Empire Jardine Matheson provided a solution through their ability to extract labour 
directly from the China coast.   
 
James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie  
James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie only briefly served as Governor of Ceylon from his 
appointment in March 1837 to his departure in April 1841, when he left to take up the post of 
Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands. Stewart-Mackenzie’s time as Governor has 
received little attention from historians; most have focused instead on his predecessor Robert 
Wilmot-Horton’s longer governorship, due to its significance in terms of colonial reform. 
Beyond broad survey texts of Sri Lankan history, which cover his governorship briefly, 
                                                 
4 Roland Wenzlhuemer, ‘Indian Labour Immigration and British Labour Policy in Nineteenth-Century Ceylon’, 
Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 41, Issue 3 (May 2007), pp. 575-602.  
5 Sujit Sivasundaram, Islanded: Britain, Sri Lanka, and the Bounds of an Indian Ocean Colony (London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
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Stewart-Mackenzie has been neglected by histories of colonial Ceylon.6 An overview of 
Stewart-Mackenzie’s governorship will draw out his attempts to address labour shortages and 
enact colonial improvements in Ceylon. An examination of Stewart-Mackenzie’s relationship 
with James Matheson and their lengthy correspondence on the topic of Chinese immigration 
will then demonstrate how perceptions of the Chinese ethnic character interacted with 
Empire-wide labour shortages in the 1830s and 1840s. The close personal relationship 
between Matheson and Stewart-Mackenzie has never been discussed before, either in the 
histories of Jardine Matheson or of colonial Ceylon. In order to give this relationship the 
focus it deserves, it is necessary first to briefly consider how Stewart-Mackenzie came to be 
appointed to this pivotal role.   
In late February 1837 it was reported in newspapers across Britain that James 
Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie was to be appointed Governor of Ceylon.7 James Alexander 
Stewart was a Scottish aristocrat, educated in England and raised by his uncle, the 7th Earl of 
Galloway.8 In 1817 he married Lady Hood (Mary Mackenzie), the daughter and heiress of the 
1st Lord of Seaforth, thereby gaining both the Mackenzie surname and extensive estates in 
Ross-shire. At the general election in December 1832 Stewart-Mackenzie won the Ross and 
Cromarty seat as a moderate Whig, and defended the seat successfully in 1835.9 Stewart-
Mackenzie was an unremarkable choice for a colonial governorship considering his 
parliamentary experience and social status. Moreover the Galloway family had an imperial 
background. The 9th Earl of Galloway, Randolph Stewart, was a backer of the Upper Canada 
Clergy Society and his uncle, Charles James Stewart, served as Bishop of Quebec from 1826 
to 1837.10 Stewart-Mackenzie, like William Jardine and James Matheson, was a product of a 
Scotland where an imperial career offered a field of opportunity for well-heeled, well-
connected, ambitious men.11 James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie was an archetypal first-
time colonial official with the requisite connections, and metropolitan social and political 
background, to manage Ceylon through a period of economic transformation.12  
Despite having no direct experience of imperial administration in Asia, an examination 
of Stewart-Mackenzie’s private papers from the early 1830s reveal his connections to 
                                                 
6 See Lennox A. Mills, Ceylon under British Rule, 1795-1932 (London: Oxford University Press, 1933) and G.C. 
Mendis, Ceylon under the British (New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 2005; first published 1952). Or, more 
recently, Sivasundaram, Islanded, pp. 301-302. 
7 Morning Post, 25 February 1837.  
8 Fisher, ‘James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie’.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Joseph Hardwick, An Anglican British World: The Church of England and the Expansion of the Settler 
Empire, c.1790-1860 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), p. 35. 
11 Grace, Opium and Empire, p. 9.  
12 New research into Scottish migration to colonial Ceylon is underway: Professor Angela McCarthy, University 
of Otago (http://www.otago.ac.nz/historyarthistory/staff/otago036861.html), accessed 27 September 2015.   
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prominent British merchants and his political interest in metropolitan oversight of the EIC. 
Stewart-Mackenzie had a particularly close relationship with James Matheson. In a letter to 
John Lyall in 1838, Matheson wrote of his personal ties to the new Governor, describing him 
as a ‘great friend of our uncle and aunt on which account I am showing him every attention’.13 
Throughout Stewart-Mackenzie’s private papers there are numerous insights into his close 
relationship with the Matheson family. For example, the purchase of land from Stewart-
Mackenzie by James Matheson and correspondence between Mary Stewart-Mackenzie and 
Alexander Matheson on the plight of the Kintail poor.14 When Stewart-Mackenzie served on 
the EIC’s Board of Control in 1834, James Matheson forwarded him a ‘statement of 
Objection to the Continuance in China of a part of the East India Company's Factory for the 
Purpose of selling bills on India and purchasing bills on England’.15 Stewart-Mackenzie was 
particularly sympathetic to Matheson’s objections. In forwarding Matheson’s correspondence 
to the Board, Stewart-Mackenzie described Matheson as ‘a leading partner in the House of 
Jardine, Matheson & Co., now perhaps one of the greatest commercial establishments in the 
world’.16 The family connections and networks that James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie was 
part of in the Scottish highlands and the metropole were utilised and further developed in 
Ceylon.  
Imperial histories have increasingly used individuals, such as Governor Stewart-
Mackenzie, to connect different colonial contexts. Such ‘imperial careers’ can be used to ‘re-
imagine the geographies of the British Empire’.17 By studying individuals who moved 
between different locations, or had their own connections with different colonial sites, 
historians are able to trace processes that are neglected by conventional approaches that 
employ geographical or chronological boundaries. Importantly, Stewart-Mackenzie was able 
to ‘assume, discard, reconfigure, merge, and disassociate multiple identities and roles’.18 
Stewart-Mackenzie was simultaneously a colonial official, colonial reformer and a Scottish 
                                                 
13 James Matheson (Canton) to John Lyall (Calcutta), 12 June 1838, in MS JM/C5, Jardine Matheson Archive 
(Cambridge University). Lyall was a partner in Lyall, Matheson & Co. with Hugh Matheson.    
14 Copy of an act for vesting in trustees certain parts of the entailed estate of Seaforth, viz. the lands of the 
barony of Lewis to be sold to James Matheson of Achany and the price to be applied in payment of the entailer's 
debts and other purposes (1844). As a consequence of this purchase James Matheson became a perpetrator of the 
highland clearances. Notably involvement in the highland clearances, and the implied desire for ‘improvement’ 
is reflected in Stewart-Mackenzie’s governance in Ceylon. See letter by Alexander Matheson to Mrs Stewart 
Mackenzie relating to measures of relief for the Kintail poor and urging assistance towards emigration (18 
February 1847). 
15 Letter by James Matheson, Chairman of the British Chamber of Commerce, Canton, to J. A. Stewart 
Mackenzie, MP, Board of Control (10 November 1834), in GD46/8/23, Mackenzie Papers (National Archives of 
Scotland). 
16 James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie to John Mackay, Glasgow, 7 April 1835, in GD46/8/23, Mackenzie 
Papers (National Archives of Scotland). 
17 Lester and Lambert, Colonial lives across the British Empire, p. 1. 
18 David Nasaw, ‘Historians and Biography: Introduction’, American Historical Review, Vol. 114, No. 3 (2009) 
pp. 573-578.  
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aristocrat, who was connected through family and friendship to individuals in various parts of 
the Empire. All of these roles and identities featured in his attempts to recruit Chinese labour. 
James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie’s connection to James Matheson provides a unique 
connection between Ceylon and Canton that was contingent on a specific colonial and 
imperial conditions, as well as being simultaneously personal and unique.  
The importance of family connections has been identified in histories of British colonial 
control in India. Both Margot Finn and Elizabeth Buettner have illustrated how family was 
crucial both socially and politically in the nineteenth century Empire, and in Asia in 
particular.19 This was particularly the case for Stewart-Mackenzie given his son’s reliance on 
the firm Jardine Matheson during his service in the Opium War. The work of Zoe Laidlaw has 
emphasised how the 1830s was a decade of particular significance in terms a negotiation 
between the former reliance on personal networks and growing agendas for imperial reform.20 
The intersection here between broad themes of imperial reform and intimate personal 
connections illustrates the significance of Stewart-Mackenzie’s short governorship. Notably, 
though Stewart-Mackenzie was a colonial official his communication with Matheson and his 
attempts to secure Chinese labour did not feature in his official correspondences, legislative 
council minutes or executive council reports. He was not acting in his official capacity. In 
Governor Stewart-Mackenzie’s short, and fundamentally ineffective, time in Ceylon he 
utilised his personal, imperial connections in order to try and enact the colonial improvement 
that was expected in the metropole.  
 
British Rule in Ceylon 
The British took control of the Dutch possessions on the island of Ceylon in 1795 in what was 
meant to be a ‘temporary’ response to the threat of French territorial expansion in the region. 
By 1815 the Ceylon was a British Crown Colony. This colonial unification was achieved by a 
series of wars with the inland Kandyan Kingdom, through which British control had been 
extended to the entire island.21 The unification of the island under British rule has been 
identified by histories of Ceylon as the starting point of the island as a modern colonial 
state.22 Similarly to when the British seized control of Java from the Dutch in 1811, the new 
administration saw an opportunity to ‘modernize’ the island’s economy and to break down 
                                                 
19 Margot Finn, ‘Family Formations: Anglo India and the Familial Proto-State’, in David Feldman and Jon 
Lawrence (eds.), Structures and Transformations in Modern British History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), pp. 100-117; Elizabeth Buettner, Empire Families: Britons and Late Imperial India (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004). 
20 Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, p. 5. 
21 Alicia Schrikker, Dutch and British Colonial Intervention in Sri Lanka, 1780-1815: Expansion and Reform 
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 157. 
22 Ibid, p. 4. 
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traditional social hierarchies.23 Once the Kandyan Kingdom’s political authority in the 
island’s interior was eroded the British divided the island into five provinces: Northern, 
Southern, Eastern, Western and Central.24 As a result, the previous ethnic or political divides 
of the island were disregarded and replaced by geographical divides by colonial authorities. 
British rule over the entire island would lead to the creation of different ethnic hierarchies and 
the disruption of traditional, alternative forms of authority in the islands interior. For British 
colonists, Ceylon was an island of economic potential. However, the question of how to 
transform Ceylon into a plantation economy without an adequate supply of labour was a 
problem for colonial authorities over the 1820s and 1830s.25  
Developing a competitive export economy was a priority for British colonial 
administrators in Ceylon. In the late 1820s Ceylon was the subject of a Commission of 
Eastern Inquiry led by William Colebrooke, who resided on the island from 1829 to 1831.26 
The Commission’s Report, published in 1833, had some significant implications for the 
colonial government and led to clashes with Governor Sir Robert Wilmot-Horton.27 The key 
disagreement was over the Commission’s suggestion that the colony had to become 
financially independent. In contrast, Wilmot-Horton believed that British colonies ought to be 
retained even if it meant a significant expense to the metropole. For Wilmot-Horton the 
civilizing mission of Empire was more important than its economic utility. Colebrooke’s 
other recommendations included checks on the executive powers of the Governor, the 
centralization of the island’s judicial system and integrating the different ethnic groups 
(including both settled-Dutch and indigenous populations) into the colonial legislative 
council. That the Commission’s report was endorsed by the Colonial Office meant that 
Wilmot-Horton was compelled to increase production and exports, in order to pay for 
infrastructure spending, whilst the impending abolition of slavery created a labour crisis. 
Simultaneously, the late 1830s and early 1840s have been described as ‘coffee mania’ in 
Ceylon as there was sizeable private investment in coffee plantations, heightened by 
anticipated impact of abolition on West Indian coffee production.28 By the mid-1830s British 
                                                 
23 Donald W. Fryer and James C. Jackson, Indonesia (London: Ernest Benn, 1977), pp. 47-49. 
24 Mills, Ceylon under British Rule, p. 68. 
25 John D. Rogers, ‘Early British Rule and Social Classification in Lanka’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 
(2004), p. 626. 
26 Laidlaw, ‘Investigating Empire’, p. 757; C. A. Harris, ‘Colebrooke, Sir William Macbean George (1787–
1870)’, rev. Lynn Milne, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5867, accessed 27 September 2015]; Report of Lieut.-col. Colebrooke, 
one of His Majesty’s Commissioners of Inquiry, upon the Administration of the Government of Ceylon (24 
December 1831), in Parliamentary Papers, Slave trade (East India).--Slavery in Ceylon. Return to an order of the 
Honourable the House of Commons, dated 1 March 1838, 1837-38 (697). 
27 Vijaya Samaraweera, ‘Governor Sir Wilmot-Horton and the Reforms of 1833 in Ceylon’, The Historical 
Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1972), pp. 209-228. 
28 Wenzlhuemer, ‘Indian Labour Immigration and British Labour Policy in Nineteenth-Century Ceylon’, p. 577. 
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metropolitan and colonial administrators were committed to transforming Ceylon’s 
economy.29   
 As with Britain’s other Asian colonies, colonial observers were also concerned with 
documenting the island’s history and contemporary ethnic composition.30 Notions of ethnic 
stratification in Ceylon influenced Stewart-Mackenzie’s governorship. Many nineteenth-
century accounts of the island drew heavily on Robert Knox’s seventeenth-century Historical 
Relation of the Island of Ceylon in the East Indies, which laid the foundations of British 
understanding of the Kandyan Kingdom and the ethnic divisions of Ceylon.31 The influence 
of Buddhism in colonial Ceylon led British authors such as Henry Charles Sirr, William 
Knighton and Horatio John Suckling to emphasise the Chinese origins of human habitation.32 
But more important than the origins of Ceylon’s settlement, was how to define the different 
ethnic groups that inhabited the colony. Simon Casie Chitty – a linguistic expert and the first 
Singhalese member of the Legislative Council – in his version of the 1831 census, 
distinguished these groups and the European settlers according to whether located in the 
Singhalese Districts, Malabar Districts or the Kandyan Provinces.33 In the later 1830s the 
official census was divided the population first by location (much like Chitty) and then by 
ethno-economic criteria. Within the eighteen ‘Maritime’ and ‘Kandyan’ provinces the 
population was divided into male or female ‘Whites’, ‘Free Blacks’, ‘Slaves’ and ‘Aliens and 
Resident Strangers’.34 These groups were then further divided into those employed in 
‘Agriculture’, ‘Manufacture’ and ‘Commerce’, with the census of 1832 giving a total 
population for Ceylon of 1,009,008.35 For colonial authorities in Ceylon ethnicity and 
economic utility were comparable and interconnected methods of categorisation.  
The ethnic composition of Ceylon was considered important by colonial authorities 
for two reasons. First, the British were aware that before their conquest of the island’s interior 
the different ethnic groups and regions had been independent and autonomous. They were 
also aware that despite the unification of the island Ceylon remained a ‘plural society’.36 
Second, given the pressures put on colonial finances by the Colebrooke Commission and the 
                                                 
29 Frank Broeze (ed), Gateways of Asia: Port Cities of Asia in the 13th-20th Centuries (London: Routledge, 2010), 
p. 191. 
30 This can be compared to the work of John Crawfurd in Southeast Asia, as discussed in chapter one.  
31 Robert Knox, An Historical Relation of the Island of Ceylon In the East Indies (London: Royal Society, 1681). 
32 Henry Charles Sirr, Ceylon and the Cingalese (London: William Shobrer, 1850); Horatio John Suckling, 
Ceylon; a general description of the island (London: Chapman & Hall, 1876); William Knighton, The History of 
Ceylon (London: Longman, 1845).  
33 Simon Casie Chitty, The Ceylon Gazetteer (Ceylon: Gotta Church Mission Press, 1834), p. 48. 
34 Ceylon Blue Book (1839): CO 59/50 (National Archives); Ceylon Blue Book (1840/1): CO 59/52 (National 
Archives); For an example of a comparable colonial census see Robert Montgomery Martin, History of the 
British possessions in the Indian & Atlantic oceans (London: Whittaker & Co., 1837), pp. 58-59.  
35 Ibid. 
36 Broeze, Gateways of Asia, p. 200. 
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resulting necessity for a cheap, productive labour force, the capacity of the ‘native’ population 
to fulfil this need was subject to debate. In keeping with the dismissive attitude seen across 
the Empire in Asia, Governor Wilmot-Horton was also resistant to Colebrooke’s 
recommendations for indigenous representation on the legislative council.37 Despite 
acknowledgement of ethnic difference within Ceylon’s population, some colonial observers 
still dismissed the ‘native’ population as a whole. British resident Sampson Brown 
summarised such a view in the Ceylon Magazine: ‘I have had some rather long chats about 
the natives and their moral character. They certainly are a most repelling race: there’s no 
making anything of them as yet, and I doubt if we ever shall.’38 The views of Wilmot-Horton 
and Sampson Brown reflect the dismissive attitude of British colonial observers to the 
different ethnic groups of Ceylon, specifically played out in decisions around political 
representation and alternative forms of indigenous authority.  
In addition to the dismissal of the ‘natives and their moral character’ colonial 
governors also faced pressures around labour shortages, particularly as Ceylon was affected 
by the abolition of slavery in the 1830s. Comparatively little is known about the origins of 
slavery in Ceylon as slaves on the island were often sourced domestically and scholarly 
literature on Indian Ocean slavery has been focused on imported slaves from the East Coast of 
Africa.39 Though slavery in the Indian Ocean predated European involvement, the movement 
of slaves to Ceylon vastly increased under Portuguese and Dutch colonial governance as 
European capital and networks led to the increased importation of un-free labourers.40 Under 
British governance the institution of slavery on the island was gradually eroded. In 1816 an 
Executive Act was passed that declared ‘all children who may be born of slaves from and 
after the 12th of August 1816 inclusive, shall be considered free’.41 Following the liberation of 
slave children and the prevention of slave imports, existing slaves were gradually 
emancipated. However, abolitionist moves by the British authorities were only reluctantly 
accepted by planters. In response to the emancipation of slave children a petition was sent to 
the Prince of Wales by ‘his Majesty’s loyal subjects, the Dutch inhabitants and native castes’ 
advocating that abolition be gradual so as not to subject the island’s inhabitants to excessive 
                                                 
37 Michael Roberts, ‘Problems of Social Stratification and the Demarcation of National and Local Elites in 
British Ceylon’, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1974), p. 553.  
38 Sampson Brown, ‘Life in the Jungle, or letters from a planter to his cousin in London’, Ceylon Magazine, 
Vo.11, No.17 (January 1842), p. 234. 
39 Richard B. Allen, ‘Satisfying the “Want for Labouring People”: European slave trading in the Indian Ocean, 
1500-1800’, Journal of World History, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2010), p. 73. 
40 Ibid, p. 73. 
41 Parliamentary Papers, Slave trade (East India).--Slavery in Ceylon. Return to an order of the Honourable the 
House of Commons, dated 1 March 1838, 1837-38 (697). 
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‘privations, losses and expenses’.42 The opposition from the planters – seen as essential to 
boosting the colony’s economy – placed additional pressure on colonial authorities to find an 
alternative source of labour.       
There were limits to the extent of British abolitionism in Ceylon. In taking control of 
Kandy the British had gained access to the region with the greatest ‘economic potential’, 
specifically from agriculture.43 The management of the Kandyan Kingdom also demonstrated 
the frustrations and contradictions of abolitionism. By the time slavery was abolished across 
the Empire in 1833 slave numbers in Ceylon were already on the decline due to earlier 
legislation. A despatch from the Colonial Secretary Baron Glenelg to Governor Stewart-
Mackenzie in 1837 gave the total figure at that time of 27,397 slaves.44 The limits of colonial 
control in Kandy were highlighted by the issue of emancipation. Rather than a plantation 
system, Kandyan slavery tended towards household or personal slavery with slave masters 
tending to own single individuals or small families. In correspondence from 1829 the colonial 
government estimated 2,113 people were still held in personal bondage in Kandy, but laws 
regulating personal slavery on the rest of the island were not extended to Kandy until the late 
1830s.45 That is not to say that the British authorities were entirely opposed to forced labour. 
Wilmot-Horton’s administration only abolished the Rajakaria – which was the government 
right to extract labour from land tenants as rental payment – after the labour extracted through 
the system was used to complete the Colombo-Kandy Road.46 By the late 1830s Ceylon was 
on a trajectory of transformation into a post-slave plantation economy that would rely on free 
labour. Where this labour would come from was not clear. For Governor Stewart-Mackenzie, 
Chinese migrant labour was the preferred solution.   
 
Governor Stewart-Mackenzie in Ceylon 
James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie departed Britain to take up his Governorship in July 
1837. Upon arrival he had to operate within the framework of the Colebrooke Commission’s 
recommendations and the policies of Governor Wilmot-Horton. The Colebrooke Commission 
had two major legacies for Stewart-Mackenzie. First, it had limited the executive power of the 
Governor by making the executive council answerable to the legislative council and by 
                                                 
42 Ibid, p. 575. 
43 Wenzlhuemer, ‘Indian Labour Immigration and British Labour Policy in Nineteenth-Century Ceylon’, p. 575.  
44 Parliamentary Papers, Slave trade (East India), p. 598. 
45 Ibid, p. 569.  
46 Mills, Ceylon under British Rule, p. 73. 
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establishing an independent judiciary.47 Second, the Commission had set out expectations of 
the Colonial Office that limited the autonomy of the Governor in managing the island 
economy. It decreed that the colony would become economically self-sufficient, whilst ending 
compulsory labour and dismantling government monopolies.48 The Commission’s reforms 
also stressed that the colonial government should disregard social and cultural differences 
between ethnic groups, but pursue what metropolitan planners believed to be universal ideas 
of civilization and progress. To this end three ‘Ceylonese’ seats were created on the 
legislative council in 1835.49 The main policy issues that Stewart-Mackenzie faced all related 
to change: the transformation of the island economy into a profitable, privatised plantation 
system; the complete abolition of slavery and other forms of compulsory labour; and, to 
borrow a phrase from his advisor Simon Casie Chitty, the improvement of the ‘native 
character’.50  
These different challenges can be grouped under the umbrella notion of colonial 
improvement. Peter Marshall has distinguished between ‘intellectual improvement’, centred 
around education, and ‘moral improvement’, which was to be achieved through the 
advancement of Christianity.51 Notably, these forms of improvement were often enacted in 
combination. For example, missionaries played a key role in providing colonial education, 
covering both intellectual and moral improvement simultaneously. In Jayeeta Sharma’s work 
on interactions between the British state and Assamese tribes, the ‘improving regime’ 
encompassed both economic productivity in the form of tea production and missionary 
activity to ‘elevate the character of the people’.52 Similarly, Stewart-Mackenzie’s main 
concern was to bring about economic improvement or ‘modernization’, which was 
simultaneously distinct from, and connected to, notions of moral or intellectual improvement. 
A change like the abolition of slavery is an example of the type of reform that fell under both 
economic and moral forms of colonial improvement. As in Assam, the transformation of 
Ceylon under British rule had significant implications for indigenous communities. Having 
lost political control, previously autonomous groups would either have to adapt to new forms 
of land ownership and employment relationships or, to facilitate ‘economic progress’, be 
removed or replaced.  
                                                 
47 Rogers, ‘Early British Rule and Social Classification in Lanka’, p. 643; Vijaya Samaraweera, ‘The Ceylon 
Charter of Justice of 1833: A Benthamite Blueprint for Judicial Reform’, The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Vol. 2 (1974), p. 274. 
48 Rogers, ‘Early British Rule and Social Classification in Lanka’, p. 639. 
49 Ibid, pp. 639-643. These were seats specifically reserved for ‘non-European’ residents.   
50 Chitty, The Ceylon Gazetteer, p. 257. 
51 Marshall, ‘British-Indian connections’, p. 52.   
52 Sharma, ‘Old Lords and “Improving” Regimes’, in Sharma, Empire’s Garden, pp. 119-147.   
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Due to the Colebrooke Commission and changing Colonial Office expectations 
Ceylon was under metropolitan pressure to become an efficient and profitable ‘resource pool’ 
for the Empire.53 Following the privatization of the Dutch cinnamon monopoly, the 
development of coffee plantations in Ceylon in the late 1830s was an all-consuming economic 
project.54 In 1837 the English import duty on Ceylon coffee was reduced to the same level as 
West Indian coffee, which led to a vast increase in investment in coffee cultivation.55 The 
boom of private investment transformed the island. In 1834 the colonial government sold 
forty-nine acres of crown land for coffee cultivation, yet by 1841 the annual sales figure was 
78,685 acres with a total capital investment in coffee cultivation of around £3 million between 
1837 and 1845.56 The prospects of coffee cultivation seemed so bright that the ‘Governor 
[Stewart-Mackenzie] and the Council, the Military, the Judges, the Clergy, and half of the 
Civil Servants’ were amongst the buyers.57 The coffee plantations were not sustained long-
term – they were replaced by commercial tea cultivation from the 1880s onwards – but their 
proliferation in the 1830s exacerbated existing labour shortages.58 Contemporary writers 
noted how the labour supply and the capital available for labour was not equivalent to the 
demand created by the new coffee-plantations – in addition the cost of agricultural labour in 
Ceylon quadrupled over the 1830s.59   
 Migrant labour from India was the obvious solution to Ceylon’s shortage. The Indian 
Ocean colony of Mauritius saw the first large scale importation of Indian ‘coolie’ labourers as 
indentured labourers, and the colony would act as a model for the later migration of 
indentured Indian labourers to the West Indies and around the Empire.60 However, a spate of 
cases in which Indian labourers were killed in attempting to avoid passage to Mauritius in 
1838 was a cause for concern to both the Colonial Office and the Indian government, and led 
the system’s suspension.61 Act XIV of 1839 enacted by the Government of India prohibited 
all private Indian emigration pending further investigation.62 A ‘Petition of the Planters, 
Merchants, Traders and other Inhabitants of the Island of Mauritius’ from May 1839 claimed 
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to have recruited upwards of 20,000 ‘native Indian labourers’ in the four years between 1835 
and 1839.63 Ceylon was harmed by such prohibition of Indian emigration due to the fears 
about onward migration to colonies like Mauritius. This ordinance specifically aimed to 
prohibit migrants entering into contracts for other colonies, where they might be subject to 
abuse.64 Although emigration was managed by the Indian Government from the 1840s to 
protect against abuses, only Act XIII of 1847 repealed the prohibition with respect to Ceylon 
due to concerns over coercive onward migration to other destinations.65 
This was the context in which Stewart-Mackenzie took control. He was expected, by the 
Colonial Office, to engineer significant economic change, using effective, cheap and 
voluntary labour, without using Indian immigrant labour. Upon taking the post of Governor, 
Stewart-Mackenzie wrote to a friend in Scotland giving his early opinion of Ceylon:  
 
I have been banished to the most interesting island, the Lewis of the East, in point 
of civilization, cultivation and means of moving about in it. But then, how 
different in every other respect, such a lavish profusion of natives, most 
luminescent riches within the tropical regions, such heat, moisture and 
vegetation.66  
 
Stewart-Mackenzie’s feelings about his ‘banishment’ to Ceylon were revealed in his private 
correspondence to family and friends in Scotland. Boosting productivity in the colony, a 
requirement that had been emphasised by the Colebrooke Commission, was a top priority. 
Specifically, Stewart-Mackenzie repeatedly corresponded with the Indian government and 
Colonial Office on the necessity of steam powered boats for transport and the implementation 
of advanced agricultural techniques and technologies.67 As well as coffee cultivation Stewart-
Mackenzie was also interested in sugar production, and appealed to London for equipment as 
‘we are greatly in want of the most powerful machinery’.68 Stewart-Mackenzie maintained his 
personal and political networks in London and Scotland through his correspondences from 
Ceylon. His letters gave his views on metropolitan political issues as well as support and 
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resources for his projects in Ceylon. The developing of the colony’s production technologies 
formed part of a wider drive by Stewart-Mackenzie to improve the productivity of the colony 
and, by extension, its inhabitants.  
An examination of executive and legislative council proceedings, and Ceylon’s 
government gazettes, reveals Stewart-Mackenzie’s interest in improving the ‘natives’. Such 
sources display his scepticism about the indigenous capacity for self-representation. Stewart-
Mackenzie wrote to London, as his predecessors did, to warn against admitting locals to the 
civil service.69 In his first full-length speech to the legislative council Stewart-Mackenzie 
promoted legislation which had been ‘calculated to improve the morality and reduce crime 
among the lower orders generally’.70 Improving the ‘moral’ character of the colony’s 
inhabitants was a particular priority. A Government Ordinance of 1840 enacted fines or, 
failing that, hard labour for ‘promiscuous Gaming, at cockfighting, or with any Table, Dice, 
Cards or other Instrument for Gaming’, or for being ‘convicted a third time or more often of 
being idle and disorderly’.71 As in Assam, the perceived Asian predilection to opium 
addiction was also identified by British observers in Ceylon.72 Notably, as in colonial 
Singapore, morality and industriousness were equated by colonial authorities in Ceylon. 
Legislation was announced by Stewart-Mackenzie’s administration in November 1839 ‘for 
the Punishment of Idle and Disorderly Persons and Rogues and Vagabonds’ and was followed 
in 1840 with an ‘Ordinance for the better regulation of Servants, Labourers and Journeymen 
Artificers under Contracts for Hire and Service’.73 Such measures can be compared to similar 
vagrancy legislation in the Cape Colony, which was aimed at forcing the Khoikkhoi peoples 
into labour relationships that benefitted Western production owners.74 Across the British 
Empire, and in Britain itself, legislative efforts were simultaneously made to punish 
unemployment and limit worker’s rights. In Ceylon, both pieces of legislation were designed 
to prevent workers from leaving employment, through enforcing proper contracts and, 
ultimately, to deter ‘idleness’. Through such provisions the enforced economic activity of the 
indigenous population was directly related to notions of moral improvement.  
 It was not purely through punitive legislation that Governor Stewart-Mackenzie aimed 
to transform Ceylon’s population. Singhalese islander Simon Casie Chitty was a particular 
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ally of Stewart-Mackenzie. Chitty was an orientalist author who wrote for the Ceylon 
Gazetteer and Tamil Plutarch, and published in the first issue of the Journal of the Ceylon 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society in 1845.75 Within weeks of his arrival Stewart-Mackenzie 
wrote to the Colonial Office proposing that Chitty be made one of the ‘natives’ on the 
Legislative Council, a post that he held until 1845.76 Chitty also gave church services in Tamil 
and acted as Stewart-Mackenzie’s guide over much of the island. Education and religion were 
key components of Stewart-Mackenzie’s philosophy of improvement. Despite the Colonial 
Office’s preference for English-language education, Stewart-Mackenzie established a 
Translation Committee to distribute Sinhala language books in rural areas and he prioritised 
‘native language’ schooling.77 Stewart-Mackenzie also began the process of disassociating the 
colonial state from Buddhism on the island – a relationship that had been inherited from the 
Kandyan model of governance – and moving towards a new model of church-state relations 
based on religious freedom – specifically religious freedom for different Christian 
denominations. Though he was unable to completely eliminate the role of the Buddhist 
temples in tax collection, his successor, Governor Colin Campbell, was able to complete the 
separation of the traditional bonds between the temples and the state.78 Efforts to cut the ties 
between colonial government and ‘idolatry’ were also underway across India in the 1830s as 
part of a wider process of reform under Governor-General Bentinck.79  
For Governor Stewart-Mackenzie, the issue of labour was just part of a broader 
programme of colonial improvement. Stewart-Mackenzie’s interest in Chinese migration 
would contribute to colonial improvement in two ways. Stewart-Mackenzie’s first attempt to 
source ‘Chinese with capital’ was an attempt to replicate the Chinese merchant elite of 
Singapore.80 In this context the Chinese would fulfil a role of ‘economic improvement’ in 
which they would act as a collaborative force with colonial authorities. As in Singapore, such 
figures could also act as philanthropic moral improvers who subsidised schools, temples and 
hospitals. The second attempt to acquire Chinese migrants – in the form of skilled Chinese tea 
cultivators – was more focused on knowledge transfer, as in Assam. This attempt at 
recruitment was fundamentally opportunistic. Stewart-Mackenzie was connected to James 
Matheson who was able to recruit tea cultivators from China. This connection was not 
contingent on any official position or channel of communication but on links that had been 
exported from the Scottish highlands to Ceylon and Canton. Stewart-Mackenzie hoped to use 
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Chinese labour, which he had access to through Matheson, as a tool to create resources in 
Ceylon. As tea cultivators the Chinese would act as agents of economic improvement and 
would play a role in the transformation of Ceylon into a lucrative plantation colony.    
 
James Matheson and Chinese Migration to Ceylon 
Governor Stewart-Mackenzie’s attempts to source Chinese labour through his connections to 
Jardine Matheson have been entirely omitted from both histories of Chinese migration and 
colonial Ceylon. Stewart-Mackenzie’s interest in Chinese labour motivated by necessity, 
rather than choice. He needed to boost the colony’s economy without recourse to Indian 
immigration or forced labour.81 Most important in Stewart-Mackenzie’s multiple attempts to 
recruit Chinese labourers and tea cultivators was his relationship with the Matheson family, 
which predated his time in Ceylon. The influence of Chinese migrations to Singapore and 
Assam can also be seen in Stewart-Mackenzie’s attempts to acquire Chinese labour. At 
different times in his governorship Stewart-Mackenzie sought to replicate both the Chinese 
merchant elite of colonial Singapore and the Chinese-led tea plantations of Assam.  
Examining Stewart-Mackenzie’s private papers demonstrates how he developed his 
relationship with James Matheson after arriving in Ceylon. The two men shared regular 
correspondence, which can been traced through both the Stewart-Mackenzie papers and the 
Jardine Matheson archive. These sources show that the exportation of familial links from 
Scotland into the Empire, something which has been chronicled in both India and the 
‘Atlantic world’.82 Given the context of the Opium War, relations with China were a major 
theme in their correspondence. In Matheson’s letters to Stewart-Mackenzie he gave details of 
events on the China coast: military movements, such as the arrival of HMS Larne to 
intimidate the Chinese government; dismissing Chinese government edicts as ‘waste paper’; 
and regular updates for Stewart-Mackenzie on ‘public affairs’ in Canton.83 Given that 
Stewart-Mackenzie had previously described Jardine Matheson as ‘one of the greatest 
commercial establishments in the world’ and had close links to the Matheson family, it is of 
little surprise that he defended opium smuggling.84 In a letter of May 1839 Stewart-
Mackenzie suggested that the prohibition of opium in China was futile. It was, he wrote, 
unbelievable that the ‘whole nation will be brought, by a mere edict, to forgo the use of any 
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drug’.85 In his personal letters Stewart-Mackenzie also acknowledged that ‘the revenue of 
Bombay can't do without that derived from opium’.86 Such a concession demonstrates his 
contemporary awareness of the interconnection between British imperial interests in India and 
the activities of Jardine Matheson on the China coast. Stewart-Mackenzie, as governor of a 
relatively new Indian-Ocean colony also had a vested economic interest in the expansion of 
British trade with China.    
 Stewart-Mackenzie’s interest in affairs on the China coast was also linked to his 
immediate family. His son Keith William Stewart-Mackenzie served as a Lieutenant during 
the Opium War, having previously been appointed as an aide de camp to British commanders 
in Ceylon by his father in 1837.87 During the conflict James Matheson acted as connection 
between Governor Stewart-Mackenzie and his son. For example, in June 1840 Keith Stewart-
Mackenzie sent a letter to James Matheson with ‘two letters for my father’ enclosed.88 
Governor Stewart-Mackenzie thanked Matheson repeatedly in his letters for passing on these 
communications. He implored Matheson to pay special attention to the welfare of his son and 
emphasised how grateful both he and Mary Stewart-Mackenzie were for his service.89 Keith 
Stewart-Mackenzie’s time in China came to an abrupt end in June 1841 when he contracted a 
fever, from which he recovered at the residence of James Matheson in Macao, before his 
return to Britain.90 The Narrative of the Second Campaign in China, written and published by 
Keith Stewart-Mackenzie in 1842, focused on the military operations and manoeuvres during 
the war.91 As well forwarding letters from his son, Matheson also sent Governor Stewart-
Mackenzie copies of the Canton Register and the Chinese Repository, about which Stewart-
Mackenzie was greatly appreciative as China was a ‘subject of great interest’.92 Matheson 
acted as Stewart-Mackenzie’s primary source of information on affairs in China and the 
activities of his son, who in turn was grateful for Matheson’s ‘friendship’.93 In contrast to 
examples from Assam or Sydney, attempts to introduce Chinese labour to Ceylon were 
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facilitated by personal, family networks, as opposed to connections between companies or 
colonial and imperial government.    
 In their correspondence, Governor Stewart-Mackenzie also expressed interest in using 
Matheson’s expertise to assist his trials with new plantation crops in Ceylon. As a result 
Matheson wrote to his business partner John Lyall in Calcutta in order to ‘obtain a selection 
of the best vegetable seeds with directions as to their cultivation and a few melon ground 
seeds’ for Stewart-Mackenzie at his own expense.94 Stewart-Mackenzie used Matheson’s 
business connections across both Eastern and Southern Asia to procure different plants for 
experimental cultivation. On multiple occasions Matheson referenced plants and seeds that 
had been sent to Stewart-Mackenzie.95 In particular, Stewart-Mackenzie was interested in 
experimenting with tea cultivation in a replication of the Assam project. It is worth noting that 
these experiments with tea in Ceylon coincided with the successful first sale of the Assam tea 
in London. In an 1839 letter Stewart-Mackenzie asked Matheson for tea plants: ‘I shall 
therefore be extremely obliged to you if, when an opportunity offers, you can send me a 
supply of plants ... and if, at the same time, you can procure and send me a plain, intelligible 
account of the culture of the plant’.96 As with the Assam experiment Stewart-Mackenzie was 
reliant on the expertise and connections of Jardine Matheson, and James Matheson 
specifically, to source the necessary materials.  
Stewart-Mackenzie’s first enquiries into using Chinese migrant labour in Ceylon began 
at the very start of his governorship. This was linked to his broader interest in the cultivation 
of cash crops. Unfortunately the original correspondence from Stewart-Mackenzie is not 
available through the Jardine Matheson archive or the Stewart-Mackenzie papers, it is 
possible to deduce the nature of his requests from James Matheson’s responses to them. For 
example, in April 1838 Matheson forwarded Stewart-Mackenzie a letter from Alexander 
Lawrie Johnstone – the prominent Singapore merchant and lead partner in A. L. Johnstone & 
Co. – ‘respecting Chinese emigrants to Ceylon’. Johnstone responded by stating that ‘I do not 
think there is any probability of Chinese with capital emigrating to Ceylon. But I have little 
doubt they might be induced to go over as labourers’.97 From this response, it can be deduced 
that Stewart-Mackenzie had specifically been seeking ‘Chinese with capital’, presumably as 
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investors in cinnamon and coffee cultivation like in Singapore. Johnstone, drawing on his 
own experience in Singapore, elaborated that although unlikely, it would be preferable for 
Stewart-Mackenzie to attract self-employed Chinese migrants, rather than labourers:   
 
The Chinese would be found most useful to the colony, their improvement would 
be infinitely greater when they were interested themselves, than working as 
labourers for others ... All the cultivation in the interior of Singapore Island has 
been made by Chinese.98            
 
In this correspondence, the language of ‘improvement’ is present, though it is unclear whether 
it was first used by Stewart-Mackenzie or Johnstone. That Matheson turned to Johnstone’s 
expertise demonstrated an acknowledgement of the success of Chinese emigration to 
Singapore. It also demonstrated a personal rather than commercial connection between the 
largest British merchant house in Canton and Singapore’s premier firm, A.L. Johnstone & 
Co., which prospered in the Straits Settlements until its closure in the 1890s.99 Again, 
commercial or colonial connections were supplemented and influenced by personal ties. 
Notably, when Matheson was asked about Chinese emigration by Stewart-Mackenzie, he 
turned to the ‘imperial template’ of Singapore.          
Matheson’s involvement in recruiting Chinese labourers also allowed him to claim 
personal expertise on the topic of Chinese emigration. He found space in the form of a lengthy 
‘additional memoranda’ to share his own expertise on Chinese emigration.100 Matheson gave 
Stewart-Mackenzie an overview of the ‘great numbers’ of Chinese who emigrated annually to 
‘Singapore, Malacca and Penang’.101 He also weighed up the positives of Chinese migration 
to Ceylon, such as the cheap price of sustenance given by Ceylon’s ‘rice’ production, against 
possible negatives, such as the sojourning nature of Chinese migration that limited 
settlement.102 Matheson’s recommendation for a system of emigration was for Chinese 
migrants to be landed in Ceylon by British and Portuguese vessels passing from China to 
Bombay. Furthermore Matheson foresaw that to give this plan ‘stability’ it would be,  
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Found advisable to hold out encouragement for some families to remove from the 
Straits of Malacca, who would serve as a managers for new operations. Some 
individuals of good character accustomed to intercourse with the English, would 
be also desirable to act as overseers and interpreters.103     
 
As in previous chapters the notion of ‘good character’ is significant. There are clear 
similarities with the Assam experiment in terms of importance put upon ‘overseers’ and 
‘interpreters’ in the recruitment and management of Chinese labourers. Judging by the 
comments of both Matheson and Johnstone, the focus of Stewart-Mackenzie’s request 
appeared to be for a moneyed class of Chinese migrants who would comply with British 
colonial authority to create a plantation economy, as in Singapore. A community leader like 
Seah Eu Chin – who was a notable figure in colonial Singapore as a major employer and 
plantation owner – would have been exactly the type of migrant Stewart-Mackenzie was 
looking to attract alongside a larger labouring population. In late 1838 Stewart-Mackenzie 
suggested to Matheson that his memoranda had been ‘interesting’ and pledged to forward any 
future news on the subject.104        
Governor Stewart-Mackenzie next approached Matheson over the issue of Chinese 
migration in February 1840. Stewart-Mackenzie was now specifically interested in facilitating 
tea cultivation in Ceylon. The timing of this project was important. The first batch of Assam 
tea was successfully sold in London in 1839, but the problems with the Assam Company’s 
recruitment of Chinese labour were not known publicly until late 1840. Stewart-Mackenzie 
was acting during a period of optimism about the prospects of Chinese tea cultivation in 
Assam. He asked James Matheson for the ‘acquirement of the common labourer who would 
look after a tea plantation about to be established’.105 Despite having grandiose plans for a 
system of tea cultivation that would provide ‘employment for a very large number’, Stewart-
Mackenzie initially requested ‘good labourers’ numbering ‘50 to 100’.106 As well as Chinese 
tea cultivators, Matheson was also asked for a ‘large supply of tea seed … packed in boxes 
with light sand’ and, in contrast to the 1838 correspondence, specified that these migrants 
need be ‘single men, and in the prime of life, stout and able bodied’.107 This request for 
Chinese tea cultivators for Ceylon, using the resources of James Matheson on the China coast, 
was an almost direct replication of the Assam experiments of the 1830s. Stewart-Mackenzie’s 
request for ‘stout and able bodied’ men was also reminiscent of the language of systematic 
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emigration and colonization in general. This appeal came just six months after James 
Matheson had agreed the final contracts with tea cultivators for Assam. In this instance the 
specific pressures on Governor Stewart-Mackenzie to create a plantation economy – rather 
than a vague desire for colonial improvement – necessitated his interest in procuring Chinese 
tea cultivators.      
Ultimately, however, Stewart-Mackenzie’s plans for Chinese managed tea cultivation 
went unrealised. Stewart-Mackenzie was a divisive figure in Ceylon due to his role in 
religious and educational reforms, and he was reassigned by the Colonial Office as High 
Commissioner to the Ionian Islands in 1841.108 As such, Stewart-Mackenzie informed 
Matheson that he would be returning to Europe in April 1841, asking Matheson to give ‘good 
advice’ to his son and expressing ‘regret’ that he was unable to undertake the ‘cultivation of 
tea’.109 In anticipation of this news Matheson had already delayed transporting tea cultivators 
to Ceylon: 
 
I have been hesitating a good deal whether to send you Chinese Tea Cultivators 
by the England - having them here ready - but on showing your letter to your son 
the both of us came to the conclusion that it had better be deferred for the 
present.110  
 
With this Matheson enclosed copies of the contracts signed by tea cultivators as part of the 
Assam experiment. Because of the problems with Chinese migrants in Assam in 1840 he 
warned Stewart-Mackenzie that ‘you have considerable risk of finding them not qualified, a 
point we have no means of ascertaining here’.111 In addition to the problem of unqualified 
recruits in Assam, we can see here the limiting effects of the Opium War on access to labour 
from China. This would be Matheson’s last personal involvement in the recruitment of 
Chinese workers. In response, Stewart-Mackenzie was ‘well satisfied’ that the Chinese 
cultivators recruited by Matheson had not been sent because he would not be able to oversee 
the project personally.112  
Stewart-Mackenzie’s later correspondence with Matheson provides further evidence of 
the conceptual link between economic development and colonial improvement, similar to that 
seen in Assam. As seen in his ordinances as Governor, Stewart-Mackenzie was particularly 
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interested in discouraging ‘idleness’ amongst the island’s population. In his letter to Matheson 
expressing regret at his failure to institute Chinese-run tea cultivation on the island, Stewart-
Mackenzie explained his self-appointed task as governor: 
 
The great work which I had down to myself, of endeavouring systematically to 
improve and advance the mental resources of the varied population of the island, 
an attempt of which I confess I would not have despaired to lay the foundations, 
had I been fortunate enough to remain in the Government 3 or 4 years longer.113 
 
This quest to ‘improve and advance the mental resources’ of the Ceylon’s population gives a 
clue as to why Stewart-Mackenzie, like colony-builders in Singapore in particular, had 
initially sought to introduce ‘Chinese with capital’ to Ceylon in place of indigenous investors. 
The request for Chinese tea cultivators, as in Assam, was born out of necessity. Notably, 
Stewart-Mackenzie had not sought a few overseers but a significant number of ‘good 
labourers’. His two different attempts to source Chinese labour, born of different motivations 
and circumstances, display how Chinese migrants were deemed useful in the economic 
transformation of Ceylon. Despite the abandonment of the tea planting project, Stewart-
Mackenzie left a legacy for large-scale tea cultivation in Ceylon.  
 Stewart-Mackenzie’s short governorship and his death in 1843, means that little 
evidence of his broader ideas about ‘Chinese character’ exists. Unlike figures such as John 
Crawfurd or Gordon Forbes Davidson, it is unclear whether or not Stewart-Mackenzie was 
especially interested or engaged with contemporary discourse on the Chinese character, other 
than through his correspondence with James Matheson or his reading of the Canton Register. 
Prospects of using Chinese labour in Ceylon were contingent on a specific context at a 
specific time. In Stewart-Mackenzie’s obituary in the Ceylon Herald he was praised for his 
devotion to ‘Christian philanthropy’ and lauded as a ‘martyr’.114 The way that Stewart-
Mackenzie was eulogised in the Herald reflected his preoccupation with improvement. His 
governorship was remembered fondly as defined by ‘good intention, combined with liberal 
views’ and the deep interest ‘he took in every cause which had civilization or Christianity for 
its object’.115 Stewart-Mackenzie believed that Chinese migrants of different social classes 
and economic roles had a part to play in the spread of ‘civilization’ in Ceylon, though he did 
not remain in office long enough to personally implement such change.  
 The brevity of Stewart-Mackenzie’s governorship not only limited his ability to recruit 
Chinese labourers and implement his desired changes, but it also causes a problem for 
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historians. Whilst Sivasundaram has detailed the problems Stewart-Mackenzie faced with the 
English-language press in the colony, his administration has been generally ignored by 
scholars.116 His failure to implement any significant policy of colonization contrasts with the 
Assam tea plantation or the debates over the nature of labour in Australia, which lasted 
decades. Despite Stewart-Mackenzie’s failure, his attempts to source Chinese labour from 
Jardine Matheson provide a significant insight into issues of labour and ethnicity in the British 
Empire in Asia in the late 1830s. Again, colonial officials had advocated the replacement of 
indigenous populations with Chinese migrant labour. This was an emerging pattern in 
colonial development in Asia, and was connected to the access to the Chinese labour market 
that Jardine Matheson were able to provide.  
Although Stewart-Mackenzie failed to establish a Chinese-run tea industry in Ceylon, 
tea cultivation did eventually prosper and surpassed the ‘coffee mania’ that had gripped 
investors in the late 1830s. The development of the Ceylon tea industry was modelled on the 
success of Assam. The Ceylon Agricultural Society was founded in 1841 and, by the 1870s, 
Ceylon had established a reputation of as a centre of ‘scientific agriculture’.117 The ‘Belfast 
Chameleon’ Sir James Emerson Tennent, one of the primary chroniclers of the colony’s 
development over the nineteenth century, remarked that ‘should it ever be thought expedient 
to cultivate tea in addition to coffee in Ceylon, the adaptation of the soil and climate has thus 
been established, and it only remains to introduce artisans from China to conduct the 
subsequent processes’.118 In the 1860s a small number of Chinese artisans were brought to 
Ceylon and the suitability of Ceylon as a centre for tea production was firmly established 
amongst the colonial planting community.119  
           The development of a plantation economy was connected philosophically to improving 
both the population and economic performance of the colony. Stewart-Mackenzie’s self-
appointed task of improving the ‘mental resources of the varied population’ was continued by 
his successors.120 Educational and religious reform remained a core part of colonial 
governance. For example, British authors in the late nineteenth century described Buddhism 
in Ceylon as ‘Protestant Buddhism’ while ‘improvement societies’ such as the YMCA were 
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active in Ceylon from the late 1850s.121 Importantly, the urban indigenous populations, not 
those who would be expected to form a rural plantation labour force, were co-opted easily 
into British colonial authority.122 A solution to the perceived inability of the indigenous 
population to form a colonial labouring class was to induce mass immigration from Southern 
India. This system was deregulated from 1847 and encouraged by colonial investors such as 
John Ferguson in response to the economic crisis of the 1880s.123 The legacies of the colonial 
era on concepts of ethnicity in Ceylon have been understandably side-lined by a focus on 
ethnicity following Sri Lankan independence.124 Yet it is important to note the role of British 
governance in forging the connection between ideas about ethnicity and certain forms of 
labour in Ceylon. Lieutenant de Butts’ comments in his 1840 writing about the extension of 
the coffee estates reflected the British view that the benefits of plantation agriculture went 
beyond finance. He wrote of planation agriculture that ‘an immense alteration will be effected 
in the heretofore desert wastes of the island, and, as a necessary consequence, in the moral 
character and intellectual advancement of its inhabitants’.125  
 
Imperial Labour Shortages and Chinese Migration in the 1840s 
The issues Stewart-Mackenzie faced in Ceylon were both local and imperial in nature. 
Notions of colonial improvement – whether economic, moral and intellectual – were not 
confined to Ceylon. They were increasingly attached to issues of colonization and labour 
migration across the British Empire. The creation of the Colonial Land and Emigration 
Commission (hereafter CLEC) resulted from both the growing interest in centralized imperial 
colonization policy and an Empire-wide labour shortage. The CLEC became increasingly 
aware of the possibility of using Chinese labour in new colonies to address labour shortages 
on an imperial scale. Zoe Laidlaw’s Colonial Connections highlights the ‘information 
revolution’ taking place in the Empire, which made use of the ‘blue books’ compiled annually 
by colonial governors from 1822.126 New information available in the metropole greatly 
informed calls for a more organised migration policy to meet the needs of the colonies.  
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One of the loudest and most consistent voices calling for an improved system of 
colonization was that of Edward Gibbon Wakefield. Wakefield’s primary concern was that 
free migrants, not slaves or convicts, should be procured for the Australian colonies by the 
imperial government in London.127 He disseminated his ideas through texts such as Letter 
from Sydney, the Principal Town of Australasia and a Sketch of a Proposal for Colonising 
Australia, and in 1830 Wakefield established the National Colonization Society.128 This 
society became influential. For example, Robert Torrens chaired the society and was made a 
CLEC Commissioner in 1840.  Having helped to float the South Australian Land Company in 
1832, Torrens was a supporter of ‘self-supporting colonization’, which encouraged peasant 
proprietorship, and was able to exert his influence through the CLEC.129 The clout of 
Wakefield’s supporters of free labour and assisted emigration meant that their ideas affected 
imperial policy. By the beginning of the 1840s the empire in Asia and Australasia was seen as 
a tempting field for state managed colonization.130        
 As measures were taken to increase voluntary migration by the Colonial Office, 
specifically to Australian colonies, a framework to manage the bureaucracy of emigration 
became increasingly necessary. For example, Thomas Frederick Elliot, one of the original 
three Commissioners, worked with the London Emigration Committee from 1831 and was 
Agent-General for Emigration from 1837. Elliot’s management of emigration, originally 
focused on South Australia, soon broadened.131 The growing involvement of the Colonial 
Office in migration led to the creation of the CLEC by the Colonial Secretary Lord Russell in 
January 1840.132 The Commission consisted of three members – Thomas Elliot, Robert 
Torrens and E. E. Villiers – who were appointed to serve as ‘the connecting link between the 
disposal of Crown Lands and the conveyance of immigrants’. They were also engaged in 
distributing funds designated by the Colonial Office for the promotion of emigration.133 Elliot, 
who had strong expertise in the field of emigration, was made the chairman of the CLEC and 
took the lead on Empire-wide migration policy.134 
Insight into the work of the Commission can be best gained from the ‘General 
Reports’. The 1842 report gives some insight into the scope of the Commission’s early 
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activities.135 The first section dealt with the ‘Diffusion of Information’, which included both 
information from the colonies (such as population statistics) and from parliament (such as 
details of schemes for assisted emigration).136 The second section was concerned with the 
‘Disposal of Lands’ in the colonies. These included Antipodean colonies, such as New South 
Wales, Van Diemen’s Land, Western Australia and New Zealand; Central and North 
American possessions, including Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and the West Indies; and 
‘additional colonies’, such as the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon and the Falkland Islands.137 
Importantly, though the desire to manage issues of labour on an imperial scale was stimulated 
by the specific issues of the abolition of convict transportation and slavery, the institutions 
that emerged dictated policy beyond these specific colonial contexts. The ‘Disposal of Lands’ 
supplemented the third section of ‘Emigration’ as land available in the colonies was seen as 
the primary method of inducing free migration. The ‘Emigration’ section gave an overview of 
migration levels to the colonies, emigration levels from the United Kingdom, and discussed 
legislation for the regulation of and encouragement of migration.138 The scope of the CLEC’s 
work over the 1840s became increasingly broad – encompassing control over the disposal of 
crown lands and emigration, as well as the collection and dissemination of information.139    
In response to the imperial labour crisis the CLEC sought more information on China 
as a possible source of immigrants. In order to discover more, the CLEC drew on existing 
information about Chinese migrant labour and the expertise of British observers from across 
Britain’s Asian Empire. Indeed, Elliot had already compiled much information detailing his 
involvement in Australian migration on the ‘Capabilities of the Chinese to become good 
emigrants to the colony of New South Wales’.140 The 1843 General Report included a 
‘Proposal to obtain emigrants from the Straits of Malacca’ for British plantation labour in the 
West Indies. This was based on the contemporary accounts of the competence of Chinese 
labour and the ‘number of emigrants who arrived at Singapore in 1842 and 1843’.141 The 
work of the CLEC was essential in identifying Chinese labourers as a suitable source of 
replacement labour for former slave-holding colonies.142 For information on the utility of the 
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Chinese in the Straits Settlements, Elliot turned to the expertise of John Crawfurd. In response 
to a list of questions about the nature of Chinese labour from the Commission, Crawfurd 
extolled the virtues of the Straits Chinese.143 Importantly for the planned scheme, Crawfurd 
assured Elliot that the Chinese would be able to fulfil the requirements of the plantation 
system as they were ‘a sort of ambidextrous people who can turn their hands to anything’.144 
Again, it was the knowledge of experts like Crawfurd, coupled with the experience of Chinese 
colonists in the Straits Settlements, which provided metropolitan planners with a possible 
solution to the Empire-wide labour shortage.  
Like Singapore, another British colony, Mauritius, became a template of the utility of 
Chinese labour in developing plantation colonies. The possibility of using Chinese labourers 
on Mauritian sugar plantations had been raised as a possibility from the beginning of British 
rule. Robert Townsend Farquhar, who served as Governor of Mauritius from 1810 to 1817 
and again between 1820 and 1823, was the first colonial administrator to experiment with 
Chinese. Farquhar had witnessed the economic benefits of using Chinese emigrant 
communities as Lieutenant-Governor of Penang in 1804.145 Between 1788 and 1810 the 
Chinese population in Penang increased from 537 to 5,088.146 As a result of his time in 
Penang, Farquhar wrote Suggestions for counteracting any injurious effects upon the 
population of the West India colonies from the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, in which 
he advocated a scheme for encouraging Chinese labourers to migrate to the West Indies as a 
replacement for African slave labour.147 This suggestion led to the establishment of a select 
committee to report into the possibility of using Chinese labourers in the West Indies in 1811. 
The committee ultimately decided against the scheme due to concerns over its practicality in 
terms of distance.148 Disappointed by the Committee’s decision Farquhar despatched a 
Chinese immigrant in Mauritius (Hayme) to recruit more Chinese labourers for the colony in 
1821.149 Notably, despite Farquhar’s experience, he was reliant on a Chinese intermediary 
already resident in Mauritius. Hayme returned in 1826 with a select group of carpenters – 
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Whampoo, Hankee, Nghien, Hakkim and Ahim – and in 1829 the Planter’s Association 
recruited a small group of agricultural labourers meaning that by 1830 the Chinese 
community in Mauritius numbered twenty-six.150 Huguette’s work on Chinese communities 
in the Indian Ocean projects an average of twelve new Chinese arrivals per year over the 
course of the 1830s. As such, by the time Indian indentured labour was suspended in 1839 the 
planters of Mauritius were already familiar with the systems through which Chinese labourers 
could be acquired. Between 1837 and 1843 more than 2,100 Chinese labourers arrived in 
Mauritius, with most shipments coming from the Straits Settlements of Penang and 
Singapore.151    
Chinese migration to Mauritius in the early was seen as template for the wider Empire. 
Specifically, systems of Chinese indentured labour were later replicated in the West Indies, 
with supply established through Jardine Matheson and connected firms in the late 1840s. One 
of the main challenges facing the imperial planners and colonial planters was filling the 
labour shortage created by abolition.152 The challenge was to secure a workforce that was both 
cheap and productive. The CLEC saw Chinese labourers as a solution in the similar plantation 
context of the West Indies. Lord Stanley was sent copies of the agreements entered into by 
Chinese labourers in Mauritius by the CLEC when he was determining the details for state 
managed indentured agreements between Chinese migrants and the West India Committee.153 
The CLEC Report of 1843 praised Chinese migrants as ‘by far the most industrious and most 
hardy of oriental labourers’.154 Additionally, when the CLEC’s Colonization Circular of 1843 
gave the bounty rules for Chinese Emigration to the West Indies it was suffixed by John 
Crawfurd’s ‘paper on Chinese labourers’ which detailed the terms of Chinese labour 
migration to the Straits Settlements and again praised the Chinese character.155 It is notable 
that even after having returned to Britain permanently in 1827 Crawfurd’s expertise was 
invoked by the CLEC sixteen years later. The CLEC saw Chinese labour migration to the 
Straits Settlements, and subsequently Mauritius, as something replicable in the post-slave 
economy of the West Indies. As British access to the China coast increased after 1842, 
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Chinese indentured migration to the West Indies developed into a highly organized system 
that transported thousands of labourers annually.156 
This new system of labour importation resulted from the abolition of slavery, and the 
subsequent reluctance of freed slaves to take work as waged labourers on their former 
plantations. The British state was therefore desperate to assist the West India planters in 
sourcing labour in order to maintain the colony’s economic output. There had been a solitary, 
unrepeated, experiment with 200 Chinese contract labourers in 1806 and the report on the 
possibility of Chinese labour as a replacement for slave labour, instigated by Farquhar, in 
1810. However, the 1840s saw a new wave of interest in solving the labour crisis in the West 
Indies.157 The practicalities of using both Chinese and Indian labour were explored repeatedly 
in Colonial Office correspondences, CLEC reports and select committee reports.158 Lord 
Stanley permitted the immigration of Chinese labourers to the West Indies from 1843 
provided that the system be regulated through government licences to avoid the types of 
abuses seen in the Indian indenture system. Additionally, Stanley stipulated that labourers had 
to be procured from the British Straits Settlements, as opposed to the Chinese treaty ports.  
 
Table 4.1. Licenses for Chinese Labourers from the Straits Settlements to the West 
Indies 
Date of License To Whom Granted Colony Number of 
Labourers 
3 November 1843 Cavan Brothers & 
Co. 
Trinidad 150 
3 November 1843 Reid Irving, & Co.  Trinidad 150 
3 November 1843 Cavan Brothers & 
Co.  
British Guiana 400 
4 November 1843 G. Anderson, Esq.  British Guiana 500 
4 November 1843 Neill Malcom, Esq.  Jamaica 400 
13 November 1843 Cavan Brothers & 
Co. 
British Guiana 250 
13 November 1843 G. Labalmondiere British Guiana 500 
30 November 1843 H. Barkly, Esq. British Guiana 250 
1 January 1844 Bosanquet & 
Naghton 
British Guiana 250 
   2850 
Source: Licenses granted for the conveyance of Chinese Labourers from the British settlements in the Straits of 
Malacca to Jamaica, British Guiana and Trinidad, Colonial Office, 6 March 1844: CO129/4 (National Archives). 
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The uptake of the license system, shown in Table 4.1, demonstrates the early interest in the 
use of Chinese labour in the West Indies. Abolition had not led to a significant decrease in the 
number of coffee plantations in the West Indies, which was an anticipated response to 
emancipation that would have mitigated some of the demand for imported labour.159 
However, the lifting of the ban on Indian emigration shortly after the licenses were granted 
meant there was no further state managed immigration from China until an order for 5,000 
labourers from the newly established British firm Syme, Muir & Co. in 1849.160  
It was not until 1851 that a regular system of Chinese emigration to the West Indies 
emerged. Emigration agent James T. White was dispatched from Calcutta to the Chinese 
treaty port of Amoy to oversee the government managed emigration system directly from the 
China coast. White’s recruitment efforts on the China coast, especially in Hong Kong, have 
been dismissed by historians as a failure. In particular he faced competition for ships, which 
preferred to take lucrative credit-ticket passengers to California. He did enjoy some success 
through the British firm Tait & Co., as indicated by his records which provide the most 
detailed Chinese emigration figures available.161 By January 1853 White had secured 1,022 
labourers for Trinidad aboard the Australia (445 migrants), Clarendon (257 migrants) and 
Lady Flora Hastings (320 migrants), with arrangements for a further 800 labourers for 
Demerara and 700 for Trinidad.162 Despite later Chinese resistance and problems with the 
passenger trade, which are outlined in chapter five, the labour shortages in the West Indies 
was so severe that the CLEC and the Colonial Office were unwilling to stop the trade.163 
Chinese migration to the West Indies in the 1850s demonstrates how metropolitan planners 
had replicated systems of Chinese migration to Mauritius, which were themselves replications 
of migration to the Straits Settlements. The drive for colonial improvement, exemplified by 
the economic transformation of Ceylon, played a pivotal role in the extension of systems of 
Chinese migration to new destinations in the British Empire.   
 
Conclusion 
Experiments with Chinese migrant workers to the Indian Ocean Colonies of Ceylon and 
Mauritius in the late 1830s and early 1840s both built on and modified existing systems of 
Chinese labour migration. The development of a plantation economy in Ceylon was directly 
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modelled on the experiment with tea cultivation in Assam. Likewise migration to Mauritius 
was informed by Robert Townsend Farquhar’s experience in the Straits Settlements. The 
replication of Chinese labour systems in different colonies was influenced by a growing 
metropolitan interest in ethnicity and labour migration. The involvement of the CLEC was an 
example of the interplay between imperial and colonial concerns. It is also important to 
emphasise the role that individuals played. Stewart-Mackenzie’s attempts to bring Chinese 
labourers to Ceylon, like the Assam experiment, drew upon the resources and networks of 
Jardine Matheson. Stewart-Mackenzie’s preconceptions about the possible impact of Chinese 
migration in Ceylon demonstrated the impact of ideas about Chinese character that had been 
developed over the 1820s and 1830s in contact zones like Singapore. In Ceylon, in the late 
1830s, ideas about Chinese character and the access to China itself offered by Jardine 
Matheson intersected with broad imperial conversations about labour and ethnicity.  
 The example of Ceylon demonstrates the different factors that stimulated interest in 
Chinese labour. First, the transition to plantation economies based on ‘free’ labour was a 
major catalyst for a serious pan-imperial examination of the possibilities of sourcing labour 
from new locations. In addition, the specific limits placed on Indian emigration meant that the 
Chinese, perceived to be a cheap and reliable alternative, were increasingly sought. Governor 
Stewart-Mackenzie’s repeated attempts to attract different types of Chinese migrants – 
including migrants with capital, general labourers, and tea cultivators – demonstrates the link 
between ethnicity and labour more clearly than our previous examples. Stewart-Mackenzie’s 
interest in colonial improvement and his legislative commitment to dissuading ‘idleness’ 
demonstrated a clear connection between a propensity to labour and the relative value of 
different ethnic groups. Crucially, the economic issues Stewart-Mackenzie faced in Ceylon 
were replicated elsewhere. As demonstrated by the increasingly broad brief of the CLEC, 
issues of ‘economic improvement’ were placed at the forefront of imperial planning. 
Theorists, such as Wakefield, advocated assisted emigration from Britain as an ideal approach 
to colonization. However, the realities of supplying cheap, effective labour for a vast and 
distant range of colonies meant that Chinese labour emerged as a solution. As in previous 
examples, the demand for labour from China was contingent on the assumed superiority of 
skilled and unskilled Chinese workers in comparison with other Asian ethnic groups.   
The second factor at play in Ceylon was the personal connection that provided 
Governor Stewart-Mackenzie with access to Chinese labour, even if he was unable to utilise 
it. Networks that had their origins in the Scottish highlands allowed for new systems of 
migration to be examined and explored. Stewart-Mackenzie, like the Assam Tea Committee, 
was reliant on Jardine Matheson’s resources to recruit Chinese tea cultivators. As seen in 
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chapter three, George J. Gordon’s connection to Jardine Matheson had been through his 
experience with Mackintosh & Co. and consequently through James Matheson’s family ties. 
The Stewart-Mackenzie example again shows the importance of personal, as well as 
commercial or official, networks in sharing information about Chinese emigration. It also 
shows how different commercial, official and personal networks often overlapped and 
intersected – particularly amongst the community of wealthy Scottish men who were forging 
imperial careers in Asia.   
Although Stewart-Mackenzie’s attempt to recruit Chinese migrants ultimately, like 
Davidson’s project in New South Wales, failed, it remains significant for two reasons. First, it 
shows the continued belief in the Chinese as agents of colonial improvement in the British 
Empire in Asia. Second, it demonstrates how wider imperial conditions, specifically the 
growing focus on productivity and corresponding labour crisis (which persisted into the 
1840s), led to an increased interest in the potential of Chinese labourers as colonists for the 
British Empire. As the next chapter will demonstrate, these wider imperial conditions were 
matched by an unprecedented access to the China coast for British merchants in the 1840s. 
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Chapter Five: Hong Kong and Amoy: the Treaty Ports and the 
Dawn of Mass Migration, 1843-1853 
 
Introduction  
 
His  Majesty  the  Emperor  of  China  agrees  that  British  Subjects  shall  
be  allowed  to  reside … at  the  Cities  and  Towns  of  Canton, Amoy, 
Foochow-fu,  Ningpo, and  Shanghai … the  Island  of  Hong‑Kong [is] to  
be possessed  in  perpetuity  by  her  Britannic  Majesty.1 
 
The Treaty of Nanking was the ‘opening’ of China that Jardine Matheson and their 
contemporaries had so vehemently lobbied for throughout the 1830s.2 The treaty has been 
identified by historians as the start of a new age in Anglo-Chinese economic, political and 
military relations. It is known in Chinese history as the start of China’s ‘century of 
humiliation’ at the hands of foreign imperialism.3 In terms of emigration too, the newly 
opened ports and acquired territory listed in the treaty provided new opportunities for Chinese 
workers seeking to circumvent the imperial ban on emigration. Historians of Chinese 
emigration have taken 1843 as the start of a new era and have emphasised changes from, 
rather than continuities with, the 1830s.4 This chapter will situate Chinese emigration in the 
wake of the Treaty of Nanking as connected to systems and perceptions of Chinese 
emigration developed over the 1830s. From their base in Hong Kong, Jardine Matheson 
established new systems of Chinese migration from different departure points and to new, 
global destinations.  
 First, the role of Hong Kong as an Anglo-Chinese contact zone, as well as a 
destination and departure point for migrants is examined. Colonial authority in Hong Kong, 
much like Singapore previously, was simultaneously reliant on Chinese elites and 
intermediaries, whilst being threatened by the size and organization of the Chinese labour 
force. As some of the colony’s most powerful and influential residents, and as proprietors of 
the renamed Hong Kong Register, Jardine Matheson were again actively involved in 
characterising the Chinese population. Hong Kong was also important as it provided a base 
from which the firm could facilitate onward migration to destinations around the globe. The 
establishment of British judicial hegemony on the China coast, combined with the firm’s 
                                                 
1 Treaty of Nanking (Great Britain – China) available in G. E. P. Hertslet & Edward Parkes, Hertslet’s China 
Treaties. Treaties between Great Britain and China and between China and Foreign Powers, etc., 3rd ed. 
(London: Harrison and Sons, for H. M. Stationery, 1908).   
2 For more on the belief in the necessity to ‘liberate’ the Chinese see chapter two.   
3 See Bickers, The Scramble for China, pp. 5-7, for a description of Chinese nationalist historiography.   
4 For an overview of these histories see the section ‘Chinese Migration in the British Empire’ in the introduction.  
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extensive shipping connections and the development of Hong Kong as an emigrant hub, 
meant that the mass migrations to the goldfields of Australia and California provided a 
lucrative business for Jardine Matheson as demand shifted from technically skilled migrants 
to cheap and high-volume labour.5 The centrality of the firm’s position in Hong Kong, and its 
ability to adapt to new situations and markets, made it a major profiteer from the mass 
migration of Chinese emigrants in the 1850s.        
 Second, the role Jardine Matheson played in assisting the Western ‘coolie’ firms of 
Tait & Co. and Syme, Muir & Co., who established contract migration routes from Amoy, is 
explored.6 Within the system of contract emigration, problems of coercion and kidnap were 
endemic, leading to contemporary and historical comparisons with slavery.7 The passenger 
trade from Amoy has been treated as a new and distinct phenomena in histories of Chinese 
migration, yet links to Jardine Matheson reflect how new systems developed in the 1840s 
were contingent on the expansion of Western commercial networks in the 1830s. As 
discussed in chapter four, Indian and Chinese migrants on long-term contracts were used to 
cover labour shortages in the wake of emancipation in the British Empire, but such demand 
was also outstripped by the new phenomena of free migrants seeking passage to make their 
fortunes in the Australian and California gold rushes.8 The capital reserves, networks and 
commercial connections that Jardine Matheson had built up in the wake of the EIC Charter 
Act in 1833 were essential in supporting the new British firms establishing these coercive 
emigration systems at Amoy. The role of the firm in the cases of the emigrant ships the Duke 
of Argyll, the Nimrod and the Lady Amherst will be explored in detail.  
The Amoy riots (1852) and the regulation of the Chinese migration that resulted in the 
Chinese Passenger Act (1855) will act as an end point for this study. Specifically, by January 
1853, Governor John Bowring’s inquiry into the passenger trade and James T. White’s 
recruitment of Chinese migration labour for the West Indies marked the beginning of the 
British state starting to exercise some form of control over these new private firms.  
Resistance and reaction to the new regulations of the 1850s provides additional insight into 
the involvement of Jardine Matheson in new coercive systems of extracting labour. 
Significantly, 1853 also saw a growth in the number of Chinese migrants moving from Amoy 
to Singapore aboard Western vessels. Migration to destinations already examined in this 
                                                 
5 Sinn, Pacific Crossings, p. 143. 
6 The use of ‘coolie’ in this context was a pejorative term for Asian contract labour. Derived from the Tamil 
word ‘Kuli’, meaning wages or hire, the term ‘coolie’ will be seen frequently in primary sources throughout this 
chapter, but its use will be avoided in analysis due to the use of the term as racial slur in various colonial and 
post-colonial societies. ‘Amoy’ will be used as opposed to Xiamen to maintain consistency with contemporary 
usage. See Gaiutra Bahadur, Coolie Woman: The Odyssey of Indenture (London: Hurst & Co., 2013), p. xx.   
7 Siu and Ku, Hong Kong Mobile, p. 20. 
8 Walton, Indentured Labour, Caribbean sugar, p. 38. 
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thesis, most notably Singapore and Australia, was heavily impacted by emerging post-1842 
systems of trade and shipping. The analysis of Jardine Matheson’s role in assisting emigration 
from Hong Kong and Amoy shows how new forms of voluntary and forced emigration were 
contingent on the physical networks and conceptual frameworks established in the 1830s and 
1840s.  
 
Chinese Emigration and Hong Kong 
The cession of Hong Kong to Britain in 1842 had implications for systems of Chinese 
emigration through both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Hong Kong became both a 
point of onward migration to various global locations and a destination for migrants from 
across southern China. Hong Kong acted as a contact zone in which existing concepts of the 
Chinese character were further developed by both experienced and new Western observers. 
For the small indigenous population, seizure of the island and its colonization by the British 
would completely change the geographic, economic, social and cultural fabric of Hong 
Kong.9 The immigration of thousands of people from across southern China as well as the 
establishment of a wealthy and powerful foreign merchant elite led to new formations of 
colonial identity.10 The mainland Chinese who moved to Hong Kong were criticised by 
Western observers, such as Robert Montgomery Martin who referred to them as the ‘scum of 
Canton’.11 In addition to Hong Kong’s role as a contact zone it also became an important base 
for Jardine Matheson’s operations on the China coast. Jardine Matheson were also an 
important political, economic and social force in Hong Kong. As Hong Kong became a busy 
colony and key site of onward migration globally, the significance of firms like Jardine 
Matheson and Dent & Co. provides a connection to the pre-Opium War context of Anglo-
Chinese exchange.  
Frank Welsh’s description of Hong Kong as a ‘Chinese colony that happened to be run 
by Britain’ is useful as it brings attention to the fact that twentieth-century histories of 
colonial rule often ignored or over-simplified the role of the island’s Chinese inhabitants.12 
Hong Kong’s significance in migration history is derived from its Chinese majority. That a 
large Chinese population overtly operated outside of the judicial control of the Qing Empire 
from 1842, both highlighted the ineptitude of existing emigration restrictions and created an 
environment in which new systems of migration could be established. Two historical 
                                                 
9 Bird, Traders of Hong Kong, p.19. Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 19, gives an estimated 
population of 5,000-7,000 prior to British occupation.  
10 Namely the developing ‘Hong Konger’ identity, which is discussed repeatedly in Siu and Ku, Hong Kong 
Mobile.  
11 Chan, The Making of Hong Kong Society, p. 49. 
12 Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London: Harper Collins, 1994), p. 8. 
 180 
 
approaches have resulted in the Chinese being largely written out of the history of Hong 
Kong. Early Western historiography focused on the Western residents and Hong Kong’s 
success story as a liberal, capitalist, free trade port. In contrast, Chinese scholars had 
maintained that Hong Kong was a symbol of imperialism, with the Chinese islanders either 
being described as captives or collaborators.13 More recent work by Christopher Munn and 
John Carroll has focused on the Chinese majority and their relationship with colonial 
authority and mercantile elites. Munn’s Anglo-China sets out to redress this balance by 
dismissing the notion of Chinese inhabitants as passive victims of ‘colonial machinery’.14 
Similarly, Carroll has emphasised the close business relationships between Western 
merchants and their Chinese employees known as compradors, highlighting co-operation over 
conflict.15 Jardine Matheson’s reliance on Chinese employees and intermediaries re-enforces 
this perspective. These texts build on an increasing body of work that highlighted the different 
social and economic roles played by Chinese migrants – whether labourers, artisans or 
merchants – in Hong Kong.16  
Hong Kong’s Chinese population was essential to the colony’s economic development 
in the 1840s and 1850s. Initial population counts at the point of Hong Kong’s cession to 
Britain estimated a community of 15,000 at Victoria, of whom more than 12,000 were 
Chinese.17 This population increased rapidly over the 1840s, a process that was encouraged by 
European capital and poor economic conditions in Guangdong Province due to the opening of 
the treaty ports.18 Contemporaries like Arthur Cunynghame described how ‘it was almost 
impossible to prevent the people from the opposite coast from flocking to us’.19 Early colonial 
blue books did try to quantify the growing Chinese population in the 1840s.20 The first such 
measure in 1845 gave the ‘coloured’ population, as 23,748 (only 4,809 of whom were 
female).21 By 1849 ‘Chinese’ had been written in pencil over the term ‘coloured’, which was 
printed in the blue book, and the total ‘Chinese’ population was given as 28,956 (with a 
similar gender disparity) and was now further split with the subcategory of ‘boat people’.22 
                                                 
13 Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 9. 
14 Munn, Anglo-China, p. 10. 
15 Carroll, ‘The Canton System’, p. 54. For more on the role of Chinese compradors in see chapter two. 
16 For example see Elizabeth Sinn, Power and Charity: a Chinese Merchant Elite in Colonial Hong Kong (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003); Chan, The Making of Hong Kong Society; Jung-fang Tsai, Hong 
Kong in Chinese History: Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1842-1913 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993).   
17 Welsh, A History of Hong Kong, p. 139; These figures were the estimates of Governor Pottinger’s new, under-
resourced colonial administration.  
18 Skeldon, Emigration from Hong Kong, p. 21. 
19 Cunynghame, The Opium War, p. 40. 
20 Chan, The Making of Hong Kong Society, p. 65. 
21 Hong Kong Blue Book (1845): CO133/2 (National Archives).  
22 Hong Kong Blue Book (1849): CO 133/6 (National Archives). 
 181 
 
The Tanka ‘boat people’ were placed at the foot of social stratification by many mainland 
Chinese contemporaries, but had been extremely useful to the British merchants and colony 
builders by providing provisions during the Opium War.23 As a consequence of British 
colonization, many Tanka relocated to Hong Kong in search of economic opportunities. The 
census information points to the problems local government faced when it came to 
categorising different Chinese ethnic groups. It was not until 1845, three years into British 
governance, that a ‘Registrar General’ was appointed to take responsibility for a Chinese 
community that constituted ninety-five per cent of the total population.24 Colonial authorities 
were aware that the Chinese migrant population was essential to the colony’s success.   
The Western firms that relocated to Hong Kong during the Opium War were 
dependent on Chinese employees. As an example, Jardine Matheson employed a large staff of 
Chinese compradors, interpreters and clerks in their head office and warehouses (buildings 
which themselves were erected by Chinese labour) at East Point – a prime location in Hong 
Kong’s Victoria Harbour.25 Other trading operations required Chinese intermediaries, with 
each opium ship employing at least one comprador and interpreter.26 Another draw for 
migrants were the opportunities for entrepreneurship that Hong Kong presented. Early 
occupational data is as limited as census data, but sporadic attempts were made to gauge 
Chinese employment in the 1840s. In March 1842 the Canton Register published a table 
listing the various occupations of Chinese inhabitants. The largest ‘shop-based’ categories 
included 566 carpenters, 439 prostitutes, 402 chandlers and 380 masons.27 In contrast there 
were also non-‘shop-based’ employment categories, such as 1,366 labourers, 500 bricklayers 
and 500 ‘having no ostensible employment’.28 The increasingly varied nature of Chinese 
employment can be seen if we compare this crude list and the Hong Kong Almanac of 1846. 
The 1846 list of ‘Chinese traders’ covers more than seventy specialist trades, the most popular 
being forty chandlers, thirty lodging house keepers, nineteen carpenters and eighteen 
druggists.29 Crucially, the growing Chinese population of Hong Kong created new social and 
economic relationships. The immigrant population brought connections that were essential in 
turning Hong Kong into a base for later mass migrations to destinations like Australia and 
                                                 
23 Carroll, Edge of Empires, p. 23. 
24 Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, p. 24. 
25 LeFevour, Western Enterprise in Late Ch’ing China, p. 22. 
26 Ibid, p. 22. 
27 Canton Register, 29 March 1842.  
28 Ibid.  
29 A.R. Johnston, Hong Kong Directory/Almanac (Hong Kong, 1846); for full lists from the Canton Register and 
Hong Kong Almanac see Appendix C, p. 225.  
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California. Hong Kong was a transmission point for money, information and people between 
southern China and overseas destinations.30   
As in Singapore in the 1820s and 1830s there was recognition by colonial authorities 
and Western merchants that co-operation with elements of the Chinese community was 
necessary to ensure the colony’s success.31 Hong Kong also provided a space for new Chinese 
entrepreneurs to acquire social status and become economically powerful. Examples included 
figures like Loo Aqui of the Tanka community who was given land in recognition of the 
provisions he gave to the British during the Opium War and became an extremely wealthy 
community leader.32 Whilst the British had referred to the Tanka as ‘boat people’ in their 
early census data, colonial Hong Kong provided opportunities for previously marginalised 
people like Loo Aqui to acquire wealth and power through collaboration. The formation of the 
Tung Wah Hospital in the late 1860s has been highlighted as an example of the Chinese elite 
becoming incorporated into the formal political structure of the colony.33 Indeed Governor 
John Bowring’s failed proposals of 1855, which would have enfranchised propertied Chinese 
residents and included Chinese representation on the legislative council, did signify an 
awareness of class distinctions and opportunities for collaboration within the Chinese 
community.34  
Hong Kong also offered a new colonial contact zone in which Chinese migrants could 
be critiqued by British observers. A common early observation of Western residents and 
visitors to the colony was the supposedly poor character of the Chinese inhabitants. As in 
Singapore, Westerners made distinctions between a threatening mass of conniving Chinese 
workers and complicit Chinese merchants who were crucial to colonial rule. Importantly, 
these Chinese and British elites were less well integrated than in Singapore.35 The early years 
of the colony were blighted by high rates of violent crime. The cause of this, according to 
observers such as Charles Gutzlaff and Robert Montgomery Martin, was the poor class and 
character of the Chinese immigrants, which was believed to be exacerbated by the lack of 
females to act as a pacifying force.36 ‘Disturbances’, ‘affrays’ and ‘secret sects’ were 
regularly reported in the pages of the (now re-named) Hong Kong Register.37 Christopher 
Munn has discussed how allegations of criminality allowed the colonial government to pass 
                                                 
30 Michael Williams, ‘Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta Qiaoxiang’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 
(2004) p. 260. 
31 Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 20. 
32 Ibid, p. 17.  
33 Chan, The Making of Hong Kong Society, p. 105.  
34 Ibid.  
35 For more on the relationship between Chinese elites and colonial authority in Singapore see chapter one.  
36 Bird, Traders of Hong Kong, p. 39.  
37 Hong Kong Register, 17 October 1843; Hong Kong Register, 7 May 1844; Hong Kong Register, 17 September 
1844.   
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law and order legislation that strengthened colonial authority.38 Hong Kong’s vast class of 
criminal Chinese, whether real or imagined, were particularly maligned as the worst examples 
of the Chinese character.  
Importantly, in Hong Kong in the 1840s the interests and personnel of the colonial state 
and elite merchant houses overlapped. For example, Alexander Matheson – who became head 
of Jardine Matheson on the China coast following James Matheson’s return to Britain in 1843 
– was made an unofficial member of the legislative council.39 Western elites specifically 
highlighted distinctions between themselves and the ‘criminal’ Chinese majority. The early 
years of the Hong Kong Register carried a litany of Chinese crimes, ranging from ‘serious 
disturbances’ to illegal gambling establishments.40 Often these events were distinctly 
personal. For example, the Register gave extensive coverage of the trial of ‘Wang Acho’, who 
had committed forgery ‘with the intention of defrauding A. Matheson Esq.’.41 Existing in the 
midst of a Chinese colonial population, the Register’s previous critique of the Chinese 
authorities was broadened to include Chinese migrants to Hong Kong. The proximity of the 
powerful Western merchant elite to the colonial authorities meant that legislative action was 
focused against the ‘criminal’ Chinese. An article titled ‘The Secret Sects of China and Hong 
Kong Legislation’ covered how the first ordinance of 1846 allowed the authorities to 
‘imprison’, ‘brand’ and ‘expel’ members of the ‘Triad, or other secret societies’.42 For both 
elite firms like Jardine Matheson and colonial authorities the criminal character of the Chinese 
population was a concern.     
A revealing solution that was proposed for controlling the Chinese population, and one 
which was conflated with a ‘defence’ of Western property, came in the form of a letter to the 
editor of the Register signed ‘Senex’:43 
 
I wish to offer some suggestions respecting a new body of police, to be called the 
Hong Kong Rangers, so alert and watchful that no bands of robbers, or petty 
pilferer, will longer dare to move abroad. The rangers shall be so numerous and 
strong, that, on all ordinary occasions, the military will not be required for nightly 
patrol, and consequently will be saved from one of the many causes of mortality 
among them.44 
 
Of course, ‘Senex’s’ proposals envisaged the rangers – notable for their exceptional powers of 
crime prevention – as a largely European force. The policing of the colony provides a good 
                                                 
38 Munn, Anglo-China, p. 16. 
39 Endacott, A Biographical Sketch-Book of Early Hong Kong, p. 160. 
40 Hong Kong Register, 7 May 1844; Hong Kong Register, 23 September 1845.  
41 Hong Kong Register, 8 October 1844.  
42 Hong Kong Register, 20 May 1845.  
43 Presumably ‘Senex’ here is a reference to the Latin usage of ‘old man’. 
44 Hong Kong Register, 17 October 1843. 
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example of how criminality was intensely racialised by the colonial authorities. The Hong 
Kong Police Force in 1845 was formed by seventy-one Europeans, fifty-one Chinese and 
forty-six Indians, with the Chinese component reduced to twenty-three by 1847 and thirteen 
by 1849 as Chinese officers were believed to be ‘untrustworthy’ and were accused of having 
connections to triad societies.45 It was the view of colonial authorities that the Chinese of 
Hong Kong were especially prejudiced against Western residents. This view of an ‘ill feeling 
of people of Hong Kong towards foreigners [Westerners]’ also surfaced during the 1847 
Select Committee on Commercial Relations with China, and played a role in the Colonial 
Office’s decision to limit representative government in the 1850s.46  
 Concerns about Chinese criminality in Hong Kong can, in many ways, be compared to 
political and social attitudes to Chinese labourers seen in early colonial Singapore. As 
discussed by Anthony Webster, the extent to which the European community were 
outnumbered by the Chinese meant they were viewed as an ‘intimidating presence’ by 
colonial authorities.47 This intimidation was exacerbated by concerns about secret society 
membership and increasing rates of opium consumption. The Chinese in Hong Kong were 
viewed as especially subversive. The contrast between the Straits Settlements and Hong Kong 
was most vividly illustrated by the shipment of Chinese convicts from Hong Kong to Penang, 
via Singapore, aboard the General Wood.48 Jardine Matheson used the ship during the Opium 
War, and it was used to transport opium between Bombay and China by Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy 
over the 1840s.49 In November 1847 the General Wood was chartered by the Hong Kong 
government to transport ’92 convicted pirates’.50 A passenger uprising whilst the ship was 
harboured at Singapore served to further underline the perception of Hong Kong’s criminal 
underclass as the ‘scum of Canton’.51   
It is worth noting some of the wider motivations for the emphasis placed on Chinese 
criminality in Hong Kong. Palmerston famously described the island as a ‘barren rock’ after 
Elliot’s acquisition of it during the Opium War and many British observers would have 
preferred the island of Chusan, temporarily held in the 1840s as collateral by British forces, as 
a colony.52 Charles Gutzlaff acted as an administrator in Chusan and echoed the common 
opinion that the Chinese in Hong Kong, in contrast to the Chinese of Chusan, were of the 
                                                 
45 Norman Miners, ‘The Localization of the Hong Kong Police Force, 1842-1947’, The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1990), pp. 299.  
46 Parliamentary Papers, Report from the Select Committee on Commercial Relations with China, p. 552. 
47 Webster, ‘The Development of British Commercial and Political Networks in the Straits Settlements’, p. 911. 
48 Williamson, Eastern Traders, pp. 164-165.  
49 Ibid, p. 162.  
50 Clare Anderson, ‘The age of Revolution in the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal and South China Sea: a Maritime 
Perspective’, IRSH, 58 (2013), p. 239.  
51 Chan, The Making of Hong Kong Society, p. 49. 
52 Bird, Traders of Hong Kong, p. 39. 
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‘lowest moral standard’. Nobody was more critical than Robert Montgomery Martin.53 Martin 
was appointed Treasurer of Hong Kong in 1844 and whilst spending time in Chusan 
recovering from illness wrote a report on the advantages of Chusan over Hong Kong.54 Martin 
famously wrote that there was not ‘one respectable Chinese inhabitant’ in Hong Kong and he 
lamented how the ‘migratory, predatory, gambling and dissolute habits’ of the Chinese had 
made them ‘not only useless but highly injurious subjects in the attempt to form a new 
colony’.55 Published as the British Position and Prospects in China, Montgomery Martin’s 
work was criticised in the Hong Kong newspaper press. Key figures such as Alexander 
Matheson privately agreed that Chusan would be a preferable location for a colony, but the 
firm had invested so much capital in Hong Kong they did not publicly advocate relocation.56 
Martin’s general criticisms of Hong Kong – its limited size, disadvantageous geographical 
position, lack of natural resources and unfitness for European habitation – gained some 
currency in London as evidenced by the stir his resignation in Hong Kong caused in 
Parliament and the Colonial Office.57 Though his advocacy of Chusan was in vain, Martin’s 
writing had further promoted the opinion that the Chinese migrants to Hong Kong were of an 
especially poor character.  
As well as being a destination for migrants, Hong Kong developed into a 
‘clearinghouse’ between the qiaoxiang region of Guangdong Province and various global 
locations.58 Jardine Matheson played a crucial role in both facilitating the movement of 
people from Hong Kong and supplying support services that allowed for the remittance of 
goods, money and information. The firm also facilitated mass emigration from Hong Kong 
through the publication of news from the goldfields that drew thousands of migrants each 
year. The Register published numerous original articles and extracts on ‘The California Gold 
Rush’, ‘Report from the Gold Coast of California’, ‘The California Trade’ and the ‘Discovery 
of Gold in Australia’.59 Importantly these new pull factors for emigrants drew on the labour 
pool supplied by the increased Chinese population of Hong Kong over the 1840s. Elizabeth 
Sinn has discussed three groups that were targeted by emigrant recruiters: those who had 
                                                 
53 Ibid, p. 39; Christopher Munn, ‘The Chusan episode’, pp. 82-112.  
54 King, Survey Our Empire!, p. 232. 
55 Endacott, A Biographical Sketch-Book of Early Hong Kong, p. xvi.  
56 Friend of China, 26 September 1846; Hong Kong Register, 6 October 1846.  
57 The details of Martin’s resignation were debated in the metropole and correspondence over the issue was 
published as a parliamentary paper; Robert Montgomery Martin, Reports, Minutes and Despatches on the British 
Position and Prospects in China (London: Harrison, 1846); Parliamentary Paper, Mr. Montgomery Martin. Copy 
of correspondence of Mr. Montgomery Martin with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, relating to his 
resignation of the office of Treasurer of Hong Kong, 1847 (743). 
58 Williams, ‘Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta Qiaoxiang’, p. 360. See page 81 for the different uses of 
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59 Hong Kong Register, 5 June 1849; Hong Kong Register, 24 July 1849; Hong Kong Register, 4 June 1850; 
Hong Kong Register, 12 August 1851.  
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settled in Hong Kong and decided to re-migrate; those who had arrived in Hong Kong with 
the intention to migrate elsewhere; and indigenous villagers from rural Hong Kong.60 The 
migration of southern Chinese to Hong Kong in the 1840s was crucial in creating the context 
for mass emigration from Hong Kong to new destinations in the 1850s. 
By the mid-1850s Hong Kong had developed into a major departure point for Chinese 
emigrants. Table 5.1, created using the Victoria Harbour Master’s list between 1 November 
1854 and 30 September 1855, shows the significance of Hong Kong as an emigrant port:  
 
Table 5.1. Departures of Chinese passengers from Hong Kong 
Destinations Total Number of Passengers 
Amoy 871 
California 743 
Canton 40 
East Coast 88 
Foo-Chow-Foo 26 
Hobson’s Bay 1,942 
Macao 4 
Manila 11 
Melbourne 1,980 
Port Philip 6,544 
San Francisco 2,299 
Shanghai 305 
Siam 50 
Singapore 46 
West Coast 16 
Whampoa 24 
Total 14,991 
Source: ‘List of vessels cleared outwards with Chinese passengers from 1 November 1854 to 30 September 
1855’, Thos. V. Watkins, Harbour Master. Harbour Master’s Office, Victoria, Hong Kong, 5 October 1855.61 
 
Australian and Californian ports were the destinations for more than ninety per cent of the 
passenger traffic from Hong Kong due to the gold rushes that had been reported in the 
Register. Elizabeth Sinn has detailed the way that these new, large migration systems were 
extremely profitable for Jardine Matheson. The Chinese communities that became resident in 
various destinations were connected to their homeland through Hong Kong. Jardine Matheson 
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were able to profit through their involvement in the growing shipping traffic to the lucrative 
gold-fields, as well as the supplementary postal, goods and financial remittance industries.62  
The cession of Hong Kong to Britain in 1842 had two main implications for Chinese 
migration in the British Empire. First, Hong Kong was a new colonial contact zone in which 
the Chinese character was debated. As before, British colonial authority was contingent on 
complicit Chinese elites, who often worked with Jardine Matheson, but Hong Kong also 
became home to a large Chinese population that was dismissed as a criminal underclass by 
observers such as Robert Montgomery Martin. Jardine Matheson’s economic and political 
power in Hong Kong ensured that, whilst the character of the Hong Kong Chinese might be 
criticised, the colony was retained. Second, Hong Kong in the 1840s was an environment in 
which the firm could profit from both Chinese immigration to Hong Kong and Chinese 
emigration from Hong Kong to new, global destinations. As seen in the next section, Hong 
Kong acted as a staging point from which Jardine Matheson would become involved in new 
migration systems from the China coast.    
 
Jardine Matheson and the Chinese Passenger Trade from the Treaty Ports 
The Chinese ‘coolie trade’ began life inauspiciously, with a shipment of Chinese labourers 
from Amoy to Reunion aboard a French ship in 1845.63 Large scale emigration from Amoy 
began in earnest in 1847 through the British firms Tait & Co. and Syme, Muir & Co.64 The 
details of these firm’s nefarious activities are known largely due to parliamentary interest 
stimulated by comparisons between Asian indentured labour and the recently abolished 
system of African slavery by political heavyweights like Lord John Russell.65 These firms 
operated in a confusing legal space as, thanks to the extraterritoriality afforded by the Treaty 
of Nanking, they were bound by British, not Chinese, laws. However, they utilised a network 
of Chinese brokers (ketou) who operated outside of Chinese law.66 Though neither firm hid 
their activities from British authorities the records of their migrant shipments are confusing at 
best. Crucially, Jardine Matheson were active in establishing these new, controversial forms 
of Chinese emigration. The firm’s role in shipping migrants to new colonial destinations will 
be explored.  
                                                 
62 Sinn, Pacific Crossings, p. 143. 
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The scale of involvement of Jardine Matheson in the Chinese passenger trade has been 
neglected by historians of Chinese emigration from Amoy.67 The new British firms at Amoy 
have generally been studied in isolation. Whilst Elizabeth Sinn has catalogued Jardine 
Matheson’s involvement in emigration and the export trade from Hong Kong to California, 
knowledge of the firm’s involvement in emigration from Amoy has been more speculative.68 
The only specific references in texts on the contract trade have been Arensmeyer’s accusation 
of ‘ad hoc’ participation through personal relationships and money loaned to Tait & Co., and 
Meagher’s vague reference to the trade evolving ‘in the footsteps of the opium trade’.69 In this 
section the scale of Jardine Matheson’s involvement in the trade is based on a cross 
referencing of ships discussed in colonial office correspondence on Chinese emigration and 
the various reports on the passenger trade, with shipping lists constructed from the Hong 
Kong Register, the China Mail and the Friend of China. These shipping records provide 
limited details on ship cargoes. Ships departing from Amoy were largely recorded as carrying 
‘ballast’ to stabilise the ship having deposited their imports, but both goods and human 
passengers could be used as ballast. Correspondence from the British Consulate at Amoy to 
Hong Kong Governor George Bonham demonstrates the difficulties in tracking the firms’ 
activities: ‘Two other British vessels, the ‘Inchinnan’ and ‘Eleanor Lancaster’ have cleared 
from Amoy in ballast, with the intention of taking coolies on board at Namoa or some place in 
its vicinity.’70 However, in spite of these issues, such records do reveal the extent to which 
Jardine Matheson acted as ‘agents’ or ‘consignees’ for vessels identified as emigrant ships by 
British authorities. Table 5.2 shows such these Chinese passenger ships, as well as the acting 
agents and destinations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Amoy was a natural centre for the new systems established by Western merchants given the existing links 
between merchants in Amoy’s and Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, see Bickers, The Scramble for 
China, p. 64.  
68 Sinn, Pacific Crossings, p. 144. 
69 Arensmeyer, ‘The Chinese Coolie Labour Trade and the Philippines’, p. 193; Meagher, The Introduction of 
Chinese Laborers to Latin America, p. 92. 
70 Consul J. Backhouse (Amoy) to Governor John Bowring (Hong Kong), 24 December 1852, in Parliamentary 
Papers, China. Correspondence with the Superintendent of British trade in China, upon the subject of emigration 
from that country, 1852-53 (1686). 
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Table 5.2. Chinese passenger vessels for which Jardine Matheson acted as agents 
 Vessel  Agents/Consignees From To 
Adelaide Jardine Matheson 
(Syme, Muir & Co. from 30 
July 1850) 
Hong Kong Amoy 
Alfred Jardine Matheson  Hong Kong San Francisco; 
Melbourne 
Ann Jardine Matheson  Hong Kong Amoy 
Arabia Jardine Matheson Amoy Sydney 
Audax Jardine Matheson  Hong Kong East Coast 
Blenheim Jardine Matheson  
(Syme, Muir & Co. from 26 
October 1852) 
Amoy Havana 
Confucius Jardine Matheson  Hong Kong Amoy 
Duke of Argyll Jardine Matheson  Amoy Havana 
Gazelle Jardine Matheson  Amoy Sydney 
Lady Amherst Jardine Matheson  
(Syme, Muir & Co. from 26 
October 1852) 
Amoy Havana 
Lady Hayes Jardine Matheson  Hong Kong Port Philip 
Lady Montagu Jardine Matheson  Amoy Lima 
Lord Warriston Jardine Matheson  Amoy Demerara  
Nimrod Jardine Matheson  
(Tait & Co. from 27 June 
1848) 
(Jardine, Matheson again 
from 31 July 1849) 
Amoy Sydney 
Palmetto Jardine Matheson  Hong Kong San Francisco 
Rosa Elias (Formerly 
the Sarah) 
Jardine Matheson  
Tait & Co. (from 25 
January 1853) 
Amoy Lima 
Statesman Jardine Matheson  
(Tait & Co. 28 October 
1851) 
(Jardine Matheson again 
from 26 July 1853) 
Amoy Sydney 
Source: Hong Kong Register (1844-1853), CO 885/1/20: Correspondence Relative to the Emigration of Chinese 
Coolies (1853) and Hong Kong Harbour Master’s Report (1855).71  
 
 
As seen in Table 5.2, not only did Jardine Matheson transfer agency between themselves and 
firms at Amoy, but they also acted independently as agents for emigrant vessels. It reveals the 
extent of the firm’s involvement in Chinese emigration from Amoy and Hong Kong. Notably, 
three main types of involvement are show here: shipments of passengers for which Jardine 
Matheson acted as agents; shipments of passengers for which agency was transferred to the 
                                                 
71 Ships listed as emigrant vessels in Colonial Office correspondence for which Jardine Matheson acted as 
agents. Agency of Jardine Matheson collated from the shipping lists of the Hong Kong Register between 1844 
and 1853, also from correspondences in Correspondence Relative to the Emigration of Chinese Coolies (1853): 
CO 885/1/20 (National Archives), and the Hong Kong Harbour Master’s Report of 1855. 
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Amoy firms temporarily and then back to Jardine Matheson; and shipments of passengers that 
were arranged by Jardine Matheson before agency was transferred to Amoy firms and not 
transferred back. The variable migrant destinations of these shipments means it would be 
misguided to describe Jardine Matheson as involved systematically in the passenger trade to 
any specific location. Instead, through their broader involvement in shipping and trade on the 
China coast, the firm became entangled, consciously, in emerging migrant routes. In order to 
outline the nature of Jardine Matheson’s involvement in the growing and diverse Chinese 
passenger trade over the 1840s and 1850s three ships – Duke of Argyll, Nimrod and Lady 
Amherst – are examined in detail. These vessels have been chosen for two reasons. First, they 
each reflect different migrant destinations, contractual arrangements and issues that blighted 
the Chinese passenger trade. Second, of the ships listed these vessels are amongst the best 
documented, with various Colonial Office reports, private correspondence and newspaper 
sources available.    
It is again worth highlighting that the records provided by the Register, as in previous 
chapters, indicate the premium put on information by the firm.72 The owner of the newspaper, 
Alexander Matheson, and the editor, John Cairns, made arrangements with the Singapore-
based title the Straits Times to publish European news whilst the mail ships were still in 
Singapore harbour, giving the Register an advantage over Hong Kong rivals the Friend of 
China and China Mail.73 John Cairns offered a free copy of the Register to incoming ship 
captains provided they ‘immediately on their arrival, forward to him the latest papers, and to 
communicate to him the dates of their sailing from their ports of departure and arriving in 
China’ as such information conferred ‘a great benefit on the whole of the civilised world’.74  
Jardine Matheson were a dominant force in China coast shipping in the 1840s. 
Elizabeth Sinn has described the firm, along with other established firms such as Russell & 
Co., as ‘natural choices for ship-owners looking for agents’.75 The firm became particularly 
connected to the new Amoy merchant firm Tait & Co. through its head James Tait. 
Arensmeyer has noted the frequent correspondence between Tait and the Jardine Matheson 
agent at Amoy, Robert McMurdo, who gave extensive evidence on the cause and events of 
the Amoy riots in 1852.76 James Tait also shared information with the head of the firm on the 
China coast, Alexander Matheson, from 1845 onwards. These exchanges can be noted for 
their cordial nature as Tait, in a direct repetition of the language used between William 
                                                 
72 Connell, A Business in Risk, p. 30. 
73 King, A Research Guide to China-Coast Newspapers, p. 53-57.  
74 Canton Register, 1 February 1842. 
75 Sinn, Pacific Crossings, p. 100.  
76 Arensmeyer, ‘The Chinese Coolie Labour Trade and the Philippines’, p. 193; See page 210 for an excerpt of 
McMurdo’s evidence.  
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Jardine and James Matheson, routinely opened letters with ‘My Dear Matheson’.77 
Correspondence between the two also openly discussed the emigration of Chinese labourers. 
Tait assured Matheson of the conduct of one shipment of labourers by suggesting that ‘we 
believe these to be of a better class that those that generally leave for the Straits’ and 
Matheson made reference to ‘having provided insurance on three of the coolie ships to 
Havanna’.78 The firm also acted as insurers on the risk of goods to San Francisco for the other 
emigration firm Syme, Muir & Co., though this business relationship was not nearly as 
close.79 Jardine Matheson routinely acted as agents for Tait & Co.’s early passenger 
shipments and the firm’s support was crucial in the establishment of Tait’s emigration 
business at Amoy. As the examples of the Duke of Argyll, Nimrod and Lady Amherst 
demonstrate, James Tait would have been unable to establish a new Chinese passenger trade 
from Amoy without the support of the firm that still dominated the China coast: Jardine 
Matheson.  
  
The Duke of Argyll 
On 7 November 1846 the Duke of Argyll arrived in Hong Kong.80 The ship was docked in 
Victoria Harbour with no listed agent until Jardine Matheson stepped in on 8 December 
1846.81 A letter from the firm to James Tait in January 1847 revealed why the firm had 
acquired agency of the ship: 
 
In accordance with the letters which have passed between you and our own Mr 
Matheson with reference to the charter of a vessel on your account for the 
Havanna we now beg to enclose a Signed Copy of agreement entered into 
between us & the commander of the ship 'Duke of Argyle' Capt. Bristow, which 
we trust will be found in conformity with your wishes on the subject.82  
 
This encapsulated the role of the shipping agent, acting as a ‘middle-man’ between ship 
owners and ship charterers. In 1846 Tait & Co., a fledgling British firm at Amoy, had neither 
the expertise, connections nor resources to secure a vessel of the necessary specifications for 
                                                 
77 James Tait (Hong Kong) to Alexander Matheson (Macao), 7 Febraury 1845; James Tait (Amoy) to Alexander 
Matheson (Hong Kong), 24 March 1848, in MS JM/B6/6, Jardine Matheson Archive (Cambridge University). If 
we compare this with correspondence with G. F. Davidson, seen in chapter three, the language used reflected 
that this was a much closer relationship.    
78 Tait & Co (Amoy) to Jardine, Matheson & Co. (Hong Kong), 3 June 1852, in MS JM/B6/6, Jardine Matheson 
Archive (Cambridge University); Alexander Matheson (Hong Kong) to Tait & Co. (Amoy), 21 March 1853, in 
MS JM/C36/14, Jardine Matheson Archive (Cambridge University).  
79 Jardine Matheson & Co. (Hong Kong) to Syme, Muir & Co., 1 May 1849; Jardine, Matheson & Co., to Syme, 
Muir & Co., 9 July 1850, in MS JM/C36/8, Jardine Matheson Archive (Cambridge University).   
80 Friend of China, 7 November 1846.  
81 Friend of China, 8 December 1846. 
82 Jardine Matheson, & Co. (Hong Kong) to James Tait. (Amoy), 2 January 1847, in MS/JM/C13/4, Jardine 
Matheson Archive (Cambridge University) 
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carrying large number of Chinese passengers.83 On 13 January 1847 the Duke of Argyll 
proceeded to Amoy from Hong Kong and, after spending time ‘seeking coolies’, was 
despatched to Havana by James Tait with 420 Chinese passengers on 10 March 1847.84  
The impact of the Duke of Argyll as the first of Tait & Co.’s migrant shipments would 
be felt throughout the initial evolution of the passenger trade. Most significantly the Duke of 
Argyll was identified as a legal precedent. In spite of concerns about coercion the British 
Consul at Amoy, T. H. Layton, had been reluctant to prevent the shipment until he had 
clarification on the extent of his legal authority.85 James Tait was also insulated from British 
consular authority as he was the acting consul for Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands at 
Amoy.86 That the Duke of Argyll was allowed to travel from Amoy to Havana meant that both 
Tait & Co. and Syme, Muir & Co. could reference it as evidence of the legality of the trade, or 
more commonly argue that the prevention or regulation of emigration was the responsibility 
of Chinese officials. In particular, if such emigration to a Spanish ‘slave colony’ was deemed 
legal, or was not objectionable to the British consul, then similar migrant voyages to ‘free’ 
British colonies were definitely legal.87 It also set a standard for passenger conditions. ‘The 
allotment of space was nine superficial feet, or about one ton and a-half to each man; whereas 
the English rule is two tons, with ten superficial feet’ the allowance of water – which was of 
‘essential importance’ – was ‘two pints more than the allowance of vessels carrying English 
emigrants’.88 Most significant for future Chinese migrants was news of the poor treatment of 
the Chinese labourers in Cuba, which had been remitted to Amoy by Spanish doctor Jose 
Villate from Havana. This reduced the attractiveness of contract emigration in general and 
contributed to increased coercion of the trade as Chinese recruiters struggled to attract willing 
labourers.89 
                                                 
83 The failure to acquire ships for passage had previously prevented Davidson’s emigration scheme from taking 
place.  
84 Hong Kong Register, 12 January 1847; James Tait (Amoy) to Jardine, Matheson & Co. (Hong Kong), 20 
February 1847, in MS JM/B6/6, Jardine Matheson Archive (Cambridge University); Hong Kong Register, 10 
March 1847. 
85 Consul T. H. Layton (Amoy) to Governor J. G. Bonham (Hong Kong), 17 July 1848, in Parliamentary Papers, 
Emigration (North American and Australian Colonies), 1849 (593). This was the ‘benign neglect’ of the British 
state that allowed British observers to act with autonomy in the treaty ports, see Robert Bickers, 
‘Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community in Shanghai, 1843-1937’, Past 
and Present, Vol. 159, No. 1 (May 1998), p. 175.  
86 Margaret Slocomb, Among Australia’s Pioneers: Chinese Indentured Pastoral Workers on the Northern 
Frontier 1848 to c.1880 (Queensland: Balboa Press, 2014), p. 91. Notably the use of an official position on 
behalf of other European powers as an insurance policy was a method of James Matheson’s from the early 
1820s.  
87 Melbourne Argus, 5 May 1848.  
88 ‘Note by Dr. Winchester’, Governor Bowring to Earl of Malmesbury (25 September 1852, Hong Kong), in 
Parliamentary Papers, China. Correspondence upon the subject of emigration from China, 1854-55 (0.7). 
89 Murakami, ‘Two Bonded Labour Emigration Patterns in mid-nineteenth-century Southern China’, p. 158. 
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Within the passenger trade there were two main groups of migrants: contract and free. 
The term contract refers to indentured labourers who would agree to contracts of a set length 
– examples usually ranged from five to eight years – with emigration brokers who would 
either have a prior arrangement with specific employers or planned to ‘auction’ labourer’s 
contracts at their destination. It is clear how this system could be compared to slavery, 
especially given the visceral image of the ‘auction’ of labourers. It is also worth noting that in 
contemporary discourse, free migrants – usually, in the 1850s, using arrangements similar to 
the credit-ticket system or paying for passage in advance in order to access goldfields in 
Australia or California – would often be conflated with contract labourers under the pejorative 
term ‘coolies’.90 The British Consul at Amoy, T. H. Layton, explained to Hong Kong 
Governor George Bonham that ‘there is a wide distinction between voluntary emigration to 
Singapore and “buying men” for terms of years’.91 In particular the concept of ‘buying men’ 
was a direct reference to the Duke of Argyll’s landing in Havana where contracts were 
auctioned upon arrival.92 The following contract, entered into at Amoy for five years labour in 
British Guiana, demonstrates some of the common terms of these indenture agreements: 
 
I ___ native of the village of ___ in the province of ___ in China, of the age of 
____ years, have agreed to embark in the vessel with the object of proceeding to 
the colony of British Guiana, obliging myself from and after my arrival, to 
dedicate myself there to the orders of the honourable the Immigration Agent of 
that colony, to whatever class of labour I may be destined, whether in plantations 
or other estates, during the customary hours of work in that colony, or even at 
other than plantation labour, as may be most convenient to the honourable 
Immigration Agent, or whoever may become the holder of this engagement, and 
to perform said work for ____ of monthly salary, maintenance of eight ounces of 
beef, one and a half pounds of other alimentary food daily medical assistance and 
medicines, two suits of clothes, one blanket, and one flannel shirt annually … that 
I shall find myself in all provisions and other necessities, fulfilling these 
obligations for five years continuous, which are fixed for the term of this 
engagement, during which it shall not be permitted me to leave the colony, nor 
deny my services to the persons to whom this engagement may be transferred; at 
the end of that period, I shall be at liberty to act as may seem to be best…93 
 
Importantly, from the perspective of those looking to hire contract migrants (in the case of 
British Guiana to replace slave labour), the contract’s vagueness about future employers as 
well as its limiting of migrants to plantation work ensured a fixed labour market, which, by 
                                                 
90 Arensmeyer, ‘The Chinese Coolie Labour Trade and the Philippines’, p. 194; Meagher, The Introduction of 
Chinese Laborers to Latin America, p. 104. 
91 Consul T. H. Layton (Amoy) to Governor J. G. Bonham (Hong Kong), 17 July 1848, in Parliamentary Papers, 
Emigration.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Consul Charles A. Winchester (Amoy) to Governor John Bowring (Hong Kong), 26 August 1852, in 
Parliamentary Papers, China. Correspondence upon the subject of emigration from China, 1854-55 (0.7).   
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suppressing entrepreneurial self-employment, benefitted employers. After entering into such 
an agreement indentured migrants would then undertake passage, arranged by a firm like Tait 
& Co., and the contract would be auctioned at the destination. As an example, the British 
Consul General in Cuba, Jos. J. Crawford detailed a scheme by which Villoldo, Wardrop & 
Co. contracted 8,000 labourers from the Amoy firms and then planned to auction the 
labourers to employers using the following method: ‘8,000 colonists of this contract shall be 
divided into series of eight Chinese each. 800 tickets, numbered from 1 to 800, shall be made 
and put into an urn, from whence they shall be drawn by the proprietors’.94 These types of 
contracts and distribution arrangements were the speciality of the Amoy firms.   
The contract passenger trade was blighted by the coercion of migrants. Both Tait & 
Co. and Syme, Muir & Co. used Chinese brokers who outsourced recruitment to local 
recruiters ignominiously referred to as ‘crimps’. The recruitment network also encouraged 
kidnapping as foreign merchant firms hired ‘great’ brokers who used subordinate brokers to 
recruit workers. If brokers could not fill ship capacities they had to pay the firm’s expenses.95 
The threat of debt to foreign merchants meant that brokers enforced strict quotas on 
subordinate brokers who resorted to kidnap in order to fill them. As well as kidnap, debt 
exploitation was a common method of recruitment. Wages offered on indenture contracts, 
normally around two to four dollars per month or eighty to 120 wen per day, were relatively 
low and unattractive to skilled labourers. ‘First-class’ agricultural labourers in the vicinity of 
Amoy could expect to earn 160 wen per day.96 As a result only the most desperate or indebted 
emigrants took up these contracts. In particular, opium or gambling addicted workers were 
most vulnerable to being press-ganged by aggressive crimps.97 
 British authorities were well aware of accusations of kidnap. In Consul Layton’s 
correspondence with Bonham he made reference to a petition for liberty that had been placed 
in his hands ‘from the father of one of the boys’ due to be shipped aboard the Duke of Argyll. 
As mentioned previously, Layton could not grant the request until he had clarity over his legal 
right to interfere as consul.98 Contract migrants were kept in secure pens prior to embarkation. 
The utility of these enclosures was ostensibly to prevent potential migrants collecting advance 
payments and absconding. In reality, the British firms were aware of some of the more 
questionable recruitment methods of their Chinese brokers and feared those who were held 
                                                 
94 Consul Jos. J. Crawford (Cuba) to Lord Stanley (London), 7 August 1852, in Correspondence Relative to the 
Emigration of Chinese Coolies (1853): CO 885/1/20 (National Archives).  
95 Murakami, ‘Two Bonded Labour Emigration Patterns in mid-nineteenth-century Southern China’, p. 157. 
96 Ibid, p. 157. 
97 Pan, The Encyclopaedia of the Chinese Overseas, p. 61. 
98 Consul T. H. Layton (Amoy) to Governor J. G. Bonham (Hong Kong), 17 July 1848, in Parliamentary Papers, 
Emigration. 
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without their consent breaking free. The conditions within which coerced migrants were held 
led to the passenger trade being contemptuously referred to as the ‘pig trade’ in Amoy and the 
surrounding area.99  
The Qing Empire’s prohibition on emigration technically rendered Tait’s passenger 
shipment illegal, but the firm’s international connections helped to insulate them from British 
authority. As Governor Bowring remarked ‘the principal shipper of coolies is Mr. Tait, a 
British subject, who has all the advantages and influence which his being Spanish, Dutch and 
Portuguese Consul gives him’.100 The firms acted in an ill-defined legal space, where their 
early shipping activities were used to justify their later shipping activities. In correspondence 
between Syme, Muir & Co. and T. H. Layton the firm referenced Layton’s early allowance of 
a shipment of Chinese passengers to justify the legality of their proposed shipments to 
Australian colonies: ‘as we need hardly remind you that within a short period back the Duke 
of Argyle left this for Havana with upwards of 400 on board, that she did so with your 
cognizance, and carried with her your port clearance, stating her cargo and destination’.101 
The British firms operated comfortably within a network of Western mercantile and shipping 
interests but exploited the poorly defined role of British authority in the treaty ports.  
The emigrant destinations most commonly linked to the abuses of the passenger also 
sat outside of the British Empire. Notably, the Duke of Argyll’s destination was Havana. The 
Spanish, and former Spanish, colonies of Cuba and Peru became common emigrant 
destinations in the late 1840s.102 Between 1853 and 1860, 6,000 Chinese workers were 
brought annually to Cuba, not necessarily to replace the slave population but to provide 
additional labour for the expansion of the sugar trade and mill construction.103 The emigration 
agent James T. White, who had been dispatched to the China coast by the West India 
Committee to arrange contract labour for the West Indies, catalogued Chinese emigration 
from Amoy and Namoa to Cuba between 1847 and 1853:    
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Table 5.3. Chinese contract labourers from China to Cuba 
Date Colours Ship’s Name Where from Number Mortality 
1847, Jan.  Spanish Oquendo Amoy 220 12 
1847, Mar. English Duke of 
Argyll 
Amoy 420 38 
1852, Aug.  English British 
Sovereign 
Amoy 313 -- 
1852, Sep. English Panama Amoy 349 -- 
1852, Oct. English Gertrude Amoy 350 -- 
1852, Oct. English Blenheim Amoy 453 -- 
1852, Nov. English Inchinnan Namoa 355 -- 
1852, Dec. English Lady 
Amherst 
Amoy 275 -- 
1852, Dec. English Sir T. 
Gresham 
Namoa 347 -- 
1853, Jan. Spanish Julian 
d’Unzeuta 
Namoa 350 -- 
1853, Jan. English Columbus Amoy 300 -- 
1853, Feb.  Spanish Bella 
Gallega 
Namoa 390 -- 
1853, Feb. Spanish San Andres Namoa 383 -- 
Source: James T. White to S Walcott Esq., Emigration of Contract Labourers to Cuba, from 1847 to date (April 
16 1853), from Fohkien province.104 
 
It is notable that the mortality figures for most of these voyages are unrecorded. This suggests 
poor conditions and, potentially, high levels of passenger fatalities. Peru, despite gaining 
independence from Spain in 1824, was also supplied with labour by Tait & Co. and their 
Spanish business partners.105 Peru’s geographical location favoured a trans-pacific Chinese 
contract labour supply rather than the increasingly precarious – given the fledgling state’s 
geopolitical situation – African labour supplies.106 Layton’s replacement as consul at Amoy, 
Adam Elmslie, reported that by 1852 ‘about 2,025 coolies’ had been hired out to the Peruvian 
Government. As demonstrated by the Duke of Argyll, the direct support of Jardine Matheson 
was essential in allowing the Amoy firms to supply Chinese labourers for these new 
destinations that lay outside the British Empire.  
 
The Nimrod 
The Nimrod was a ship chartered by Tait & Co. under similar circumstances to the Duke of 
Argyll, but for a different colonial destination. Jardine Matheson acted as agents for the 
                                                 
104 James T. White to S Walcott Esq., Emigration of Contract Labourers to Cuba, from 1847 to date (April 16 
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Nimrod from May 1847 into the 1850s. Tait & Co. chartered the ship from June to August 
1848 in order to despatch the passengers to Sydney in July. The cargo of the Nimrod was 120 
Chinese labourers under indenture contracts on account of Captain Thomas Larkins, formerly 
of the EIC maritime service. These contracts were for five years labour in New South Wales 
at a rate of $2.50 per month for the men and $1.50 for the boys.107 Larkins was closely 
connected to Jardine Matheson as a long-time associate of James Matheson. Their 
correspondence date back to Matheson’s time at Yrissari & Co. in 1825, when Larkins was 
working as a ship captain for private merchant firms. Larkins arranged the shipment to New 
South Wales through Jardine Matheson and Tait & Co. from Hong Kong in 1848.108 Here 
Jardine Matheson acted as a connection, not just between charterers and ship owners, but 
between emigrant brokers and employers. It should also be emphasised that the firm’s new 
centre of operations in Hong Kong was essential to connecting them to both Larkins, who had 
lived in Hong Kong, and Tait & Co., who were reliant on Hong Kong as a centre of shipping 
on the China coast.   
Given the age of many of the emigrants and official concerns about the lack of 
consent, the British Consul T. H. Layton saw that the passengers were interviewed by an 
interpreter before the ship’s departure.109 In particular, Layton was concerned that twenty-one 
of the 120 contract labourers aboard the Nimrod were found to be boys below the age of 
thirteen. In a foreshadowing of the Amoy riots of 1852 Hong Kong Governor Bonham, who 
was nominally responsible for overseeing British subjects at Amoy, informed Palmerston that 
the ‘consul considers it probable that these shipments may give rise to a popular outbreak’ in 
a specific reference to the passage of the Nimrod.110 On arrival in Sydney, on 3 October 1848, 
the Chinese labourers were described in the Australian press as young men who ‘appear in 
sound health’ and were suited for work under the supervision of shepherds.111 In contrast to 
Layton’s description of the arrangement between Jardine Matheson and Larkins, not all of the 
Chinese labourers had pre-arranged employment. Articles in Australian newspapers between 
17 October and 24 November 1848, posted by an ‘agent’ named Henry Moore, advertised that 
‘some’ of the Chinese immigrants were ‘still open for engagement’.112 These adverts detailed 
the contracts the labourers had entered into, which were available to be purchased. The 
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contracts covered five years, with provisions for food and clothes, and were estimated to 
provide one labourers hire at a total cost of less than £11 per annum for employers.113    
Much like Davidson’s attempted project in 1837, the arrival of the Nimrod divided 
press opinion in Australia. The reaction of the Goulburn Herald reflected the criticisms. The 
newspaper opined, ‘we much dislike this copper-colored, anti-Christian emigration’.114 Whilst 
the necessity for labour in the colony was recognised – Australian colonies faced many of the 
same problems with labour shortages in 1848 as they had in 1837 – the critics preferred for 
the necessary labour to be  sourced from the ‘virtuous and enlightened’ population of 
‘Christians and born subjects of the British Crown’.115 In settler society it was one thing for 
Asian migrants to do jobs that whites would not, but quite another for them to actively 
compete in the labour market.116 The origins of the exclusionary, racialised, white-working-
class resistance to Chinese immigration that became politically mobile in Australia from the 
mid-1850s onwards can be seen in the criticism of the Chinese labourers who arrived aboard 
the Nimrod in 1848. Angela Woollacott has discussed how newspaper discourse in the 1840s 
advocated government funded migration schemes from Britain as opposed to Asian ‘coolie’ 
labour, which would lead to a multi-ethnic colonial population that was deemed 
undesirable.117 The threat of Asian immigration led to the self-definition of Australia as a 
‘white’ country. Ethnic groups, such as the Irish, who were subject to discrimination in 
Britain were incorporated, by virtue of their skin colour, into a vision of colonial labour that 
excluded non-whites and the Chinese in particular.118          
In spite of settler protests, demand for Chinese migrant labour was been driven by the 
continued Australian employment crisis. The labour shortages that had created demand for 
Davidson’s 1837 scheme had not abated by the late 1840s, in many ways that had been 
exacerbated by continued colonial, pastoral expansion. In contrast to the criticisms made in 
the Goulburn Herald, an 1847 letter from the entrepreneurial Australian settler Adam Bogue 
praised the Chinese and their potential as labourers in New South Wales. Following a visit to 
Amoy, Bogue’s letter was published in both the Sydney Morning Herald and the Canton 
Register: 
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The great poverty of the majority of the inhabitants, their civility and kindness to 
Europeans, their general quiet and inoffensive manners, the tractability of their 
character, and their indomitable industry in agricultural and other pursuits, 
induced me to suppose that it would be of the first advantage to New South Wales 
in her present condition, if she could be supplied with labourers from that 
province.119  
 
Note here how Bogue’s praise invoked many of the common perceptions of the Chinese 
character discussed in the 1830s. Again, notions of Chinese ‘character’ and ‘industry’ made 
China a particularly desirable source of labour. This was exacerbated by the ‘present 
condition’ of New South Wales. The difference between 1847 and 1837 was not the demand 
for labour in New South Wales, but the easy access Adam Bogue had to China and Chinese 
labour in contrast to Davidson.        
 Investors in the Nimrod scheme also responded to press criticism. This response came 
in the form of vociferous praise of the Chinese workers. An advert published 24 November 
1848 was accompanied by a letter from ‘an influential settler and magistrate’ who had 
Chinese labourers in his employ. The mystery settler wrote that the Chinese workers, who had 
been working as shepherds, ‘do the same work as Europeans, with whom they are equally 
intelligent and hardy’.120 Aside from the specifics of the author’s recruits, praise was extended 
to other potential forms of employment: ‘they are careful … honest, and exceedingly cleanly, 
and would doubtless answer well for cooks and in-door servants … by their civility and tact 
they have avoided all quarrelling, and are individually liked by their white fellow servants’.121 
This promotion of Chinese labour is notable for the comparisons and importance placed on 
the ‘European’ and ‘white’ servants, as opposed to comparisons with other Asian ethnic 
groups seen in previous chapters. Evidently this letter was constructed in the context of the 
contemporary clamour for migrants from Britain, which in Australia was grounded in a desire 
for homogeneity.               
 The Nimrod shipment was particularly significant as it became a model for importing 
Chinese labour in Australia in the late 1840s. In May 1849 an advertisement was circulated to 
try and attract employers who interested in recruiting Chinese labourers. The advertisement 
was placed by ‘parties who hired the Chinese immigrants per Nimrod, from Amoy, for a 
further number of those men’.122 The continuing expansion of the pastoral industry in the late 
1840s and the paucity of labour meant that in spite of criticisms Australian newspapers were 
aware of the necessity of Chinese labour to fuel the colony’s economic development. Articles 
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spoke of how the importation of cheap Chinese labour would lead the river banks ‘to be 
diversified by plantations of sugar-cane, cotton, coffee, rice etc.’ and how ‘Chinese labourers 
will be required to colonize the northern and tropical portions of New Holland’.123 By March 
1849 the importation of Chinese labour was referred to as ‘not a mere matter of experiment, 
but a regular and systematic trade’ in the colonial press.124 Before the discovery of gold in 
1851 – from which point Chinese migrants tended to be self-funded, free migrants – schemes 
that involving Chinese contract labour brought an estimated 3,000 migrant workers to 
Australia.125     
Australian demand for labour in the late 1840s also combined with increased supply 
from China. In particular, colonial observers noted that the proximity of Australia to China – 
as compared with destinations like the West Indies – encouraged immigration as migrants 
‘could have frequent communication with their friends in China’.126 Due to J. T. White’s 
investigation into emigration on behalf of the West India Committee, numbers of Chinese 
passengers from Amoy and Namoa between 1848 and 1853 were recorded. Table 5.4 gives 
details of migrant shipping to Sydney in this period: 
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Table 5.4. Chinese contract labourers from China to Sydney 
Date Colours Ship’s Name Where from Number Mortality 
1848, Jul. English Nimrod Amoy 120 0 
1849 English Cadet Amoy 150 -- 
1850, Mar. English Gazelle Amoy 134 3 
1850, Nov. English Duke of 
Roxburgh 
Amoy 272 16 
1851, Aug. English Duke of 
Roxburgh 
Amoy 240 -- 
1851, Sep. English Ganges Amoy 224 13 
1851, Sep. English Arabia Amoy 196 10 
1851, Oct. English General 
Palmer 
Amoy 335 70 
1851, Nov. English Statesman Amoy 180 0 
1851, Dec.  English Amazon Amoy 303 13 
1852, Jan.  English Eleanor 
Lancaster 
Amoy 240 10 
1852, Jan.  English Spartan Amoy 250 10 
1852, Nov. English Eleanor 
Lancaster 
Namoa 260 -- 
1852, Nov. English Royal Saxon Amoy 227 -- 
1853, Jan.  English Spartan Amoy 254 -- 
Source: James T. White to S Walcott Esq., Emigration of Contract Labourers to Sydney, from 1848 to date 
(April 16 1853), from Fohkien province.127 
 
These emigrants were largely contracted for roles in agriculture (including vineyards and 
olive groves), the wool industry and, causing the increase in the 1850s, gold and tin mining.128 
The discovery of gold, first reported in Hong Kong in 1851, changed the nature of emigration 
to Australia as the contract labour catalogued above was replaced by free migrants to the 
goldfields.129 British authorities were less able to catalogue migrant passages during the gold-
rush as they were arranged by a wide array of private Western and Chinese firms. Between 
1855 and 1867 an estimated 62,000 Chinese miners were shipped from Hong Kong to 
Australia.130   
The story of Chinese mass migration to the Australia gold fields in the 1850s is well 
known, but the origins of the Amoy to Sydney passenger route – trail blazed by the Nimrod – 
is less so. The success of the Nimrod shipment, and the subsequent shipments of agricultural 
labourers, stood in contrast to Gordon. Forbes Davidson’s failed experiment in 1837. Here we 
see the importance of Jardine Matheson as a connection between Sydney, Hong Kong and 
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Amoy, and again supporting new systems of Chinese contract labour. The discovery of gold 
in Australia in 1851 fundamentally changed the nature of Chinese migration to Australia. In 
search of a quick fortune on the goldfields, passengers either paid for their own passage or 
moved under a version of the credit-ticket system, one where they had their passage paid and 
repaid the debt to their sponsor.131 Various histories have emphasised the role of Chinese 
migrants on the Australian goldfields in economic and social terms, as well as resistance to 
immigration as a significant force in Australian political discourse in the late nineteenth 
century.132 For example, John Fitzgerald has discussed how Chinese workers formed the 
second largest ethnic group in mid-nineteenth-century Victoria and how the majority of the 
population of Darwin was Chinese until the 1920s, in order to outline the significance of the 
Chinese population.133 The fact that these migrations followed in the tracks of the Nimrod, 
which itself was arranged by Jardine Matheson, reveals an extended lineage. Nobody 
illustrates this sense of continuity in an era of rapid change better than John Dunmore Lang 
who, after first employing Chinese migrants in Sydney in 1827, took the lead in arguing for 
the repeal of New South Wales’ anti-Chinese legislation in 1867.134  
 
The Lady Amherst  
As evidenced by the different funding methods, the different commercial organisations 
involved and the various migrant destinations, the Chinese passenger trade that evolved in the 
treaty ports was not standardised. The case of the Lady Amherst demonstrated the versatility 
of shipping vessels on the China coast. Initially used by Jardine Matheson for shipments to 
Java and Liverpool the vessel was shipping cargo to San Francisco by 1852 and by the end of 
that year it had been chartered by Syme, Muir & Co.135 This transition between different types 
of cargo, including large numbers of human passengers, was also echoed by Jardine 
Matheson’s own ships, such as the General Wood which moved from transporting opium to 
transporting Chinese convicts from Hong Kong to the Straits Settlements.136  
The Lady Amherst departed Amoy for Havana with 275 officially registered emigrants 
on 3 December 1852 (the real figure was estimated to be closer to 350 by consular 
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authorities).137 The Straits Times recounted how the ‘happy demeanour’ of the ‘coolies’ was a 
cover for an attack on the captain and crew of the ship who fired upon the passengers to 
regain control of the vessel before stopping at Singapore to ‘rid the ship of the worst 
characters on board’.138 The editorial reflected the increasing concerns over the Amoy 
contract trade: ‘looking at the character of the persons shipped as coolies, and the means 
resorted to in procuring them, we need not be surprised at the melancholy results which have 
attended this pernicious trade’.139 Here both the perceived criminal character of the Chinese 
emigrants from Amoy and the coercive practices of labour recruiters were combined into a 
single damning assessment of a trade that was becoming increasingly unpopular in both 
Britain and China. 
Upon stopping for supplies at St. Helena, the Lady Amherst was inspected by Naval 
Officer W. Rowlatt who concluded that the uprisings against the crew could be attributed to ‘a 
small portion [of passengers] who seem generally to have been entrapped into going ... the 
remainder belonging to the dangerous classes’.140 Rowlatt also noted that of the twenty-seven 
passengers who had died, ‘three or four had been drowned by jumping overboard’.141 In both 
Singapore and St. Helena the indolent character of the passengers was acknowledged but 
official suspicions were raised over the lack of consent. British observers increasingly echoed 
John Hurst’s comments to emigration agent James White that ‘the coolies must be misled in 
some way or they never would prefer going to a slave country to going to a good English free 
settlement.’142 Whilst Hurst’s observation contained a particular irony – in that the West India 
Committee White represented had been resistant to abolition – his view was representative of 
most colonial commenters in that he saw the destinations of the passenger shipments, 
arranged by British firms, as their most problematic aspect.   
The Lady Amherst’s departure point was a Chinese treaty port and its final destination 
was a Spanish colony, but British colonial, shipping and mercantile involvement demonstrates 
the trans-imperial context of Chinese emigration. The example of the Lady Amherst indicates 
the significance of supply ports in tracking the abuses of the contract trade. The stopping of 
the ship at Singapore and St. Helena allowed for its story to be catalogued. The Spanish port 
of Manila was also particularly important in this regard as it was a regular stopping point on 
trans-Pacific, trans-Atlantic and Australian voyages. Cases of high mortality through 
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overcrowding, such as the Inglewood, which involved more than 200 deaths, were routinely 
discovered at locations such as Manila and Singapore as opposed to their final destinations.143 
Of course these ports offered a cover to illicit shipments as they were pre-existing destinations 
for Chinese migrants, with large and diverse Chinese communities. As a result, legislation, 
such as the Chinese Passengers Act of 1855, was not applied to these ‘short’ voyages as ‘the 
passengers are not ignorant Coolies but mechanics, who have either made the passage before, 
or are acquainted with the circumstances of it from others’.144  
The passenger trade that emerged from Amoy in the 1840s not only relied on the pre-
existing shipping networks of firms like Jardine Matheson but also pre-existing migration 
networks that had been established by the Chinese junk trade centuries before. Official 
records from Singapore showed that of a total of 11,484 Chinese immigrants between June 
1852 and June 1853, 3,456 Chinese migrants arrived from Amoy aboard European-owned 
vessels.145 Over the same period only 330 migrants arrived from Amoy aboard the Chinese 
junks that had been carrying passengers along this familiar route.146 The very system of 
migration that had alerted British colonial observers to the possibility of using Chinese labour 
came to be directly replicated and controlled by private Western firms. Of the twenty-eight 
European vessels involved in this new passenger trade route, nineteen were British.147 In the 
post-Opium War era systems of Chinese migration to Singapore were extremely similar to 
those that had developed over the 1820s, the crucial difference was that the British were no 
longer reliant on Chinese intermediaries to secure a supply of labour from China itself.       
Over the late 1840s and early 1850s the increasing number of deaths and uprisings on 
passenger ships brought the issue to the attention of colonial authorities. Deaths were largely 
caused by cramped conditions and a shortage of provisions. The death of 170 migrants aboard 
the Lady Montagu in 1850 was attributed to an ‘insufficient supply of food and water’.148 
Poor on-board conditions, combined with widespread kidnapping, caused a high frequency of 
ships to be overrun by passengers. An Australian title, the Inquirer, blamed poor provisioning 
for such an incident in 1853: ‘Another vessel has been captured by her coolie passengers, and 
the captain murdered. She was bound for Havannah, with 200 Chinese coolies and a Malay 
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crew. The cause of the riot was a deficiency of water’.149 Given the combination of factors at 
play many voyages were interrupted or abandoned due to passenger uprisings. 
In spite of the growing awareness of duplicitous recruitment practices, uprisings on 
passenger ships were commonly described as ‘piracy’ in official communications and 
newspapers across the empire. The accusation of piracy lay within a broader British concern 
with establishing legal and economic hegemony of the China coast.150 Piracy was discussed 
regularly in correspondence with the Colonial Office and was the subject of early colonial 
ordinances.151 Throughout the 1840s and 1850s the Royal Navy would commit vast resources 
to preventing piracy on the China coast, under the command of celebrated Admirals like 
Thomas Cochrane and Henry Keppel, and the issue was raised repeatedly in parliamentary 
discussions on the China trade.152 For example, the seizure of the Rosa Elias (a ship chartered 
by Tait & Co.) on its voyage to Peru was reported as the torrid tale of ‘piracy and murder of 
an English captain and crew’ who were killed by ‘200 Chinese coolies’.153 The testimony of 
surviving ship crews confirmed suspicions that the cause of these uprisings was the 
dishonesty and criminality of the migrants. The frequency of piracy among Chinese 
passengers was commonly attributed to the emigrants being of the ‘most vicious classes in 
Amoy’ as opposed to the lack of informed consent in recruitment for labour contracts.154 
There were clear parallels between the accusations of criminality in Hong Kong and amongst 
Chinese ship passengers as evidence of innate ethnic duplicity.    
 
Crisis in the Chinese Passenger Trade 
The event that forced the Colonial Office to seriously investigate coercive recruitment 
practices was the Amoy riot of November 1852.155 The flashpoint that led to violence was the 
attempt by Syme, Muir & Co. to free a migrant recruiter, who had been accused of kidnap, 
from jail.156 The riot was the culmination of building local anger at the kidnap that supplied 
the contract trade and the poor pre-departure conditions of the ‘pig pens’. Additionally, news 
of fatalities aboard passenger ships and reports of poor working conditions at emigrant 
destinations had fed back to China itself. Syme, Muir & Co. and Tait & Co. were specifically 
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named by rioters who raised placards explaining that ‘if persons among themselves should 
trade with these hongs their houses would be pulled down, their goods plundered and their 
lives taken’.157 The severity of the riot, which threatened not only the merchants concerned 
but all Western residents in Amoy, led to the republishing of Colonial Office correspondence 
on emigration as a parliamentary paper. The evidence of Robert McMurdo, Jardine 
Matheson’s agent at Amoy, highlighted the implications of coercive emigration for British 
property and trade, as well as the necessity for regulation and imperial oversight of the trade: 
 
Q - What in your opinion would have been the consequences of deferring to fire? 
A - The consequences would have been most serious; general plunder of the 
British hongs, if not murder. I may add I saw a blow aimed at Mr. Thompson, my 
assistant, with an axe … He escaped only by tripping, and got safely into Mr. 
Syme’s hong.  
Q - Do you think it would conduce to the safety of property if Mr. Syme’s sheds 
were discontinued as coolie-sheds? A - Yes; I think it would be beneficial, and 
would conduce to the safety of property.  
Q - Effect of coolie trade upon the general trade of the port? A - It has had a 
depressing tendency since the commencement of this riot.  
Q - Do you think a well-regulated system of emigration would affect the trade 
injuriously? A - Not the least I think.158  
 
Evidence such as this demonstrates how Jardine Matheson were aware of Chinese criticisms 
of the passenger trade that they had been involved in establishing. The riot lasted for days and 
resulted in the death of several local people, and suppression of the riot even required the 
assistance of British marines.159       
The riot marked the decline of the passenger trade from Amoy. It also laid the 
groundwork for British legislation to regulate the trade in 1855. As a result of the riot the 
Governor of Hong Kong, John Bowring, instituted a court of inquiry in December 1852. In 
the short term F. D. Syme was fined $200 (roughly £40) for his role in creating the conditions 
for the riot, even though in his evidence to British officials in Amoy he feigned innocence: ‘Q 
- How do you account for the fact of your house and that of Tait and Co. being mentioned in 
the hostile placard? A - I cannot account for it’.160 As a consequence of the Amoy riot the 
passenger trade became spread more evenly across the treaty ports by the late 1850s.161 The 
‘opening’ of Amoy and Hong Kong to British merchants had led to a new, more overtly 
politically problematic, framework of Chinese emigration.  
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The examples given in this chapter demonstrate Jardine Matheson’s involvement and 
knowledge of the contract trade, but given the high levels of mortality, ‘piracy’ and political 
disruption, the firm was careful to not be publicly connected to the Amoy firms. When the 
firm’s Amoy agent, Robert McMurdo, gave evidence citing the trade as the cause of the 
Amoy riots he omitted any information on Tait’s connection to his firm.162 The abuses and 
criticisms of the trade were also printed in the Hong Kong Register. For example, an 1852 
letter to the editor signed ‘the unfortunate pig’ told the story of an emigrant who escaped 
despotism in China before finding himself in chains in Hong Kong and coming to the 
conclusion that ‘justice then is not to be had in this land without exertion, any more than in 
other lands’.163 The firm’s unwillingness to defend the trade, much like their previous silence 
on the legalisation of opium, may have been partly motivated by the fact that it remained 
more profitable as a trade that operated outside, or at least at the edge, of the law.164 
Jardine Matheson’s involvement in coercive migration was much more than the ‘guilt 
by association’ posited by Arensmeyer.165 As state intervention in the trade intensified after 
the Chinese Passenger Act, the firm tried to claim that as mere shipping agents they bore little 
responsibility for the abuses of the trade. In 1857, in response to enquiries about fatalities 
aboard the Duke of Portland, they explained:   
 
We were mere agents for the ship which we chartered to Lyall, Still and Col., who 
had afterwards everything to do with the shipment of the coolies &., and who are 
therefore much more likely to be in a position to afford you information regarding 
the voyage than we are; indeed we have not heard of or from the vessel since her 
departure, and consequently know nothing whatever of the mortality on board to 
which you allude.166  
 
Despite claims of innocence, the firm was quick to defend the guilty parties. When Syme, 
Muir & Co. were fined £1,000 for breaking the terms of the Chinese Passengers Act on the 
John Calvin in 1856 – a case of ship overloading in which 110 passengers lost their lives – 
Jardine Matheson were joined by other major Hong Kong firms, such as Dent & Co. and 
Gibb, Livingston & Gilman, in successfully petitioning the Governor to reduce the penalty to 
£50.167 However, other firms also took precautions to avoid being implicated in such 
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shipments. Lancelot Dent, head of Dent & Co., turned down the proposed position of 
emigration agent, to be financed by the West India Committee, due to apprehension at the 
abuses of the trade.168 Jardine Matheson’s involvement was not inevitable. As can be seen 
from the cases of the Duke of Argyll, Nimrod and Lady Amherst, senior members of Jardine 
Matheson were entirely complicit in the establishment of the treaty port passenger trade on 
the China coast.  
  By the early 1850s the catalogue of abuses in the Chinese contract trade made state 
regulation of Chinese migration inevitable. In an article on the case of the Lady Amherst in 
December 1852 the Straits Times claimed that it was the ‘eleventh vessel’ to be the scene of 
‘cooly violence’.169 Such a pattern caused concern in the metropole. The high frequency of 
fatalities and passenger uprisings on British ships, combined with the threat to British trade 
posed by the Amoy riots, was well known to the Colonial Office. These issues were 
exacerbated by the perceived poor character of emigrants who were generally young, single, 
unskilled, male labourers. As before, the character of the Chinese was a ubiquitous topic in 
correspondence on emigration from China, though in references to the treaty port passenger 
trade it was overwhelmingly negative.170 The international context also put pressure on 
imperial policy makers. The mutiny on the American ship Robert Browne on its voyage to 
San Francisco was arguably the most widely reported incident and applied international 
pressure on the British state to act, as Syme, Muir & Co. had acted as brokers and agents.171 
The biggest issue facing consular and colonial authorities was the extra-legal space in which 
the trade operated. The Lady Amherst demonstrated this issue as the inspection from Rowlatt 
had held the ship to the standards of the existing British Passengers Act, but as the ship was 
transferring Chinese subjects (emigrating illegally under Chinese law) from an extra-
territorial treaty port to a Spanish colony it is unclear whether this Act for British passengers 
was actually applicable.172 As urged by Governor Bowring, legislation was needed that would 
simultaneously ‘control the cupidity of brokers and captains’ in the contract trade and respond 
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to the overcrowding of credit-ticket passengers headed to goldfields in Australia and 
California.173 
An Act for the Regulation of Chinese Passenger Ships was passed by Parliament in 
1855 to counter the ‘abuses [which] have occurred in conveying Emigrants from Ports in the 
Chinese seas’.174 In order to cover the different departure points and shipping arrangements 
the Act defined a ‘Chinese Passenger Ship’ as ‘every ship carrying from any port in Hong 
Kong, and every British ship carrying from any port in China or within one hundred miles of 
the coast thereof, more than twenty passengers, being natives of Asia’.175 The act stipulated 
that Chinese passenger ships required certificates before embarkation.176 The granting of the 
certificate required an inspection of the ship by an emigration officer to ascertain the ship’s 
sea-worthiness, whether the ship held adequate medical provisions and if the passengers 
understood the terms of their emigration.177 The Passengers Act did not stop accusations of 
abuse and coercion, but it did provide a framework for Parliamentary enquiry into abuses as 
emigration numbers increased throughout the 1850s. The decade saw a vast increase in 
emigrant numbers motivated by the Taiping Rebellion at home and the increased promise of 
mineral riches abroad.178 Ultimately the contract trade from Amoy declined following the 
riots of November 1852. In 1859 Shanghai was affected by similar riots in response to 
kidnapping in order to fill the quotas of emigration brokers.179 In the long-term Hong Kong 
became the centre of Chinese emigration. By the twentieth century the island acted as a 
departure point for ninety per cent of Chinese emigrants.180 This re-centring of the trade, as 
well as the stipulations of the Passengers Act, allowed for more detailed emigration statistics, 
which have supplemented the work of scholars examining Chinese migration from the 1850s 
onwards.  
 
Conclusion 
The mass migrations of the 1850s, which relied on new systems of Chinese emigration from 
Hong Kong and Amoy in the 1840s, can be connected to the pre-Opium War context of 
Anglo-Chinese relations. Hong Kong and Amoy not only acted as new departure points for 
emigrants, but also as new locations for changing interpretations of the Chinese character. 
                                                 
173 Bowring to Duke, 21 April 1854, in Chinese Emigration (1854): CO 129/45 (National Archives); Skeldon, 
Emigration from Hong Kong, p. 18. 
174 Parliamentary Papers, Chinese passenger ships. 
175 Ibid, p. 3. 
176 Ibid, p. 7. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Parliamentary Papers, Chinese, &c., emigrants; Parliamentary Papers, Hong Kong. 
179 Murakami, ‘Two Bonded Labour Emigration Patterns in Mid-nineteenth-century Southern China’, p. 161; 
Irick, Chi’ing Policy towards the Coolie Trade, p. 3. 
180 Carroll, A Concise History of Hong Kong, p. 3. 
 210 
 
Hong Kong in particular acted as new contact zone in which representations of the majority of 
Chinese emigrants as criminal and untrustworthy were again constructed in an environment in 
which colonial authority was contingent on a complicit Chinese merchant elite. Additionally 
the treaty ports and new migrant destinations acted as new contact zones. The vessels on 
which migrants travelled even became locations in which assessments of the Chinese 
character were made in the accounts of passenger uprisings and piracy. Jardine Matheson 
again played a role in discussion of the Chinese character through the Hong Kong Register, 
which supplemented the firm’s economic, social and political dominance in colonial Hong 
Kong.      
On a practical level these systems of emigration drew on previous experiences. The 
credit-ticket arrangements entered into by some migrants heading to the Australian and 
Californian goldfields mirrored those that had been used to reach various locations in 
Southeast Asia, aboard both European vessels and Chinese junks. Migrant journeys from 
southern China to Southeast Asia itself were also increasingly undertaken aboard Western 
vessels. The new shipping networks that emerged in the treaty ports were essential to this. 
Additionally the indenture contracts signed in Amoy were extremely similar to those used to 
supply Indian labour for Mauritius and mirrored the contracts from the Assam experiment in 
terms of duration and conditions, if not pay. Ironically, systems of Chinese migration that 
emerged from a colonial need for free labour in the wake of abolition were criticised for their 
similarities to slavery. Debates about desirable forms of labour and ethnic hierarchy in the 
British Empire persisted, and continued to affect perceptions of Chinese migrants, in the post-
Opium War period.  
That Jardine Matheson positioned themselves as major players in China coast shipping 
over the 1830s enabled them to gain prime position in Hong Kong and key connections with 
the treaty ports. Their ubiquitous presence in China coast shipping meant that their 
involvement in such schemes was inevitable. Most significantly, Hong Kong and the treaty 
ports provided a space in which firms could conduct business beyond the reaches of the Qing, 
something that the firm had lobbied for vigorously over the 1830s. Histories of Chinese 
migration often accept this new context as a given, yet it was decades in the making. These 
emigrations relied on existing systems and networks, but the presence of the British firms Tait 
& Co. and Syme, Muir & Co. in the treaty ports was a new factor. China had, in the words of 
Gutzlaff, been ‘opened’. As seen in the example of Tait & Co., the firm was initially reliant 
on Jardine Matheson for support, especially in terms of shipping. The involvement of Jardine 
Matheson connects the emergence of these new systems of migration in the 1850s to the 
experiments with Chinese labour in the 1830s.  
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Conclusion 
Over the 1830s and 1840s Jardine Matheson provided unparalleled access to the China coast. 
This allowed for the recruitment of Chinese labour for expanding British colonies. The 120 
Chinese migrants who arrived in Sydney aboard the Nimrod in October 1848 were treading a 
new and unfamiliar path. These labourers were followed by around 100,000 more Chinese 
migrants to Australia by 1901.1 In 1879 some of these men – Lowe Kong Meng, Cheok Hong 
Chong and Louis Ah Mouy – linked the Opium Wars and Chinese immigration in a response 
to the anti-Chinese political rhetoric sweeping Australia:  
 
This outflow of our population was never sought by us. Western powers, armed 
with the formidable artillery with which modern science has supplied them, 
battered down the portals of the empire; and, having done so, insisted upon 
keeping them open.2 
 
Chinese migration and perceptions of Chinese labour in the British Empire were connected to 
the broader context of Anglo-Chinese contact and exchange in the 1830s and 1840s. Lowe 
Kong Meng in particular typified this connection. Born in the Straits Settlements, and 
therefore a British subject, Meng arrived in Melbourne in 1853, ahead of the 10,000 Chinese 
fortune seekers who arrived in 1854, and set up a business selling tea and other provisions to 
Chinese gold diggers.3 A wealth of literature exists on these growing Chinese communities in 
the second half of the nineteenth century and their significance in the globalisation of border 
control in the twentieth century.4 Yet it is the start of these migrations, and in particular the 
transitional period from the 1830s to the 1850s, that requires further study. Not only does the 
life story of Lowe Kong Meng bridge this period, but concepts of Chinese character 
constructed in the contact zones of the Straits Settlements and China coast were re-configured 
and re-applied in colonial Victoria. The activities of Jardine Matheson connected these 
contexts.  
 Jardine Matheson’s involvement in establishing new systems of Chinese migration 
demonstrates three main points. First, it has shown how Chinese mass migration from the 
1850s onwards, to locations like Australia and California, would have been impossible 
without the networks cultivated by private merchant firms in the 1830s. The case studies 
examined show how experiments with Chinese labour in the British Empire in 1830s and 
1840s were dependent on the resources and networks of Jardine Matheson for recruitment on 
                                                 
1 Fitzgerald, Big White Lie, p. 13.  
2 L. Kong Meng, Cheok Hong Chong, and Louis Ah Mouy, The Chinese Question in Australia 1878-9 
(Melbourne: F. F. Bailliere, 1879), p. 4. 
3 Lake and Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line, pp. 16-17.  
4 McKeown, Melancholy Order, p. 2. 
 212 
 
the China coast. The economic, diplomatic and spiritul openings of China – in which Jardine 
Matheson were so heavily involved – were intertwined with the physical opening of China to 
emigration, both through the firm’s illicit opium networks the opening of the treaty ports. In 
addition to the new networks established by commercial firms, Anglo-Chinese contact zones 
that developed in this period were crucial to global migration systems in the later period. The 
trade entrepots of Singapore and Hong Kong were dominated by British firms and connected 
to global trade networks. They became particularly important points of onward migration as 
they combined large Chinese populations with the liberal atttitude towards the free movement 
of labour advocated by British colonial authorities.     
Second, the 1830s and 1840s were also vitally important for the ranking of Chinese 
migrants in ethnic hierarchies that were constructed in British colonies. Whilst some migrants 
were able to shape how they were perceived and define their role in colonial society, many 
Chinese labourers had little agency when evaluated by Western observers. There were two 
main drivers of the British obsession with defining who the Chinese were and what they were 
like. Concern over British commercial access to China and concerns over the shortage of 
labour in British colonies. Many of the stereotypes about the Chinese character, which would 
become widespread in the West over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, were formed in 
the 1830s. Both emerging China ‘experts’ and Jardine Matheson’s publishing network were 
essential in confirming common tropes about Chinese migrants that would be reproduced in 
anti-immigration rhetoric from the 1850s onwards. Many of these perceptions were riven with 
contradictions. For example, James Matheson simultaneously criticised Chinese deceitfulness 
and praised Chinese industry, and both of these views were manifest in the anti-immigration 
discourse of the late nineteenth century. It is also misguided, though common in existing 
literature, to see such characterisations as fundamentally positive or negative. Chinese 
immigrants in the British Empire in Asia were viewed as a useful economic and political tool 
of colonial governance.  
Third, within the context of changes in terms of labour and economic relationships in 
the British Empire, China and globally, Jardine Matheson proved remarkably adaptive. The 
firm thrived in both post-EIC monopoly Canton and in the post-Opium War Hong Kong. In 
this era of change the firm was able to maintain access to the China coast and, as a result,  
could respond to changing demand for labour by making use of existing Chinese recruitment 
networks. Simultaneously, Jardine Matheson were agents for change. The activities of the 
firm fundamentally changed how Western firms and governments were able to extract labour 
from China. That Jardine Matheson were at the forefront of opening China to opium, biblical 
literature and ultimately war, is readily acknowledged and discussed in historical literature. 
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That the firm was also engineering change through the extraction of Chinese migrant labour 
to be employed in new destinations has been missing from this narrative.    
 
Chinese Migration in the British Empire, 1833-1853 
The development of Singapore over the 1820s and 1830s and the removal of the EIC 
monopoly in 1833 changed the economic, political and social dynamics of the British Empire 
in Asia. Emerging commercial, personal and information networks filled the void left by the 
absence of the EIC in Anglo-Chinese exchange from 1833 onwards. Discussions of Chinese 
character in the debate around the Charter Act demonstrate why historians of Chinese 
migration into the British Empire must ground their work in the broader context of Anglo-
Chinese relations and British economic and imperial expansion in Asia. At the same time, 
Singapore was identified as an imperial template – with a dynamic combination of British 
colonial leadership working in tandem with a Chinese merchant elite to control the large 
Chinese labour force. Both colonial and imperial debates enabled some, like John Crawfurd 
and James Matheson, to become recognised as experts on China and the Chinese in the 
metropole. Importantly, Singapore did not just act as a template, but continued to be a popular 
destination for Chinese migrant labour. Southeast Asia had attracted Chinese migrants prior to 
the British imperial presence and continued to attract Chinese migrants after decolonization. 
As of the 2010 census, Singapore was home to 2.8 million residents who were Chinese 
nationals or identified as Chinese (seventy-four per cent of the resident population).5 Whilst 
Chinese migration to Singapore in the nineteenth century was not a uniquely ‘British’ 
phenomenon, the systems, arrangements and economic value of Chinese labour in Singapore 
had a significant impact on colonial observers and imperial planners.  
The role of Jardine Matheson in spreading and coordinating ideas about the Chinese as 
an ethnic group in the 1830s was vital. The firm was part of a broader growth of publishing 
on China stimulated by an increasing number of individuals gaining direct experience of 
China and Chinese communities in Southeast Asia. This was matched by metropolitan interest 
in the increasingly tumultuous and lucrative China trade. The broad narrative in the 
publications of Jardine Matheson and connected individuals was that of a fundamental 
division. This division was between an enterprising, industrious, liberty-deserving, southern 
Chinese population and a despotic, insular, tyrannical, northern Manchu state. Not only did 
this division justify the firm’s questionable economic activity on the China coast but it also 
acted as an implicit, and sometimes explicit, advocacy of Chinese emigration. Criticism of the 
                                                 
5 Singapore Department of Statistics, 2010 (http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/latest-data#7), accessed 27 
September 2015.   
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Qing was persistent and intensified over the nineteenth century. The Second Opium War, and 
consequent legalisation of Chinese emigration, again demonstrates the connection between 
freedom of movement and the defiance of Qing authority. The burning of the Summer Palace 
was a further punishment of the non-compliant Qing Empire and the Convention of Peking 
was a continuation of the ‘opening’ of China for which Jardine Matheson and others had so 
vigorously pushed in the 1830s. Notions of Chinese character remained important as Western 
economic incursions into China continued unabated.     
 The 1830s was also a crucial period for establishing new systems of migration. The 
procurement of Chinese labour for Assam demonstrated the specific utility of Jardine 
Matheson’s opium network in terms of facilitating migration. The failure of Chinese 
recruitment under the Assam Company underlined the significance of Jardine Matheson’s 
unique access to labour from China. This was also illustrated by Gordon Forbes Davidson’s 
failure to replicate systems of credit-ticket migration to Singapore in New South Wales. 
Crucially, these were also early attempts to extend the limits of existing migration systems to 
new destinations. In Assam, the experiment had a vast economic, ecological and social 
impact. The success of tea planting in Assam changed the region, trade in the British Empire 
and the commodification of tea globally.6 At the same time, Davidson’s scheme gave an early 
indication that the white settlers of Australia would politically mobilise in resistance to cheap 
Chinese labour. A commonality of these experiments was that both the indigenous Assamese 
and Australian populations were seen as candidates for replacement by industrious Chinese 
workers. The pattern of replacement of indigenous peoples was replicated across the British 
Empire and beyond. In particular, Aboriginal Australian communities were subject to such 
marginalisation repeatedly over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.7 This destruction of 
Aboriginal Australian society was driven by the same notions of economic progress and 
ethnic hierarchy that had created a demand for Chinese labour in the 1830s.  
 Demand for Chinese workers also reveals the far reaching impact of contemporary 
debates over labour and colonization in the British Empire. Chinese migrations were taking 
place in a patchwork of colonial contexts, many of which were afflicted by labour shortages. 
The phasing out of coercive forms of employment – slave labour, convict labour and the 
suspension of Indian indentured labour – left questions about how shortfalls could be covered 
by free, or voluntary, labour. Chapter four demonstrated different ways in which industrious 
Chinese labour could be sourced to fill colonial demands. Governor of Ceylon James 
                                                 
6 Ellis, Coulton and Mauger, Empire of Tea, pp. 202-221. 
7 For more on this process of destruction see Stuart Macintyre, The History Wars (Victoria: Melbourne 
University Press, 2004); Henry Reynolds, This Whispering in our Hearts (St. Leonards, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 
1998); Tom Lawson, The Last Man: a British Genocide in Tasmania (London: B Tauris, 2014). 
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Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie twice approached his fellow Highlander and family friend, 
James Matheson, regarding the possibility of introducing Chinese migrants to Ceylon. In 
contrast a new layer of imperial bureaucracy, the CLEC, was formed in London to attempt to 
address problems with labour, colonization and land distribution across the Empire. The 
establishment of migration systems to Mauritius and the West Indies, managed by the CLEC, 
demonstrated the replication of existing Chinese migration systems by official structures. In 
the wake of the abolition of slavery it was still unclear what free labour – especially free 
labour that was cheap and effective – was or looked like. Different forms of convict and 
indentured labour were used in various locations well into the late nineteenth century. From 
the 1850s onwards roughly 18,000 Chinese labourers migrated to the West Indies.8 Such 
systems were continually compared to slavery which, in the post-abolition era, was an evil 
that came to represent the antithesis of British liberty. More broadly, migration to new 
colonial contexts, such as the West Indies or the United States, saw Chinese migrants 
becoming part of new multi-ethnic societies. In these intensely racialised societies, Chinese 
migrants were compared and critiqued alongside Indian, African and European labourers.    
 British commercial, and military, aggression on the China coast over the 1830s 
culminated in a new context of Anglo-Chinese exchange from 1842. The cession of Hong 
Kong, the opening of the treaty ports, the granting of legal extraterritoriality – these changes 
all had an impact on Chinese migration into the British Empire. Colonial authorities in Hong 
Kong, much like Singapore previously, simultaneously praised Chinese elites and were wary 
and critical of the Chinese majority. Most importantly, Hong Kong acted as a point of onward 
migration to destinations around the globe and a strategic base for Western firms looking to 
extract labour from China. Notably, Jardine Matheson were intimately tied to both colonial 
authority and global shipping networks in nineteenth-century Hong Kong. Chapter five also 
detailed the role Jardine Matheson in assisting the Western ‘coolie’ firms of Tait & Co. and 
Syme, Muir & Co., who established new, coercive contract migration systems from Amoy. 
These ‘new systems of slavery’, alongside mass migration to the goldfields in the 1850s, have 
been discussed as the two main systems in the vast body of literature on Chinese migration in 
the nineteenth century. The passenger trade established by these firms has been treated as a 
new and distinct phenomena, yet their links to Jardine Matheson reflect how new systems 
developed in the 1840s were contingent on changes occurring in the 1830s. Further study of 
the links between the movement of people from Hong Kong and the treaty ports to the British 
Empire, the United States and Spanish colonies is needed.     
                                                 
8 Marjory Harper, ‘Exile into Bondage? Non-White Migrants and Settlers’, in Marjory Harper and Stephen 
Constantine, Migration and Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 152.  
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Legacies of Migration 
Jardine Matheson’s involvement in sourcing Chinese migrant labour has a bearing on several 
areas of historiography. In terms of source material, this study of Chinese migration in the 
British Empire has largely dealt with the colonial lives of powerful individuals and the 
development of a wealthy multi-national corporation. John Crawfurd, James Matheson, 
Gordon Forbes Davidson, James Alexander Stewart-Mackenzie, and others, were bound 
together by their imperial careers in Asia. All were white, British men with power and wealth. 
Notably, many were also moneyed products of post-enlightenment Scotland. They viewed the 
British Empire as both a conduit for civilization and as a space in which to advance their 
careers and seek a personal fortune. A focus on such individuals in histories of empire is 
increasingly unpopular as scholars seek to tell the story of voiceless groups that have been 
omitted from the historical record. A study of these men does not directly tell us the story of 
the Chinese migrant experience. But this does tell us about how migrants were perceived, and 
the ideas that shaped the colonial contexts in which migrants lived. Importantly, these men 
had agency. They were not just reacting to change, but actively changing the British Empire 
in Asia. Crucially, the examination of Chinese migration through these individuals has 
allowed for a subversion of some of the methodological binaries that often exist in studies of 
migration. A focus on a specific time or place can often cut histories of migration off from 
other areas of imperial history or wider historical processes. The focus on Jardine Matheson 
means that Chinese migration between 1833 and 1853 can be placed in the broader context of 
change taking place in the British Empire. The firm has allowed for the examination of 
different movements of people that would otherwise be studied in isolation. Historians who 
dismiss colonial officials, wealthy merchants and powerful organisations as over-examined or 
disconnected from the realities of migration are failing to utilise a rich resource. 
 The centrality of perceptions of Chinese migrants in this thesis also points to the 
importance of information networks and the acquisition and transfer of knowledge. In recent 
decades, the role of information networks in the development of the British Empire has been a 
keen focus of scholarly work.9 Jardine Matheson’s involvement in the dissemination of 
information about China emphasises the different types of organisations that were concerned 
with information exchange. In this respect this private firm echoed the activities of the EIC in 
India. For both commercial organisations the information business was a core activity. 
Crucially, such information networks were utilised by different actors, with different agendas. 
Missionaries, private merchants and colonial officials, whilst often broadly aligned, had 
fundamentally different motivations and aims. However, the central agenda of the firm was to 
                                                 
9 Lester, Imperial Networks; Potter, ‘Webs, Networks and Systems’; Laidlaw, Colonial Connections. 
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discredit the Qing Empire. Praise of the Chinese people and criticism of the Qing’s 
prohibition on emigration were part of a broader rhetorical attack. These information 
networks were also often contingent on personal connections, which operated outside of the 
official or uniform structures of empire or commercial systems. The different ways in which 
merchant firms fitted into non-commercial information networks requires further study.  
Perceptions of Chinese migrants formed in colonial contact zones have significant 
implications for histories of immigration restriction and white, working class anti-Asian 
movements in the late nineteenth century. The narrative of these movements is often 
straightforward. After large amounts of Chinese, as well as Indian and Japanese, immigration 
into settler colonies – namely Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada – and the 
United States from the 1850s onwards, white working class movements emerged that agitated 
for the exclusion of cheap Asian labour.10 This political pressure meant that a legislative 
framework for exclusion was in put in place across these nations, forming the basis of 
modern-day systems of border control.11 These political processes, and associated prejudices, 
have been interpreted as a reaction to Asian immigration. However, they were actually 
informed by perceptions of the Chinese that had been formed much earlier in Asian contact 
zones. Intensely racialised, sensationalist anti-Chinese rhetoric appeared in late nineteenth 
century Australia and Chinese migrants were criticised as strikebreaking criminals. As shown 
in this thesis, notions of the Chinese as a cheap labour force – who were also flawed opium 
addicts, gamblers and thieves – were constructed in colonial Singapore in the 1820s and 
1830s. These traits re-emerged in the late nineteenth century as criticisms of Chinese 
immigrant labour. Anti-immigrant discourse clearly drew on the narratives of a much longer 
tradition of Anglo-Chinese exchange.  
 Additionally, there is broad scope for a comparative analysis of perceptions of Chinese 
migrant labour in new, multi-ethnic contexts. Donna Gabaccia has discussed how Italian 
immigrants in North America were labelled the ‘Chinese of Europe’.12 Notions of Italian and 
Chinese labour sat uneasily between the dichotomy of ‘free white’ and ‘unfree black’ 
labour.13 Further comparison with different ethnic groups that migrated from Europe is 
possible. This thesis has demonstrated how Chinese labour was simultaneously viewed as 
uniquely effective and as part of a broad category of harmful Asian labour. Such perceptions 
                                                 
10 Victoria in 1854 is often cited as the start of such movements in the British Empire: Hollinsworth, Race and 
Racism in Australia, p. 101; Hyslop, ‘The Imperial Working Class Makes Itself White’, pp. 398-421.  
11 McKeown, Melancholy Order, p. 2; Lucy E. Salyer, Laws as Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the 
Shaping of Modern Immigration Law (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).  
12 Donna Gabaccia, ‘The ‘Yellow Peril’ and the ‘Chinese of Europe’: Global Perspectives on Race and Labour, 
1815-1930’, in Jan Lucassen, Migration, migration history, history: old paradigms and new perspectives (Bern: 
Peter Lang, 1999), pp. 177-197.  
13 Ibid, p. 196.  
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were contingent on specific local circumstances and similar distinctions were applied to other 
migrant groups. For example, Irish immigrants often faced discrimination in Britain and the 
United States but, in the exclusionary rhetoric of ‘white’ Australia, were preferred to non-
white immigrants. Migrants from Europe, Asia and elsewhere, were all part of and subject to 
confused notions of ethnic hierarchy as settler colonies developed.  
Most importantly, Chinese migration into the British Empire must be situated in the 
wider context of Anglo-Chinese relations. Chapter two discussed how the Canton Register 
incorporated Chinese emigration into its broader criticism of the Qing Empire. In 1834 the 
Register published an editorial concerned with the surplus population of China. The article 
criticised the Qing Empire ‘which caused them [the Chinese people] to abhor foreigners and 
to crowd under the protection of their native leaders’.14 This criticism fitted with the firm’s 
broad critique of the tyranny of the Chinese Emperor, but also served to advocate the 
legalisation of Chinese emigration. The exportation of labour was advanced as a humanitarian 
solution to the country’s impending Malthusian crisis. Jardine Matheson’s mouthpiece wished 
that ‘excess finds an outlet in emigration, we fondly hope the threatening evil may be averted 
from this empire’.15 The firm’s desire for China to open its borders meant the movement of 
labour and capital out of China as much as it meant the movement of missionaries, Western 
imports and foreign merchants into China. In the pre-Opium War context of the 1830s a 
warning was offered for the cost of Chinese isolationism: ‘if they do not advance with the 
world they will sooner or later fall a sacrifice to their stubbornness’.16 China was to be opened 
in various ways, using various means. 
 In the post-1842 era, when China had been opened, Jardine Matheson helped to 
establish entirely new systems of migration from treaty ports like Amoy. These new systems 
brought the British experience of Chinese migration full circle. As discussed in chapter five, 
records of Chinese immigrants to Singapore in 1852-1853 showed that of 11,484 Chinese 
arrivals 3,456 came from Amoy aboard British-owned vessels.17 The pre-existing systems of 
Chinese migration to Southeast Asia, which the examples in this thesis attempted to replicate 
in new contexts, eventually became directly replicated by British merchant firms themselves. 
Between the 1830s and 1850s experiments with and systems of Chinese migration into the 
British Empire were connected to the growing, private, British commercial networks on the 
China coast. Simultaneously the Chinese as an ethnic group were celebrated as innately 
predisposed to providing cheap colonial labour. The period 1833 to 1853 was crucial in 
                                                 
14 Canton Register, 7 October 1834.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Hong Kong Register, 16 August 1853.  
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shaping the view of China as a source of high quality, low cost labour for colonial shortages. 
Both physically and conceptually, the foundations of Chinese migrations that would change 
the British Empire, and the world, in the second half of the nineteenth century were built in 
this period of upheaval.   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Canton Register Covers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Canton Register,  11 February 1828. 
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Canton Register,  26 August 1834. 
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Canton Register,  20 April 1841. 
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Appendix B: List of Subscribers for G. F. Davidson’s Migration Scheme 
J. E. Manning, Esq.  10 
George Townshend, Esq.   20 
J. Blaxland, Esq. M. C.  10 
G. Blaxland, Esq.  2 
J. Blaxland, junior, Esq.  5 
C. Campbell, Esq.  2 
Thomas Icely, Esq.  4 
J. King, Esq.  4 
A. Park, Esq.  3 
H. O’Brien, Esq.  10 
W. Dumaresq, Esq.  3 
G. B. White, Esq.  2 
E. D. Day, Esq.  2 
G. T. Palmer, Esq.  3 
J. Verge, Esq.  3 
E. W. Hardy, Esq.  4 
A. Seymour, Esq.  4 
G. F. Davidson  5 
Mr. J. H. Lyon  3 
W. Dangar, Esq.  5 
J. Robertson, senior, Esq.  4 
T. W. Ryder, Esq.  5 
H. H. M’Arthur, Esq. 10 
Captain P. P. King  10 
Dr. James Mitchell }  
R. and H. Scott }  25 
A. W. Scott }  
R. C. Lethbridge, Esq.  4 
R. T. Futter, Esq.  6 
T. M’Quoid, Esq.  5 
Alexander McLeay, Esq.   8 
T. L. Campbell, Esq.  2 
A. C. Innes, Esq. 4 
Leslie Duguid, Esq.  10 
J. Larnach, Esq.  4 
Edye Manning, Esq.  10 
W. Braidwood Wilson, 
Esq.  
10 
F. M’Kenzie, Esq.  2 
J. B. Bloomfield, Esq.  4 
Thomas Gore, Esq.  8 
A. B. Spark, Esq.  5 
Thomas Smith, Esq.  2 
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Sydney Herald, 26 June 1837 
 
Of the listed subscribers eighteen were also signees of a public letter to the colonial 
government on the subject of emigration: Opinions of the Colonists as to raising money by 
loan for assisting emigration. To the honourable committee of the legislative council 
appointed to consider the question of Immigration (New South Wales, September 1838). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sir John Jamison, M. C.  5 
J. W. Russell, Esq.  4 
Thomas Wiils, Esq.  5 
Thomas Shadforth, Esq.  4 
Thomas Stubbs, Esq.  1 
A. L. Brown, Esq.  5 
Henry Smyth, Esq.  2 
William Redfern, Esq.  5 
John Coghill, Esq.  10 
C. Boydell, Esq.  12 
W. Hirst, Esq.  5 
W. H. Moore, Esq.  3 
W. Ogilvie, Esq.  10 
Captain S. Wright  10 
John Pike, Esq.  12 
Total  335 
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Appendix C: Chinese employment and business interests in colonial Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong Almanac (1846) and Canton Register (1842).  
 
Industry  Number of Chinese 
Traders 
Bamboo workers  3 
Bakers  4 
Barber  7 
Bird Dealer  1 
Blacksmiths  3 
Bookbinders  4 
Bonnet Maker  1 
Cabinet Maker  11 
Carpenters  19 
Carver  1 
Chandlers  40 
Cigar Maker  1 
Clothiers 4 
Comprador  2 
Copper Smith  1 
Cow Keepers  6 
Curiosity Dealers  2 
Druggists  18 
Dyer  1 
Earthenware and 
Porcelain 
7 
Eating House  5 
European Goods  12 
Firework Seller  1 
Fruiterers  3 
General Dealers  8 
Glaziers  3 
Grasscloth Dealers  2 
Greengrocers  2 
Grocers  4 
House Painter  1 
Iron Mongers  5 
Ivory Workers  2 
Jappaner  1 
Lantern  Maker  1 
Lodging House Keepers  30 
Manchester Goods 
Vendors 
8 
Mast Seller  1 
Mat House Builders  3 
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Mattrass Maker  1 
Money Changers  3 
Old Clothes Dealer  1 
Opium Dealers  5 
Opium Refiners and 
Retainers 
11 
Pawn Brokers  5 
Pewterer  1 
Printer  1 
Poulterer  2 
Rice Dealers  3 
Rice Paper Printers  2 
Rope Maker  1 
Sam-shew Venders  15 
Tea Dealers  1 
Sail Maker  1 
Shoe Makers  10 
Shoe Sellers  4 
Slop Sellers  2 
Silversmiths  13 
Silk Dealers  11 
Sheep Dealers  2 
Sweetmeat Dealers  1 
Tailors  22 
Timber Stainer  1 
Timber Dealers  8 
Tinsel Paper Sellers  1 
Tinsmiths  5 
Toy Seller  1 
Turner  1 
Umbrella Makers  2 
Washermen  16 
Total  381 
A. R. Johnston, Hong Kong Directory/Almanac (Hong Kong, 1846) 
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Business Shops Souls 
Chandlers 67 402 
Butchers 7 56 
Bakers 6 39 
Confectioners  1 10 
Greengrocers 4 31 
Fishmongers 3 17 
Rice dealers 1 9 
Eating houses  3 28 
Apothecaries  6 22 
Carpenters 17 566 
Blacksmiths 7 53 
Silversmiths 2 14 
Boat-builders 6 59 
Masons 1 380 
Bamboo workers 3 43 
Tailors 14 89 
Shoemakers 5 28 
Drapers 4 36 
Barbera 11 66 
Stationers 1 2 
Pawnbrokers 1 8 
School masters 2 10 
Tanners 2 17 
Washermen 6 42 
Shroffs 2 12 
Opium sellers 24 131 
Prostitutes 23 439 
Compradors 8 100 
Bricklayers  500 
Brickmakers  50 
Limeburners  120 
Ropemakers  10 
House painters  30 
Labourers  1366 
Hawkers  600 
In the employ of Europeans  200 
Having no ostensible employment   500 
Boat population  2100 
Total 237 8,181 
Canton Register, 29 March 1842 
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